Carol Ting and Martin Montgomery (2024) ground their perceptive analysis of experimental social science in its optimistic albeit problematic adoption of the experimental methods of the physical sciences. This fervent embrace has been diagnosed as “physics envy” and “epistomopathy” (Toulmin… Read More ›
“Apology for an Average Believer” (2024) casts judgment on those who would judge our ordinary fellow citizens “irrational” for believing “demonstrably false” claims such as that significant irregularities marred the 2020 American presidential election. It criticizes our tendency to be… Read More ›
I am very grateful to Benjamin McCraw for his recent contribution and continuation of our discussion of the “Reidian Transcendental Argument” (RTA) (see McCraw 2026). I think that McCraw is bringing up a new and very important point: one about… Read More ›
3. Productive Intersections Between Systemic Epistemic Alterity and Other Traditions in the Study of Knowledge and Power Placing Systemic Epistemic Alterity in dialogue with major traditions in the study of knowledge and power clarifies a central claim: the production of… Read More ›
Abstract This article advances Systemic Epistemic Alterity as a critical analytical framework rather than a comprehensive empirical model. It does not claim to exhaustively explain all forms of epistemic exclusion, nor to replace existing theories of epistemic injustice, postcolonial critique,… Read More ›
Abstract Jonathan Matheson’s critique (2025) of my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025) hinges on the claim that the vice I describe is not novel, but rather a variation of familiar epistemic vices—namely, intellectual arrogance and hyper-autonomy. In what follows, I will… Read More ›
Abstract In Mizrahi (2025a), I sketch two arguments against the claim that LLMs should be granted the status of epistemic authorities worthy of epistemic respect. Rico Hauswald (2026) objects to the second premise (2, II) of each of these arguments… Read More ›
In commenting on my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025), David Lanius (2025) makes several interesting observations, all of which point to the need for a deeper exploration and clearer definition of this epistemic disposition. The objective of these observations is manifold:… Read More ›
Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 ❧ Hauswald, Rico. 2026. “Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable ‘Bullshit Machines’? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 1–7. ❧ McCraw, Benjamin W. 2026…. Read More ›
Within the values in science debate, it is a popular position to allow for social values and aims to shape scientific research as long as they do not conflict with epistemic values and aims. In her recent paper, Cathrine Holst… Read More ›
The Enlightenment’s universalist wager now faces coordinated assault from positions that ostensibly oppose one another. On the right, nationalism and civilizational particularism treat universality as a naïve fiction or, worse, as a solvent of the loyalties that make political life… Read More ›
