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This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This code is an explicit offensive tool for CI/CD secrets exfiltration against GitLab projects. It programmatically injects a CI pipeline into a target repository, triggers remote execution on runners to have those runners encrypt their environment/secrets to the attacker's public key, retrieves job logs, decrypts the secrets locally with the private key, and attempts to remove traces (delete branch/pipelines). It is malicious and should not be used in benign projects. If found as a dependency, treat it as a supply-chain compromise and remove or block it immediately.

This script is attempting to exfiltrate system information by sending the hostname and current user to a remote server. This behavior is highly suspicious and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 43 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The analyzed source code is primarily a legitimate implementation of the SweetAlert2 modal popup library. However, it contains a malicious hidden code block that targets Russian users visiting Russian domains by disabling all pointer events on the page and forcibly playing the Ukrainian anthem audio on loop after 3 days from first visit. This behavior constitutes a serious supply chain security incident involving forced denial of user interaction and unwanted network activity without user consent. The code is not obfuscated but includes a politically motivated sabotage. Users of this library should be aware of this malicious behavior and consider it a high security risk.

This module performs immediate, unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive system and package information to a hard-coded external endpoint. Its behavior is malicious in a dependency (supply-chain) context. Treat as a high-risk backdoor: remove or replace the module, block network access to the domain, and audit/contain affected systems and credentials.

Live on npm for 1 day, 4 hours and 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code attempts to establish an SSH connection to a hardcoded EC2 host using a hardcoded user and absolute private key path, then expose a helper to execute arbitrary caller-supplied commands on that remote shell. The presence of embedded credential paths, a specific remote host, and AutoAddPolicy (automatic trust of host keys) are strong indicators of backdoor-like or at least insecure behavior. If this fragment is present in a distributed package, it poses a high security risk: it can authenticate using a local private key, create outbound network connections to a single remote endpoint, and execute arbitrary commands remotely. Actions: treat this code as suspicious — remove or disable before distribution, replace hardcoded values with explicit, audited configuration, require explicit host-key verification, add input validation and robust error handling, and audit systems for presence of the referenced private key.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The module collects sensitive network and credential data (username, password, SSH info, internal IPs, open ports) from caller-supplied input and transmits them to a hardcoded third-party HTTPS endpoint, while also logging the full payload. This pattern is high risk for credential exfiltration and privacy leakage. The code contains a bug in the final except ('return Fals') and uses broad exception handling. If this behavior is unexpected for the package or not documented/authorized, treat the package as potentially malicious or at minimum unsafe. Recommend not using the package until the endpoint, intent, and convert_ssh_format are verified and until logging/secret handling and the bug are fixed.

Live on PyPI for 7 days and 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an LLM-driven orchestrator that exposes powerful actions (shell execution, GitHub repo modifications, working-directory changes) directly to a model without visible safeguards. The file is syntactically incomplete, but the design is high-risk: a compromised model, malicious prompt, or inadvertent instruction could trigger arbitrary command execution, repository tampering, or leakage of secrets via printed tool outputs. There is no direct evidence of embedded malware or obfuscation in this snippet, but running this code as-is (or completing it) in a privileged environment would be unsafe without strict mitigations: sandboxing, credential scoping, human authorization, command allowlists, output redaction, and audit logging.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This fragment is intentionally obfuscated: it decodes and decompresses an embedded blob and executes it via exec(). That pattern prevents static review and is a high-risk supply-chain/runtime execution vector. The code may be benign (IP protection) but is commonly used for malicious purposes. Do not run it as-is; decode and analyze the payload in a safe sandbox before trusting or deploying. Recommend treating the package as suspicious and requiring maintainer justification and signed/clear source.

Live on PyPI for 2 days, 21 hours and 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is intentionally malicious as it implements a reverse shell, allowing unauthorized remote access to the system. This is a severe security risk and should not be used.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

The code primarily serves to provide alert functionality using the SweetAlert2 library. However, it includes potentially risky behavior, such as the use of new Function(), and dynamically playing a remote audio file based on locale and domain conditions. This requires further scrutiny for any context-specific vulnerabilities.

The codebase exhibits critical security flaws primarily due to user-controlled deserialization that can instantiate and execute arbitrary JavaScript (new Function from client data), coupled with forking a worker process using unvalidated input and elevated privileged actions. This creates a strong potential for remote code execution, privilege escalation, and data/system compromise. Immediate remediation should include removing dynamic Function usage from client data, validating and strictly sandboxing worker executions, eliminating or tightly restricting sudo-elevated commands invoked from HTTP requests, and hardening path handling and input validation. A thorough review of worker.js and all isomorphic/gateway endpoints is essential, and security controls should be added to avoid exporting internal state or sensitive data to clients.

This module implements server-side RPC handlers of the Sliver implant framework that read/generate shellcode and DLL bytes, parse PE exports to compute reflective loader offsets, and forward marshalled requests containing executable payloads to remote implants via session.Request. There is no obfuscation or hidden credential theft, but the functionality enables remote arbitrary code execution, process migration, and DLL sideloading — operations that are malicious or dangerous outside an authorized red-team context. The code also contains some robustness issues (use of log.Fatal, limited validation when parsing PE files) that could affect availability.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This fragment is a clear proof-of-concept exploit that tries to achieve remote command execution by abusing form rendering and AJAX endpoints (pattern consistent with past Drupal RCEs). It should not be present in production packages unless explicitly documented and isolated for security research. Treat inclusion as a serious supply-chain risk: remove or quarantine, and audit repository history and maintainers if found in a dependency.

This file is heavily obfuscated and implements an on-load unpacker/loader: it decrypts embedded resources, verifies signatures, allocates and writes executable memory and may write into other process memory and execute it. Those behaviors (VirtualAlloc/WriteProcessMemory/VirtualProtect/OpenProcess/Marshal pointer writes + dynamic delegate invocation) are high-risk and consistent with process injection or an in-memory loader. If this assembly is included in a library distributed via a package manager, it poses a serious supply-chain risk. Treat as malicious/untrusted until provenance and purpose are validated; remove or replace with a clean, unobfuscated implementation. Recommended actions: do not use in production, audit original upstream source, verify signatures of the package, and scan deployment systems for injected/foreign processes if this package was executed.

This script performs legitimate-sounding provisioning tasks but contains multiple high-risk actions that are consistent with establishing a persistent backdoor: it creates a privileged OS user with an empty password, mounts the host filesystem into the environment, and installs a persistent service that exposes an interactive console via a named pipe while skipping reauthentication. Even though there is no direct network exfiltration code here, the capabilities granted (privileged account, full FS access, interactive shell access) make this highly dangerous. Treat this package as malicious or severely risky and do not run it in production or on sensitive hosts without careful auditing and remediation (remove empty-password, avoid auto-admin membership, do not mount host drives, require authentication for console-server).

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This code is an explicit offensive tool for CI/CD secrets exfiltration against GitLab projects. It programmatically injects a CI pipeline into a target repository, triggers remote execution on runners to have those runners encrypt their environment/secrets to the attacker's public key, retrieves job logs, decrypts the secrets locally with the private key, and attempts to remove traces (delete branch/pipelines). It is malicious and should not be used in benign projects. If found as a dependency, treat it as a supply-chain compromise and remove or block it immediately.

This script is attempting to exfiltrate system information by sending the hostname and current user to a remote server. This behavior is highly suspicious and poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 43 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The analyzed source code is primarily a legitimate implementation of the SweetAlert2 modal popup library. However, it contains a malicious hidden code block that targets Russian users visiting Russian domains by disabling all pointer events on the page and forcibly playing the Ukrainian anthem audio on loop after 3 days from first visit. This behavior constitutes a serious supply chain security incident involving forced denial of user interaction and unwanted network activity without user consent. The code is not obfuscated but includes a politically motivated sabotage. Users of this library should be aware of this malicious behavior and consider it a high security risk.

This module performs immediate, unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive system and package information to a hard-coded external endpoint. Its behavior is malicious in a dependency (supply-chain) context. Treat as a high-risk backdoor: remove or replace the module, block network access to the domain, and audit/contain affected systems and credentials.

Live on npm for 1 day, 4 hours and 37 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code attempts to establish an SSH connection to a hardcoded EC2 host using a hardcoded user and absolute private key path, then expose a helper to execute arbitrary caller-supplied commands on that remote shell. The presence of embedded credential paths, a specific remote host, and AutoAddPolicy (automatic trust of host keys) are strong indicators of backdoor-like or at least insecure behavior. If this fragment is present in a distributed package, it poses a high security risk: it can authenticate using a local private key, create outbound network connections to a single remote endpoint, and execute arbitrary commands remotely. Actions: treat this code as suspicious — remove or disable before distribution, replace hardcoded values with explicit, audited configuration, require explicit host-key verification, add input validation and robust error handling, and audit systems for presence of the referenced private key.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The module collects sensitive network and credential data (username, password, SSH info, internal IPs, open ports) from caller-supplied input and transmits them to a hardcoded third-party HTTPS endpoint, while also logging the full payload. This pattern is high risk for credential exfiltration and privacy leakage. The code contains a bug in the final except ('return Fals') and uses broad exception handling. If this behavior is unexpected for the package or not documented/authorized, treat the package as potentially malicious or at minimum unsafe. Recommend not using the package until the endpoint, intent, and convert_ssh_format are verified and until logging/secret handling and the bug are fixed.

Live on PyPI for 7 days and 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an LLM-driven orchestrator that exposes powerful actions (shell execution, GitHub repo modifications, working-directory changes) directly to a model without visible safeguards. The file is syntactically incomplete, but the design is high-risk: a compromised model, malicious prompt, or inadvertent instruction could trigger arbitrary command execution, repository tampering, or leakage of secrets via printed tool outputs. There is no direct evidence of embedded malware or obfuscation in this snippet, but running this code as-is (or completing it) in a privileged environment would be unsafe without strict mitigations: sandboxing, credential scoping, human authorization, command allowlists, output redaction, and audit logging.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This fragment is intentionally obfuscated: it decodes and decompresses an embedded blob and executes it via exec(). That pattern prevents static review and is a high-risk supply-chain/runtime execution vector. The code may be benign (IP protection) but is commonly used for malicious purposes. Do not run it as-is; decode and analyze the payload in a safe sandbox before trusting or deploying. Recommend treating the package as suspicious and requiring maintainer justification and signed/clear source.

Live on PyPI for 2 days, 21 hours and 36 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is intentionally malicious as it implements a reverse shell, allowing unauthorized remote access to the system. This is a severe security risk and should not be used.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

The code contains potential security risks such as hard-coded file paths, subprocess.Popen usage, and the handling of untrusted data through PyArrow Plasma. It is essential to review and address these security concerns before using this code in a production environment.

The code primarily serves to provide alert functionality using the SweetAlert2 library. However, it includes potentially risky behavior, such as the use of new Function(), and dynamically playing a remote audio file based on locale and domain conditions. This requires further scrutiny for any context-specific vulnerabilities.

The codebase exhibits critical security flaws primarily due to user-controlled deserialization that can instantiate and execute arbitrary JavaScript (new Function from client data), coupled with forking a worker process using unvalidated input and elevated privileged actions. This creates a strong potential for remote code execution, privilege escalation, and data/system compromise. Immediate remediation should include removing dynamic Function usage from client data, validating and strictly sandboxing worker executions, eliminating or tightly restricting sudo-elevated commands invoked from HTTP requests, and hardening path handling and input validation. A thorough review of worker.js and all isomorphic/gateway endpoints is essential, and security controls should be added to avoid exporting internal state or sensitive data to clients.

This module implements server-side RPC handlers of the Sliver implant framework that read/generate shellcode and DLL bytes, parse PE exports to compute reflective loader offsets, and forward marshalled requests containing executable payloads to remote implants via session.Request. There is no obfuscation or hidden credential theft, but the functionality enables remote arbitrary code execution, process migration, and DLL sideloading — operations that are malicious or dangerous outside an authorized red-team context. The code also contains some robustness issues (use of log.Fatal, limited validation when parsing PE files) that could affect availability.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This fragment is a clear proof-of-concept exploit that tries to achieve remote command execution by abusing form rendering and AJAX endpoints (pattern consistent with past Drupal RCEs). It should not be present in production packages unless explicitly documented and isolated for security research. Treat inclusion as a serious supply-chain risk: remove or quarantine, and audit repository history and maintainers if found in a dependency.

This file is heavily obfuscated and implements an on-load unpacker/loader: it decrypts embedded resources, verifies signatures, allocates and writes executable memory and may write into other process memory and execute it. Those behaviors (VirtualAlloc/WriteProcessMemory/VirtualProtect/OpenProcess/Marshal pointer writes + dynamic delegate invocation) are high-risk and consistent with process injection or an in-memory loader. If this assembly is included in a library distributed via a package manager, it poses a serious supply-chain risk. Treat as malicious/untrusted until provenance and purpose are validated; remove or replace with a clean, unobfuscated implementation. Recommended actions: do not use in production, audit original upstream source, verify signatures of the package, and scan deployment systems for injected/foreign processes if this package was executed.

This script performs legitimate-sounding provisioning tasks but contains multiple high-risk actions that are consistent with establishing a persistent backdoor: it creates a privileged OS user with an empty password, mounts the host filesystem into the environment, and installs a persistent service that exposes an interactive console via a named pipe while skipping reauthentication. Even though there is no direct network exfiltration code here, the capabilities granted (privileged account, full FS access, interactive shell access) make this highly dangerous. Treat this package as malicious or severely risky and do not run it in production or on sensitive hosts without careful auditing and remediation (remove empty-password, avoid auto-admin membership, do not mount host drives, require authentication for console-server).

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.