Cascade Institute plan for national service

Image

I live out on the West Coast, not far from Royal Roads University which used to be Royal Roads Military College.

Royal Roads houses the Cascade Institute, a research and policy group that studies “polycrises” and how society can organize to mitigate them. It is headed by Dr. Thomas Homer-Dixon, someone you may have heard of and who is definitely wired into a lot of what is going on.

It escaped my initial notice, but in August 2025 the Institute released a concept paper written by David Last of the Royal Military College with some loose ideas and back-of-the-envelope costing for a scheme of voluntary national service with four components:

1. National Service: one year of paid training and service in uniformed or civilian security services (CAF, RCMP, CBSA, Coast Guard, CSE etc.).

2. National Civil Defence: civilian volunteers with relevant skills or seeking to develop deployable skills Training in first aid, traffic control, communications, inter-organizational cooperation, and other skills; organized in regionally based units, these would be deployed to support any national, provincial, or municipal emergency under existing funding arrangements. Periodic retraining and regional or national training exercises.

3. Community Protection Service: a federally supported program to develop cadres of volunteers in every community available for immediate response. Would likely give local support to the National Civil Defence units and security services in any affected area when they are deployed there.

4. Youth Development Program: Expand the Cadet movement and other youth programs to mobilize young people and give them useful training for emergencies.

An appendix at the back of the paper gives a figure of about $1.1 bn per year to add 10,000 recruits to the National Service component; the National Civil Defence would cost about the same but give you larger numbers.

For an idea of scale, Canada spent approximately 380 billion dollars (current value) on military recruitment and training during the six years of the Second World War, that saw about 1.1 million people serve in uniform from a population of almost 12 million.

Introductory note says that this was sent to the Prime Minister’s Office in April 2025, which is probably where it stayed.

Anyway, go and have a look at it!

 

Click to access Last-et-al.-Strategy-for-National-Service-v1.6.pdf

Campus Total Defence

Image

Alex Usher’s “One Thought to Start Your Day” is very good today… amplifying on how post-secondary education institutions can contribute to the defence of the nation.

Looking forward to his recap of what might be discussed, or maybe even decided, at the March 23 event.

Campus Total Defence
January 26, 2026
Alex Usher


This blog doubles as an invitation to a very cool event in Ottawa on March 23rd. See the end of blog for details.

If there is anything Canada should take from President Trump’s deeply disturbing rants about Greenland over the past couple of weeks, it is that our country is very definitely a target. The fascist government in power in the United States genuinely believes both that might makes right and that the entire hemisphere is rightfully theirs. The threat to national sovereignty is real, and imminent. A full-scale actual invasion is unlikely, because that takes work and Trump is nothing if not extremely lazy. But, as Philippe Lagassé has pointed out, scenarios where American troops start arriving to “help” Canada aren’t very far-fetched and we desperately need to work out how to “defend against help”.

This is obviously a huge question. From this blog’s perspective, the question is: how can universities and colleges help? To date, this blog has focused on research, because that’s where the government’s primary interest seems to have been. But defence doesn’t happen without people. And so today I want to talk about something which is only starting to rise on the government’s consciousness: how do we train to defend the country, and what role do our post-secondary institutions have to play?

Well, first of all, the military is obviously going to have to grow in size. That means a larger Royal Military College for one thing, and – possibly – a greater role for universities across the country to provide education for both enlisted personnel and officers (both in the Regular Forces and in the presumably much-expanded military reserves). A re-introduction of the Canadian Officer Training Corps on Canadian campuses, as mooted by Jack Granatstein in this piece for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, is an obvious choice as well.

This would all be to the good. But when it comes to national security, military preparedness is only part of the equation. The bigger issue, obviously, is whether a country has the ability to mount a whole-of-society defence, or so-called Total Defence, where military defence and civil defence combine seamlessly, as is practiced in many Nordic countries. Total Defence, above all, requires civil defence skills, which run from emergency preparedness, transport and emergency logistics to cyber and AI security, environmental and climate security, and psychological defence/information influence. These aren’t necessarily military skills, but they are extremely useful in any kind of crisis. Having more people in more places that have these kinds of skills makes us a safer country.

Now, of course, Canada isn’t ready for a full-on version of Total Defence (it’s usually accompanied by a system of conscription/national service, and however elbows-up Canada may be these days, I have a feeling that step isn’t imminent). It isn’t even really thinking too ambitiously yet about civil defence and how to organize it (Public Safety Canada did a public consultation on this in 2024, but it was framed in some pretty tentative/small ball terms). However, it seems to me that however we end up organizing it, there is still a crying need for more people with more key skills in more places around the country.

And that’s an opportunity for our colleges and universities to make a real contribution to Canadian sovereignty.

Just after the invasion of Ukraine, a group of universities in Sweden – which is one of those countries that has adopted a “Total Defence” posture (they call it “totalförsvaret” – along with the Swedish Defence University, which is sort of a supercharged version of our Royal Military College) began developed something they call “Campus Total Defence”. I will simply quote from the website of one of the program’s founding institutional sponsors, Örebro University:

Campus Total Defence brings together academia, public authorities, industry, and civil society to create a robust platform for education, research, and innovation. It collectively contributes the knowledge and expertise needed to meet current and future national security challenges.

By offering tailored courses, developing new research, and creating conditions for innovation, universities across the country collaborate in areas that will benefit defence capabilities, such as protective security, crisis management, AI, healthcare, food supply, and robust energy systems. The goal is to create a range of courses that will provide skills enhancement and training for personnel in various branches of the defence sector nationwide.

(As you can see, the language here includes research, but that has been a more recent development. To start off with, this was definitely a skills exercise).

Anyways, even if Canada has not quite got there yet politically, the demand for these kinds of skills is going to up. A few of these areas might end up being the subject of bachelor’s or master’s programs, but my guess would be that a lot of these would – as in Sweden – simply be practical single courses delivering specific skills (this actually seems to me like a great use case for stackable, portable micro-credentials, if you ask me), and the potential for institutions to joint program development and delivery seems pretty high.

This isn’t an initiative for which institutions need to wait for government funding. They can just go ahead and do it. While Sweden’s Campus Total Defence is now being subsidized by the government as a strategic workforce and security investment, it began as a campus-based, bottom-up initiative. Because it was the right thing to do and the country needed it.

Canada can and should do that too.

To that end, we’d like to invite everyone to join us at Carleton University on March 23rd for a day-long roundtable focused on how post-secondary institutions contribute to whole-of-society defence. We are very excited to be partnering with Carleton University for this event. We’ll have folks over from Europe to explain Campus Total Defence, some experts from Canada to talk through how the concept might work, and some excellent moderated group discussions to generate ideas on moving the concept forward. If you’re from a university or a college, already offering courses in areas related to civil defence, or interested in being part of driving this work forward, please join us. Everyone is welcome. Ticket and event info is available here.

As with our National Defence Research Roundtable in December, this is a chance for the higher education sector to show how we can contribute during this time of rupture. We hope to see you there.

 

Nationallen resiliencenn pamphalentents forren yuu, bork bork bork!

Image

The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency is an administrative agency organized under the Ministry of Defence. The agency is responsible for issues concerning civil protection, public safety, emergency management and civil defence. The Agency works with municipalities, rural government, other government organizations and the private sector to help prepare the population and its economy, government and society to prepare and cope with emergencies and crises. This is done through education, support, training exercises, regulation and supervision.

Recently the Agency published a pamphlet in English on how private sector businesses can prepare themselves ahead of time. It makes a good companion to the earlier pamphlet “In Case of Crisis or War” which is about individual and family preparation for events.

Have a look!

https://www.mcf.se/sv/publikationer/preparedness-for-businesses–in-case-of-crisis-or-war/

https://www.mcf.se/sv/publikationer/om-krisen-eller-kriget-kommer-pa-engelska/

Higher education and defence preparedness II

 

 

Things that make you go, “hmmm.”

From the Policy Options website, posted yesterday:

Universities can help solve the Canadian military’s mobilization problem

 

Universities can help solve the Canadian military’s mobilization problem
Force-generation planning exposes bottlenecks in training, administration and infrastructure. Universities could strengthen readiness.

January 21, 2026

Recent CBC reporting that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are examining large-scale mobilization scenarios has drawn understandable attention. The prospect of dramatically expanding Canada’s reserve force in a national emergency appears, at first glance, to reflect a more dangerous international environment. That focus, however, misses the more consequential point.

What the mobilization planning described by CBC actually tests is not political intent or public willingness, but force-generation capacity: whether Canada could convert civilian availability into trained, sustained military capability on a timeline that would still be strategically advantageous. What it exposes is a limitation that receives far less public attention than recruiting campaigns or equipment procurement – the system’s capacity for turning recruits into trained, deployable personnel.

The figures being modelled help explain why this matters. Canada’s primary reserve currently numbers roughly 29,000 members. The CBC report shows that internal planning scenarios explore expansion toward 100,000, alongside a much larger supplementary reserve, under extreme conditions. While not formal policy, these figures are serious planning assumptions designed to reveal where existing systems would saturate under sustained pressure. They are intended to expose constraints before those constraints become operationally decisive.

Civilian enabling systems are key
Mobilization is often framed as a personnel problem. In practice, it is a logistics and systems problem. Force generation depends on moving large cohorts through a sequence of enabling functions – medical screening, security clearance, enrolment administration, basic preparation, training capacity, accommodation, and sustainment – without degrading standards or overwhelming the institutions responsible for delivery. When any one of these functions saturates, the entire force-generation process slows, regardless of recruitment success. This is why mobilization planning cannot be treated as a challenge for the CAF to solve alone.

Universities and force generation
No modern military is designed to scale rapidly without relying on civilian enabling systems. In a surge scenario, many of the binding constraints are not tactical or operational, but enabling: administrative capacity, instructional throughput, housing, and regional co-ordination. If these functions are not reinforced in advance, force generation stalls long before questions of combat capability arise. Canada already possesses a significant component of this enabling capacity, but it resides outside the defence establishment.

Canada’s universities are provincially governed institutions, but, taken together, they form nationally distributed civilian infrastructure that already performs many of the functions large-scale force generation would require. Each year, they manage high-volume intake, deliver standardized instruction, operate residential and food-service systems, maintain secure administrative processes, and co-ordinate complex operations across regions.

The argument here is not that universities should assume military roles. They should not. This is not a proposal to militarize campuses, outsource soldiering, or place universities within the chain of command. Nor is this to suggest that the federal government should intrude on provincial jurisdiction. Rather, the point here is that force generation depends on enabling functions that already exist within provincially governed systems. Universities in particular are uniquely well-positioned because they already concentrate large numbers of people within structured, administratively coherent environments that can be scaled.

Ottawa does have a legitimate role in contracting and aligning this civilian capacity when national defence objectives are at stake. This enabling approach is well-precedented. Ottawa routinely funds provincially delivered systems – including health care, training, and infrastructure – when national priorities require co-ordinated capacity. Force generation is no different.

Critically, this approach can strengthen national readiness while also improving the utilization of existing university infrastructure, particularly during off-peak periods when capacity is available.

A contract-based, seasonal surge arrangement with clear boundaries
Universities would not be required to suspend core academic functions or absorb unfunded workload. Instead, it could be structured as a time-limited, contract-based surge arrangement, delivered largely in seasonal windows such as the summer months, with any incremental staffing and support funded explicitly through federal–provincial agreements.

In that form, Ottawa would be purchasing additional throughput, while universities would secure a revenue-positive use for summer capacity, when fixed costs persist even as demand and revenue soften.

Clear boundaries would be essential. Military training authority must remain exclusively with the CAF. No weapons training would occur on campus. Participation by institutions and individuals would be voluntary, governed through transparent agreements, and subject to civilian oversight. The objective is not to blur civil–military boundaries, but to reinforce the enabling layer on which force generation depends.

Three supporting roles for universities
Here are three areas where universities could play a concrete, bounded role in support of CAF readiness:

Pre-enrolment readiness and administrative throughput
Before formal military training begins, potential reservists must meet fitness thresholds, complete first-aid or emergency response certification, and navigate medical and security clearance documentation. These are enabling functions, not combat training. Universities already deliver fitness programming, first-aid certification, and large-scale intake administration. Supporting these functions through advanced federal-provincial agreements would reduce early attrition and administrative backlog without altering CAF standards, selection authority, or training control.

Defence-adjacent instruction that accelerates force integration
Contemporary operations rely heavily on logistics, supply-chain management, communications, cyber hygiene, language capability, and emergency administration. These are core sustainment and support functions. Universities already teach them at scale through applied programs. Aligning specific modules with CAF requirements would shorten time-to-usefulness for reservists and free military training establishments to focus on warfighting tasks that only they can perform.

Surge and sustainment infrastructure
Rapid force expansion would immediately stress accommodation, classroom space, simulation facilities, and regional co-ordination nodes. Universities already operate distributed residential and instructional infrastructure that functions, in practice, as surge capacity. Time-limited access agreements would allow Canada to draw on this infrastructure during periods of expansion rather than attempting emergency construction or ad hoc leasing under pressure.

If universities are not deliberately integrated, this enabling capacity must be created elsewhere. That would require building new facilities, expanding bases, hiring instructors, and scaling administrative systems during a crisis – a slow, expensive, and operationally risky approach. Contracting capacity that already exists is faster, cheaper, and more reliable.

The mobilization planning reported by CBC should therefore be understood as a signal about force-generation fragility, not force numbers. Canada cannot improvise enabling capacity at scale. It must be organized in advance.

Force generation is not only about how many people are willing to serve. It is about whether the systems that prepare, train, house, and sustain them can keep pace. On that front, Canada already owns part of the solution. The remaining question is whether it chooses to use that capacity deliberately.

You are welcome to republish this Policy Options article online or in print periodicals, under a Creative Commons/No Derivatives licence.

(author)
John Walsh is an associate professor of classics at the University of Guelph. He founded the Serving Scholar Program, a university–military initiative supporting members of the Canadian Armed Forces.

 

Can you imagine?

Right now my mind does not stretch all the way to having university campuses become Primary Reserve training sites.

But I think there is definitely existing capacity and more importantly willingness on the part of universities and colleges (let’s not forget colleges) to conduct preparedness training for the people in the Civil Defence Corps that I’ve been writing about, through their existing Continuing Education departments.

First aid training, communications, logistics, planning and project management, leadership, technology training… these are all things these departments do now, alongside Conversational Spanish and Paint Your Pet in Watercolour. And they would be very happy to accept DND money to do it, with a reduced chance of faculty associations getting upset.

Hmmm….

 

Maple Leaf Rag

Image

From the Globe and Mail today.

Military models Canadian response to hypothetical American invasion

The Canadian Armed Forces have modelled a hypothetical U.S. military invasion of Canada and the country’s potential response, which includes tactics similar to those employed against Russia and later U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, two senior government officials say.
It is believed to be the first time in a century* that the Canadian Armed Forces have created a model of an American assault on this country, a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a partner with the U.S. in continental air defence.
A military model is a conceptual and theoretical framework, not a military plan, which is an actionable and step-by-step directive for executing operations.
The Globe and Mail is not identifying the officials, who were not authorized to discuss the military’s thinking on this matter publicly. The officials, as well as a number of experts, say it is unlikely the Trump administration would order an invasion of Canada.
The Globe reported this week that Canada is considering sending a small contingent of troops to Greenland to join a group of eight European countries that are holding military exercises as a show of solidarity for Denmark, of which the self-ruling island is a territory.
U.S. President Donald Trump has been challenging NATO allies with repeated calls for the U.S. to acquire Greenland and threats to impose tariffs on European countries who oppose the takeover. Those threats escalated after his attack on Venezuela and capture of President Nicolás Maduro earlier this month.
Mr. Trump has also repeatedly mused about Canada becoming the 51st state. On the weekend, NBC reported Mr. Trump has been increasingly complaining to aides in recent weeks about Canada’s vulnerability to U.S. adversaries in the Arctic. Steve Bannon, the former Trump chief strategist who remains close to the President, said Canada is “rapidly changing” and becoming “hostile” to the United States.
The two senior government officials said military planners are modelling a U.S. invasion from the south, expecting American forces to overcome Canada’s strategic positions on land and at sea within a week and possibly as quickly as two days.
Canada does not have the number of military personnel or the sophisticated equipment needed to fend off a conventional American attack, they said. So, the military envisions unconventional warfare in which small groups of irregular military or armed civilians would resort to ambushes, sabotage, drone warfare or hit-and-run tactics.
One of the officials said the model includes tactics used by the Afghan mujahedeen in their hit-and-run attacks on Russian soldiers during the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War. These were the same tactics employed by the Taliban in their 20-year war against the U.S. and allied forces that included Canada. Many of the 158 Canadian soldiers killed in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 were struck by improvised explosive devices or IEDs.
The aim of such tactics would be to impose mass casualties on U.S. occupying forces, the official said.
The modelling provides the keenest insight yet as to the level of threat assessment now being actively discussed by Canada with respect to the Trump administration.
One of the officials noted, however, that relations with the U.S. military remain positive and the two countries are working together on Canada’s participation in a new continental defence system, or “Golden Dome,” to defend against Russian or Chinese missiles.
The military has also run models on missile strikes from Russia or China on Canadian cities and critical infrastructure.
Military planners envision an American attack that would follow clear signs from the U.S. military that the two countries’ partnership in NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defence Command, was ending, and the U.S. was under new orders to take Canada by force.
Conscription has been ruled out for now, but the level of sacrifice that would be asked of Canadians remains a central topic, the officials said. General Jennie Carignan, Chief of the Defence Staff, has already announced her intention to create a 400,000-plus-strong reserve force of volunteers. The officials said they could be armed or asked to provide disruptions if the U.S. becomes an occupying power.
A senior Defence Department official said Canada would have a maximum of three months to prepare for a land and sea invasion. The first indications that invasion orders had been sent would be expected to come from U.S. military warnings that Canada no longer has a shared skies policy with the United States, the source said.
This rupture in the joint defence agreement would likely see France or Britain, nuclear-weapon states, being called on to provide support and defence for Canada against the U.S.
The Globe is not identifying the senior defence official, who was not authorized to discuss Canadian war-modelling scenarios.
Retired major-general David Fraser, who commanded Canadian troops in Afghanistan alongside the United States, said Canada could also use drones and tank-killing weapons like the Ukrainians used against the Russians to blunt their invasion in February, 2022.
Mr. Fraser said it is unthinkable that Canadian planners have had to draw up a U.S. invasion scenario. Whatever Mr. Trump does with Greenland and possibly Mexico would weigh into any Canadian scenario, he said.
But Canada can count on support from European countries, Britain, Japan, South Korea and other democratic nations.
“You know if you come after Canada, you are going to have the world coming after you, even more than Greenland. People do care about what happens to Canada, unlike Venezuela,” Mr. Fraser said. “You could actually see German ships and British planes in Canada to reinforce the country’s sovereignty.”
Mr. Fraser said Canada should immediately place more military assets in the North to claim its right to the region.
If the threat from the U.S. became serious, he said Canadian soldiers would be placed along the border even though there is no realistic possibility that Canada could defeat the U.S. militarily.
Insurgency tactics would be the best way to deal with U.S. invading forces, he said.
“There is a quantum difference between defending another land like Canadians did in Afghanistan versus defending Windsor, Ontario. You do not walk across that border because everybody is your enemy then,” Mr. Fraser added.
Retired lieutenant-general Mike Day, who headed Canadian Special Forces Command and served as chief strategic planner for the future of the Canadian Armed Forces, said it was “fanciful” to think the Americans would actually invade Canada.
But he acknowledged Canada’s armed forces could not stand up to the world’s biggest and most sophisticated military. He said, however, that the U.S. would have great difficulty occupying a country the size of Canada.
“We wouldn’t be able to withstand a conventional invasion. We would, for a limited period of time, be able to defend a very small civilian population, like the size of Kingston,” he said.
“Notwithstanding the size of the American military, however, they do not have the force structure to occupy, let alone control every major urban centre in Canada.”
“Their only hope would be a Russian-like drive to Kyiv and hope that works and the rest of country capitulates once they seize the seat of power in Ottawa,” he added. “Like Ukraine, it would inconceivable to me that we would give up if they seized our capital.”
Gaëlle Rivard Piché, executive director of the Conference of Defence Associations, said she did not see a situation where the U.S. would attack Canada. But she also said it’s crucial for Canada to significantly build up its defence capabilities.
“Clear signalling to our neighbour to the south that we want and we’re willing and able to rapidly be a credible ally that is capable of defending itself, ensuring our own national security, our national defence, will play a deterrence role towards a potential willingness by the United States to control some of Canada or to invade a portion of Canada,” she said.
University of Toronto political scientist Aisha Ahmad said Canada needs to drastically boost its homeland defence capabilities, regardless of the potential U.S. threat to the border.
“The better Canada can embrace this approach to homeland defence, the less likely all of these horrible scenarios that nobody wants will ever come to pass,” she said.
U.S. generals would be aware that Canadians would fight back against an invasion, using whatever tactics would be the most effective, she said.
“I do believe that there are intelligent generals south of our border who could very easily identify that risk environment.” ❞

 * “first time in a century”: This is of course a reference to COL Sutherland-Brown’s “Defence Scheme No. 1” a plan created in the 1920s by while he was working as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence for the Canadian Army. Basically, it was a scheme for a pre-emptive limited incursion into parts of the United States to disrupt an imminent full-scale invasion by the US, in order to win some time for British forces to make their way across the Atlantic to defend the country. 

Anyway, as interesting as drawing up this model might have been, it does point out the obvious: there is no way the United States could militarily occupy or administer this country without crippling its own defence, unless its inhabitants were completely supine. Which they won’t be, I’m fairly sure.

Maple Leaf Raggregator

Canada: Higher education and defence preparedness

Image

Some of you may know, and likely none of you will care, that my day job involves research, writing and some program development or administration in or rather adjacent to the BC public post-secondary system. 

One news source that crosses my path nearly every day is  a blog entry or other item from Higher Education Strategy Associates or HESA, led by one Alex Usher who is the usual go-to guy fo rthe big picture on post-secondary education in Canada. If you are interested in this topic, you should certainly subscribe to his “One Thought To Start Your Day” blog. 

Today he gave an account of a “National Defence Research Roundtable” that was held in Ottawa on December 15, 2025. About 77 representatives of universities across Canada met to discuss the new security situation, the new alignment, priority and above all spending on the part of the federal government concerning national defence, and how post-secondary education could contribute to this urgent issue.

Usher presented the notes and proceedings of the roundtable:

https://higheredstrategy.com/report-back-on-the-national-defence-research-roundtable/

Certainly there was a lot in there about how miserably fragmented and seemingly hopeless the situation is given the pace of current events, but a certain amount of optimism too, if enough people would wake up. Much of the discussion also centred around pure and applied research and technical points, and I zipped through it in search of anything that might related to professional military education or civil defence, since this sort of thing is related to professional wargaming and training. One passage stood out for me as a model we might follow (p. 8):

 

In discussions, participants identified components of international models that were best suited
to the Canadian context, namely Sweden’s Campus Total Defence model and the Australian
Defence Science and Universities Network.


The Swedish model is rooted in an expansive whole-of-society definition of defence that encompasses civil preparedness and emergency response in addition to military capabilities. Participants felt this was an apt culture fit for Canada and would align well with the needed culture shift
in post-secondary towards a whole-of-society readiness framing of defence and security. This
model is also rooted in a coordinated network of 30+ Swedish universities (civilian and military)
oriented around providing upskilling education for the total defence mandate and developing
specialized research hubs reflecting each member university’s areas of strength. This coordination has largely been bottom-up and organized by universities themselves, which resonated with
post-secondary leaders and representatives from funding bodies. Participants felt that the
Canadian post-secondary sector could self-organize and coordinate in similar ways, enabling
them to proactively develop strategies and solutions in response to governmental priorities
rather than awaiting top-down instruction.

Again the Swedes are helping to show us the way, I think. 

I’ve written before about a “Canadian Civil Defence Corps” on the Swedish model, and the amount of training and skills development that could be quickly and hopefully efficiently be done at our universities and colleges has great potential. 

Ditto also, for the professional military education needs of the instructors, analysts, officers and NCOs of an expanded Canadian military (regular and reserve). This is where wargaming and wargame thinking comes in!

I hope something concrete will come of this roundtable. Meanwhile, let’s keep thinking about this. 

Click to access Presentation-on-International-Defence-Research-Funding-Models.pdf

Click to access 2025-01-14_2025-NDRR-Report_web.pdf

Cons: SDHistcon Online, 31 January 2026

Image

https://tabletop.events/conventions/sdhist-online-2026-winter-quarters

COMRADES!

It’s time for the annual online SDHistcon again!

One day only, Saturday 31 January 2026!

The event schedule hasn’t been filled out yet, but there will be lots of demonstrations, presentations, and panel discussions.

I can verify that I have been tapped to have a nice interview/chat with the affable Andrew Bucholtz about my recent work and published games.

It will be at 0900 Pacific time, 1200 on the Right Coast.

https://tabletop.events/conventions/sdhist-online-2026-winter-quarters/schedule/23

But if you are reading this blog regularly you may have heard it before so other events will feature Mark Herman, Volko Ruhnke, John Butterfield, David Thompson (showing a mystery new game, what could it be?), Dan Bullock, and more.

Tickets are $10 and all events are free… pretty cheap buzz if you ask me, and no Con Crud virus to take home.

 

[Edited to add:]

Here is the link to the Youtube of the interview, if you are interested!

Free game: The Chair Is Empty

Image

[Cover image: La Legende des Siecles by Rene Magritte, 1950.]

The Chair is Empty

A card-based game about political tensions and power vacuums, for 3 or more players.

This is a much cleaned-up and streamlined version of Caudillo, a power politics game placed in a thinly disguised post-Chavez Venezuela which I first designed in 2013 (before Chavez was post-Chavez).

It is basically similar in its semi-cooperative and semi-competitive nature, and it plays up the constant tension between these urges. As players vie to create the largest and most durable personal power base (scored periodically throughout the game), the card deck delivers more and more crises that players must deal with collectively (and collect small rewards immediately) or become overloaded. Coups d’etat provide another quick way to score, and the office of El Presidente has its own perks too.

The free PnP version consists of 108 cards, 88 counters, and the usual rules and play aids. Several scenarios are supplied, including a 2-player variant.

The game rules say it is for 3-5 players which seems to be where it scales best, but certainly more than 5 can play simply by adding sets of player markers.

I started work on this during lockdown in 2020; David Turczi was involved in early development and I am very grateful for his help. I kept at it over the post-COVID years and it’s in a state I feel okay to release for free print and play, especially with the uncertain situation in Venezuela now (though this is in no way an attempt at a simulation of the actual situation there; the stupid Spanish language puns will tell you that).

I plan on self-publishing a physical version of this later, since in the course of locating resources for O Canada I found a good card printer in Canada (The Playing Card Factory of Mississauga ON: https://theplayingcardfactory.com/ ). But I would like it to have better art than the janky free clip art I am using now, and no damn generative AI will be involved. So it might take a while.

Meanwhile, here are the files:

Chair rules 10 Dec 25  rules

Chair PAC 5 Nov 25  player aid card

Chair variants 5 Nov 25  scenarios, including a 2-player method where El Presidente is a dummy and a “Gringo” piggybacking variant that is perhaps applicable right now.

Chair group cards 2 Aug 24 Group and Agent cards

Chair crisis cards 2 Aug 24 Crisis and other cards

Chair card lists 30 July 24 Card lists for perusing

Chair ctrs 13 Nov 22  double set of counters

[PS: Thanks to friend of the blog Roger Leroux for the title, replacing the functional but less ambiguous “Strongman-2”]

The view from there

Image

On the last day of each year I like to take a hike in a large park nearby that is centred on a really big hill or really small mountain, depending on which part of it you are climbing.

Today it was sunny, the best weather in days and I took this picture looking north from the top.

I live in a remarkable part of a remarkable country and I’m hopeful that 2026 will see us continuing to do the sorts of things we need to for our long term survival, if not prosperity.

This is too good to lose.

Happy New Year to everyone.

QUICK: files for new version posted

Image[illustration of a section of the new map, from QUICK Junior.]

I have posted new print and play files for a new version of the game: The QUICK Page

This will not be news to some of you, but unfortunately August 2024 was the last serial of the Urban Operations Planner Course held by the US 40th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard. I decided to keep the QUICK game available to everyone on this blog as it has attracted interest by civilians and military members from a variety of countries.

But I’ve made a big change to the approach used for the map, based on some work I was doing on another urban combat system. The map is divided into large hexagons called Areas, scaled at 750 m or more per hex, depending on the general situation shown in the module. Inside each Area is a further subdivision of 1 to 6 Locations, denoted by dashed lines within the hexagon like sections of a pie.
All Locations within an Area are mutually adjacent, but are adjacent to a Location in another Area only if they share a section (not a vertex) of Area boundary. The number of Locations denotes the relative “complexity” of the terrain in the area: that is, how challenging and canalizing the terrain is to fight through and the terrain type remains a modifier for the robustness of construction there.  So an open field or park would have 1 Location and Open Terrain, but a section of an older city with small alleys and stone buildings would have 6 Locations and Closed Terrain and would be very difficult to dominate and fight through. Yet both represent the same amount of physical distance. I don’t think anyone has done exactly this kind of thing with a hex map before. I’d be interested to hear your reactions; so far everyone I have demonstrated this to has been quite positive.

Like the earlier version, the set of files here are for a game that takes place in downtown Manila but it has a new pattern map that covers a larger area. Opposing forces are the US 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Olvanan 17th Group Army, plus North Torbian forces that could be on either side.

I have also made a module with I MEF advancing on Kuala Lumpur but will post it at a later date.

Optimistically, I have also kept the teaching materials and files giving instructions for a simple method of remote play on the page. The refer to the earlier (2024) version of the game but the mechanics are largely the same and can be adapted.

Thanks for your interest.

Design a site like this with WordPress.com
Get started