

A small distributed consensus protocol

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- This document is produced from the code available at <https://github.com/pirapira/pos>.
- To get updates on this project and similar ones, follow <http://gitter.im/ethereum/formal-methods>.

theory *MinimumAlgo*

imports *Main*

begin

1 Definition of the Protocol (Not Skippable)

In this development we do not know much about hashes. There are many hashes. Two hashes might be equal or not.

datatype *hash* = *Hash int*

Views are numbers. We actually need the fact that views are in total order. Otherwise accountable safety can be broken.

type-synonym *view* = *int*

We have two kinds of messages.

datatype *message* =
 *Commit hash * view*
 | *Prepare hash * view * view*

Sometimes we want to talk about the view of a message.

datatype *validator* = *Validator int*

type-synonym *sent* = *validator * message*

A situation might be seen from a global point of view where every sent messages can be seen, or more likely seen from a local point of view.

record *situation* =
 Validators :: validator set
 Messages :: sent set
 PrevHash :: hash ⇒ hash option

In the next section, we are going to determine which of the validators are slashed in a situation.

We will be talking about two conflicting commits. To define 'conflicting' one needs to look at the hashes.

A situation contains information which hash is the parent of which hash. We can follow this link n-times.

```
fun nth-ancestor :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  nat  $\Rightarrow$  hash  $\Rightarrow$  hash option
where
  nth-ancestor - 0 h = Some h
| nth-ancestor s (Suc n) h =
  (case PrevHash s h of
    None  $\Rightarrow$  None
  | Some h'  $\Rightarrow$  nth-ancestor s n h')
```

And also we are allowed to talk if two hashes are in ancestor-descendant relation. It does not matter if this is computable.

```
definition is-descendant-or-self :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  hash  $\Rightarrow$  hash  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  is-descendant-or-self s x y = ( $\exists$  n. nth-ancestor s n x = Some y)
```

We can also talk if two hashes are not in ancestor-descendant relation in whichever ways.

```
definition not-on-same-chain :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  hash  $\Rightarrow$  hash  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  not-on-same-chain s x y = (( $\neg$  is-descendant-or-self s x y)  $\wedge$  ( $\neg$  is-descendant-or-self s y x))
```

In the slashing condition, we will be talking about two-thirds of the validators doing something.

We can lift any predicate about a validator into a predicate about a situation: two thirds of the validators satisfy the predicate.

```
definition two-thirds :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  (validator  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  two-thirds s f =
    (2 * card (Validators s)  $\leq$  3 * card ({n. n  $\in$  Validators s  $\wedge$  f n}))
```

Similarly for one-third, more-than-two-thirds, and more-than-one-third.

```
definition one-third :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  (validator  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  one-third s f =
    (card (Validators s)  $\leq$  3 * card ({n. n  $\in$  Validators s  $\wedge$  f n}))
```

```
definition more-than-two-thirds :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  (validator  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  more-than-two-thirds s f =
    (2 * card (Validators s) < 3 * card ({n. n  $\in$  Validators s  $\wedge$  f n}))
```

```
definition more-than-one-third :: situation  $\Rightarrow$  (validator  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  more-than-one-third s f =
```

$$(card (Validators\ s) < 3 * card (\{n. n \in Validators\ s \wedge f\ n\}))$$

definition *two-thirds-sent-message* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *message* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

$$two-thirds-sent-message\ s\ m = \\ two-thirds\ s\ (\lambda\ n. (n, m) \in Messages\ s)$$

A hash is prepared when two-thirds of the validators have sent a certain message.

definition *prepared* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *hash* $\Rightarrow$ *view* $\Rightarrow$ *view* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

$$prepared\ s\ h\ v\ vs = \\ (two-thirds-sent-message\ s\ (Prepare\ (h, v, vs)))$$

A hash is committed when two-thirds of the validators have sent a certain message.

definition *committed* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *hash* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

$$committed\ s\ h = (\exists\ v. two-thirds-sent-message\ s\ (Commit\ (h, v)))$$

2 The Slashing Conditions (not skippable)

[i] A validator is slashed when it has sent a commit message of a hash that is not prepared yet.

definition *slashed-one* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *validator* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

$$slashed-one\ s\ n = \\ (n \in Validators\ s \wedge \\ (\exists\ h\ v. \\ ((n, Commit\ (h, v)) \in Messages\ s \wedge \\ (\neg (\exists\ vs. -1 \leq vs \wedge vs < v \wedge prepared\ s\ h\ v\ vs))))))$$

[ii] A validator is slashed when it has sent a prepare message whose view src is not -1 but has no supporting preparation in the view src.

definition *slashed-two* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *validator* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

$$slashed-two\ s\ n = \\ (n \in Validators\ s \wedge \\ (\exists\ h\ v\ vs. \\ ((n, Prepare\ (h, v, vs)) \in Messages\ s \wedge \\ vs \neq -1 \wedge \\ (\neg (\exists\ h-anc\ vs'. \\ -1 \leq vs' \wedge vs' < vs \wedge \\ Some\ h-anc = nth-ancestor\ s\ (nat\ (v - vs))\ h \wedge \\ prepared\ s\ h-anc\ vs\ vs'))))))$$

[iii] A validator is slashed when it has sent a commit message and a prepare message containing view numbers in a specific constellation.

definition *slashed-three* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *validator* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

slashed-three *s* *n* =
 $(n \in \text{Validators } s \wedge$
 $(\exists x y v w u.$
 $(n, \text{Commit } (x, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge$
 $(n, \text{Prepare } (y, w, u)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge$
 $u < v \wedge v < w))$

[iv] A validator is slashed when it has sent two conflicting Prepare messages at the same view.

definition *slashed-four* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *validator* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

slashed-four *s* *n* =
 $(n \in \text{Validators } s \wedge$
 $(\exists x1 x2 v vs1 vs2.$
 $(n, \text{Prepare } (x1, v, vs1)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge$
 $(n, \text{Prepare } (x2, v, vs2)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge$
 $(x1 \neq x2 \vee vs1 \neq vs2)))$

A validator is slashed when at least one of the above conditions [i]–[iv] hold.

definition *slashed* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *validator* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

slashed *s* *n* = (*slashed-one* *s* *n* $\vee$
slashed-two *s* *n* $\vee$
slashed-three *s* *n* $\vee$
slashed-four *s* *n*)

definition *one-third-slashed* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

one-third-slashed *s* = *one-third* *s* (*slashed* *s*)

However, since cardinality of an infinite set is defined to be zero, we should be talking about situations where the set of validators is finite.

definition *situation-has-finitely-many-validators* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

situation-has-finitely-many-validators *s* = (*Validators* *s* $\neq \{\}$ $\wedge$ *finite* (*Validators* *s*))

3 Useful Lemmas for Accountable Safety (can be skipped)

lemma *card-not [simp]* :

finite *s* $\implies$
 $\text{card } \{n \in s. \neg f n\} = \text{card } s - \text{card } \{n \in s. f n\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *not-one-third [simp]* :
situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 $(\neg \text{one-third } s \ f) = (\text{more-than-two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. \neg f \ n))$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *condition-one-positive* :
 $\exists n. (n, \text{Commit } (x, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge$
 $n \in \text{Validators } s \wedge$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 $(\exists v \text{ vs.}$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. (n, \text{Prepare } (x, v, \text{vs})) \in \text{Messages } s)$
 $\wedge -1 \leq \text{vs} \wedge \text{vs} < v)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *condition-one-positive'* :
 $\exists n. (n, \text{Commit } (x, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge$
 $n \in \text{Validators } s \wedge$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 $(\exists \text{vs.}$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. (n, \text{Prepare } (x, v, \text{vs})) \in \text{Messages } s)$
 $\wedge -1 \leq \text{vs} \wedge \text{vs} < v)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *set-conj [simp]* :
 $\{n \in s. f \ n \wedge g \ n\} = \{n \in s. f \ n\} \cap \{n \in s. g \ n\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-more-two-set* :
finite $s \implies$
 $2 * \text{card } s \leq 3 * \text{card } \{n \in s. f \ n\} \implies$
 $2 * \text{card } s < 3 * \text{card } \{n \in s. g \ n\} \implies$
 $\text{card } s$
 $< 3 * \text{card } (\{n \in s. f \ n\} \cap \{n \in s. g \ n\})$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-more-two* :
situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ f \implies$
 $\text{more-than-two-thirds } s \ g \implies$
 $\text{more-than-one-third } s \ (\lambda n. f \ n \wedge g \ n)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *card-nonzero-exists* :
 $\text{card } \{n \in s. f \ n\} > 0 \implies$
 $\exists n \in s. f \ n$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *more-than-one-third-exists* :
 situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 more-than-one-third $s \ f \implies$
 $\exists \ n \in \text{Validators } s. \ f \ n$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-more-two-ex* :
 situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 two-thirds $s \ f \implies$
 more-than-two-thirds $s \ g \implies$
 $\exists \ n \in \text{Validators } s. \ f \ n \wedge g \ n$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *commit-expand*:
 situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 two-thirds-sent-message $s \ (\text{Commit } (x, v)) \implies$
 $(\exists \ vs. \ \text{prepared } s \ x \ v \ vs \wedge -1 \leq vs \wedge vs < v) \vee \text{one-third-slashed } s$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *card-conj-le* :
 finite $s \implies$
 $\text{card } (\{n \in s. \ f \ n\} \cap \{n \in s. \ g \ n\})$
 $= \text{card } \{n \in s. \ f \ n\} + \text{card } \{n \in s. \ g \ n\} - \text{card } (\{n \in s. \ f \ n\} \cup \{n \in s. \ g \ n\})$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-two-set* :
 $2 * \text{card } s \leq 3 * \text{card } \{n \in s. \ f \ n\} \implies$
 $2 * \text{card } s \leq 3 * \text{card } \{n \in s. \ g \ n\} \implies$
 finite $s \implies$
 $\text{card } s \leq 3 * \text{card } (\{n \in s. \ f \ n\} \cap \{n \in s. \ g \ n\})$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-two* :
 situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 two-thirds $s \ f \implies$
 two-thirds $s \ g \implies$
 one-third $s \ (\lambda \ n. \ f \ n \wedge g \ n)$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *dependency-self* [simp]:
 $\neg \text{not-on-same-chain } s \ y \ y$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *prepare-direct-conflict* :
 not-on-same-chain $s \ x \ y \implies$

$n \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $(n, \text{Prepare } (x, v2, vs1)) \in \text{Messages } s \implies$
 $(n, \text{Prepare } (y, v2, vs2)) \in \text{Messages } s \implies \text{slashed-four } s \ n$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *inclusion-card-le* :
 $\forall n. n \in \text{Validators } s \longrightarrow f \ n \longrightarrow g \ n \implies$
 $\text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\text{card } \{n \in \text{Validators } s. f \ n\} \leq \text{card } \{n \in \text{Validators } s. g \ n\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *mp-one-third* :
 $\text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\forall n. n \in \text{Validators } s \longrightarrow f \ n \longrightarrow g \ n \implies$
 $\text{one-third } s \ f \implies \text{one-third } s \ g$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *mp-two-thirds* :
 $\text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\forall n. n \in \text{Validators } s \longrightarrow f \ n \longrightarrow g \ n \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ f \implies \text{two-thirds } s \ g$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *safety-case1'* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{not-on-same-chain } s \ x \ y \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. (n, \text{Prepare } (x, v2, vs1)) \in \text{Messages } s) \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. (n, \text{Prepare } (y, v2, vs2)) \in \text{Messages } s) \implies \text{one-third } s$
 $(\text{slashed } s)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *safety-case1* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{not-on-same-chain } s \ x \ y \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ x \ v2 \ vs1 \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ y \ v2 \ vs2 \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *not-on-same-chain-sym [simp]* :
 $\text{not-on-same-chain } s \ x \ y = \text{not-on-same-chain } s \ y \ x$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *commit-prepare* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. (n, \text{Commit } (y, v)) \in \text{Messages } s) \implies$
 $(\exists vs. \text{prepared } s \ y \ v \ vs \wedge -1 \leq vs \wedge vs < v) \vee \text{one-third-slashed } s$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *one-third-prepared-conflict* :

$x \neq y \implies$
 $\text{one-third } s$
 $(\lambda n. (n, \text{Prepare } (y, c\text{-view}, vs)) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge (n, \text{Prepare } (x, c\text{-view}, vs1))$
 $\in \text{Messages } s) \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{one-third } s \text{ (slashed } s)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *prepared-conflict* :

$\text{prepared } s \ y \ c\text{-view } vs \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $x \neq y \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ x \ c\text{-view } vs1 \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *commit-prepared* :

$\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $x \neq y \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, c\text{-view})) \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ x \ c\text{-view } vs1 \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *condition-three-again* :

$\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $vs1 < c\text{-view} \implies$
 $c\text{-view} < v \implies$
 $\text{one-third } s \ (\lambda n. (n, \text{Commit } (y, c\text{-view})) \in \text{Messages } s \wedge (n, \text{Prepare } (x, v,$
 $vs1)) \in \text{Messages } s) \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *between-concrete* :

$c\text{-view} < v \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, c\text{-view})) \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ x \ v \ vs1 \implies$
 $vs1 < c\text{-view} \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *between-case* :

$c\text{-view} \leq v \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, c\text{-view})) \implies$

$\text{prepared } s \ x \ v \ vs1 \implies -1 \leq vs1 \implies c\text{-view} \neq v \implies vs1 < c\text{-view} \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *ancestors-ancestor* :

$\forall \ m \ x \ y.$
 $\text{nth-ancestor } s \ n \ x = \text{Some } y \longrightarrow$
 $\text{nth-ancestor } s \ m \ y = \text{nth-ancestor } s \ (n + m) \ x$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *nat-min-min* :

$vs1 < v \implies$
 $\neg vs1 < c\text{-view} \implies$
 $(\text{nat } (v - vs1) + \text{nat } (vs1 - c\text{-view})) = \text{nat } (v - c\text{-view})$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *ancestor-ancestor* :

$\text{nth-ancestor } s \ (\text{nat } (v - c\text{-view})) \ x \neq \text{Some } y \implies$
 $vs1 < v \implies$
 $\neg vs1 < c\text{-view} \implies$
 $\neg c\text{-view} \leq -1 \implies$
 $-1 \leq vs' \implies$
 $vs' < vs1 \implies$
 $\text{Some } h\text{-anc} = \text{nth-ancestor } s \ (\text{nat } (v - vs1)) \ x \implies$
 $\text{nth-ancestor } s \ (\text{nat } (vs1 - c\text{-view})) \ h\text{-anc} \neq \text{Some } y$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *the-induction* :

$\text{nat } (v - c\text{-view}) \leq \text{Suc } n \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{nth-ancestor } s \ (\text{nat } (v - c\text{-view})) \ x \neq \text{Some } y \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, c\text{-view})) \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ x \ v \ vs1 \implies$
 $vs1 < v \implies$
 $\neg vs1 < c\text{-view} \implies$
 $\neg c\text{-view} \leq -1 \implies$
 $\forall \ x \ y \ v.$
 $\text{nat } (v - c\text{-view}) \leq n \longrightarrow$
 $c\text{-view} \leq v \longrightarrow$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \longrightarrow$
 $\text{nth-ancestor } s \ (\text{nat } (v - c\text{-view})) \ x \neq \text{Some } y \longrightarrow$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, c\text{-view})) \longrightarrow$
 $(\forall \ vs1. \text{prepared } s \ x \ v \ vs1 \longrightarrow -1 \leq vs1 \longrightarrow vs1 < v \longrightarrow \text{one-third-slashed } s) \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

The following lemma is a core of the accountable safety proof. It requires the mathematical induction.

lemma *safety-sub-ind'* :

$\forall$ *c-view* *s x y v vs1* .
 $n \geq \text{nat } (v - \text{c-view}) \longrightarrow$
 $v \geq \text{c-view} \longrightarrow$
situation-has-finitely-many-validators *s* $\longrightarrow$
nth-ancestor *s* (*nat* (*v - c-view*)) *x* $\neq \text{Some } y \longrightarrow$
two-thirds-sent-message *s* (*Commit* (*y*, *c-view*)) $\longrightarrow$
prepared *s x v vs1* $\longrightarrow$
 $- 1 \leq \text{vs1} \longrightarrow \text{vs1} < v \longrightarrow \text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *safety-sub-ind''* :

$n = \text{nat } (v - \text{c-view}) \implies$
 $v \geq \text{c-view} \implies$
situation-has-finitely-many-validators *s* $\implies$
nth-ancestor *s n x* $\neq \text{Some } y \implies$
two-thirds-sent-message *s* (*Commit* (*y*, *c-view*)) $\implies$
prepared *s x v vs1* $\implies$
 $- 1 \leq \text{vs1} \implies \text{vs1} < v \implies \text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *not-on-chain-not-ancestor* [*simp*] :

not-on-same-chain *s x y* $\implies$
nth-ancestor *s m x* $\neq \text{Some } y$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *safety-sub-ind* :

situation-has-finitely-many-validators *s* $\longrightarrow$
not-on-same-chain *s x y* $\longrightarrow$
two-thirds-sent-message *s* (*Commit* (*x*, *v1*)) $\longrightarrow$
two-thirds-sent-message *s* (*Commit* (*y*, *v2*)) $\longrightarrow$
prepared *s x v1' vs1* $\longrightarrow$
prepared *s y v2' vs2* $\longrightarrow$
 $v1' \geq v2 \vee v2' \geq v1 \longrightarrow$
 $- 1 \leq \text{vs1} \longrightarrow \text{vs1} < v1' \longrightarrow - 1 \leq \text{vs2} \longrightarrow \text{vs2} < v2' \longrightarrow \text{one-third-slashed}$
 s
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *safety-sub-closer* :

situation-has-finitely-many-validators *s* $\longrightarrow$
not-on-same-chain *s x y* $\longrightarrow$
two-thirds-sent-message *s* (*Commit* (*x*, *v1*)) $\longrightarrow$
two-thirds-sent-message *s* (*Commit* (*y*, *v2*)) $\longrightarrow$
prepared *s x v1 vs1* $\longrightarrow$
prepared *s y v2 vs2* $\longrightarrow$
 $v2 \leq v1 \vee v1 \leq v2 \longrightarrow$

$-1 \leq vs1 \longrightarrow vs1 < v1 \longrightarrow -1 \leq vs2 \longrightarrow vs2 < v2 \longrightarrow \text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *view-total* [simp]:
 $(v2 :: \text{view}) \leq v1 \vee v1 \leq v2$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *safety-sub'* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{not-on-same-chain } s \ x \ y \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (x, v1)) \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, v2)) \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ x \ v1 \ vs1 \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \ y \ v2 \ vs2 \implies$
 $-1 \leq vs1 \implies vs1 < v1 \implies -1 \leq vs2 \implies vs2 < v2 \implies \text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *accountable-safety-sub* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\exists v1 \ vs1. \text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (x, v1)) \wedge \text{prepared } s \ x \ v1 \ vs1 \wedge$
 $-1 \leq vs1 \wedge vs1 < v1 \implies$
 $\exists v2 \ vs2. \text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ (\text{Commit } (y, v2)) \wedge \text{prepared } s \ y \ v2 \ vs2 \wedge$
 $-1 \leq vs2 \wedge vs2 < v2 \implies$
 $\text{not-on-same-chain } s \ x \ y \implies$
 $\text{one-third-slashed } s$

$\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

4 Accountable Safety (don't skip)

lemma *accountable-safety* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{committed } s \ x \implies \text{committed } s \ y \implies$
 $\text{not-on-same-chain } s \ x \ y \implies \text{one-third-slashed } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

5 More Terminology for Liveness

definition *view-of-message* :: $\text{message} \Rightarrow \text{view}$

where

$\text{view-of-message } m = (\text{case } m \text{ of}$
 $\quad \text{Commit } (h, v) \Rightarrow v$
 $\quad | \text{Prepare } (h, v, v\text{-src}) \Rightarrow v)$

definition *message-has-valid-view* :: $\text{message} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

$\text{message-has-valid-view } m = (\text{case } m \text{ of}$
 $\quad \text{Commit } (h, v) \Rightarrow 0 \leq v$

| *Prepare* ($h, v, v\text{-src}$) $\Rightarrow -1 \leq v$)

definition *view-of-sent-message* :: (*validator* * *message*) $\Rightarrow$ *view*
where
view-of-sent-message = *view-of-message* o *snd*

definition *no-invalid-view* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
no-invalid-view *s* =
 $(\forall n\ m. (n, m) \in \text{Messages } s \longrightarrow$
 $\text{message-has-valid-view } m)$

definition *finite-messages* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
finite-messages *s* = *finite* (*Messages* *s*)

definition *new-descendant-available* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
new-descendant-available *s* =
 $(\forall n\ h\ v\ \text{diff}.$
 $(n, \text{Commit } (h, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \longrightarrow$
 $(\exists h\text{-new}. \text{nth-ancestor } s\ \text{diff } h\text{-new} = \text{Some } h \wedge \neg \text{committed } s\ h\text{-new}))$

definition *authors* :: (*validator* * *message*) *set* $\Rightarrow$ *validator set*
where
authors *ms* = $\{n. \exists m. (n, m) \in ms\}$

definition *unslashed-validators* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *validator set*
where
unslashed-validators *s* = $\{n \in \text{Validators } s. \neg \text{slashed } s\ n\}$

definition *unslashed-can-extend* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
unslashed-can-extend *s* *s-new* =
 $(\exists \text{new-messages}.$
 $\text{authors } \text{new-messages} \subseteq \text{unslashed-validators } s \wedge$
 $\text{Validators } s\text{-new} = \text{Validators } s \wedge$
 $\text{Messages } s\text{-new} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{new-messages} \wedge$
 $\text{PrevHash } s\text{-new} = \text{PrevHash } s\text{-new})$

definition *no-new-slashed* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*
where
no-new-slashed *s* *s-new* =
 $(\forall n. n \in \text{Validators } s \longrightarrow \text{slashed } s\text{-new } n \longrightarrow \text{slashed } s\ n)$

6 Useful Lemmas for Plausible Liveness (skippable)

definition *no-commits-by-honest* :: *situation* $\Rightarrow$ *bool*

where

no-commits-by-honest $s =$
 $(\forall n \in \text{Validators } s. (\forall h v.$
 $(n, \text{Commit } (h, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \longrightarrow \text{slashed } s n$
 $))$

definition *no-messages-by-honest* $:: \text{situation} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

no-messages-by-honest $s =$
 $(\forall n \in \text{Validators } s. (\forall m. (n, m) \in \text{Messages } s \longrightarrow \text{slashed } s n))$

definition *some-commits-by-honest-at* $:: \text{situation} \Rightarrow \text{view} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

some-commits-by-honest-at $s v =$
 $(\exists n \in \text{Validators } s.$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s n \wedge$
 $(\exists h. (n, \text{Commit } (h, v)) \in \text{Messages } s))$

definition *some-messages-by-honest-at* $:: \text{situation} \Rightarrow \text{view} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

some-messages-by-honest-at $s v =$
 $(\exists n \in \text{Validators } s.$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s n \wedge$
 $(\exists m. \text{view-of-message } m = v \wedge$
 $(n, m) \in \text{Messages } s))$

definition *no-commits-by-honest-after* $:: \text{situation} \Rightarrow \text{view} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

no-commits-by-honest-after $s v\text{-latest} =$
 $(\forall n \in \text{Validators } s. (\forall h v.$
 $(n, \text{Commit } (h, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \longrightarrow$
 $v \leq v\text{-latest} \vee \text{slashed } s n$
 $))$

definition *no-messages-by-honest-after* $:: \text{situation} \Rightarrow \text{view} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$

where

no-messages-by-honest-after $s v\text{-latest} =$
 $(\forall n \in \text{Validators } s. (\forall m.$
 $(n, m) \in \text{Messages } s \longrightarrow$
 $\text{view-of-message } m \leq v\text{-latest} \vee \text{slashed } s n))$

lemma *some-commits-by-honest-intro* :

$\exists n \in \text{Validators } s. (\exists h v. (n, \text{Commit } (h, v)) \in \text{Messages } s) \wedge \neg \text{slashed } s n \implies$
 $\{M1. \text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s M1\} \neq \{\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *some-messages-by-honest-intro* :

$\exists n \in \text{Validators } s. (\exists m. (n, m) \in \text{Messages } s) \wedge \neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 $\{M1. \text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M1\} \neq \{\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *finite-commits-by-honest* :
 $\text{finite-messages } s \implies$
 $\text{finite } \{M1. \text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s \ M1\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *finite-messages-by-honest* :
 $\text{finite-messages } s \implies$
 $\text{finite } \{M1. \text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M1\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *view-some-arithmetics* :
 $(v :: \text{view}) \leq x \vee v \neq x$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *finite-views-have-max* :
 $\text{finite } (\text{views} :: \text{view set}) \implies \text{views} \neq \{\} \implies$
 $\exists v\text{-max}.$
 $v\text{-max} \in \text{views} \wedge (\forall v. v \leq v\text{-max} \vee v \notin \text{views})$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *M1-prop-sub2* :
 $\exists v\text{-max}. v\text{-max} \in \{M1. \text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s \ M1\}$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \leq v\text{-max} \vee v \notin \{M1. \text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s \ M1\})$
 $\implies$
 $\exists M1. M1 = -1 \wedge (\forall n \in \text{Validators } s. (\exists h \ v. (n, \text{Commit } (h, v)) \in \text{Messages } s)$
 $\longrightarrow \text{slashed } s \ n) \vee$
 $\text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s \ M1 \wedge \text{no-commits-by-honest-after } s \ M1$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *M1-properties* :
 $\text{finite-messages } s \implies$
 $\exists M1.$
 $(M1 = -1 \wedge \text{no-commits-by-honest } s)$
 $\vee (\text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s \ M1 \wedge \text{no-commits-by-honest-after } s \ M1)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *M2-prop-sub2* :
 $\exists v\text{-max}. v\text{-max} \in \{M1. \text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M1\}$
 $\wedge (\forall v. v \leq v\text{-max} \vee v \notin \{M1. \text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M1\})$
 $\implies$
 $\exists M2. M2 = -1 \wedge (\forall n \in \text{Validators } s. (\exists m. (n, m) \in \text{Messages } s) \longrightarrow \text{slashed } s$

$n) \vee$
 $\text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M2 \wedge \text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *M2-properties*:
 $\text{finite-messages } s \implies$
 $\exists \ M2.$
 $(M2 = -1 \wedge \text{no-messages-by-honest } s)$
 $\vee (\text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M2 \wedge \text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-messages-no-commits [simp]* :
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest } s \implies \text{no-commits-by-honest } s$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-messages-then-no-messages-after [simp]* :
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest } s \implies \text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ m$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-messages-denies-somit-commits-at [simp]* :
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{some-commits-by-honest-at } s \ m$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-messages-denies-some-messages-at [simp]* :
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ m$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-commits-denies-some-commits-at [simp]* :
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest-after } s \ M1$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

definition *liveness-witness* :: $\text{hash} \Rightarrow \text{view} \Rightarrow \text{view} \Rightarrow \text{validator set} \Rightarrow (\text{validator} * \text{message}) \text{ set}$

where

$\text{liveness-witness } h \ M1 \ M2 \ ns =$
 $\{(n, \text{Prepare } (h, M2 + 1, M1)) \mid n. n \in ns\} \cup$
 $\{(n, \text{Commit } (h, M2 + 1)) \mid n. n \in ns\}$

lemma *author-of-witness [simp]* :
 $\text{authors } (\text{liveness-witness } h\text{-new } M1 \ M2 \ ns) = ns$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *unslashed-can-use-witness [simp]*:
 $\text{unslashed-can-extend } s$

$\langle \text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } h\text{-new } M1 \ M2 \ \{n \in \text{Validators } s. \neg$
 $\text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s \rangle$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *more-than-two-thirds-mp* :
 $\text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\forall n. n \in \text{Validators } s \longrightarrow f \ n \longrightarrow g \ n \implies$
 $\text{more-than-two-thirds } s \ f \implies \text{more-than-two-thirds } s \ g$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *witness-commits-inner* :
 $\text{Validators } s \neq \{\} \wedge \text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\text{more-than-two-thirds } s \ (\lambda n. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n) \implies$
 $2 * \text{card } (\text{Validators } s)$
 $\leq 3 * \text{card } \{n \in \text{Validators } s. (n, \text{Commit } (h\text{-new}, M2 + 1)) \in \text{Messages } s \vee$
 $n \in \text{Validators } s \wedge \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *witness-commits [simp]* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 committed
 $\langle \text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } h\text{-new } M1 \ M2 \ \{n \in \text{Validators } s. \neg$
 $\text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s \rangle$
 $h\text{-new}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-thirds-transfer [simp]* :
 $\text{two-thirds } \langle \text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s, \text{Messages} = X, \text{PrevHash} = Y \rangle g =$
 $\text{two-thirds } s \ g$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *prepared-transfer* :
 $\text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\text{prepared } s \text{ ha } v \text{ vs} \implies$
 prepared
 $\langle \text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup X,$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s \rangle$
 $\text{ha } v \text{ vs}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *witness-has-certain-view* :
 $(na, \text{Commit } (ha, v)) \in \text{liveness-witness } h\text{-new } M1 \ M2 \ \{n \in \text{Validators } s. \neg$
 $\text{slashed } s \ n\} \implies$

$$v = M2 + 1$$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-has-certain-hash* :

$(na, Commit(ha, v)) \in liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ \{n \in Validators\ s. \neg slashed\ s\ n\} \implies$
 $ha = h-new$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *more-than-two-thirds-imply-two-thirds* :

$more-than-two-thirds\ s\ f \implies$
 $two-thirds\ s\ f$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-prepares*:

$situation-has-finitely-many-validators\ s \implies$
 $\neg one-third-slashed\ s \implies$
 $prepared$
 $(\begin{array}{l} Validators = Validators\ s, \\ Messages = Messages\ s \cup liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ \{n \in Validators \\ s. \neg slashed\ s\ n\}, \\ PrevHash = PrevHash\ s \end{array})$
 $h-new\ (M2 + 1)\ M1$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *commit-can-be-after-neg-one*:

$situation-has-finitely-many-validators\ s \implies$
 $n \in Validators\ s \implies$
 $\neg slashed\ s\ n \implies$
 $(n, Commit(h, M1)) \in Messages\ s \implies$
 $-1 \leq M1$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-not-slashed-one* :

$situation-has-finitely-many-validators\ s \implies$
 $\neg one-third-slashed\ s \implies$
 $no-messages-by-honest-after\ s\ M2 \implies$
 $n \in Validators\ s \implies$
 $\neg slashed\ s\ n \implies$
 $(n, Commit(h, M1)) \in Messages\ s \implies$
 $na \in Validators\ s \implies$
 $slashed-one$
 $(\begin{array}{l} Validators = Validators\ s, \\ Messages = Messages\ s \cup liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ \{n \in Validators\ s. \neg \\ slashed\ s\ n\}, \end{array})$

$PrevHash = PrevHash\ s$)
 $na \implies$
 $slashed-one\ s\ na$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *nth-ancestor-transfers* [simp] :

$\forall\ N\ M\ s\ ha.$
 $nth-ancestor$
 $(\parallel Validators = N,$
 $Messages = M,$
 $PrevHash = PrevHash\ s)$
 $n\ ha =$
 $nth-ancestor\ s\ n\ ha$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-prepares-certain-hash* :

$(na, Prepare\ (ha, v, vs)) \in liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ validators \implies$
 $ha = h-new$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-prepares-certain-view* :

$(na, Prepare\ (ha, v, vs)) \in liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ validators \implies$
 $v = M2 + 1$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-commits-certain-view* :

$(n, Commit\ (h, v)) \in liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ validators \implies$
 $v = M2 + 1$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *witness-prepares-certain-view-src* :

$(na, Prepare\ (ha, v, vs)) \in liveness-witness\ h-new\ M1\ M2\ validators \implies$
 $vs = M1$
 $\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *it-is-somebody-that-prepares* :

$situation-has-finitely-many-validators\ s \implies$
 $\neg one-third-slashed\ s \implies$
 $prepared\ s\ h\ v\ v-src \implies$
 $\exists\ n. n \in Validators\ s \wedge$
 $\neg slashed\ s\ n \wedge$
 $(n, Prepare\ (h, v, v-src)) \in Messages\ s$

$\langle proof \rangle$

lemma *slashed-two-transfers* :

$situation-has-finitely-many-validators\ s \implies$
 $\neg one-third-slashed\ s \implies$
 $no-messages-by-honest-after\ s\ M2 \implies$

$n \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 $(n, \text{Commit } (h, M1)) \in \text{Messages } s \implies$
 $\text{nth-ancestor } s \ (\text{nat } (M2 + 1 - M1)) \ h\text{-new} = \text{Some } h \implies$
 $na \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 slashed-two
 $(\mid \text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } h\text{-new } M1 \ M2 \ \{n \in \text{Validators}$
 $s. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s)$
 $na \implies$
 $\text{slashed-two } s \ na$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-prepare-after* :
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2 \implies$
 $na \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $(na, \text{Prepare } (y, w, u)) \in \text{Messages } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ na \implies w \leq M2$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *slashed-intro-three* :
 $\text{slashed-three } s \ n \implies \text{slashed } s \ n$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-commit-after* :
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest-after } s \ M1 \implies$
 $na \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $(na, \text{Commit } (x, v)) \in \text{Messages } s \implies \neg \text{slashed } s \ na \implies v \leq M1$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *slashed-three-transfers* :
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest-after } s \ M1 \implies$
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2 \implies$
 $na \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 slashed-three
 $(\mid \text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } h\text{-new } M1 \ M2 \ \{n \in \text{Validators}$
 $s. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s)$
 $na \implies$
 $\text{slashed } s \ na$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *slashed-four-transfers* :
no-messages-by-honest-after s M2 $\implies$
na $\in$ *Validators s* $\implies$
slashed-four
 $(\mid$ *Validators* = *Validators s*,
Messages = *Messages s* $\cup$ *liveness-witness h-new M1 M2* $\{n \in$ *Validators*
s. $\neg$ slashed s n},
PrevHash = *PrevHash s*)
na $\implies$
slashed s na
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

lemma *slashed-destruct* :
slashed s n $\implies$
slashed-one s n $\vee$ *slashed-two s n* $\vee$ *slashed-three s n* $\vee$ *slashed-four s n*
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

lemma *slashed-intro-two* :
slashed-two s na $\implies$ *slashed s na*
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

lemma *slashed-intro-four* :
slashed-four s na $\implies$ *slashed s na*
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

lemma *witness-not-guilty* [*simp*]:
situation-has-finitely-many-validators s $\implies$
finite-messages s $\implies$
 $\neg$ *one-third-slashed s* $\implies$
 $\neg$ *no-messages-by-honest s* $\implies$
 $\neg$ *no-commits-by-honest s* $\implies$
no-commits-by-honest-after s M1 $\implies$
some-messages-by-honest-at s M2 $\implies$
no-messages-by-honest-after s M2 $\implies$
n $\in$ *Validators s* $\implies$
 $\neg$ *slashed s n* $\implies$
 $(n, \text{Commit } (h, M1)) \in \text{Messages } s \implies$
nth-ancestor s (*nat* (*M2* + 1 - *M1*)) *h-new* = *Some h* $\implies$
 $\neg$ *committed s h-new* $\implies$
no-new-slashed s
 $(\mid$ *Validators* = *Validators s*,
Messages = *Messages s* $\cup$ *liveness-witness h-new M1 M2* $\{n \in$ *Validators*
s. $\neg$ slashed s n},
PrevHash = *PrevHash s*)
 $\langle$ *proof* $\rangle$

lemma *no-messages-cannot-commit* :
situation-has-finitely-many-validators s $\implies$

$\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies \text{no-messages-by-honest } s \implies \neg \text{committed } s \ h$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *corner-kick* :

$\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{finite-messages } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\text{no-new-slashed } s$
 $(\text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } (\text{Hash } 0) (- 1) (- 1) \{n \in$
 $\text{Validators } s. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s)$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *at-least-neg-one* :

$\text{no-invalid-view } s \implies$
 $\text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M2 \implies$
 $- 1 \leq M2$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-commit-new-slashed-three*:

$\text{no-invalid-view } s \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2 \implies$
 $n \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 slashed-three
 $(\text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } (\text{Hash } 0) (- 1) M2 \{n \in$
 $\text{Validators } s. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s)$
 $n \implies$
 False
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-commit-new-slashed-four*:

$\text{no-invalid-view } s \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2 \implies$
 $n \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 slashed-four
 $(\text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } (\text{Hash } 0) (- 1) M2 \{n \in \text{Validators}$

$s. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s\}$
 $n \implies$
 False
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *two-thirds-sent-message-transfers :*

$\text{finite } (\text{Validators } s) \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message } s \ m \implies$
 $\text{two-thirds-sent-message}$
 $(\text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} =$
 $\text{Messages } s \cup X,$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s) \ m$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *no-commit-new-slashed-two:*

$\text{no-invalid-view } s \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M2 \implies$
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2 \implies$
 $n \in \text{Validators } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{slashed } s \ n \implies$
 slashed-two
 $(\text{Validators} = \text{Validators } s,$
 $\text{Messages} = \text{Messages } s \cup \text{liveness-witness } (\text{Hash } 0) \ (-1) \ M2 \ \{n \in$
 $\text{Validators } s. \neg \text{slashed } s \ n\},$
 $\text{PrevHash} = \text{PrevHash } s)$
 $n \implies$
 False
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

lemma *corner-kick2 :*

$\text{no-invalid-view } s \implies$
 $\text{situation-has-finitely-many-validators } s \implies$
 $\text{new-descendant-available } s \implies$
 $\neg \text{one-third-slashed } s \implies$
 $\text{no-commits-by-honest } s \implies$
 $\text{some-messages-by-honest-at } s \ M2 \implies$
 $\text{no-messages-by-honest-after } s \ M2 \implies$
 $\exists s\text{-new } h\text{-new}.$
 $\neg \text{committed } s \ h\text{-new} \wedge$
 $\text{unslashed-can-extend } s \ s\text{-new} \wedge \text{committed } s\text{-new } h\text{-new} \wedge \text{no-new-slashed } s$
 $s\text{-new}$
 $\langle \text{proof} \rangle$

7 Plausible Liveness (don't skip)

lemma *plausible-liveness* :
 situation-has-finitely-many-validators $s \implies$
 no-invalid-view $s \implies$
 new-descendant-available $s \implies$
 finite-messages $s \implies$
 $\neg$ *one-third-slashed* $s \implies$
 $\exists$ $s\text{-new}$ $h\text{-new}$.
 $\neg$ *committed* s $h\text{-new}$ $\wedge$
 unslashed-can-extend s $s\text{-new}$ $\wedge$
 committed $s\text{-new}$ $h\text{-new}$ $\wedge$
 no-new-slashed s $s\text{-new}$

<proof>

end