The Key Problem with Maria Corina Machado

Marco Rubio's announcement that the Venezuelan regime will have to submit a monthly budget, which will then release money from a Qatari account*, just underlines a key reason that democratic transition in Venezuela is a problem for the Trump administration. Democratically-elected (or even just democratically-minded) leaders could not accept such an arrangement. No one in Venezuela gets a say in the country's most precious natural resource.

If María Corina Machado were to return, there would be myriad challenges, but let's focus on this one for now. The U.S. could not say they would overthrow or kidnap her if she didn't follow its orders. She would have independent legitimacy that Delcy Rodríguez completely lacks. With that legitimacy she could dictate terms even though she might feel indebted to the U.S. for getting her back in the country. She would have the right to say no. She would not want to ask permission from a foreign power to spend her own country's money.

This will come as no surprise to people who know Latin American political history, but it's far better for the Trump administration to have a pliable, vulnerable, and undemocratic president in Venezuela. It carries its own problems, but it's better. The U.S. might not even need any military force to remove Rodríguez if she doesn't act as Marco Rubio wants--just whisper to political rivals that she's out of favor. Remote control authority doesn't work with democracy (it's not clear how well it works with dictatorship, but it's easier).

The administration has made abundantly clear that democracy is definitely not a short-term goal and is only hazily a long-term one. Aside from the obvious problem of having groups that detest each other, democracy in the best of times is messy and unpredictable. For a foreign country wanting access to oil and money, messy and unpredictable is no good. 

*The term "slush fund" is not out of order here.

Read more...

Controlling Another Country's Money

 I was reading through Lars Schoultz's In Their Own Best Interest and found a fun citation in the Foreign Relations of the United States documents. It is Secretary of State Philander Knox speaking to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1911. The topic is Honduras but it could be Venezuela today.

We can not blink the fact that there is no hope for peace and prosperity for Honduras except through the United States. All she now asks is, Will you assist us to make the security good which we offer for the debt we are incurring, at a reasonable rate of interest, by helping us to secure an honest collection of our revenues, or will you, by withholding that assistance, drive us back upon the usurers and plunderers who have brought us to our present stagnation?

How will this be done?

The convention has been drawn for the purpose of giving security. That is, for the purpose of assuring the regular payment of interest and sinking fund upon the debt. Its provisions, briefly, are:

1. Honduras engages to place the loan in the United States.

2. Honduras pledges her customs receipts for the payment of the interest and sinking fund.

3. Honduras agrees to appoint a receiver from a list of names prepared by the fiscal agent and approved by the President of the United States.

4. Honduras agrees to afford protection to the receiver and that if necessary the United States may give such protection.

5. The receiver is under obligation to report to the fiscal agent of the loan and to either Government regarding the discharge of his duties.

6. Honduras further agrees not to alter the customs receipts during the existence of the loan.

In essence, Honduras hands its economy over to U.S. officials.

The convention would have the effect of affording security to the bondholders; of assuring to Honduras the punctual and complete discharge of her obligations practically without cost to the Government; the enjoyment of continued peace, and the consequent internal development; and to the United States the saving in expense to this Government would alone seem to be a sufficient inducement.

Good for everyone. Except Hondurans.

Read more...

Trump's Policy Toward Latin America and China

I wrote a guest blog post for the University of New Mexico Press, which published my book on autonomy. It's not a new story for anyone reading this blog. Not even the Venezuela invasion will suddenly push China aside. Indeed, Latin America doesn't want to it pushed aside. Go read it and give them some clicks.

Read more...

Latin America's Response to Mark Carney's Speech

I was watching a webinar put on by the Canadian Council for the Americas, which naturally touched on Mark Carney's speech. Robert Funk, a Chilean professor (but also Canadian) noted how unusual it was to have people talking about a Canadian Prime Minister's speech in casual conversation. And I don't blog very much about Canada.

It resonated elsewhere and Claudia Sheinbaum praised it. Carney will spend a lot of the year traveling, which already includes Brazil and I imagine will include plenty more of Latin America. This isn't exactly new, but the sense of urgency is intensifying.

A question came up in the webinar about whether Canada would lead some sort of group of middle powers, which I think misses the core point. This isn't a "movement" per se but rather just the rational response by sovereign countries with options. There doesn't have to be a leader, which suggests common political views, policies, and the like.

Read more...

Delcy Rodriguez's Public Face

Delcy Rodriguez is widely quoted as saying she's had "enough" of U.S. interference and orders. Telesur, which I hadn't looked at in forever, really gets into it but it's getting play in all the major U.S. outlets as well. It is in fact getting so much play and so little official pushback that it feels planned. In that sense, Telesur is (unwittingly or not) following right along with U.S. policy.

She's obviously facing intense pressure from within the regime, but the rest of Venezuela didn't suddenly lose their sense of nationalism. They wonder whether the U.S. is simply sucking the oil and profit out of the country. She has to be allowed to give fiery speeches every once in a while to bolster an image of nationalism and sovereignty. This has plenty of precedent in Latin American history more broadly. Fidel Castro himself was consistently involved in quiet talks with the U.S. while explaining he had to give a certain kind of speech publicly. That could well be what's happening here.

Read more...

Don't Make Sweeping Generalizations About Latin American Politics

Michael Reid, who is a highly experienced observer of Latin American politics, should know better than to make sweeping generalizations about it, but he did. He says that the rightward trend in Latin America is different from past pendulums and is likely here to stay. Here are his two main reasons and the problems with them.

1. Latin American voters have been afraid of a repeat of Venezuela so vote for the right instead. The problem here is obvious--in 2022 neighboring Colombia voted in not just a leftist (the first in their history!) but a former guerrilla. The same year, neighboring Brazil chose Lula over a Jair Bolsonaro, who was both incumbent and close to Donald Trump. So this reason doesn't pass muster.

2. "Since the Covid-19 pandemic, which hit the region hard, voters’ focus has changed to the basics of life: finding stable work, putting food on the table and, perhaps above all, keeping safe." The entire first part of this puzzles me because Latin American voters have always, and I mean always, centered on finding stable work and food. That's what gave rise to Hugo Chávez in the first place. And it absolutely relates to incumbency because when the right or left can't fulfill those promises, voters look elsewhere. That said, his point about how drug violence has spread more than in the past is definitely true. But even in countries with serious drug trafficking (take Honduras or Mexico) voters have moved to the left and right.

After making the point that anti-incumbency is less likely now and so the right might well dominate, he hedges:

"In the end, the durability of Latin America’s latest shift will turn on how successful these leaders are in improving the lives of ordinary citizens, in making them safer and less poor and offering them better services like health care, education and public transport."

In other words, if incumbents don't fulfill promises, voters look elsewhere.

He does make the critical point that the current Latin American right is heterogeneous. Different approaches, different personalities, and different priorities. This is the most important takeaway of the piece because it tells us that sweeping generalizations will always lead you astray. What happens in Argentina--always so idiosyncratic--may or may not have significant impact elsewhere. If there is a regional or global recession (let's say the AI bubble bursts badly) then we might soon be talking about a resurgence of the center-left.*

* I do think the revolutionary left is so badly discredited that it will take decades for people to forget about its disasters. But they always do eventually!

Read more...

Mark Carney's Speech and Latin America

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's speech at Davos is all about autonomy and fits exactly with my own argument with regard to Latin America.

[M]any countries are drawing the same conclusions that they must develop greater strategic autonomy, in energy, food, critical minerals, in finance and supply chains.

...

Allies will diversify to hedge against uncertainty.

They'll buy insurance, increase options in order to rebuild sovereignty – sovereignty that was once grounded in rules, but will increasingly be anchored in the ability to withstand pressure.

...

We are calibrating our relationships, so their depth reflects our values, and we're prioritizing broad engagement to maximize our influence, given and given the fluidity of the world at the moment, the risks that this poses and the stakes for what comes next.

...

The past few days, we've concluded new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar. We're negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.

...

[T]he middle powers must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu.

This is all exactly right and Latin America has been doing it since the 1990s, with acceleration once the first Trump administration demonstrated the United States could not longer be relied upon. Note the "past few days" comment. In the first year of this second term, governments are working overtime to forge new partnerships.

The United States remains extremely powerful and is always a partner, but just not to the same extent that it used to be. Governments have to hedge, they just have no choice, especially when tariffs are announced based on person dislike. Those tariffs might never materialize, and often don't, but plenty of times they do.

Watch for more trade and investment announcements. They'll be coming for sure.

Read more...

Colombia and China

In the midst of all the "Donroe Doctrine" hype I am staying focused on how Latin America maintains and deepens ties with extrahemispheric countries, which would supposedly violate the doctrine. For example, Colombia is deepening technology ties with China with a ministerial visit, following up on Gustavo Petro's visit last year. This includes connectivity, data infrastructure, and AI, plus satellites.

China's relationship with Latin America is embedded within countless contracts and agreements. Chinese and Colombian companies are working together--this isn't just talk between two governments. And it's necessary when the United States is openly an unreliable partner and reneges on agreements. Latin America has no choice but to play the field and at this point they've been doing it for a long time.

Read more...

Five (Problematic) Assumptions We're Making in Venezuela

There's a really good piece in Foreign Affairs by a former Bush administration who was in Iraq right after the invasion. She points to mistakes that need to be avoided in Venezuela. Go read that but I want to turn it on its head a bit and lay out what assumptions the Trump administration is making that seem fine in this honeymoon period but need to be watched carefully.

1. Venezuelans don't care about having control of oil. This assumption seems core and it contradicts the entire political history of Venezuela, no matter what political party you're talking about. But it also raises the question of what Venezuelans do as it sinks in that the United States has no interest in their well-being and only wants oil.

2. Venezuelan bureaucracies will work just fine. There is no well-functioning civil service. In its place is a highly politicized institutions that control distribution of just about everything.

3. The threat of U.S. force will prevent criminal groups from operating. I don't think there's much historical precedent for this anywhere.

4. Venezuelans don't mind the dictatorship continuing. Venezuelans hate this government and the repression it unleashes daily. How that translates into behavior isn't clear.

5. The dictatorship is a bloc that will be fine with change. The point O'Sullivan makes in the article is that if drug trafficking and other illicit activity drove allegiance then that will evaporate if the goodies stop flowing. Then you end up with chaos.

We're in the honeymoon period and the article shows how similar optimism on similar points prevailed in the early days of Iraq. There's oil and all we need to do is harness that--we get rid of the leader and the country will start running itself effectively. Right?

Read more...

Contradictions in Venezuela Policy

 There are some apparent contradictions, or at least dilemmas, that litter the current situation in Venezuela.

1. Venezuelan in the U.S. want the option to go home but fear they won't be allowed back into the United States (this was a point that came up in the Global Americans webinar today). U.S. immigration policy currently works against stability.

2. Donald Trump says that U.S. oil executives will get on board but the State Department also says Americans should get out of Venezuela.

3. The administration wants to restore the oil industry without a political transition, but the oil industry needs transition to make it work.

4. The administration wants to reduce China's influence in Venezuela and elsewhere but the dismantling of USAID and tariffs make that almost impossible.

5. There is a mixed message when the Trump administration talks a lot about protecting Iranian protesters but nothing when Venezuelans continue to be attacked.

It's mind blowing that the invasion occurred 10 days ago and virtually nothing of consequence has changed on the ground. It doesn't matter to Venezuelans who lack freedoms whether Nicolás Maduro of Delcy Rodríguez is the leader.

Read more...

U.S. Framework for Venezuela

Marco Rubio has said that the U.S. has a three-point plan for Venezuela. The country is completely controlled by the United States but "it will be up to the Venezuelan people to transform their country.”

1. Stabilization of the country. This basically means keeping the dictatorship in place while the U.S. sorts out the oil to prevent chaos. That will somehow enrich both the U.S. and the average Venezuelan. There aren't details.

2. Recovery. This means sorting out the oil, which in turn means selling it. To what countries and how is not stated. There aren't details.

3. Transition. This political and has zero details. When does it end? No one knows.

Rubio also said, "This is not just winging it" even though this is textbook winging it. It has the feel of a cocktail napkin plan that took no more than 15 minutes to develop.

Donald Trump talked extensively about the grab operation itself, which involved months of planning, but clearly there wasn't much thought given to the aftermath, except that María Corina Machado, who has the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump openly covets, was to be excluded and the dictatorship maintained. 

At least at the moment, there is a lot of talk but nothing has changed except the leadership. The Venezuelan people are being attacked by their own government, all U.S. sanctions remain in place, and oil tankers are being taken without any sense of what happens to them.

Read more...

China After the Venezuela Invasion

There are, and will continue to be, fairly breathless analyses about the U.S. invasion of Venezuela has thwarted Chinese ambitions in Latin America. Or wording to that effect. But be careful with broad pronouncements.

Case in point: Argentina. China and Argentina have had mutually beneficial economic relations for a long time. Javier Milei, who is gushingly pro-Trump, just said in an interview that "I’m not going to break the trade links with China." This is the problem with so many takes on China--they assume it's ideological when it's not.

Latin America has been playing the field for several decades now and the Venezuela invasion won't suddenly change that. It's not just China, but rather the whole world. Latin America has strong trade and investment ties all over.

Things change daily, but for now I expect Latin American leaders to mostly stay quiet, stay off Trump's radar, and continue doing business. Since the U.S. has proved itself an unreliable partner, increasingly that business is spread out.

Read more...

What Does It Mean for Cuba to be "Next"?

Donald Trump recently said that "“Cuba looks like it is ready to fall." But what does that mean? I don't really know and I have a sense he doesn't either. Here are possibilities:

1. There is a popular uprising that overthrows the regime. This is not likely given the tight control the government has on the population. There is no sign of it happening, at least.

2. Economic collapse leads to democratic transition. Things are bad right now. As I and others have argued plenty of times, the Special Period was disastrous and Fidel Castro held on. Economic deprivation alone does not cause regime change. So it's possible but not likely.

3. Economic collapse leads to Miguel Díaz-Canel resigning and someone more willing to work with the U.S. takes his place. This one would not involve democratic transition. Low likelihood but not impossible.

4. Economic collapse leads to chaos. If even security forces are deprived enough to form their own criminal bands that could even threaten the government, then you end up with a Haiti-type scenario. I suppose this is possible but would be very protracted.

5. U.S. "Snatch and Grab" like Venezuela. In this scenario, the U.S. grabs Miguel Díaz-Canel and chooses a pliable government figure to run the country in a way the U.S. prefers. Possible but not likely. I don't think the Cuban government is as porous as Venezuela's, but I guess you never know. Cuba's entire political framework is built on independence from the U.S. so it would be crazy to see. Plus, I am guessing Cuban security forces are better prepared than Venezuela's to protect the president.

6. Full U.S. invasion. This might be least likely since it's not popular in the U.S. and would face significant resistance in Cuba.

Estimating likelihood is really difficult in any situation but even tougher with Cuba. The Cuban revolution has hung on through invasion attempts, blockades, sanctions, loss of its main patron, economic crashes, you name it. So it's hard to envision how such a thing changes. But low likelihood still means it can happen!

Read more...

Venezuela Invasion FAQs

Here are some FAQs I put together as a way to clarify my own thoughts on the rapidly changing situation in Venezuela. They are not exhaustive and some may well change as they are overtaken by events.

1. Is it legal to grab a head of state out of their country?

    --No, and that's problematic, but international law is routinely ignored by powerful countries.

2. Did Venezuela steal U.S. oil and property?

    --No. The 1976 nationalization was uncontroversial and the 2000s expropriation by Hugo Chávez was being repaid until U.S. sanctions basically made continued payment impossible, at least temporarily.

3. Is Nicolás Maduro guilty of the crimes alleged by the U.S. government?

    --He was definitely part of a web of narcotics trafficking and corruption but the U.S. government must prove his direct involvement. For example, the Venezuelan government certainly connected to the FARC and ELN in Colombia, but was it Maduro himself? How well can we distinguish Maduro from "the regime"? He is guilty of many things but it's on the U.S. government to prove these specific charges. All that said, I can't see any scenario that doesn't involve conviction of at least some of the charges.

4. Was Maduro elected freely?

    --No. Over time he increasingly had to use fraud to win elections and in July 2024 it was egregious. He was a dictator.

5. Is Venezuela a major source of drugs in the U.S.?

    --No. Cocaine trafficking is aimed more at Latin America and Europe. Fentanyl doesn't come from Venezuela at all.

6.. Should we compare the Venezuela invasion to the 1989 Panama invasion?

    --Use care. Superficially, both involved a president indicted for drug trafficking who is grabbed and taken to court in the U.S. But Panama is small and heavily dependent on the U.S., with strong ties to the U.S (Manuel Noriega was a U.S. ally for years). Plus, the U.S. sent troops, who stayed about five weeks.

7. Did the U.S. remove the Venezuelan government?

    --No. Maduro is gone but everything else is intact. Venezuelan security is still on the streets. There is no sign yet that repression is decreasing. Venezuela remains a dictatorship.

8. Who is María Corina Machado and why didn't the U.S. name her president?

    --She is the opposition leader who was prohibited from running in the 2024 presidential election. There was another candidate (Edmundo González) but she is the face of the opposition. She is popular but putting her in power would certainly require U.S. troops, which so far the Trump administration has not been willing to commit.

9. Is Delcy Rodríguez very different from Maduro?

    --She is seen as more pragmatic. What that means in practice is not clear, especially without U.S. troops on the ground. She is a long-time regime member and is deeply implicated in all its abuses. She is a dictator.

10. Should we expect a democratic transition in Venezuela?

    --This is unclear. Given his statements, Trump has little to no interest in democratization and he has referred to a possible future transition but it remains vague.

11. Why won't the Trump administration commit occupying troops?

    --Almost certainly because of domestic political opinion. His core supporters claim to oppose this exact type of military action.

12. How should we expect Russia and China to respond?

    --The message is that you can do what you want in your sphere of influence, your "backyard." That message is not new but it's reinforced.

13. Can the Venezuelan oil industry be fixed quickly?

    --Almost certainly not. There is significant disrepair.

14. What does this mean for Cuba?

    --Both Trump and Rubio have indicated Cuba might be next. How this would work is unclear because the Cuban military is far superior to Venezuela's and so an attack will be riskier and less certain. Cuba will definitely be hit hard by being shut out of Venezuelan oil, though during the so-called Special Period of the early to mid-1990s its economy suffered terribly after the fall of the Soviet Union but the regime held on. It is very clear that Marco Rubio's ultimate goal is Cuba more than Venezuela.

Read more...

Viceroyalty Office in Venezuela

The Trump administration is working toward reopening the U.S. Embassy in Venezuela. This is worth paying attention to. There are no U.S. troops in Venezuela, or if they're there secretly they certainly do not constitute an occupying force. Imposition of U.S. will by remote control is going to be tricky and around the world, the embassy (and the ambassador) have been at the center of political control. Orders come from the ambassador.

As Ambassador Early Smith once said of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba:

    Whenever I asked President Batista for Cuba's vote to support the United States in the United Nations,        he would instruct his Foreign Minister to have the Cuban delegation vote in accordance with the United     States delegation and to give full support to the American delegation at the United Nations.

This is the sort of enterprise that takes time. There has been no ambassador since 2010 and no staff since 2019. But it is also the sort of enterprise that can be done quickly if you force it on the country and don't care about things going smoothly for a while.

Read more...