Category Archives: Management

The Ten Most-Read Kellblog Posts in 2025

I did this analysis last year and it became a popular post, so I figured I’d do the same retrospective today. Following are the ten most-read Kellblog posts in 2025, regardless of the year in which they were written — and it includes some golden oldies.

  1. What it really means to be a manager, director, VP (2015). Now at ten years old, this post is a perennial favorite. I wrote it because I got tired of answering the question and something about my answer clearly struck a note with a lot of people. (Hint: the answer’s not in your job leveling system.)
  2. How to navigate the pipeline crisis (2025). In this post I wrote about what I saw as a general pipeline crisis in the industry, shared some interesting posts on it, and then tried to put myself back in the CMO chair and answer: what would I do about it?
  3. The one key to dealing with senior executives: answer the question! (2012). If the manager vs. director post (above) gets the most traffic, this post gets the most in-person mentions. Think: “Dave, I forwarded your ATFQ post about a dozen times this year.” This issue bothered me 13 years ago when I wrote the post and evidently non-answered questions are still bothering people today. If someone, particularly a customer or an executive, asks you a question: answer it.
  4. Kellblog predictions for 2025 (2025). I scored these an 8 out of 10. Go here to read my predictions for 2026, the 12th annual post in this series. These posts are more industry commentary and analysis than simply a list of things I think are going to happen. And they require Herculean effort. This year’s post was 7,644 words with 166 links and took 65 hours to write.
  5. Your ICP starts as an aspiration and ends as a regression (2025). I love the pithy title of this one. This post discusses the evolution of your ideal customer profile (ICP) which starts out as a wink in the founder’s eye and should, over time, end up the result of a regression analysis. That is, you start out by deciding who you want to focus on and then, over time and as a function of your definition of “success,” the data should tell you.
  6. De-mystifying the growth-adjusted enterprise value to revenue multiple: introducing the ERG ratio (2024). I first heard of the PEG ratio in Peter Lynch’s classic, One Up on Wall Street. This post takes the same idea — growth adjusting — and applies it to price/sales as opposed to price/earnings. Much as I love the metric, I was frankly surprised to see this one up here.
  7. The SaaS Rule of 40 (2017). Another classic, from eight years back. See this year’s predictions to understand why I believe the Rule of 40 might well become the Rule of 60 in 2026.
  8. A CEO’s high-level guide to GTM troubleshooting (2025). An integration and repackaging of a lot of my advice specifically written for the CEO and to help them troubleshoot their go-to-market (GTM) issues. I was happy to see this one up here.
  9. The pipeline progression chart: why I like it better than tracking rolling-four-quarter pipeline (2022). Give the CRO rolling-four-quarter sales targets and I’ll be in favor of tracking rolling-four-quarter pipeline. Meantime, we need to track it by quarter and this chart shows you how. Don’t even get me started on people who want to track annual pipeline.
  10. Six tips on presenting to the board of directors (2025). A post I wrote to help executive staff make a good impression on the board by losing any prior board PTSD, making a deck from scratch (not recycling slides), cutting to the chase, taking certain things offline, and of course ATFQ.

Technically, my Best of Kellogg post also made the list, so if you’ve not checked that out lately, perhaps you should. I’ve recently revised it as I do about once a year.

I was happy to see that five of the ten top posts were from 2025, which I think hits the right balance of healthy re-use of the classics along with some endorsement of my new material. Thanks for reading.

The Startup Board’s Hippocratic Oath

The Hippocratic Oath is a well known oath of ethics taken by physicians. It requires them to swear, among other things, to do no harm in dealing with patients. While chatting with a VC the other day, it occurred to me that we should have a similar concept for startup boards.

Unfortunately, I think “do no harm” actually sets too high a bar.

To help startups succeed, boards need to challenge leadership teams, ask hard questions, and get them to consider new ideas and approaches. While I think boards should refrain from giving directive feedback, there is always the chance that a hard question leads the company down a path that ultimately proves unproductive. For example, if a board member asks if a company to consider a PLG motion for a new product, that could lead to the company launching a new sales motion that ultimately fails.

This example, by the way, shows both why boards should not give directive feedback (i.e., “do a PLG motion”) and why founders should not listen to them when they do. Think: yes, we’ll consider that, but only try it if we think it’s a good idea. Throwing a bone to board members by agreeing to try ideas you don’t believe in is a losing strategy. If they fail, you are more likely to get scorn for poor execution than credit for the openness in having tried. When results are the only thing that matter, only place your bets on things you think will deliver results. (And yes, the possibility that you threw good execution at a bad idea seems conveniently never to be in consideration.)

If “do no harm” sets too high a bar, then what oath might we use? After talking to my friend, I think I found a great alternative: do no demotivation. “I don’t want executive teams leaving board meetings feeling demotivated,” he said. And he was absolutely correct.

How do we want people to feel at the end of a board meeting?

  • We want the board to feel like they attended a well-run meeting, had a chance to help the company, and understand the plan to address current challenges going forward
  • We want the management team to feel like the board is knowledgeable, helpful, and supportive
  • And we want the management team to feel energized to go execute the plan

That’s it. If you get those three things, you had a successful board meeting. And demotivation is nowhere on that list. Demotivation doesn’t help anyone.

  • It doesn’t improve the odds of executing the plan successfully
  • It definitionally doesn’t make anyone feel good
  • It does make the e-staff start to question the CEO and each other
  • It does make people wonder why they’re grinding so hard
  • It does make the team feel unappreciated and potentially vulnerable

So I’d propose Do No Demotivation as the Hippocratic Oath for startup boards.

I’ll finish this post by listing some common ways that boards demotivate executive teams (and feel free to put more examples of your own in the comments):

  • Expressing surprise over things they should have known.
  • Asking trap questions: “do you think our sales productivity is substandard or very substandard?”
  • Placing blame: “clearly, since our CAC payback is so long, we have an inefficient sales organization.” (Maybe we do. Or maybe we have a hard-to-sell product. Or weak gross margins. Or something else. The high CPP is a fact. The reason for it is not always a bad sales team.)
  • Cherry-picking: taking top decile benchmarks, or public comps, or even just top quartile numbers but across 4 different metrics. It’s like comparing your child to the best mathematician, athlete, musician, and writer in the school. (It’s quite rare when one person is all those things.) Or, my favorite: benchmarking without regard for situation. Yes, our CAC ratio is high, but 75% of our deals are dogfights against a price-slashing competitor. And yes, I know what “sell value” means, thanks.
  • Expressing anger in pretty much any form. While I’ve seen some howlers, fights in board meetings are not OK. They demotivate everyone. And they take focus off the top busness priorities.
  • Ratholing, failing to take things to an offline meeting or working group. OK, I do this one from time to time. (“But I promise it will be quick.”)
  • Making easy things hard. When in doubt, if a topic is not strategic, just do things the standard way at the good-enough level.
  • Expressing negative or hopeless sentiments: “at this course and speed, I’m not sure we’re creating any value.” As opposed to: “we need a new plan that creates value and that means we need to find a way to accelerate growth.”

So before you attend your next board meeting remind yourself to do no demotivation. It’s the new Hippocratic Oath of startup boards.

Slides from Balderton Webinar on Aligning Product and GTM Using Customer Value Metrics

Today Dan Teodosiu, Thor Mitchell, and I hosted a Balderton webinar entitled Aligning Product and Go-To-Market (GTM) Using Customer Value Metrics. We are all executives in residence (EIRs) at Balderton — Dan covers technology, Thor covers product, and I cover go-to-market — and, in a display of cross-functional walking-the-talk, we came together to present this session on alignment.

The session was based on an article Dan and I wrote, by the same title, which was published on the Balderton site last month and about which I wrote here. The purpose of this post is to share the slides from that webinar which are available here and embedded below.

Thank you to everyone who attended the session and who asked questions in advance or in the chat. I’m sorry that we didn’t have the time to answer each question, but if you drop one into the comments below, I’ll do my best to answer it here and/or ask Dan or Thor to weigh in as well. I’m not aware if Balderton is going to make a video of the session available, but if they do I’ll revise this post and put a link here.

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“All Models Are Wrong, Some Are Useful.”

“I have a map of the United States … actual size. It says, Scale: 1 mile = 1 mile. I spent last summer folding it. I also have a full-size map of the world. I hardly ever unroll it.” — Stephen Wright (comedian)

Much as we build maps as models of the physical world, we build mathematical models all the time in the business world. For example:

These models can be incredibly useful for planning and forecasting. They are, however, of course, wrong. They’re imperfect at prediction. They ignore important real-world factors in their desire for simplification, often relying on faith in offsetting errors. Reality rarely lands precisely where the model predicted. Which brings to mind this famous quote from the British statistician George Box.

“All models are wrong. Some are useful.” — George Box

It’s one of those quotes that, if you get it, you get it. (And then you fall in love with it.) Today, I’m hoping to bring more people into the enlightened fold by discussing Box’s quote as it pertains to three everyday go-to-market (GTM) models.

First, it’s why we don’t want models to be too precise and/or too complex. They’re not supposed to be exact. They’re not supposed to model everything, they’re supposed to be simplified. They’re just models. They’re supposed to be more useful than exact.

For example, in finance, if we need to make a precise budget that handles full GAAP accounting treatment then we do that. We map every line to a general ledger (GL) account, do GAAP treatment of revenue and expense, model depreciation and allocations, et cetera. It’s a backbreaking exercise. And when you’re done, you can’t really play with it to learn and to understand. It’s precise, but it’s unwieldy — a bit like Stephen Wright’s full-scale map of the US. It’s useful if you need to bring a full-blown budget to the board for approval, but not so useful if you’re trying to understand the interplay between sales productivity, sales ramping, and sales turnover. You’d be far better off looking at a sales bookings capacity model.

To take a different example, it’s why business school teaches you discounted cashflow (DCF) analysis for capital budgeting. DCF basically throws out GAAP and asks, what are the cashflow impacts of this project? The assumption being that if the DCFs work out, then it’s a good investment and that will eventually show up in improved GAAP results. Notably — and I was really confused by this when I first learned capital budgeting — they don’t teach you to build a 20-year detailed GAAP budget with different capital project assumptions and then do scenario analysis. Instead, they strip everything else away and ask, what are the cashflow impacts of this project versus that one?

In the rest of this post, I’ll explore Box’s quote as it relates to the three SaaS GTM models I discussed in the introduction. We’ll see that it applies quite differently to each.

Sales Bookings Capacity Models

These models calculate sales bookings based on sales hiring and staffing (including attrition), sales productivity, and sales ramping (i.e., the productivity curve new sellers follow as they spend their first few quarters at the company). Given those variables and assuming some support resources and ratios (e.g., AE/SDR), they pop out a series of quarterly bookings numbers.

While simple, these models are usually pretty precise and thus can be used for both planning and forecasting (e.g., predicting the bookings number based on actual sales bookings capacity). Thus, these are a lot useful and usually only a little wrong. In fact, some CEOs, including some big name ones I know, walk around with an even simpler version of this model in their heads: new bookings = k * (the number of sellers) where that number might be counted at the start of the year or the end of Q1. (This is what can lead to the sometimes pathological CEO belief that hiring more sellers directly leads to bookings, but hiring anything else does not, or at least only indirectly.)

Marketing Inverted Funnel Models

These models calculate the quarterly demand generation (demandgen) budget given sales booking targets, a series of conversion rates (e.g., MQL to SAL, SAL to SQL, SQL to won), and assumed phase lags between conversion points. They effectively run the sales funnel backwards, saying if we need this many deals, then we need this many SQLs, this many SALs, this many MQLs, and this many leads at various preceding time intervals.

If you’re selling anything other than toothbrushes, these models are wrong. Why? Because SaaS applications, particularly in enterprise, are high-consideration purchases that involve multiple people over sometimes prolonged periods of time. (At Salesforce, we won a massive deal on my product where the overlay rep had been chasing the deal for years, including time at his prior employer.)

These models are wrong because they treat non-linear, over-time behavior as a linear funnel. I liken the reality of the high funnel more to a popcorn machine: you’re never sure which kernel is going to pop, when, but if you add this many kernels and this much heat, then some percentage of them normally pops within N quarters. These models are a lot wrong — from first principles, by not just a little bit — but they are also a lot useful.

I think they work because of offsetting errors theory, which requires the company to be on a relatively steady growth trajectory. Sure, we’re modeling that last quarter’s MQLs are this quarter’s opportunities, and that’s not right (because many are from the quarter before that), but — as long as we’re not growing too fast or, more importantly, changing growth trajectory — that will tend to come out in the wash.

Note that if you wanted to, you could always build a more sophisticated model that took into account MQL aging — or today use an AI tool that does that for you — but you’ll still always be faced with two facts: (1) the trade-offs between model complexity and usefulness and (2) that even the more sophisticated model will still break when the growth trajectory changes or reality otherwise changes out from underneath the model. Thus, I always try to build pretty simple models and then be pretty careful in interpretation of them. Think: what’s going to break this model if it changes?

Marketing Attribution Models

I try not to write much about marketing attribution because it’s quicksand, but I’ll reluctantly dip my toe today. Before proceeding, I encourage you to take a moment to buy a Marketing Attribution is Fake News mug which is a practical, if passive-aggressive, vessel from which to drink your coffee during the next QBR or board meeting.

Marketing attribution is the attempt to assign credit for marketing-generated opportunities (itself another layer of attribution problem) to the marketing channels that generated them. In English, let’s assume we all agree that marketing generated an opportunity. But that opportunity was created at a company where 15 people over the prior 6 quarters had engaged in some marketing program in some way — e.g., clicking an ad, attending a webinar, downloading a white paper, talking to us at a conference, etc.

There are typically two levels of reduction: first, we identify one primary contact from the pool of 15 and second, we identify one marketing program that we decide gets the credit for the opportunity. Typically, people use last-touch attribution, assigning credit to the last program the primary contact engaged with before the opportunity was created. This will overcredit lower-funnel programs (e.g., executive dinners) and undercredit higher-funnel programs (e.g., clicking on an ad). Some people use first-touch attribution, reversing the problem to over-credit higher-funnel programs and under-credit lower-funnel ones. Knowing that both of those problems aren’t great, some send complexity to the rescue, using points-based attribution where each touch by each person scores one or more points, and you add up those points and then allocate credit across channels or programs on a pro rata basis. This is notionally more accurate, but the relative point assignments can be arbitrary and the veil of calculation confusion generally erodes trust in the system.

The correct way, in my humble opinion, to do attribution analysis is to approach it with humility, view it as a triangulation problem, and to make sure people absolutely understand what you’re showing them before you show it (e.g., “we’ll be looking at marketing channel performance using last-touch based attribution on the next slide and before I show it, I want to ensure that everyone understands the limits of interpretation of this approach.”) Then follow any attribution-based performance analysis with some reverse-touch analysis where you show all the touches over the prior two years, deal by deal, for a small set of deals chosen by the CRO in order to demonstrate the messy, ground-level reality of prospect interactions over time. Simply put, it’s the CMO’s job to decide how to allocate resources in this very squishy world, to make those decisions (e.g., do we do tradeshow X and do we spend $Y) in active discussion with the CRO as their partner and with a full understanding of the available data and the limitations on its interpretability. The board or the e-staff simply can’t effectively back-seat drive this process by looking at one table and saying, “OMG, tradeshow oppties cost $25K each, let’s not do any more tradeshows!” If only the optimization problem were that simple.

But, back to the Box quote. How does it apply to attribution? These models are a lot wrong, at best a little useful, and even potentially dangerous. Hence my recommendations about disclaiming the data before showing it, using triangulation to take different bearings on reality, and doing reverse-touch analysis to immediately re-ground anyone floating in a cloud of last-touch-based over-simplification.

Note that the existence of next-generation, full-funnel attribution tools such as Revsure, doesn’t radically change my viewpoint here because we are talking about the fundamental principles of models. They’re always wrong — especially when trying to model something as complex as the interactions of 20 over people at a customer with 5 people and 15 marketing programs at a company, all while those people are talking to their friends and reading blogs and seeing billboards from a vendor. I believe tools like Revsure can take the models from a lot wrong to a little wrong, and ergo improve them from potentially dangerous to useful. But you should still show the reverse-touch analysis to keep people grounded.

And Box’s quote still applies: “All models are wrong. Some are useful.” And what a lovely quote it is.

Three Ways To Get Fired as CEO

While I could write the equivalent of 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover when it comes to variations on how to get fired as CEO, the purpose of this post is simply to discuss three things CEOs can say to their boards that will perk their ears and get them to start asking questions that could lead to the CEO’s termination.

Here are those three things:

  • I’m getting tired of running the company.”
  • I’m running out of ideas for how to fix our core problems.”
  • I think we need to sell the company.” [1]

First, let’s note that it is much harder, sometimes actually impossible, for a founder/CEO to get fired than a hired (aka, “professional”) CEO. The former have a powerful combination of moral authority, share ownership, and/or contractual protections. The latter — even if they joined very early and built much of the company themselves — will never be seen as founders, but simply employees who, in the end, are replaceable much as anyone else.

While it’d be stretch to call hired CEOs “goldfish” — as one of my old CFOs used to refer to SDRs [2] — in the end, you’re either a founder or you’re not. So this post is largely for hired CEOs, but it should nevertheless be of interest to founders as well.

While it’s probably somewhat self-evident, what’s so scary about the three above statements?

  • They each say the CEO is effectively giving up on solving the company’s challenges
  • They are not easily fixable by the board — a stock grant, a pat on the back, or a bonus program isn’t likely to fix anything
  • To the extent you define the CEO’s job as “to get what matters right,” they each signal that the CEO is no longer interested in doing it

And scariest of all, each statement is a bell that is impossible to unring. Think: Oh, just kidding, I have tons of ideas. Or, oh, I was just messing around, I don’t think we should sell the company. It was just a modest proposal, in the Jonathan Swift sense. Sure.

It’s like saying to your spouse, “hey honey, I think we should start dating other people.” It’s very difficult to roll that back.

This means the CEOs should think very carefully before making statements like these. Because once they’re said, they may be stuck somewhere in the board’s mind forever:

  • We keep missing quarters because Mary’s tired and not pushing the company.
  • We’re only shooting for moderate growth because Bob’s out of ideas for how to grow more quickly.
  • James isn’t investing for growth because he wants to sell soon and is trying to juice up profit.

Why? Because the CEO told us so. If I were a bell, I’d go ding, dong, ding, dong, ding.

Now, it’s certainly possible to try and walk these statements back: “oh, I was just tired that day because I had some personal stuff going on and I was sick.” But they’ll always be there in the back of the board’s mind. Think: Maybe Joe said that because Joe meant it.

So the best thing to do is never say these things in the first place. Not unless you’re very sure how they’ll land and ideally have socialized them 1-1 in advance with key board members. Or, if you decide to say them anyway, at least understand the potential downstream effects. Otherwise, you may find that a simple, off-the-cuff comment may haunt you for some time.

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Notes

[1] The notable exception here is a PE-backed firm where the company has achieved its target financial profile and ergo hopefully its target valuation, and it really is time to sell. In VC-backed firms, where the general goal (and belief that underlies the VC’s investment thesis) is to “shoot the moon,” saying you want to sell can be seen as betraying the mission — especially if the company is performing well — and/or if the VCs still believe in the company’s bright future. Saying you want to sell before there is consensus that hope is dead can be seen as a premature admission of defeat.

[2] On the theory that they often perish, and if you find one floating in the bowl, you just get a new one.