Recent market action has once again underscored how rapidly volatility can surface across asset classes, as evidenced by pronounced price swings in gold, silver, and cryptocurrency markets. Such episodes routinely revive debate within the quantitative community about structural drivers of intraday instability, with particular attention paid to the growing prominence of S&P 500 zero-days-to-expiration (0DTE) options. The rapid proliferation of these ultra-short-dated contracts has fueled concerns among practitioners, regulators, and exchange operators that concentrated option activity may transmit destabilizing hedging flows into the cash equity market. At the same time, the paper under review challenges this prevailing spillover hypothesis, suggesting that the availability of 0DTE options systematically alters market-makers’ hedging exposures in a way that may dampen, rather than amplify, realized index volatility. So, do 0DTE options truly increase market volatility?

An interesting transaction-level study we take a closer look at today asks who takes the other side of trades when the most pro-cyclical players in markets — primarily asset managers — buy in booms and sell in busts. The paper uses comprehensive transaction data across major European equity and interest-rate cash and derivatives markets to classify counterparties by sector and to measure, at horizons from 15 minutes to one month, which sectors absorb net flows from pro-cyclical investors. Dealer banks emerge as the dominant liquidity providers across asset classes. At intraday and daily horizons, dealer banks absorb the vast majority of the net flow coming from asset managers. Other active liquidity sources, such as principal trading firms and hedge funds, play only minor roles.

The crypto-enthusiast’s mantra—“just add Bitcoin and watch the efficient frontier fly”—runs into a hard empirical wall when you extend the sample, tighten the econometrics, and force the asset to compete on identical risk-adjusted footing with equities. Alistair Milne’s new SSRN paper applies a textbook Markowitz mean–variance framework to a two-asset universe (S&P 500 vs. Bitcoin) and finds that the ex-ante optimal long-term weight on BTC is not merely small; it is outright negative. In other words, a rational, variance-averse allocator who believes expected returns equal historical equity premia plus a fair compensation for BTC’s non-diversifiable volatility should be short, not long, the flagship digital token.

Market concentration has become one of the most discussed structural risks in today’s equity markets. A small group of mega-cap stocks—often the largest five to ten names—now accounts for an unusually large share of major market indices. This has led to widespread concerns that such concentration makes markets more fragile and that elevated index weights at the top may foreshadow weaker future returns. Many investors worry that history is repeating itself and that extreme concentration today implies disappointment tomorrow.

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This article develops a price-based macro–financial model of gold that formally links its medium-horizon return dynamics to cross-asset risk-premium configurations. Although gold has traditionally been conceptualized as a non-yielding inflation hedge or safe-haven asset, contemporary empirical evidence reveals a substantially more intricate structure: gold’s forward returns are systematically conditioned by the joint momentum of (i) gold itself and (ii) long-duration U.S. Treasury total-return indices. The alignment of these two signals appears to encode macroeconomic information—specifically the direction of real interest rates, the stance and expected trajectory of Federal Reserve policy, and the prevailing global risk-appetite regime.