Ian Buchanan’s Assemblage Theory and Method sets out to define what an assemblage is (and is not), as well as make the case for why assemblage theory is useful and necessary.
The book begins with an introduction to the concept of ‘assemblages’. He pushes beyond the idea of an assemblage as ‘a random heap of fragments’, aiming to restore its ‘conceptual vitality’. It remains an incomplete project in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense: a concept that invites us to complete and apply it ourselves.
With this in mind, Buchanan calls for a return to the original text to reclaim the concept. Rather than Paul Patton and Paul Foss’ translation of ‘agencement’ as assemblage, he argues that it could just as easily be interpreted as ‘arrangement’.
Assemblage is Paul Patton and Paul Foss’s choice of translation for agencement which Brian Massumi picked up and used in his translation of A Thousand Plateaus. It has since become more or less the default translation, despite the fact that – as several people have pointed out – it has its problems. In my view, however, these problems are not resolved by altering the translation and using a different word, but rather by problematizing it and opening it up to a more complicated reading, one that is more consciously attentive to Deleuze and Guattari’s work. I would add that I think there is probably a strong case to be made for leaving it untranslated, as is increasingly the case with translations of critical theory concepts today, though that itself carries the risk of hypostatizing the term in a different way. Agencement derives from agencer, which according to Le Roberts Collins means ‘to arrange, to lay out, or to piece together’, whereas assemblage means ‘to join, to gather, to assemble’.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
Buchanan argues that agencement effectively reworks the role of the psychoanalytic “complex” (Komplex): what was once a psychic configuration becomes, in their hands, a socio‑material arrangement.
Agencement is Deleuze and Guattari’s own translation, or perhaps rearrangement would be a better word, of the German word Komplex (as in the ‘Oedipal complex’ or the ‘castration complex’).
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
In the end, assemblage is more than just a question about ‘what’. It is as much a question about how, where and when.
In the remaining chapters, Buchanan develops this reclaimed concept of assemblage through discussions of strata, desire, territory, expressive materialism, and contemporary control.
The first chapter unpacks strata and the production of nature and history.
Strata are the product of the manifold processes that have over time constructed and produced the thing we call nature, whether by that we mean human nature or nature as wilderness. We have to be careful not to reverse this historicizing process by overemphasizing the apparent ‘naturalness’ of strata, that is, by forgetting that ‘strata’ refers to a concept that enables us to see and think about a certain type of process, the production of nature, not the thing itself.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
There are three types of strata: geological, biological and techno‑semiological (the linguistic / socio‑technical stratum). Each of these is formed differently. Each stratum is made up of two dimensions: content and expression, where there is always remainder, something escapes. These two bind the strata together to resonate. With this, strata are never inert.
Buchanan outlines four first principles that explain how strata and stratification work:
- There is a chaotic flux of material and immaterial particles (including desire) that flows freely. The three kinds of strata are different, non‑analogical ways of capturing and organising this flux. However, they do not all relate things in the same way.
- Stratification is the process that gives form to matters by imprisoning intensities, simultaneously organizing material processes and capturing desire. It separates the world into distinct layers (strata), each with its own unity and logic of composition, and with beginnings and ends, allowing for variations both between and within strata. It needs to be noted that with these differences and variations, the schema of one stratum cannot be straightforwardly used to explain another, since each operates with different modes of organisation.
- Stratification is a process of capture which works by means of selecting and coding, as well as stabilising and territorialisation.
- Each assemblage contains a single abstract machine, a diagram enveloped by the stratum that constitutes its unity. It can be glossed with the question, “Whatever could have happened for things to come to this?” Conversely, the abstract machine also marks what cannot be done within an assemblage.
Stratification is important as assemblages are not defined by their components, but rather by what they produce, and these productions are complex. It is useful at explaining the way in which everyday life is experienced in a multi-layered way, without necessarily being interconnected. It helps capture the discontinuous, uneven character of historical change. It also helps theorise a process capable of producing subjects and subjectivity.
In the end, Buchanan explains that stratification is key to any understanding of ‘I’ or ‘We’.
Without stratification there would be no ‘we’. Without stratification there would be no ‘I’. Without stratification we could not communicate with one another, nor even live together in anything like a society.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
With this, he warns that there is a danger of destratification and simply opting out of a situation, without a clear path.
Deleuze and Guattari are not voluntarists; they don’t think one can simply opt out of a difficult situation. Rather, for them, it is always a matter of engineering escapes, of finding the means to build and execute the assemblages one needs to destratify, just a little, and make one’s getaway. But we cannot escape everything, all at once, because that too is a kind of death. So we must choose our lines of flight carefully. Whatever we retain after we have made our getaway is our strata: it is the bedrock of our existence.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
If Chapter 1 shows how assemblages are stratified in nature and history, Chapter 2 turns to what animates them from within: desire. Buchanan explains the importance of the concept.
Desire is primary; it is desire that selects materials and gives them the properties that they have in the assemblage. This is because desire itself is productive.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
With regards to this, he explains how what it produces is itself actual, whatever the material it is in. In relation to the assemblages, these are an actual composition of desire.
The second part of the chapter explores the relationship between desire and bodies without organs.
Desire desires on the body without organs. One cannot speak of desire in Deleuze and Guattari in the absence of their concept of the body without organs just as one cannot speak of the body without organs without taking into account their concept of desire.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
Bodies without organs are desire at degree zero, they are not in fact bodily but a surface on which desire flows.
If someone says their heart is broken, one does not imagine that they are in need of a cardiologist; one knows that it is not that heart that is the problem. The heart the broken-hearted speak of exists on a different plane to the physical body. It is real, to be sure, and its effects are real too, and its effects may even be felt in the visceral body, but it is not the same heart as the muscular organ that circulates our blood. Fixing this heart requires love, poetry, solitude, companionship, soulful healing and many other things besides, which may or may not pass through the body but are not necessarily bodily. Kind words can heal a broken heart but a heart transplant cannot.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
For Buchanan, this all serves to remind us that, although desire is always potentially assembling, we must not assume that every configuration of things is already an assemblage. Some things really are just ‘heaps of fragments’.
Having established desire as the machinic heart of assemblages, Chapter 3 turns to how desire composes “liveable orders”: territories. As Buchanan touches on in regards to stratification, territorialisation is the conversion of flux into liveable order. It is the most immediate, local form of the assemblage, the way desire first composes a liveable order out of chaos.
We territorialize because we need to and we need to territorialize because we have to confront chaos, both in its originary form and in the form of black holes. The territory transforms not only the elements constituting it but its inhabitant as well (as both the territory’s creator and primary beneficiary).
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
Unlike strata which is somewhat more stable, territory (reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation) occurs at a more local level, a part of the process of becoming. To explain this, Buchanan refers to F.Scott Fitzgerald’s discussions of cracks and the constant threat of chaos in our life.
Everything we do (insofar as it is an action of desire) carries this risk of plunging us into a black hole. In this sense then territory should be understood as a defensive concept because it describes our means of getting out of the black holes we sometimes find ourselves in either because we chose to go down a dark path or somehow our actions inadvertently lead us there. Deleuze and Guattari borrow F. Scott Fitzgerald’s notion of the ‘crack’ from his short autobiographical piece The Crack-up to illustrate this idea. In life, according to Fitzgerald, there are three ways of cracking-up, that is, three ways the black hole can make itself felt in our daily lives. First, there are the big blows that hit you from the outside, that often present themselves in terms of choices – if only I hadn’t drunk so much, if only I’d kept my mouth shut and so on. The changes that ensue, loss of love, loss of employment, loss of respect and so on, stay with you forever but also feel strangely alien because one feels that if one had made different choices things wouldn’t be the way they are. Then there are the micro-cracks that occur when things seem to be going well – one might not even notice them at first. It is the corrosion that happens in one’s soul when a thousand slights resonate together and ramify. The first time someone calls you ‘fat’ or ‘loser’ you might not even notice the hurt it caused, but the damage is done, and every repetition of that slight causes the hurt to magnify as it resonates within. Last, there are ‘clean breaks’; these are the breaks you cannot come back from because it destroys all connection to the past. This is what people mean when they say about a former relationship that there is no ‘us’ anymore, there is nothing to go back to, the past has been volatized. We can also see that these are the types of situation that could drown us if we didn’t have some kind of lifeline: territory is that lifeline.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
Buchanan explains that there are three ways of leaving a territory, or deterritorialisation:
- Negative deterritorialisation is one that is overlaid by reterritorialisation.
- Relative deterritorialisation overcomes the inertia of reterritorialisation
- Absolute deterritorialisation where it succeeds in creating a new earth, a new beginning, one that does not lead back to old territories
Extending this discussion of deterritorialisation and chaos, Buchanan brings in Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of fascism to show how a line of flight out of an unbearable territory can itself become a suicidal black hole.
As with ‘bodies without organs’ not being about literal bodies, Buchanan explains that it is more useful to consider territories as subjective states in a psychological sense.
Territory is an act, a passage, not a space. It is the composition of one’s own world.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
These worlds are composed of elements borrowed and stolen from the environments we are in. (Footnote: Buchanan explains that “Deleuze and Guattari are often portrayed as theorists of the body, they were actually more interested in the way the non-bodily, that is, words, can transform the body, without ever penetrating beneath the surface.”) This organising of environments also encompasses distance between bodies. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “critical distance,” Buchanan shows how territory regulates how close we can come to others of the same species and still coexist. Territory is thus the subjective spacing between interiors, the way a shared space is partitioned so that my “home” and your “home” can coexist without collapsing into chaos.
Buchanan then extends the conversation into language, or as Deleuze and Guattari described it, the “collective assemblage of enunciation”.
Expressed of an expression is not its meaning; it is the transformation of the world the expression instantiates.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
Buchanan ends the chapter with a discussion of the association between territory and style. He uses the example of film characters and genre to demonstrate this, with repeated traits (the action hero’s walk, clothing, gestures) serving as “directional” signs, but their peculiar mannerisms form a style, which is “dimensional” and territorial.
Style is, in this sense, an exercise in redundancy – the more distinctive it is, the greater its power of redundancy, meaning the more we are able to internalize it and know its inner rhythms.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
The fourth chapter makes the case for Deleuze and Guattari as expressive materialists: neither reducing everything to ideas (idealism) nor treating all matter as equally “vibrant”. Every assemblage has an inseparable material side (form of content) and expressive side (form of expression). To explain this, Buchanan pushes back on Jane Bennett’s misconception of assemblages as ad hoc groupings, instead explaining why the actual collection of things matter or else you just have a “growing heap of fragments.”
As I have reiterated throughout, it has a material dimension (form of content, machinic assemblage etc.) and an expressive dimension (form of expression, collective assemblages of enunication etc.), a principle of unity (abstract machine), and it rests upon a condition of possibility (BwO, plane of immanence, plane of consistency etc.) which is criss-crossed by lines of flight (lines of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation). As we have seen above in my examination of Bennett’s version of the assemblage, it is not sufficient to simply enumerate an assemblage’s material components because these do not by themselves disclose the assemblage’s constitution, much less its purpose or function. One must also ask how these material components are captured by the expressive dimension and inquire too about its principle of unity and its conditions of possibility.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
Assemblages permit wide internal variation, but not every variation is possible: their abstract machines impose a form of relative invariance.
In contrast to Bennett’s interpretation, Buchanan discusses Tess Lea’s work on indigenous housing policy in Australia. Lea’s analysis shows how the material arrangements of housing, funding streams, bureaucratic offices (form of content) are bound to a discourse of “policy” and “progress” (form of expression) that organises what can and cannot be done or even seen.
To conceive of policy as an assemblage means seeing it in terms of the kinds of arrangements and orderings it makes possible and even more importantly the complex and not always fully disclosed set of expectations it entails. To see it this way we need to separate ‘policy’ as a conceptual entity from its myriad iterations as this or that policy, for example, infrastructure policy, health policy, transport policy and so on, but also from all sense of outcomes and outputs. We also have to see so-called policy decisions as components of the policy assemblage and not as some kind of climactic moment in the life of a policy. Policy decisions are part of the form of expression of the policy assemblage, not the content. By questioning the very idea of policy Lea has enabled us to see it in its properly rhizomatic light. As Lea shows, policymaking takes place ‘in the middle of things’ but always pretends otherwise because it is locked into an image of itself as a special type of agency that defines and measures ‘progress’.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
He also discusses Löic Wacquant’s work on imprisonment in US. Wacquant likewise maps how the institutional complex of prisons, police, welfare retrenchment (form of content) is articulated with a discourse of “crime”, “delinquency” and neoliberal responsibility (form of expression), revealing imprisonment as a political technology rather than a neutral response to crime.
Wacquant argues that we cannot understand the prison system by focusing solely on enclosed world of prisons and prisoners, we need to pull back and look at the stratum as a whole (not his choice of words, obviously), which in this instance means factoring in what is happening more broadly at the level of the state. At this level it is immediately clear that neither drugs nor criminality nor even poverty were ever the main problem as far as the state is concerned. The real issue was elsewhere. Wacquant identifies the ascendency of neoliberalism as the main culprit because it placed the state in the strange position of having to give up all its roles and responsibilities except its right to exercise and control violence.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
In the end, what both of these examples provide is a way of not describing, but rather a way of analysing.
this is what the assemblage does. We have to stop thinking of the concept of the assemblage as a way of describing a thing or situation and instead see it for what it was always intended to be, a way of analysing a thing or situation. Faced with any apparent assemblage we should ask, what holds it together? What are its limits (internal and external) and what function does it fulfil?
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
For Buchanan, using assemblage theory therefore means rigorously tracking these doublings—content/expression, material/expressive—rather than simply naming any complex situation an “assemblage”.
The fifth and final chapter revisits Deleuze’s essay ‘Postscript on Control Societies’. This essay was written in 1990 at the end of the Cold War and as a “postscript” to the work of Michel Foucault:
Written at a time when the Cold War was ending, computers were becoming more common, and the internet was beginning to connect institutions, the essay describes the emergence of a new kind of society – one not ruled by a single stern voice but by the soft hum of networks.
Source: Computers tracking us, an ‘electronic collar’: Gilles Deleuze’s 1990 Postscript on the Societies of Control was eerily prescient by Cameron Shackell
Postscript was written as an update to the work of Deleuze’s contemporary Michel Foucault, who had died in 1984. Deleuze called it a “postscript” not just because of its brevity (it’s only around 2,300 words in English translation) but to highlight he wasn’t refuting Foucault, just building on his work.
Buchanan’s purpose in returning to this brief text is twofold: to show how pertinent Deleuze remains to “our contemporary situation”, and to foreground the largely overlooked role of the assemblage in the essay’s analysis of control.
For Deleuze, the panopticon that Foucault feared so much has been trumped by the rise in digital technology. With this, we have moved from individuals to dividuals:
Today surveillance is focused on controlling dividuals (not individuals), restricting their movement, limiting their access to credit and capital, determining where and how they can spend their money, and not, as was the case with disciplinary society, in shaping and forming them as particular social types (soldiers, doctors, teachers and so on).
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
In a world of surveillance and restrictions, we are controlled by nudges and modulations.
In contrast to the old duality of management and trade unions today’s businesses ‘are constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself’. Competition for its own sake lives and thrives on the intermittent highs of transitory victories (e.g. heart surgeon of the month), and never concerns itself with whether or not these victories add up to something meaningful like competency or a vocation. Not even education is immune from this trend, Deleuze laments. Schooling has been replaced ‘by continuing education and exams by continuous assessment’. To which he adds, showing uncanny prescience: ‘It’s the surest way of turning education into a business.’
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
To understand the machines of our times, such as cybernetic machines and computer networks, Buchanan argues that we need to appreciate the expressive dimension of desire. To do this, we need analyse the assemblage that the machine is a part of.
[Naomi] Klein argues that the mobilization of the logo enabled the dematerialization of businesses like Nike, but what she does not explain is the changes in desire that enabled this investment of desire in the logo. One might say then that she focuses on the machines of capitalism at the expense of its expressive dimension. ‘One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine – with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermodynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies.’ But, he adds, the ‘machines don’t explain anything’ by themselves; ‘you have to analyse the collective apparatuses [i.e. assemblages] of which the machines are just one component.’
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
In the end, Buchanan’s reading of “Postscript” reinforces the book’s central claim: that machines, institutions and technologies never speak for themselves. They become intelligible only when we map the assemblages that bind them together.
Assemblage Theory and Method is not an explicit guide. If anything, it is a book that left me with as many questions as answers. For Buchanan, the most important question that we must consider is: “What does the concept of the assemblage enable us to see that we couldn’t see before?” The book seeks to provide suggestions on how to use assemblage theory in as clear a manner as possible. However, it is no easy feat. As with so much of Deleuze and Guattari, assemblage theory is not a simple, straightforward process.
Buchanan’s book is best read as a sherpa: it carries conceptual supplies and points out paths, but we still have to climb the mountain ourselves. With this in mind, assemblage theory is more than a new name for complexity, and is better considered as a method for analysing how forms of control are composed – and, therefore, how they might be recomposed.
Thinking about this, I could not help thinking about Cory Doctorow’s work on enshittification, especially when Buchanan talks about the balance between flow of capital and flow of stupidity in the final chapter on technology and control.
Now content has been volatized by the new digital formats and ‘set free’ (to use the jargon of the techno-utopians) and made free to obtain, making it almost impossible to capture and control. This is why, as Deleuze and Guattari argue in Anti-Oedipus, the flow of capital is always balanced by an equivalent flow of stupidity, which stifles both technical innovation and social and economic revolution.
Source: Assemblage Theory and Method by Ian Buchanan
As a quick thought‑experiment in this mode of analysis, I found myself thinking about a platform like Spotify and what assemblage theory would enable us to see that we could not see before. On the content side we have servers, catalogues, licensing contracts, recommendation algorithms, mobile apps, headphones, playlists, financial flows between labels, artists and venture capital. On the expressive side we have discourses of “discovery”, “mood”, “productivity”, “chill”; metrics, moods and genres as classificatory systems.
Thinking this way turns Spotify from a platform with features into a control‑society assemblage that captures listening, partitions time and attention, and organises the circulation of musical labour and value. Where Liz Pelly’s Mood Machine – The Rise of Spotify and the Cost of the Perfect Playlist tracks Spotify’s cultural and economic effects, assemblage theory pushes us to ask how its very architecture of moods, metrics and recommendation functions as a territorialisation of listening – a way of capturing and modulating desire under contemporary conditions of control.
Similarly, as a set of questions an assemblage analysis might pose to a cultural figure, I am left thinking about
my current deep dive into the world of Prince. What would it mean to treat “Prince” as an assemblage rather than a singular genius or a linear artistic evolution? Form of content might include instruments, studios, collaborators, production techniques, contracts and formats. While form of expression might encompass genre labels, press narratives, iconography, gender and sexuality discourse, fan practices. The key questions would become: what abstract machine gives “Prince” his relative invariance across wildly different configurations, and what external historical limits shape him (format shifts, MTV, streaming, post‑9/11 politics, digital control societies)?
This approach would work against the easy story of linear “evolution” from early funk to late spirituality, instead mapping discontinuous reconfigurations of desire, territory and media strata. In Buchanan’s terms, the question would be less “Who is the real Prince?” and more “What arrangements make ‘Prince’ possible across such different historical and media conditions?” The obvious caveat is empirical, for at some point the available material may not support a robust mapping of the assemblage, and what began as analysis risks becoming conjecture.
Assemblage theory, on this view, supplies a set of questions and distinctions to guide research, but it still depends on the available archive, that is, the concrete mapping of form of content, form of expression, abstract machines and lines of flight has to rest on empirical traces or it risks becoming purely speculative. That dependence sets limits on method: some assemblages are poorly documented, evidence is always selective, choices of temporal and spatial scale shape what relations can even appear, and the work of linking material and expressive dimensions always involves judgement.
I feel like I have always dabbled with Deleuze. Initially dipping in during my university degree. I was also pulled back in via the work of Ben Williamson, Greg Thompson and Ian Guest. Anti-Oedipus and Thousand Plateaus have always sat on my bookshelf seemingly taunting me, calling me to return, sitting next to Claire Colebrook’s Understanding Deleuze. I actually downloaded Buchanan’s papers on ‘Assemblage theory and schizoanalysis’ and ‘Becoming Mountain’, along with some others that I found, with the intent on doing further reading on the topic. However, somewhere along the way I got distracted and it became another loose end left untied. I actually stumbled on Assemblage Theory and Method by chance while looking for secondary material on Fredric Jameson, while reading Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.
What I find interesting is that although I feel I have only ever touched the surface on the concept of ‘assemblage’ I still regularly used the term in my writing (see this post for example), usually to capture the general interrelated nature of things. I must admit my understanding was vague. (Buchanan talks about how it has become a ‘received idea’.)
Ironically, having a clearer grasp of the basic concepts has mostly sharpened my sense of how partial my understanding still is. That, in a way, is Buchanan’s point, that “assemblage” is not a label to apply but a way of asking better questions. If the book has left me with a richer sense of what the concept can do and where my own reading remains unfinished, then perhaps Buchanan’s assemblage has already done its work on me.









