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AI agents are running amok on developer machines and production servers. They can read credentials, modify system files, destroy and exfiltrate data - and there is nothing stopping them. We build OS-level isolation, LLM model auditing, and cryptographic provenance that makes unauthorized operations structurally impossible.
AI agents operate with zero isolation
Unrestricted File Access
AI coding agents can read and write any file on your system. Credentials, SSH keys, environment variables, shell configs -- all accessible with no restrictions.
Consequence: One compromised agent session leaks your entire development environment
Arbitrary Command Execution
Agents execute shell commands with your user permissions. There is no boundary between what the agent wants to do and what it can do.
Consequence: Agents can install packages, modify system configs, or exfiltrate data via network calls
No Audit Trail
When an agent modifies files or runs commands, there is no cryptographic record of what happened. You cannot prove what an agent did -- or did not -- do.
Consequence: Impossible to audit, investigate, or attribute agent actions after the fact
Supply Chain Blindness
Agents pull in dependencies, run build scripts, and execute arbitrary code from the internet. Without provenance verification, you are trusting everything implicitly.
Consequence: Compromised dependencies or MCP servers become invisible attack vectors
Permissions dialogs and prompt-level controls are not security
Approval prompts are social engineering targets.
Users click "allow" reflexively after the third dialog. One wrong click grants full filesystem and network access with no way to revoke it mid-session.
Safety evaluations require real adversarial testing.
Benchmarks miss the attacks that matter. Models need brute-force testing against live attack scenarios to expose actual vulnerabilities.
Allowlists and denylists are fundamentally brittle.
Capability-based security is the answer. Grant only the specific capabilities an agent needs, enforced at the kernel. Everything else is denied by default.
Model-level safety is necessary but not sufficient.
Prompt injection can override instructions. The OS must be the last line of defense.
Kernel-level isolation. Cryptographic provenance. Hardened models.
We secure AI agents at every layer of the stack. OS-level sandboxing that cannot be escaped. Cryptographic signing that proves what happened. And security-hardened models that resist adversarial inputs. Each layer independently verifiable. No single point of failure.
nono -- OS-Level Sandbox
Kernel-level enforcement via Seatbelt (macOS) and Landlock (Linux). Default-deny filesystem and network access. No escape mechanism -- unauthorized operations are structurally impossible.
Sigstore -- Agent Provenance
Cryptographic signing and transparency logs for agent actions. Keyless signing via OIDC identity. Tamper-evident audit trail of what every agent did, verifiable by anyone.
Deepfabric -- Intelligence Generation
Training and evaluation data generated through live simulation of agentic attack scenarios. Harden models against prompt injection, privilege escalation, and exfiltration using real agent behavior.
Sandbox your AI agent in 30 seconds
Default-deny
File system, network, and process access locked down from the start
Kernel-enforced
Uses macOS Seatbelt and Linux Landlock. No userspace escape possible.
Agent-agnostic
Works with Claude Code, Cursor, OpenCode, Aider, or any CLI tool
Zero config
Install via Homebrew, wrap your command, done
Explicit grants
Allow only the paths and domains your agent needs
$ nono run --allow ./src --net-block -- agent start
[nono] Entering kernel sandbox...
[nono] Applying Seatbelt profile (macOS)
[nono] Filesystem: default-deny
[nono] + read/write: ./src
[nono] Network: blocked
[nono] Kernel protections: active
[nono] Dangerous commands: blocked
[nono] Unlink/rmdir syscalls: blocked
[nono] Verifying supply chain provenance...
[nono] Sigstore transparency log: verified
[nono] Agent attestation: signed (OIDC)
[nono] Sandbox locked. No escalation possible.
[nono] Spawning agent process (PID 48291)...
> Agent running in isolated environment.Built by the team that secured the software supply chain
Created Sigstore, the open source signing standard adopted by npm, PyPI, Maven Central, and Kubernetes
Built nono, now trusted by developers worldwide to sandbox AI coding agents
Deep expertise in OS security, kernel sandboxing, cryptographic attestation, and production systems
Advising Fortune 500 companies on AI agent security and compliance strategies
New Threat ModelNew ParadigmWe're Defining It
Come chat with a founder.
