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An American Observer

  • The Middle East Crisis – Jordan

    January 28th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a country in the Southern Levant region of West Asia. It is bordered by Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, Saudi Arabia to the south, and both Israel and the Palestinian West Bank to the west. The Jordan River, which flows into the Dead Sea, runs along the country’s western border within the Jordan Rift Valley. Jordan has a small coastline along the Red Sea in its southwest, separated from Egypt by the Gulf of Aqaba. Amman is the country’s capital and largest city, as well as the most populous city in the Levant.

    The Hashemites, officially known as the royal family of the House of Hashim, have ruled Jordan since 1921. Before that, they also governed the Kingdom of Hejaz (1916–1925), the Kingdom of Syria (1920), and the Kingdom of Iraq (1958–1921). Between the 10th century and World War I, they governed the city of Mecca. During World War I, the Hashemites allied with the United Kingdom. In terms of lineage, the royal family traces back to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the great-grandfather of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.

    Suffice it to say that the history of the Hashemites is long and complicated. In essence, the Hashemites have remained a prominent part of the Middle Eastern landscape because they have been able to see through the fog of Islam and read the handwriting on the wall. When the Ottoman Empire seized Egypt in A.D. 1517, Shariff Barakat recognized a change in sovereignty and sent his son, Abu Numayy II, as a hostage to the Ottoman sultan in Cairo. Abu took the keys to Mecca with him as gifts. Because of this, the sultan confirmed Barakat and Numayy as co-rulers of the Hejaz.     

    Before World War I, Hussein bin Ali of the Hashemite Dhawu-‘Awn clan governed the Hejaz on behalf of the Ottoman sultan. For some time, the Sublime Porte had the practice of appointing the Emir of Mecca from a select group of candidates. In 1908, Hussein bin Ali was named Sharif of Mecca. However, he soon found himself increasingly at odds with the Young Turks in control at Istanbul, while he tried to secure his family’s position as hereditary emirs. Hussein bin Ali’s lineage and destined role as the Sharif of Mecca fueled his ambitions for an independent Arab kingdom and caliphate.

    When his pretensions came to the attention of the Ottoman rulers, they were prompted to invite Hussein to Istanbul as a guest of the Sultan, where officials could keep an eye on him. Hussein took along his four sons: Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zeid. It was not until after the Young Turk Revolution that he was able to return to the Hijaz and officially assume his role as Sharif.

    Among Hussein’s four sons, Abdullah was the most politically driven and became the organizer and key supporter of the Arab revolt. Abdullah received extensive military training in both Hijaz and Istanbul. He served as the deputy for Mecca in the Ottoman Parliament from 1912 to 1914. During this time, Abdullah developed a strong interest in Arab nationalism and connected his father’s desire for autonomous rule in the Hijaz to the broader goal of full Arab independence.

    In 1914, Abdullah met with the British high commissioner, Lord Kitchener, in Cairo to discuss the possibility of British support for an Arab uprising against the Turks. The idea of cooperation was raised, but neither side made a commitment. Soon after Abdullah returned to Mecca, he became his father’s foreign minister, political advisor, and one of the senior commanders of the Arab Revolt.

    Faisal, Hussein’s third son, played an active role in the revolt as a commander of the Arab army, while his father maintained overall command. The idea of an Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire was first conceived by Abdullah. Only after gradual and persistent urging did Abdullah persuade his father, the conservative Sharif of Mecca, to move from the idea of home rule for part of Arabia within the Ottoman Empire to full independence for all Arab provinces.

    Hussein recognized early in 1914 that he needed to break away from the Empire because he saw he couldn’t reach his political goals within the Ottoman system. For the Arab revolt to succeed, gaining support from another major power was essential.

    Hussein saw Arab unity as closely tied to his kingship. He aimed to control the entire Arabian Peninsula, along with Syria and Iraq, under his rule and that of his descendants. After a year of failed negotiations, Sir Henry McMahon informed the British government was willing to recognize Arab independence, but over a much smaller area than Hussein had hoped for.

    The Arab revolt, essentially an Anglo-Hashemite conspiracy, erupted in June 1916. Britain funded the revolt and provided weapons, supplies, direct artillery aid, and expert desert warfare advisors—including the now-famous T. E. Lawrence. Despite their best efforts, the Hashemites overpromised and their overly ambitious plan fell apart. Only a small number of Syrian and Iraqi nationalists joined under the Sharifan banner, while others stayed loyal to the Ottoman sultan.

    Sharif Hussein bin Ali revolted against Ottoman control during the Arab Revolt of 1916. In acknowledgment of the Hashemite contribution to the Allied effort to overthrow the Ottoman Empire, Britain pledged support for Arab independence. However, the McMahon–Hussein correspondence presented ambiguously defined territorial borders, leading to a lengthy and bitter dispute between the two sides.

    Following the First World War, recognizing that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence had become a complicated and violent situation, T. E. Lawrence was asked to draft a final agreement, which he called the Sharifian Solution. This was ultimately presented to diplomats at the Cairo Conference of 1920. Basically, the plan suggested that the three sons of Sharif Hussein become kings of the new countries created by the British across the Middle East.

    It is also true that, after the war, Great Britain had to cut spending, as is common among industrialized countries after major conflicts.  Moreover, factors beyond British control threatened the Sharifian Solution.  France, for example, removed Faisal from Syria in the summer of 1920, and without being invited, Abdullah moved into Transjordan (which had been the southern part of Faisal’s Syria) in November 1920.

    Hussein bin Ali had five sons:

    • Ali, who briefly held the throne of Hejaz before it was taken over by the Saud family in 1925.
    • Abdullah became the emir of Transjordan in 1921 and the king of Jordan in 1946, and his descendants continue to rule the kingdom, which has been known ever since as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
    • Faisal, who briefly declared himself King of the Arab Kingdom of Syria in 1920, became King of Iraq in 1921.
    • Prince Zeid bin Hussein, who moved to Jordan when his brother’s grandson, King Faisal II of Iraq, was overthrown and murdered in a coup in 1958.
    • Hassan died at a young age.

    Hussein bin Ali continued to govern an independent Hejaz, where he declared himself king, from 1916 to 1924, with the covert support of the British Foreign Office. His supporters are sometimes called Sharifians. Hussein bin Ali’s main rival in the Arabian Peninsula, the king of Najd (highlands), Ibn Saud, annexed the Hejaz in 1925 and appointed his son, Faysal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, as governor. The region was later incorporated into present-day Saudi Arabia.

    The British government granted Transjordan independence in 1921, with Abdullah as its ruler. The level of autonomy given to the Arab states by the colonial powers was an ongoing concern at the time; however, in the case of Transjordan, the independence it had was limited, with significant influence and control kept by the British government in London. Domestically, the local ruler was granted substantial power, exercised in an autocratic fashion by the Hashemite family, while remaining under the supervision of the British Resident in Amman and the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem. Abdullah was assassinated in 1951, but his descendants continue to rule Jordan today.

    In Iraq, the Hashemites governed for nearly forty years until Faisal’s grandson, Faisal II, was overthrown and executed during the 1958 Iraqi coup d’état.

    On February 7, 1999, Abdullah II ascended to the throne following the death of his father, Hussein, who had ruled for nearly 50 years. King Abdullah (b. 1962) is the 41st-generation descendant of Muhammad, the Prophet. In 1980, Abdullah became a serving officer in the Jordanian Army and later commanded the Special Forces Regiment. In 1998, Abdullah was promoted to the rank of major general. As king, he is constitutionally empowered with broad executive and legislative powers.

    After assuming the throne, Abdullah began implementing a wide range of liberal economic policies. These changes led to an economic boom for the country that lasted through 2008. He is credited with attracting more foreign investments, strengthening public-private partnerships, and laying the groundwork for Aqaba’s free-trade zone and Jordan’s growing information and communications technology sector. He also established five additional special economic zones. However, in recent years, Jordan’s economy has faced difficulties due to the impact of the Great Recession and spillovers from the Arab Spring.

    In early November 2005, al-Qaeda under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi launched a coordinated series of explosions in three hotel lobbies in Amman, killing 60 people and injuring 115. The bombings, which targeted civilians, sparked widespread outrage among Jordanians. The attack was seen as a rare event in the country, and Jordan’s internal security greatly improved afterward. Al-Zarqawi was killed by the U.S. Air Force on June 7, 2006. He did not receive his promised virgins. Since al-Zarqawi’s attack, no major terrorist incidents have occurred.

    In 2011, during the Obama administration, the so-called Arab Spring erupted, demanding economic and political reforms throughout the Arab world.  Many of these protests tore down regimes, leading some Arab nations into a period of political, economic, and civil instability.  In response to domestic unrest, King Abdullah replaced his prime minister and introduced Constitutional and Statutory reforms governing personal freedom and elections.  His proportional representation initiative re-created the Jordanian Parliament in 2016.  Consequently, Jordan was left largely unscathed from the violence that swept the region — despite an influx of 1.4 million Syrian refugees.

    On April 4, 2021, Jordanian security agents detained 19 individuals, including former Crown Prince Hamzeh bin Al-Hussein, all accused of attempting to destabilize the kingdom. Hamzeh remains under house arrest but still holds the rank of army brigadier.

    The Middle East Crisis affects Jordan in several ways, summarized below:

    • A strain caused by an economic downturn and increased pressure on humanitarian aid for a refugee population that exceeds 1.4 million Syrians.
    • The Israeli-Hamas War and Israeli-Iran War have contributed to strained finances by interrupting Jordan’s tourism industry, increasing social instability, and forcing the government to increase security throughout the nation.
    • Rising costs and unemployment: The conflict between Iran and Israel has driven up fuel prices and disrupted trade routes, increasing the cost of living for Jordanians. Meanwhile, the economy remains sluggish, with high unemployment rates further worsened by the regional turmoil.
    • Jordan’s interception of Iranian missiles in 2025, aimed at Israel, underscored the kingdom’s challenging position of maintaining crucial alliances with the West while dealing with widespread public anger over events in Gaza. Due to state-sponsored media propaganda, many Jordanians now oppose their country’s alliance with Israel, with a significant number holding strong pro-Palestinian sentiments.
    • Jordanian officials have expressed serious concerns that the forced displacement of Palestinian populations could also destabilize the region and threaten Jordan’s national security. The United States adds to these worries by publicizing proposals to move Palestinian-Arabs into Jordan, worsening their refugee issues. 
    • In April 2025, Jordanian authorities detained a militant cell suspected of links to Hamas, highlighting the risk of internal security threats arising from the conflict. 
    • Despite the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, many Jordanians remain cautious about ongoing Syrian instability, insecurity, and drug trafficking along the Syrian border.
  • The Kennedy Trump Center Springboard

    January 25th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    The John F. Kennedy – Donald J. Trump Center for the Performing Arts is funded through a public-private partnership.  The U.S. federal government (e.g., the American taxpayer) provides an annual appropriation of approximately $43-$45 million for maintenance, security, and operations.  Here, allow me to help you better understand what I just wrote: as a means of circumventing welfare payments, the American taxpayer is now funding salaries for floor cleaners, toilet scrubbers, garbage taker-outers, structural handymen, security guards, and ticket collectors.  The funding of high-level salaries for programming staff, technicians, and permanent staff comes from private donations, ticket sales, parking fees, and “other” revenues, such as those produced by the purchase of extraordinarily expensive T-shirts emblazoned with the K-T Center Logo.

    Assuming that not everyone approves of Mr. Trump’s selection of Richard Grenell as an interim director of the K-T Center, let’s now examine what Mr. Trump was thinking.  It’s actually simple enough.  Mr. Grenell was appointed to implement Trump’s Golden Age of American Art and Culture, and to eliminate un-American propaganda and “Woke” culture from K-T Center operations.  Considering the amount of tax-sourced money going into the center, a clear majority of hard-working Americans supported Mr. Trump’s involvement.  There is nothing rational or American about “Woke leftism.”

    Still, I’ve recently noticed that some bloggers are beginning to blame Donald Trump for the un-American attitudes of elitist actors, singers, musicians, and some athletes.  How does this work?  When Renee Fleming decided to boycott her pre-arranged performance at the K-T Center, some writers are arguing, “It’s all Trump’s fault.”  A more convoluted argument you will not find.

    Fleming’s behavior is simply another example of leftist strategy to disrupt American society — very much in line with the Cloward-Piven Strategy of overwhelming society — and one that the American press loves to misreport in print and televised media.

    But let’s evaluate this: regular tickets run between $28-85 (each).  Those will get the “little people” into a seat where binoculars are needed to see the stage.  If someone is wheelchair-bound, there’s a discount (with a $2.85 service charge).  Or if a patron of the arts doesn’t like having to sit next to someone who doesn’t own a Tuxedo, they can sit closer to the orchestra for around $200.00 (per ticket).  Seldom do wives appreciate their husbands taking them to the K-T Center and then leaving them to sit in the car, so if an attendee can’t afford $400.00 plus parking and restroom service fees, America’s elite would just as soon they stayed at home.

    The truth is most people who attend the K-T Center don’t pay for parking anyway; they’re chauffeured there.  Those are the elongated limos allowed to double-park on the street.  You’ve seen them.  The owners of these limos are the same people who don’t mind borrowing from the Treasury on a recurring basis.  Debt?  What debt?

    I do have some questions about what drives this country’s entertainment elites.  They love being seen in public, of course.  This is what exhibitionists do for a living when they can find work.  But while they enjoy getting big paychecks, their main goal seems to be destroying the United States of America and turning it into a sort of Soviet remake.  These bloggers I’m talking about, who claim to be conservative, are actually progressive enablers.  And, by the way, this is exactly how American Neo-Cons tricked Republicans into voting for them in the 1990s and after the turn of the century.  I’m sure my readers will remember the Bush dynasty and all their mandarins.

    In America, opinions are like buttocks: everyone has at least two.  People develop their opinions through a combination of social, psychological, and environmental factors.  These include how we were raised by our families, how media shaped our attitudes, our personal experiences, and the human urge to seek and maintain social consistency.  Essentially, our opinions are shaped by family, education, and culture.  The process is intricate, and one might realize that there is no single American culture.  An observant citizen might recall how regional differences within the United States contributed to the Civil War.  That same citizen might also observe that we Americans are on the brink of a second civil war.

    So, let’s get to it.  There are approximately 335 million people living in the United States.  About five percent of them live here illegally.  They are living here illegally because a sitting president of the United States violated his oath of office by not only refusing to uphold the laws of the United States but also working to circumvent those laws.  The people who politically supported that president aided and abetted him in his criminal endeavor.  We call these people “Democrats,” and the president I’m referring to is Joe Biden.

    The thing to remember about the people who support Joe Biden is that they have no compunction to avoid corruption or sexual aberration.  Hey, whatever it takes, ya know?  Belittling Donald Trump (and anyone who voted for him) is what they do before morning tea.  They do this to display on a more or less regular basis how deeply they oppose traditional Americana.  They favor open borders, institutional collectivism (such as requiring taxpayers to fund programs for illegal aliens), and they support and enable transsexuality, homosexuality, pedophilia, and nearly every form of sexual decadence imaginable.  They vigorously oppose and openly work against anyone who thinks differently.

    Some of the people are highly paid/very wealthy entertainers.  They are not very well educated and lack common sense.  But their wealth allows them to feel entitled to shove their political gruel down our gullets — everything from the benefits of collectivism, wealth redistribution, open borders, the benefits of sexual depravity, and the beauty of Islam.  They aren’t too much into the redistribution of their wealth, you’ll understand — only our wealth.

    One blogger underlined our situation by explaining the reflexive environment.  Found at Farmer’s Letters, an explanation of how George Soros and his money machine made a prisoner of the American Arts and Entertainment sector (and Professional Sports, too).

    A reflexive environment is one in which everyone has to talk about a particular thing.  That thing is going to be very polarizing, and there will be either one or two right ways to talk about it.  Usually, they’re going to be diametrically opposed to one another, and that means it’s a dialectical weapon.

    When George Soros famously shorted the pound sterling in September 1992, it led him to write The Alchemy of Finance.  Soros, you’ll understand, was never interested in truth; he was only interested in financial success.  In it, he developed a theory of reflexivity, positing that market participants’ biases influence market prices, which, in turn, affect fundamentals, thereby creating a feedback loop.

    The idea here is that you generate an idea and make it come true when you cause everyone to talk about it, and believe in it in a particular way.  Thus, the “current thing” exists within a reflexive environment, fueled by social media.

    By the way, social media is how Barack Obama and Joe Biden got elected to the White House.

    Now, let me turn to the professional athletes.  This odd issue began when black NFL players began demonstrating against the Sandbox Wars by “taking a knee” during the National Anthem.  I haven’t watched a football game since.  These big fat dopes couldn’t find their way out of a men’s room without a map, but want to lecture me on socio-political or socio-economic issues.

    Over several years, we somehow migrated from one embarrassment to several others.  I’m speaking now of the predatory deviants who use an athletic placement to push a far-left agenda.  Some of these morons are professional athletes, some are college peabrains — but in both instances, the net effect of their activities is that I no longer support college sports or professional teams.  One last thought: what do these professional and collegiate coaches think about?  Is it a stable American society, or winning games?  Yes — ‘Sall good.

    My bottom line?  I don’t support entertainment venues when they become part of our political dialogue — left or right.  I don’t need someone with an IQ of 40 to tell me how I should vote on any given issue.  Neither do I blame Donald J. Trump for the craziness we see almost every day from the political left.  They didn’t need any help from Trump to enter the spillway.  They did that on their own.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Lebanon

    January 21st, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    In archaeology and history, “sedentary” means living in one place for a long period, rather than, for example, being nomadic.  When we talk about sedentary people, we refer to those who were part of the development of agriculture, which allowed for permanent settlements and, in turn, led to more complex societies, technologies, and social structures.  This meaning contrasts with our modern usage, where sedentary describes someone around age 12 who weighs nearly 300 pounds because they get no exercise other than eating potato chips.

    Scientists tell us that early Lebanon was one of the world’s first settled cultures.  The people living there 14,000 years ago are now called the Natufians — although I’m not sure why, other than it is what archaeologists decided to name them.

    One of the oldest settlements in the world is located in Byblos, Lebanon.  Scientific evidence indicates the presence of settled people dating back approximately 8,800 years before Christ.  Situated in north-central Lebanon, Byblos has been home to Egyptians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Genoese, and Ottoman Turks.  Lebanon was also part of ancient Canaan, where the Phoenicians originated.  We read about the Canaanites in the Old Testament of the Bible.

    In the 9th century B.C., Phoenician colonies like Carthage in Tunisia and Cádiz flourished in the Mediterranean.  Later, the Assyrians took control of these cultures and influenced them.  The Babylonian Empire captured present-day Lebanon in the 6th century B.C., which was later incorporated into the Achaemenid Empire by Cyrus the Great, and then became part of Alexander the Great’s empire in 332 B.C.

    The region now known as Lebanon, like the rest of Syria and much of the Turkish Peninsula (Anatolia), became a major early center of Christianity within the Roman Empire.  During the late 4th and early 5th centuries, a hermit named Maron established a monastic tradition focused on monotheism and asceticism in the Mount Lebanon area.

    Those who followed Maron spread his teachings among the people living in that area, and these Christians became known as Maronites.  To avoid Roman persecution, they migrated to and settled in the mountainous regions.  During the frequent Byzantine Roman–Persian Wars (which lasted many years), the Sasanian (Middle Persian) Empire occupied present-day Lebanon until around A.D. 629.

    During the 7th century, Muslims took control of Syria from the Byzantines, including it and Lebanon into the Islamic Caliphate.

    People living in the mountainous areas, however, managed to preserve their Christian identity for years despite the regional dominance of Islam.  The relative remoteness of the Lebanese mountains made them a refuge during times of political and religious crises, serving Christians, Muslims, and various other groups and sects.

    • After Roman Anatolia fell to the Muslim Turks, the Byzantines asked the Pope in Rome for help in the 11th century.  In response, Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade in 1095 to aid the Byzantines against the Seljuk Turks and to take back the Holy Land, including Jerusalem.
    • Several reasons motivated Pope Urban to respond to the Byzantine appeal for help.  After the Turks captured Jerusalem in 1076, Muslim forces regularly terrorized Christian pilgrims by kidnapping, raping, selling Christians into slavery, and killing them outright.  This conduct angered and outraged the Christian world; the Byzantines wanted the Pope to organize protection for pilgrims and to retake Jerusalem from the Islamic forces.
    • During the Byzantine request, Pope Urban II was engaged in a power struggle with the Holy Roman Emperor, who had launched a campaign against the Pope.  By rallying European knights against a common enemy, Urban aimed to boost the papacy’s prestige and strengthen his authority across Western Europe.
    • The timing of the Byzantine request also let Pope Urban address and resolve another issue.  During that time, soldiers who weren’t fully employed often became outlaw knights — mercenaries, so to speak.  By sending these men to the Middle East, the Pope solved the problem and protected European communities from noble villains.
    • Finally, but perhaps not least, a major schism had divided the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches since A.D. 1054.  By leading a campaign to assist the Byzantines, Pope Urban hoped to bridge this gap and place the Eastern church under his authority.

    As a result, the Byzantine’s request led to a series of military campaigns conducted by nobles from France, the Holy Roman Empire (German principalities), England, the Italian states, Hungary, Spain, Scotland, and the Low Countries, including Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

    The expeditions are known as the Holy Crusades and lasted from 1095 to 1291.  Their goal was to reclaim former Byzantine Christian territories in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Syria and Roman Palestine (also called the Levant).  The First Crusade succeeded in establishing the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the County of Tripoli as Roman Catholic states along the coast.  These crusader states left a lasting impact on the region.  However, from a practical point of view, the crusaders never gained permanent control over an area with well over a million enemy troops, who faced no logistical issues.

    One of the lasting effects of the Crusades was the contact between the French and the Maronites.  Unlike most other Christian groups in the Eastern Mediterranean, which pledged allegiance to Constantinople or other local patriarchs, the Maronites declared loyalty to the Pope in Rome.  As a result, the French saw them as Roman Catholic allies.  These early interactions led to centuries of support for the Maronites from both France and Italy — even after the fall of the Crusader states in the Levant.

    In 1516, Lebanon became part of the Ottoman Empire, with governance administered indirectly through local emirs, and remained so until after the First World War.

    During that conflict (1914-1918), Lebanon suffered severe devastation when the Turkish army took direct control, disrupting supplies and confiscating crops and animals, which ultimately caused a major famine.  The death toll was estimated at around 100,000 due to starvation.

    During World War I, British and French diplomats secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which designated Lebanon as a French-controlled region after the war, following the Ottoman Empire’s collapse, allowing France to influence Lebanon’s government.  Soon after the war ended, Eastern Orthodox Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek, representing Maronite Christians, successfully pushed for an expanded Lebanese territory at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, including areas with large Muslim and Druze populations.

    Since then, considering both the 20th and 21st centuries, Lebanon has been a disaster for anyone living there, as shown below.  Sources of information do not provide a definitive number of people who have died in Lebanon due to human conflict, but a brief overview of the period from 1901 to 2024 should give us some understanding of the conditions in this once-modern and cultured region of the world.

    • 1958 Lebanon crisis: This was a U.S. military intervention aimed at supporting President Camille Chamoun’s government; it caused around 4,000 deaths.
    • Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990): Official estimates range from 120,000 to 200,000 fatalities, with tens of thousands more wounded and a massive exodus of up to one million people.  All conflicts create large numbers of refugees, and these in turn cause significant problems for other countries (and their taxpayers).
    • 2006 Lebanon War: A 34-day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, this conflict resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,100 to 1,200 Lebanese people, the vast majority of whom were civilians.
    • The Syrian Civil War (2011–2024) resulted in nearly 1,000 deaths between 2012 and 2015.  Refugees from Syria worsened the situation.  In 2024, renewed fighting between Hezbollah and the Israeli military along the border caused even more casualties.
    • Note 1: Sources provide a range of casualty figures for each conflict.  The final death toll for the Lebanese Civil War, in particular, is an estimate, and specific civilian versus combatant numbers are widely debated for many conflicts.
    • Note 2: The long period from 1900 to 2024 also included many smaller conflicts, skirmishes, and other politically motivated violence.  The casualties in these smaller yet ongoing fights probably were never officially recorded.

    At present, Lebanon is suffering the worst economic crisis in decades, bringing about a cascade of political, economic, security, and humanitarian consequences, made worse by conflict spillover from neighboring countries.  Conflict along Lebanon’s southern border has been one of the most immediate and severe impacts of the regional crisis, involving:

    • Persistent hostilities: After a ceasefire in November 2024, intermittent clashes between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah have persisted, with both sides exchanging attacks near the border.
    • Civilian casualties and allegations of war crimes: The violence has caused thousands of deaths, including many children and women.  International organizations have accused Israel of potential war crimes for strikes on civilians and infrastructure, which continued into October 2025 despite the ceasefire — but the issue is that terrorists intentionally hide among civilian populations.  Human rights groups appear to overlook this reality.
    • Significant destruction: Intense fighting, including a two-month ground invasion by Israel in late 2024, caused an estimated $14 billion in damages and economic losses.  Widespread destruction of homes and agricultural assets was reported in southern Lebanon.
    • A Gaza ceasefire in October 2025 shifted international focus to the Israel-Lebanon front, raising concerns about possible escalation if disarmament talks with Hezbollah break down.

    Humanitarian sources report that the Middle East crisis has displaced over 1.2 million people within Lebanon, mostly from the south.

    • As of January 2025, 112,076 people were still displaced within Lebanon, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Syrian refugees also fled to Syria.
    • Widespread displacement has placed heavy pressure on host communities and overwhelmed the country’s already fragile public services, including the healthcare system.  Critical infrastructure—including water systems, health centers, and schools—has been damaged or destroyed.
    • Approximately one in five people in Lebanon, including residents and refugees, faced severe food insecurity in 2025.  Rising inflation has driven up food prices, and cuts in humanitarian aid have worsened the situation.
    • Lebanon remains a top host country for refugees, particularly from Syria.  Both Syrian and Palestinian refugees face higher rates of poverty and food insecurity than Lebanese nationals.  Many displaced Syrians face double displacement after being forced to flee conflict in Lebanon.

    The regional situation of the Middle East Crisis complicates Lebanon’s domestic politics and slows its progress toward reform.

    • Iran-backed Hezbollah militia(s) remain Lebanon’s most potent military force, operating largely outside of any government control.  Its paramilitary actions, undertaken in solidarity with Palestinian militants, have triggered the conflicts that destabilized the country.
    • Regional tensions deepen existing sectarian and political divides in Lebanon.  A U.S.-backed plan to disarm Hezbollah has caused divisions within the new Lebanese cabinet, with some Shia officials opposing it (which should be no surprise).
    • Lebanon remains a battleground for competing regional and international interests, with Iran backing Hezbollah and Western nations focused on preserving economic stability and shaping political outcomes.

    The regional crisis increases pressure on the Lebanese economy, which was already in a prolonged collapse — 

    • The World Bank estimated $14 billion in damage and economic losses by March 2025 from the military conflict, with reconstruction needs projected at $11 billion.  The government has stated it cannot afford reconstruction costs.
    • While there were tentative signs of economic recovery in 2025, including projected GDP growth, experts have warned that Lebanon’s overall financial health remains fragile and vulnerable to security threats.
    • Regional instability has disrupted Lebanese supply chains, deterred international tourism, and raised fuel and import costs.

    The Middle East Crisis imposes a heavy psychological and social toll on the Lebanese population —

    • Fear of war is widespread, especially in southern towns.  The loss of essential services and ongoing displacement cause significant psychological distress for families and children.
    • War damage to hundreds of schools has worsened existing educational challenges, leaving many children without consistent learning opportunities.
    • Hazardous explosives, leftover weaponry from conflicts such as unexploded ordnance, landmines, and booby traps, continue to present a persistent danger to civilians, especially in Lebanon’s southern and eastern regions.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Iraq

    January 14th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    Historic Overview

    Iraq is a country in West Asia, bordered by Saudi Arabia to the south, Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, and the Persian Gulf and Kuwait to the southeast.  The population of Iraq is over 46 million, making it the 31st most populous country in the world.  Baghdad alone is home to 8 million people.

    Iraq is the land of ancient Mesopotamia, which began in the sixth millennium B.C.  The fertile plains between Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates rivers, collectively known as Mesopotamia, supported the development of the world’s earliest cities, civilizations, and empires — including Sumer, Akkad, and Assyria.  Mesopotamia was the birthplace of writing systems, mathematics, navigation, timekeeping, calendar making, astrology, the invention of the wheel, the sailboat, and a code of laws.  From the Sumerian city of Ur came Abraham, leader of the Hebrew people, whom God led out of the desert to settle in a place where God showed him, they ought to be.

    Academics have started several discussions about the origin of the name Iraq.  One of these traces back to the ancient Sumerian city of Uruk.  Today, modern Iraq mostly overlaps with the ancient region of Mesopotamia — often called the cradle of civilization.  The history of Mesopotamia goes back to the Lower Paleolithic period, with important historical milestones.  At the southern tip of Iraq, you will find the country of Kuwait, which some scholars and biblical experts suggest was the site of the Garden of Eden.  Kuwait’s location near the modern mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers seems to support this idea.  The only thing missing from that debate is proof.

    The Islamic Period

    After the Muslim conquest of Mesopotamia, Baghdad became the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and a major center of culture and learning during Islam’s golden age.  Following the Mongols’ destruction of Baghdad in 1258, Iraq was controlled by various empires, and from the 16th to the 20th century, it was governed within the Ottoman system, known as the Iraq Region.  Today, Iraq holds religious importance in Christianity, Judaism, Yazidism, and Mandaeism.

    Note: Yazata is the Avestan liturgical term for a Zoroastrian concept that has many meanings but generally signifies a divine being.  The word literally means worthy of worship or veneration and is also used for certain prayers that are considered sacred.

    Note: Mandaeism is a Gnostic, monotheistic, and ethnic religion influenced by Greek, Iranian, and Jewish traditions.  Its followers, the Mandaeans, hold in reverence figures such as Adam, Abel, Seth, Enos, Noah, Shem, Aram, and John the Baptist.

    Modern Period

    Since gaining independence in 1932, Iraq has experienced periods of notable economic and military growth along with times of instability and conflict.  Part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, Iraq was reestablished by the United Kingdom in 1921.  It became an independent kingdom in 1932.  After a coup d’état in 1958, Iraq became a republic, initially led by Abdul Karim Qasim, then by Abdul Salam Arif and Abdul Rahman Arif.

    In 1968, the Ba’ath Party gained power, establishing a one-party state under Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and later Saddam Hussein, who led the war against Iran from 1980 to 1988 and then invaded Kuwait in 1990.

    In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition of military forces invaded and occupied Iraq, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and sparking insurgency, sectarian, and civil violence.  The conflict, known as the Iraq War, ended in 2011.  From 2013 to 2017, Iraq battled another war with the rise and defeat of the Islamic State of the Levant (ISL).  Today, post-war conflicts persist, although at a much lower level, still hindered stability alongside the growing influence of Iran.  Of course, U.S. President George W. Bush deserves much of the credit for this.

    As a federal parliamentary republic, Iraq is seen as an emerging middle power.  It has a diverse population, geography, and wildlife.  Most Iraqis are Sunni Muslims, while significant minorities include Christians, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Yarsanis, and Jews.  Ethnically, Iraqis are Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis, Assyrians, and Armenians.  The official languages are Arabic and Kurdish, but other languages are spoken regionally.

    Iraq has one of the largest oil reserves in the world and a major oil and gas industry.  It is also well known for its agriculture and tourism.  Currently, with support from wealthy foreign nations, Iraq is rebuilding what George W. Bush destroyed during his war against Saddam Hussein.

    One of the main sources of public frustration in Iraq from 2019 to 2021 was the lack of reliable electricity and clean water.  The electrical grid faced systemic issues due to fuel shortages, damaged infrastructure from war, and increasing demand.  Corruption remains deeply entrenched throughout the Iraqi government, while the U.S.-backed sectarian political system has contributed to more violence and sectarian conflicts.

    During this period, Iraq experienced widespread droughts.  Nationwide protests erupted in Iraq in October 2019, demanding systemic reform, an end to the party-based quota system, disarmament of non-state militias, and a halt to foreign interference.  Despite heavy repression, hundreds of deaths, and many injuries, the movement remained united around calls for institutional reform and greater accountability.

    In 2020, Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi was ousted by popular demand.  His successor, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, faced the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic during his tenure, which triggered a macroeconomic shock that caused oil prices to plummet, damaging the Iraqi economy, which heavily relies on oil.  The country also endured a prolonged drought from 2020 to 2024.

    In October 2022, the Council of Representatives elected Abdul Latif Rashid as president, and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani became his prime minister.  Since taking office in October 2022, Prime Minister al-Sudani has overseen a period of relative political, security, and economic stability.  Government officials have cited increased regional diplomacy, improved international relations, and economic diversification initiatives such as the Iraq–Europe Development Road project as key signs of recovery.

    In August 2023, al-Sudani established the Iraq Development Fund to boost the private sector and finance projects with significant social and environmental value.  By February 2025, the fund had attracted $7 billion in foreign direct investments and had signed Memoranda of Understanding with several countries, including the United Kingdom and Japan.  In May 2025, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning announced that the unemployment rate in Iraq had fallen from 17% in 2022 to 13% in 2025.  A report published in July 2025 stated that ISL “is at its weakest” in Iraq since its emergence.

    However, the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East greatly affects Iraq, impacting its internal stability, economy, and geopolitical standing.  The country has been pulled into broader regional conflicts through cross-border attacks, while also managing delicate relations with major global and regional powers, including the U.S. and Iran.

    Following the start of the Israel-Hamas war in October 2023, Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq increased attacks on U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria, as well as launching strikes toward Israel.  In response, the U.S. carried out retaliatory airstrikes within Iraqi territory in 2024, targeting militia leaders and prompting some Iraqi officials to call for a withdrawal of U.S. troops.  What some Iraqi officials did not do was address the issue of illegal militias operating inside Iraq with impunity.

    Illegal militias and the activities of regional proxies have heightened the risk that Iraq could once again become a battleground between the U.S. and Iran, which weakens the government’s ability to maintain sovereignty and economic stability.

    While some militias are officially part of the Iraqi state security forces as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), they also operate with a degree of independence and have, at times, pursued their own regional agendas, which challenge the authority of the central government.  Currently, Prime Minister al-Sudani is trying to strike a balance by managing relations with the U.S. while accommodating the demands of influential Iran-backed political factions.

    U.S. retaliatory strikes have further complicated the security relationship between these two countries.  Although a joint commission has been established to negotiate a transition of U.S. military presence, the regional crisis increases pressure to both speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops and justify their continued presence.

    Additionally, the regional crisis has worsened existing political divisions within Iraq.  For example, the federal government, the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and various political and militia groups hold different positions, reflecting competing interests and alliances.

    Like other oil-producing Arab countries, armed conflicts disrupt fragile oil industries.  Any extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran would significantly damage Iraq’s economy, which relies almost entirely on oil export revenues.  Worse still, increased regional instability and the risk of broader conflict could jeopardize critical energy and trade routes, threatening far more than just Iraq’s economy.  The escalation of fighting has led major international oil companies to evacuate expatriate staff from Iraq’s southern oilfields, creating operational uncertainty.  Some expatriates, once evacuated for safety, may not be able to return to continue their skilled work.

  • The Middle East Crisis — Kuwait

    January 7th, 2026

    By Sam Huntington

    An overview

    Kuwait is a city-state in West Asia and the geopolitical region known as the Middle East.  It is located at the northern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, at the head of the Persian Gulf, bordering Iraq to the north and Saudi Arabia to the south.  Its coastline stretches about 311 miles, and it shares a maritime border with Iran across the Persian Gulf.

    Most of the country’s population lives in the urban area of Kuwait City, which is the capital and largest city.  As of 2024, Kuwait has a population of 4.82 million people.  Only 1.53 million of these are Kuwaiti citizens; the remaining 3.29 million are foreign nationals from over 100 countries.

    Humans have inhabited this region for tens of thousands of years, mainly because of its location at the head of the Persian Gulf near the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.  Some scholars believe that Kuwait is where the Garden of Eden once was, but there’s no way to prove or disprove this claim since Eden’s existence, if it ever existed, was prehistoric.

    In the early 18th century, the area now known as Kuwait was under the control of the Bani Khalid tribe.  At that time, it was called the Sheikdom of Kuwait, a British protectorate since 1899.  Before oil fields were discovered in 1938, the territory had a regional trade port that became the main source of Kuwaiti wealth.  The protectorate agreements with the United Kingdom ended in June 1961, when Kuwait officially gained independence.

    From 1946 to 1982, Kuwait experienced a major period of modernization, supported by its oil income.  In the 1980s, Kuwait faced geopolitical instability and an economic crisis after the American stock market crash.  Because Kuwait supported Iraq during its war with Iran, it became the target of pro-Iranian attacks.

    Then, in 1990, largely due to the gross incompetence of U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, a Canadian national, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and annexed by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, following disputes over oil production and border boundaries.  Despite the numerous murders and rapes committed by Iraqi forces, Glaspie stated in a 2008 interview with a Lebanese newspaper that she has no regrets because “It is over.” The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait ended on February 26, 1991, after American ground forces expelled Iraqi troops during the First Gulf War.

    Present Day

    Like many other Arab states in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait is an emirate where the emir is the head of state, and the ruling Al Sabah family controls the country’s political system.  Kuwait’s official state religion is Islam, specifically the Maliki school of Sunni Islam.  Kuwait has a high-income economy supported by the world’s sixth-largest underground oil reserves.  It is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and also belongs to the United Nations, the Arab League, and OPEC.

    Kuwait is mainly impacted by the Middle East Crisis through a cautious, diplomatic approach to regional conflicts and its vulnerability to the economic effects of instability and changing oil markets.  As a small country with a semi-democratic government, Kuwait’s security is also threatened by regional powers like Iran and internal political struggles.  In this context, Kuwait relies heavily on other powers for its physical security.

    Diplomatically, Kuwait has long used a hedging strategy to balance its relationships with rival regional powers, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia.  A hedging strategy in diplomacy is a risk-management approach where a country maintains ties with multiple, often competing, great powers at the same time to avoid relying too heavily on any one foreign power.  This involves combining cooperative and competitive actions to gain economic, political, and security benefits from different sides without forming a strict, one-sided alliance.  For example, despite past tensions, Kuwait seeks balanced relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran to prevent conflict.  Additionally, Kuwait did not fully cut off ties during periods of heightened Saudi-Iran tensions—opting for a flexible diplomatic approach to safeguard its national security.

    As it should, Kuwait consistently advocates for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.  It condemns Israeli military actions and provides humanitarian aid to Gaza, while refusing to normalize relations with Israel until a Palestinian state is established.  However, in complete fairness, the lack of recognition of Israel is normal for the Arab states.

    In October 2025, Kuwait, representing the GCC at the UN, and, as expected, warned that “Zionist violations” endanger regional security and undermine international law.  This followed a joint Arab and Muslim statement in June 2025 calling for de-escalation between Israel and Iran — even though the entire war was engineered by Iran and its proxy, Hamas in Gaza.  However, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry regularly calls for the de-escalation of regional conflicts and advocates for diplomatic solutions as its primary means of maintaining political stability.

    Currently, Kuwait’s economy relies heavily on oil, making it vulnerable to regional and global market fluctuations.  Regional political instability further increases the risk to its economic prospects.  The truth is that political instability and conflict can lead to swings in oil prices and disrupt global supply chains.

    A rentier state is a country that relies heavily on revenue from external sources, like natural resources (especially oil) or foreign aid, rather than taxing its own citizens.  This can lead to a social contract where the government provides economic benefits to citizens in exchange for political quiescence, often resulting in less democratic or more authoritarian governance.  Kuwait is a rentier state; its fiscal stability is highly sensitive to oil market developments/fluctuations.  One should also note that over 60% of Kuwait’s oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, which increases geopolitical tensions between Iran and the United States, which also poses a direct threat to the Kuwaiti economy.

    Finally, internal conflicts between the royal family and Kuwait’s parliament are causing political gridlock that hampers efforts to diversify the economy.  Kuwait’s lack of institutional stability discourages foreign investment and slows down initiatives to build a nation less reliant on oil as its main source of income.  The World Bank projects that regional instability and other factors will weaken growth prospects across the Middle East in 2025 and 2026, affecting Kuwait’s efforts to develop its non-oil sector.

  • The Middle East Crisis — Qatar

    December 31st, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    In A.D. 628, the Islamic prophet Muhammad sent a Muslim envoy to a ruler in eastern Arabia named Munzir ibn Sawa Al-Tamimi and invited him and his followers to accept Islam as their new religion. Munzir accepted the invitation, and most of the Arab tribes in the area converted to Islam. In the mid-7th century, the Muslim conquest of Persia led to the fall of the Sasanian Empire.

    During the Umayyad period (up to A.D. 750), Qatar was known for its horse and camel breeding. Later, Qatar gained an advantage from its strategic location in the Persian Gulf and developed into a hub for pearl harvesting and trading. Significant progress was made in the pearl industry during the Abbasid era (up to A.D. 1258).

    Ships traveling from Basra to India and China often stopped at Qatari ports. Archaeologists have found Chinese porcelain, West African coins, and various artifacts from Thailand and Southeast Asia. Evidence also shows that Qatari residents were quite wealthy — at least wealthy enough to afford high-quality homes and public buildings. However, when the caliphate’s prosperity declined in Iraq, the Qatari economy also suffered.

    By A.D. 1253, an Arabian dynasty known as the Usfurids controlled much of the eastern region as well as the islands of Bahrain. The Prince of Ormus took control of the region in 1320. In 1515, Manuel I of Portugal vassalized the King of Ormus (and all his holdings), and by 1521, a large part of eastern Arabia as well. In 1550, the princes of Al Hasa voluntarily submitted to the rule of the Ottoman Empire, preferring them over the Portuguese.

    By the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, the Ottoman Empire agreed to renounce its claim to Qatar and withdraw its garrison from Doha. However, with the outbreak of World War I, nothing was done to fulfill this agreement, and the garrison remained at the fort in Doha. Over time, the population of the fort decreased due to a rise in desertions. In 1915, with British gunboats in the harbor, the pro-British Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani convinced the remaining soldiers to abandon the fort. When British troops arrived the next morning, they found it deserted.

    Qatar became a British protectorate in November 1916 when the United Kingdom signed a treaty with Sheik Abdullah bin Jassim Al Thani to bring Qatar under its Trucial System of Administration. Note: The Trucial States were seven sheikhdoms under the British Protectorate until 1971 — Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain.

    The treaty reserved foreign affairs and defense to the United Kingdom but allowed internal autonomy. While Abdullah agreed not to establish relations with any other power without the prior consent of the British government, the latter guaranteed the protection of Qatar from aggression by sea and offered its ‘good offices’ if there was an attack by land — although the details were left somewhat vague.

    In 1935, while agreeing to an oil concession with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Abdullah signed another treaty with the British government that promised to protect Qatar against internal and external threats. A first oil field was discovered in 1939 — its development delayed by the Second World War.

    Given India’s independence, Pakistan’s creation, and the development of oil in Qatar, British interests there shifted after the war. In 1949, appointing the first British political officer in Doha, John Wilton, marked a strengthening of Anglo-Qatari relations. Oil exports started in 1949, making oil revenues the country’s main income; the pearl trade had declined. These revenues funded the expansion and modernization of Qatar’s infrastructure.

    When Britain officially announced in 1968 that it would withdraw from the Persian Gulf in three years, Qatar joined talks with Bahrain and the seven other Trucial States to form the Federation of Arab Emirates. However, regional disputes persuaded Qatar and Bahrain to withdraw from the talks and become independent states separate from the Trucial States, which later became the United Arab Emirates.

    Under an agreement with the United Kingdom in 1971, the special treaty arrangements that conflicted with full international responsibility as a sovereign and independent state were ended. The Emir of Qatar was Ahmad bin Ali; he was deposed on February 22, 1972, by Khalifa bin Hamad.

    In 1991, Qatar played an important role in the Gulf War, especially during the Battle of Khafji, where Qatari tanks moved through the town’s streets and provided fire support for the Saudi Arabian National Guard units fighting Iraqi Army troops. Qatar also allowed coalition troops from Canada to use the country as an airbase to launch aircraft on combat air patrols. Additionally, Qatar permitted air forces from the United States and France to operate from within its territory.

    In 1995, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani took control of the country from his father, Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, with the backing of the armed forces, cabinet, neighboring states, and France. Under Emir Hamad, Qatar saw a moderate level of liberalism, including the launch of Al Jazeera television in 1996, the approval of women’s suffrage in municipal elections in 1999, women’s participation in society in 2003, the drafting of its first written constitution in 2005, and the opening of a Roman Catholic church in 2008. An unsuccessful counter-coup occurred in 1996.

    Qatar’s role as a key mediator in the Middle East has given it both influence and risk during the current crisis. The Israel-Hamas conflict has especially impacted Qatar’s diplomatic relations — notably, increasing scrutiny of its ties to the terrorist group Hamas. The crisis further worsened with Israel’s preemptive strike on Iran in September 2025.

    In September 2025, Israeli airstrikes in Doha targeted Hamas leaders — an action that Qatar condemned as a violation of its sovereignty. The incident temporarily derailed ceasefire negotiations and forced Qatar to reassess its regional mediation role. While a new ceasefire was agreed upon in October 2025, the attack severely strained relations and highlighted the risks of hosting non-state actors as negotiators.

    Qatar has long hosted the Political Bureau of Hamas, a role it maintains was established at the request of the United States to create a communication channel.  However, this relationship has drawn heavy criticism from Israel and some Western politicians, leading to increased pressure on Qatar to distance itself from the terrorist group.  After another Hamas rejection of a ceasefire deal in late 2024, Qatar temporarily suspended its mediation efforts and (reportedly) told Hamas leaders to leave — though both parties later denied the claims.

    The crisis has forced Qatar into a delicate balancing act, as it must keep its alliances intact while managing regional tensions. The 2017–2021 Gulf diplomatic crisis saw neighboring countries impose a blockade on Qatar because of its foreign policies, and ongoing instability brings back concerns over these tense relationships. In this situation, Qatar’s close ties with the U.S., China, and Turkey are vital for its security and economic stability.

    The Israeli air strike in September 2025 prompted a swift American response to reassure its ally. President Trump signed an executive order promising U.S. military protection for Qatar and announced increased military cooperation, emphasizing the importance of the Al Udeid Air Base for U.S. strategic interests.

    Regional instability and doubts about U.S. reliability have caused Gulf states, including Qatar, to strengthen their ties with non-traditional security partners like China. This issue tends to fluctuate. When America’s allies can’t trust the U.S. government to stay committed and consistent, then America appears to lack a foreign policy worth defending. The stakes are high because America’s global adversaries are also working to advance their foreign policy interests. China aims to invest in Qatar’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects, and Qatar is considering ways to open that door.

    The Israeli strike on Qatari soil marked a major escalation, revealing the country’s vulnerability to military actions by regional powers. It raises the risk that other nations hosting targeted groups could face similar attacks. One might wonder why the United States hadn’t addressed the Hamas political bureau earlier. The answer could be that, due to the pendulum effect, America’s diplomacy has become ineffective.

    Following the 2017 blockade, Qatar effectively demonstrated economic resilience by establishing new trade routes and increasing domestic production. Despite geopolitical risks, the country remains in a strong financial position. However, regional instability could impact investor confidence over the long term. 

    Qatar’s diplomatic balancing act and ties to groups like Hamas, while strategic, pose reputational risks. Israel’s criticism and repeated accusations that Qatar is funding terrorism, despite Qatar’s denials and cooperation with the U.S. on counter-terrorism, have increased scrutiny.

    Amid this regional chaos, Qatar’s continued role in facilitating humanitarian aid and hostage releases remains critical.  Its ability to stay this course will reinforce its image as a diplomatic broker — and this is essential toward maintaining its broader geopolitical strategy.

  • Another Saudi Treachery?

    December 26th, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    In 2011, Barack Obama was President of the United States.  Key players in the Middle East saw that Obama was weak as a leader.  How weak was he?  Possibly so weak that they might have believed that if there was ever a time to advance the Sunni plan to dominate the Islamic world, Barack Obama’s presidency was it.  Mr. Obama was more than just a weak leader, however.  He was (and perhaps still is) a very confused Islamist.  Because of his weak character, Barack Obama became the prime candidate to serve as King Abdullah’s useful idiot in pushing the goals of Sunni Islam.

    In 2010, Abdullah sent armed and well-funded operatives into Syria to destabilize Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist government.  Abdullah did this because, as the leader of Sunni Islam, he strongly opposed Syrian (and Iraqi) Ba’athist ideology—a secular, nationalist, and socialist system that separates government from political theocracy.  Fundamental Islamists oppose Ba’athism because, within the strict framework of Sharia Law, Islam makes no distinction between social organization, religion, or government.

    Abdullah may have consulted Washington and briefed the American leadership on his plan to overthrow al-Assad.  If true, and the Americans implicitly approved, it would reveal the State Department’s incompetence.  War persisted in Syria from 2011 to 2024.  During that period, approximately 656,500 people died, with about 310,000 being civilians.  Over those 13 years, 6.7 million people became war refugees.

    If the refugee crisis was part of a Saudi strategy to incite chaos in the Middle East, it also significantly destabilized Western political systems, society, and religious institutions.  Western resources and those of Syria were stretched thin.  If the Saudi plan aimed to weaken secular and Christian communities, it fit the pattern of a classic Cloward-Piven operation.

    Thus, the large-scale migration of Muslims across Europe and the Americas was driven by a combination of political instability and the Saudi government’s encouragement to migrate northward from refugee camps to lands of milk and honey, without any cost to themselves.  However, Syria was not the only place experiencing armed conflict: the Afghan War continued through 2021, renewed fighting in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Syria) (ISIS) caused Iraqis to flee westward, and conflict persisted in Somalia, Lebanon, and Eritrea.

    —2015 to 2017—

    In the years after the peak of the refugee crisis, the European Union (EU) developed a more unified, yet controversial long-term strategy focused on internal controls and external cooperation.  A major agreement in March 2016 significantly reduced the flow of migrants along the Eastern Mediterranean route.  Turkey agreed to return irregular migrants arriving in Greece in exchange for financial aid, a promise of an EU resettlement plan for Syrian refugees, and other concessions.

    The EU expanded Frontex’s mandate and funding, transforming it into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in 2016.  This included enhanced search-and-rescue operations and efforts to dismantle human smuggling networks in the Mediterranean.  Additionally, the EU negotiated bilateral agreements with North African countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania) to prevent migrants from departing their shores – in exchange for financial aid.  Note: It wasn’t the EU funding these programs and guarantees; it was European taxpayers who paid for them through tax increases.

    The crisis also prompted reforms within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), leading to a new migration and asylum pact (finally agreed upon in 2024) – set for full implementation in 2026.  The agreement aims to streamline processing, establish a “fairer” burden-sharing mechanism (with flexible options such as financial contributions rather than relocation), and enable quicker returns for rejected applicants.  The issue with such arrangements is that they assume African or Middle Eastern refugees have a right to access European states.  Note: words and phrases like “burden sharing” and “financial contributions” easily translate into “making sure all European taxpayers pay out the nose equally” and “paying an annuity to migrants to stay home.” Good for them; bad for everyone else.

    —American Aid—

    This topic is quite complex.  The American taxpayer provided hundreds of billions of dollars in aid to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey for food, fresh water, shelter, and health services, making the U.S. the world’s largest contributor.  I can hear the argument now: “You Americans started this mess; you should pay the largest amount.” It would be hard to refute such an allegation.  Yet, at the same time, the U.S. government supplied arms and munitions to its favorite chess pieces, which included Saudi insurgents in Syria, and ISIS and al-Qaeda members in Libya.  One has to wonder.

    During the administrations of Barack Obama (2009 to 2017) and Joe Biden (2021 to 2025), Democrats committed the United States to resettling 10,000 Syrian refugees and granted all Syrian migrants “temporary protected status” instead of following standard immigration procedures.  Under Biden, the government launched the so-called Welcome Corps, which allowed U.S. citizens to sponsor radical Islamists, thereby expanding resettlement options.  Nothing could be more harmful to the United States and its people than this, but Democrats have never shown concern for the American homeland.

    Although President Donald J. Trump limited the number of Middle Eastern refugees entering the United States (2017–2021), Biden reversed Trump’s executive orders and reopened the door to unvetted Islamists.  When Trump resumed the presidency in 2025, he shifted policy toward significantly reducing refugee admissions and enforced travel bans from several Muslim-majority countries.

    Donald Trump’s approach to the Middle Eastern refugee situation focused on significant cuts to refugee admissions and implementing a controversial “travel ban” targeting several Muslim-majority countries.  Mr. Trump also lowered the annual cap on the total number of refugees allowed into the U.S. each fiscal year, reducing it from 110,000 (under Obama) to 50,000, then to 15,000, before leaving office in 2021.

    Under Trump, the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) was halted for 120 days to implement “extreme vetting” procedures, stopping the entire resettlement program and leaving thousands of previously approved refugees in limbo.

    Trump also announced that future refugee applications would be prioritized for those persecuted for their religion, but only if they belonged to a minority religion in their home country.  Critics attacked Trump because the prioritization favored Christian refugees over those of radical Islamism.  This suggests that Trump was more interested in protecting the United States than any Democrat in the past 16 years.

    To highlight a new focus on refugees, President Trump ended federal contracts and stopped funding for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that assist in integrating refugees into American communities, especially those who prefer not to have Islamists living in their neighborhoods.  Trump also ceased America’s contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which sends billions of dollars to Palestinian communities, where the funds are used to buy weapons and explosives to be used against Israel.

    Why is this important?

    Before the refugee crisis in Germany (2015), the total number of murders statewide was 295.  Over the following three years, the murder count rose to 373, then 405, and then 286.  In 2022, Germany reported 7,042 felony crimes nationwide.  According to Deutsche Welle (DW), Germany’s international public broadcaster, in 2024 alone, Germany experienced 13,320 rapes committed against the German people by Islamist refugees.  Under Sharia Law, rape is regarded as one of the more serious crimes that warrants severe punishment – yet, when committed against non-Muslim populations, radical Islamists and political leftists might argue that the victims had it coming.

    While I view Islam as fundamentally flawed, the problem with Islamist migration and rising crime across Europe and the United States is cultural.  Fact: Muslim boys are raised to see women as property – objects to be used and abused by any adult male, whether as punishment for challenging male authority or because many Muslim men are sociopathic dipshits.  Who really knows?

    To my knowledge, no one has thoroughly examined the issues outlined above.  It could be that Western agencies are so busy stuffing corndogs down the throats of Islamists that they haven’t had time to investigate Islamist psychopathy and related crime statistics.  What we do know is that when these people move from their home countries to ours, they bring along their non-Western, fractured cultural practices.  We also know that Muslim men are raised to use and mistreat women, and the women are brought up to accept this behavior as “their punishment” in life for being born female, including Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).  None of this makes sense to normal people, but then neither does the whole of Islam.

    Every one of those non-Western cultural abnormalities mentioned earlier now exists in Michigan’s seventh-largest city, Dearborn — the first “Arab State” in the United States.  Polygamy is illegal in the United States, but Islamists in Dearborn have found ways to bypass these laws.  Consider: Arab men continue to marry two or more women under Sharia Law.  When the second wife or subsequent wives become pregnant, they move into apartments as single mothers and enroll in state welfare programs.  It’s easier than working, but one has to wonder why Michigan state officials are allowing Islamists to get away with it.  I can’t explain it.

    Now, am I anti-Islamist?  Most certainly.  I don’t know any Muslims and have no desire to meet any.  I do not wish for any of them to be harmed in ways they have harmed so many victims of white civilization, but I have two wishes: first, that they return to their homeland and practice Islam as they choose; second, that we stay at home and refrain from interfering further in the affairs of any Middle Eastern nation.  America’s meddling has become far too costly.

  • The Middle East Crisis – Syria

    December 24th, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    Historical sources indicate that today’s Syria gets its name from the 8th-century B.C. word Surai and the ancient Greek name Syroi, both of which come from Assyria in Northern Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq and Northeastern Syria).  However, around 323 B.C., the name was also used for the Levant, a region of West Asia along the eastern Mediterranean coast.  Scholars point out that the ancient Greeks did not distinguish between the Assyrians of Mesopotamia and the Arameans of the Levant.  Modern researchers believe that the Greek word is linked to Assyria and is derived from the Akkadian word Assur.  The Greek name most closely matches the Phoenician word Assur, recorded in the 8th century B.C.

    Archaeologists tell us that people have lived in this region for the past 13,000 years.  It is also where agriculture and cattle breeding first appeared.  The oldest known structure in the world is located at the site called Tell Qaramel, dating back to 10,650 B.C.  The Syrian cities of Aleppo and Damascus are among the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world.

    Note: The word Semitic refers to a group of languages that includes Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and ancient languages like Phoenician and Akkadian, forming the core subgroup of the Afro-Asiatic language family.

    Thus, various Semitic peoples appeared in the area of present-day Syria in the 14th century B.C., including the semi-nomadic Suteans, who engaged in an unsuccessful conflict with Babylonia to the east, and the West Semitic-speaking Arameans, who absorbed the earlier Amorites.  They, too, were subjugated by Assyria and the Hittites for centuries.

    The Egyptians were constantly at war with the Hittites for control over western Syria — a conflict that peaked in 1274 B.C. at the Battle of Kadesh.  The western region remained part of the Hittite empire until its collapse around 1200 B.C., while eastern Syria became part of the Middle Assyrian Empire.

    With the destruction of the Hittites and the decline of Assyria in the late 11th century B.C., the Aramean tribes gained control of much of the interior, founding several essential and long-lasting states.  From this point forward, the region became known as Aramea (also, Aram).

    The Canaanite group known as the Phoenicians came to dominate the coasts of Western Syria, Lebanon, and the area now called Roman Palestine.  From these coastal regions, the Phoenicians eventually spread their influence across the Mediterranean, establishing colonies in Malta, Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, and along North Africa’s coast.  Their most important city, known as Carthage, was founded in the 9th century B.C. and later grew into a powerful empire rivaling the early Roman Republic.

    Syria and the western part of the Near East then fell under the control of the vast Neo-Assyrian Empire (911–605 B.C.).  The Assyrians introduced Imperial Aramaic as the common language of their empire.  This language remained dominant in Syria and throughout the entire Near East, serving as a medium for spreading Christianity.  This dominance lasted until after the Islamic conquest in the 7th and 8th centuries A.D.

    In 1516, the Ottoman Empire invaded the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, conquering Syria and incorporating it into its empire.  The Ottoman system was not burdensome to Syrians because the Turks respected Arabic as the language of the Quran and accepted the role of defenders of the faith.  Damascus became the major entrepôt for Mecca, gaining a holy status for Muslims because of the many pilgrims passing through on the Hajj.

    During World War I, the Ottoman Empire joined the conflict as a Central Power, allied with Imperial Germany, Imperial Austria-Hungary, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.  It ultimately faced defeat and lost control of the entire Near East to the British and French empires.

    During World War I, two Allied diplomats, Mark Sykes (Great Britain) and François Georges-Picot (France), secretly agreed on the post-war division of the Ottoman Empire into zones of influence in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916.  Initially, the two territories were separated by a border that ran nearly in a straight line from Jordan to Iran.  However, the discovery of oil in the Mosul region just before the war’s end led to further negotiations with France in 1918, resulting in the cession of this region to the British zone, which later became the country we now know as Iraq.  The status of the intermediate province of Zor was left uncertain; its occupation by Arab nationalists eventually led to its attachment to Syria.  This artificial border was recognized internationally when Syria became a League of Nations mandate in 1920 and remains unchanged today.

    In 1920, an independent Kingdom of Syria was briefly established under Faisal I of the Hashemite family.  However, his rule over Syria lasted only a few months.  French troops took control of Syria later that year after the San Remo conference recommended that the League of Nations assign Syria a French mandate.

    Syria successfully negotiated a treaty for its independence in September 1936, and Hashim al-Atassi became the first president elected under the modern Syrian republic.  Disappointingly for the Syrians, this treaty was never implemented because the French Legislature refused to ratify it.  With the fall of France in 1940 at the start of World War II, Syria fell under the control of Vichy France until British and Free French forces occupied the country in July 1941.  Ongoing pressure from Syrian nationalists and the British Foreign Office forced the French to withdraw their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been established during the mandate.

    The instability that followed the 1961 coup d’état led to the March 1963 Ba’athist coup.  The takeover was planned by members of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar.  Ba’ath members led the new Syrian cabinet.  From that point until the fall of the Assad government in 2024, the Ba’ath party governed Syria as a totalitarian dictatorship — a label some scholars dispute.  Nevertheless, it is accurate that Ba’athists strongly controlled Syria’s politics, education, culture, and religion, and, similar to Saudi Arabia’s government, monitored all aspects of civil society through its secret police.  The Syrian Armed Forces and secret police were merged after the elimination of traditional civilian and military elites by the Assad regime.

    Note: the Ba’ath movement was an Arab nationalist ideology and political party that mixed pan-Arabism and revolutionary socialism.  The meaning of Ba’athist is “renaissance” or “resurrection.”  Founded in Syria in the 1940s, the movement sought to unite the Arab world into a single state, free from foreign (Western) influence.

    On February 23, 1966, the neo-Ba’athist Military Committee launched an intra-party rebellion against the Ba’athist Old Guard (Aflaq and Bitar) and imprisoned President Amin al-Hafiz.  A few days later, Nureddin al-Atassi became the official head of state, with Salah Jadid serving as the head of government from 1966 until November 1970, when defense minister Hafez al-Assad overthrew him.

    In the first half of 1967, a low-key state of war existed between Syria and Israel.  The conflict focused on Israel’s development of land in the Demilitarized Zone, which led to several aerial clashes.  When the Six-Day War broke out between Egypt and Israel, Syria joined the fight on Egypt’s side and attacked Israel as well.  In the final days of the war, Israel turned its attention to Syria, capturing two-thirds of the Golan Heights in less than 48 hours.

    This defeat caused a split between Jadid and Assad over how Syria should move forward.  Jadid controlled the Ba’athist Party apparatus, but Assad held control of the military.  The 1970 retreat of Syrian forces sent to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, led by Yasser Arafat during the “Black September War of 1970,” reflected this disagreement.

    Hafez al-Assad died on June 10, 2000.  His son, Bashar, was elected president in an election where he ran unopposed.  His election marked the beginning of the Damascus Spring and sparked popular hopes for political reforms in Syria, but within a short period, Ba’athist officials suppressed the movement, imprisoning some of its leading intellectuals.  Instead, reforms have been limited to minor market changes.

    On October 5, 2003, Israel targeted and destroyed a terrorist training center for Islamic Jihad members near Damascus.  In March 2004, Syrian Kurds and Arabs clashed in the al-Qamishli province, and signs of rioting were observed inside Qamishli and Hasakeh.  In 2005, Syria withdrew its military presence from Lebanon.  That same year, the assassination of Rafic Hariri prompted international condemnation and sparked a popular uprising called the Cedar Revolution.  These events compelled Syria to end its 29-year military occupation of Lebanon.  In September 2007, a foreign aircraft suspected of being part of the Israeli Air Force conducted a bombing raid on a suspected nuclear reactor under construction by North Korean technicians.

    In 2011, the nepotism of Ba’athist ruling elites and the authoritarianism prompted the Syrian Revolution as part of the wider Arab Spring uprisings.  Public demonstrations across Syria began in late January and grew into a nationwide uprising.  Protesters called for Assad’s resignation, the ousting of his government, and an end to nearly five decades of Ba’ath Party abuses.

    President al-Assad’s response to these demands was to deploy the Syrian army to suppress the uprising, and several cities were besieged.  Still, civil unrest persisted, and some witnesses reported that soldiers who refused to shoot unarmed civilians were themselves summarily executed.  The Syrian government denied reports of army defections, blaming armed gangs for causing trouble.  This was, in fact, true; agitators armed and supervised by the Saudi government contributed to the Syrian crisis.

    While this was happening, both China and Russia avoided condemning the Assad government or imposing sanctions, arguing that such actions could lead to a period of foreign intervention.  The Arab League, mostly controlled by Saudi Arabia and its allies, suspended Syria’s membership over the government’s response to the crisis.  At this point, one might conclude that there are no honest brokers in the Middle East.

    According to the United Nations (which, contrary to its reputation, has never been a genuine broker in the Middle East), by the end of 2024, the Syrian civil war had caused over 600,000 deaths, with 90% of the blame placed on Dr. Bashar al-Assad.  What is true is that the Syrian crisis has created a massive refugee problem.  Some experts now say that 7.6 million people have been displaced by the conflict and that it has effectively destroyed the Syrian economy.  One might argue that if anything, the Saudi government is as skilled at destroying things as the Israelis are at building them.

    Despite the fall of the Assad regime, the conflict persists, with various armed groups battling for control of Syria and the Islamic State of the Levant (ISL) maintaining a continuous presence in the region.  The Syrian conflict has evolved into a proxy war, with multiple nations involved, contributing to the broader Middle Eastern crisis.

  • The Middle East Crisis — Yemen

    December 17th, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    The Republic of Yemen, a unitary provisional republic, is a country in West Asia located in southern Arabia.  The country borders Saudi Arabia to the north, Oman to the northeast, the southeastern part of the Arabian Sea to the east, the Gulf of Aden to the south, and the Red Sea to the west.  Yemen shares maritime borders with Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia.  It is the second-largest country on the Arabian Peninsula.  The capital and largest city is Sanaa.  Its population is approximately 34.7 million people, with 99.9% being followers of Islam.

    Because of its geographic location, Yemen has served as a crossroads for many civilizations over the past 7,000 years.  After converting to Islam, Yemen became a center of learning and a recruiting ground for Islamic armies.

    During the 19th century, Yemen was divided between the Ottoman and British empires.  The Kingdom of Yemen was established after World War I.  Then, in 1962, following a coup d’état, it became the Yemen Arab Republic (also known as North Yemen).  Five years later, the British Aden Protectorate gained independence and became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)—the first officially socialist state in the Arab world.  The two countries united in 1990 to form the modern Republic of Yemen, with Ali Abdullah Saleh as president until his resignation in 2012 in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring.

    Since 2011, Yemen has faced an ongoing political crisis characterized by civil unrest, high unemployment rates, corruption, and President Saleh’s attempt to remove presidential term limits.  By 2015, the country was caught in a continuous civil war with various groups vying for control, including Houthi rebels.  Officially called Ansar Allah, the Houthis are a revivalist movement that originated in Yemen in the 1990s.  They have been a key player in the Yemeni civil war.  The Houthis have faced widespread international condemnation for human rights abuses, such as deliberately targeting civilians and using children as fighters.  Iran is the main supporter of the Houthis, employing them as a proxy force against Saudi Arabia.

    Yemen is one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world.  If there were such a thing as a Fifth World Country, Yemen would qualify.  According to the United Nations in 2019, Yemen has the highest number of people in need of humanitarian aid — about 24 million, or 75% of the population.

    The Middle East Crisis has devastated Yemen and is the main cause of its humanitarian disaster.  There is no healthcare system, people are starving, and years of conflict have destroyed much of the country’s economic infrastructure.  Recent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea on maritime interests have worsened its economic decline and delayed any efforts by outside parties to address the humanitarian crisis.

    Since 2019, the Yemeni economy has shrunk by more than half, with a 58% decrease in real GDP.  Currently, Yemen has two competing economic zones — neither of which appears to be successful.  Ninety percent of the country lacks electricity.  The people are starving.  There is no healthcare system, and cholera, pneumonia, and diphtheria have reached epidemic levels.  There is no quality of life in Yemen.

  • The Middle East Crisis – The Saudis

    December 10th, 2025

    By Sam Huntington

    We know that humans have inhabited the region of present-day Saudi Arabia for about 125,000 years.  To clarify: if they were not homo sapiens, they were very close to it.  Some scholars now contend that the Saudi Peninsula is crucial to understanding human evolution and migration.  In late 2017, archaeologists uncovered engravings dating back 8,000 years.  Four years later, researchers announced the discovery of a human settlement site believed to be as old as 350,000 years.  The credibility of these claims depends on how willing archaeologists are to accept the dating estimates.

    The earliest inhabitants of the peninsula before Islam were part of the Ubaid culture from early Mesopotamia.  At that time, what is now desert was probably a lush, green area.  Climate changes, which have been happening since Earth’s formation, led to the end of the Ubaid period.  There is very little archaeological evidence of significant human activity in present-day Saudi Arabia during the following thousands of years.  The settlements that did exist were all in the eastern part of the peninsula.  Around 2200 B.C., the people living in these settlements migrated to the island of Bahrain, although scientists cannot explain why this migration took place.

    During the period from the seventh to the third centuries B.C., the people living in this region were mainly nomadic traders who either traveled in caravans or engaged in highway robbery, looting, and murder.  Throughout this time, the people of Arabia remained tribal.  The Nabataean people controlled most of what is now the northern peninsula until around 9 B.C., when the Romans took over the region and renamed it Arabia Petraea.  The Romans continued to rule the peninsula until 630 A.D.  What follows is the Islamist period, which began around 632 A.D.

    Mohammad of Makkah is believed to have been born in 570 A.D.  By 632 A.D., he had successfully united the Arabian tribes and established a single religious state.  When he died in 632, his followers expanded their territory under Islamic rule.  This impressive effort led to the conquest of regions from Arabia westward across North Africa, into the Iberian Peninsula, northward into Central Asia, and eastward into South Asia.  Conquest was achieved within a hundred years, making Saudi Arabia a key region within the Islamic world.  The Caliphates of that time included the Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid.  Between the 10th and 20th centuries, Saudi Arabia was governed locally by an Arab leader known as the Sharif of Makkah (Mecca).  He was, in turn, subordinate to rulers based in Baghdad, Cairo, or Istanbul.  During this period, most of Saudi Arabia consisted of loosely connected tribal groups, often in conflict with one another.

    The formation of the Israeli state in 1948 resulted from a complex series of events spanning several decades, including the growth of Zionism, European diplomacy during World War I, the British Mandate period, World War II, the Holocaust, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  I will share more about this in future posts.

    The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) is now Saudi Arabia’s state-owned petroleum and natural gas company.  As of 2024, it ranks as the fourth-largest company in the world by revenue.  Saudi Arabia has the second-largest proven crude oil reserve in the world (270 billion barrels) and the highest daily oil production among all oil-producing nations.

    ARAMCO’s origins trace back to the oil shortages during World War I and the exclusion of American companies from Mesopotamia by the United Kingdom and France under the San Remo Petroleum Agreement of 1920.  During that decade, the American government gained public support for its Open Door policy, which Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, initiated in 1921.  Standard Oil of California was among those U.S. companies seeking new sources of oil overseas.

    Saudi Arabia responded to the establishment of Israel in 1948 by rejecting the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, sending troops to fight against Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and joining the Arab League’s official boycott of the new state of Israel.  The Saudi kingdom voted against the partition plan, supported military intervention by Arab forces, and initially opposed any diplomatic recognition of Israel.

    The Saudis, in partnership with the Arab League, continued to boycott Israel after 1948, a policy that established a long-standing stance of non-recognition and opposition to the Israeli state.  Furthermore, the Saudi government kept supporting the Palestinians in British Palestine and called for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967.  Note: I refer to the Arabs living in British Palestine as Philistines because that’s who they are, historically and culturally.  No Arab society today holds the people of British Palestine in high regard, but since 1948, the Palestinians have become a useful tool for creating problems for the State of Israel.

    Saudi Arabia’s actions in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine have often been controversial, especially between 1970 and 2017.  They were usually driven by complex and evolving geopolitical rivalries with Iran, internal security concerns, and religious ideology.  Accusations of “Saudi mischief” relate to its use of financial aid, arms, and diplomatic pressure to pursue its interests.  Recently, Riyadh has shifted toward more pragmatic diplomacy in some areas.

    In the early years of the Syrian Civil War, Saudi Arabia was a major supporter and supplier of weapons to various rebel groups fighting to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad, a key ally of Iran’s rival.

    While Riyadh supported moderate Free Syrian Army factions, it also backed powerful Islamist rebel groups such as the Army of Conquest.  Critics have pointed out that this broad support helped fragment the opposition and strengthened extremist groups like al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

    Saudi Arabia collaborated with the American CIA on a secret program called Timber Sycamore to supply arms and train Syrian rebels, despite concerns from some U.S. officials about the rebels’ links to al-Qaeda.  Note: U.S.-supplied weapons to rebels in Libya eventually ended up with al-Qaeda fighters, who used those weapons against American contractors during the Benghazi attack.

    After years of military stalemate and the growing influence of Iran and Russia, Saudi Arabia shifted its stance toward the Assad regime.  Since late 2024, following Assad’s removal, Saudi Arabia has been moving toward normalization with Damascus, promising significant financial aid for reconstruction to counter Iranian and Turkish influence and to address security issues such as drug trafficking. 

    After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saudi Arabia declined to engage with Iraq’s new Shia-led government, viewing it as suspicious and an extension of Iranian influence.  This diplomatic isolation intensified sectarian tensions and drew Iraq’s government closer to Iran.

    Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar of supporting terrorism and civil war in Iraq and Syria.  Saudi Arabia denied these claims, but reports indicate that Saudi citizens have traveled to join Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS in Iraq.

    Saudi Arabia has long exercised influence over certain Iraqi Sunni groups, tribes, and even rival Shia politicians through financial and security agreements.  In recent years, recognizing that its previous policies backfired by drawing Iraq closer to Iran, Riyadh re-engaged with Baghdad.  As a result, the two countries restored diplomatic relations in 2015, and Saudi Arabia has since offered investments and promoted regional security cooperation.

    In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia, in partnership with Pakistan and the U.S., supplied significant funding to the Mujahideen to oppose Soviet occupation.  This included support for factions that would later become the Taliban.  In 1996, Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries that recognized the first Taliban government.  Saudi intelligence provided the Taliban with financial aid in an unsuccessful effort to persuade them to hand over the Saudi-born al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

    After the 9/11 attacks, during which most of the hijackers were Saudi citizens, Riyadh engaged in a treacherous game against the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan.  While outwardly cooperating with the U.S. war on terror and opposing the Taliban, the Saudis secretly provided arms to certain Pakistani “freedom fighters” and Taliban forces to oppose U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan.  It was nothing less than betrayal.  Following the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, Saudi Arabia has used a “leading from behind” approach, working through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to deliver humanitarian aid instead of granting direct diplomatic recognition.  Riyadh aims to reassert its influence and counter Iran and Qatar without risking damage to its reputation. 

    Historically, Saudi Arabia supported fundraising for Hamas within its borders as a way to pacify Saudi Shi’a.  The Saudis did not directly fund the group, but relations with Hamas worsened after Hamas aligned with Iran in the early 2000s.  In recent years, Saudi Arabia has cracked down on Hamas fundraising and arrested individuals suspected of supporting the group financially.  This move aligned with Riyadh’s support for the Trump administration’s Middle East policies, including pressure on the Palestinian Authority.

    Following Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, official Saudi rhetoric sharply turned against Hamas terrorists.  For example, Saudi-funded media labeled Hamas militants killed in Gaza as “terrorists,” and the government shifted its support for the Palestinian Authority by sending humanitarian aid to its civilian population.

    Saudi Arabia has reiterated its position that Palestinian statehood is crucial for broader regional peace — reaffirming support for a two-state solution.  While the Saudi-Israeli normalization talks have stalled after the Gaza war, Riyadh’s focus remains on pressuring Israel to agree to a ceasefire and achieve a lasting resolution.

    Today, Saudi Arabia’s current Middle East strategy focuses on its plan to diversify the country’s economy and ensure its long-term stability.  This plan is called Vision 2030.  Even the Saudis recognize the possibility that the future might render the use of gas and oil for fueling motor vehicles obsolete.  From this perspective, the main goal is to transform Saudi Arabia into a major independent global power, which requires a stable regional environment for investment and development.

    The success of Vision 2030, which aims to reduce the country’s dependence on oil, is essential to its foreign policy.  Additionally, economic stability is vital for large-scale projects like Neom — an architectural and ecological development launched in 2017 on the northern edge of the Red Sea, directly east of Egypt and south of Jordan.  The planned size of this new city is 10,200 square miles, covering multiple regions, including a floating industrial complex, a global trade hub, tourist resorts, and a linear city powered by renewable energy sources.

    The stability required for large-scale projects like Neom and the need to attract foreign investments are vital to the interests of the Saudi kingdom.  They are leveraging the country’s vast wealth to reshape the Saudi economy and develop new sectors, including tourism, technology, and renewable energy.

    The Saudis are also focusing on their own national interests rather than strictly aligning with any single superpower, such as the United States, China, or the Russian Federation.  While the United States remains a key security partner, the Saudis are expanding their ties with other global powers like China to maintain a strategic balance.  This approach of hedging their bets ensures that the Saudi government isn’t overly dependent on one ally and allows them to benefit from other competing interests.

    Saudi de-escalation with regional rivals beginning around 2023 represents a major shift from previous policies, when the Saudis supported Wahhabist terrorism, implicitly approved the 2001 attack on the United States, funded the Taliban, and backed Pakistani “freedom fighters” against Saudi allies like the United Kingdom and the United States.

    However, the fact remains that while the Saudi royal family and most of the population follow Sunni Islam, about five million residents of Saudi Arabia adhere to Shi’a Islam.  Therefore, the number of Shi’ite followers, although clearly a minority within the overall Saudi population, still represents “an enemy within” to the royal family.  The number of Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia is enough to worry Saudi royals about the potential for factional radicalism to develop within Sunni communities.  It therefore makes sense for the Saudis to support anti-Western radicals, anti-Syrian rebels, and anti-Israeli policies.

    The shift also explains why Saudi Arabia agreed to the China-brokered normalization of relations with Iran, which has involved military and diplomatic cooperation despite ongoing suspicions.  The Saudis hope that their de-escalation strategy will prevent regional conflicts that could threaten their economic growth and long-term security.

    The Saudis leverage their unique strengths — such as being the custodian of Islam’s holiest site, their vast financial resources, and energy dominance — to pursue a more proactive and self-fulfilling foreign policy.  This includes using financial aid to build alliances, provide humanitarian assistance, and mediate conflicts.

    Although Saudi and Iranian diplomats have eased tensions, deep mistrust still exists.  Ongoing proxy wars and the threat of a larger regional conflict—particularly related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions—continue to endanger Saudi security and its Vision 2030 plans.

    However, despite efforts to diversify, the Saudi economy remains vulnerable to oil price fluctuations.  Fiscal and external deficits are anticipated as the kingdom heavily invests in its Vision 2030 projects, which carry long-term financial risks.

    Furthermore, the kingdom’s strategy is vulnerable to regional and global instability.  Geopolitical events, such as the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, could redirect Saudi Arabia’s focus and resources, potentially weakening their diplomatic and economic objectives.  Domestically, while Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has started societal liberalization, political dissent remains suppressed.  The catch-22 is that the government must balance its modernization efforts with public opinion, especially on sensitive issues like the Palestinian crisis, to maintain internal stability.

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