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This module intentionally conceals its behavior by embedding a compressed base64 payload and executing it at import time. That pattern is high risk: it grants arbitrary code execution and prevents static review. While the wrapper itself does not show explicit malicious API calls, the use of exec on an opaque payload is a malicious-enabling construct and should be treated as suspicious. Do not import or run this module in production; decode and inspect the embedded payload in a secure, isolated environment before any execution.

This module appears to be legitimate protocol-handling code, not intentionally malicious. However it contains high-risk patterns: unpickling data directly from a network socket and dynamically invoking methods based on deserialized input. Those patterns allow remote attackers who can connect to the socket (or send crafted payloads) to achieve arbitrary code execution or to call unintended device/server methods. In short: not malware by intent, but unsafe for use in untrusted networks without strong authentication, encryption, and replacement of pickle with a safe serialization or explicit validation of incoming objects.

No definitive malware or backdoor detected in the provided fragment. The bundle appears to be a composite of legitimate UI/editor libraries (React internals, CodeMirror-like editors, Sandpack runtime, styling tools). The risk remains moderate due to potential data exposure paths in complex plugin ecosystems and the opaqueness of transitive dependencies in a large bundle. A full audit should include: dependency integrity checks, SAST/DAST on dynamic imports, and runtime data-flow tracing across all plugins/extensions.

Live on npm for 7 hours and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is malicious. It harvests environment variables and common credential files, encodes the collected data, and exfiltrates it by pushing to an attacker-controlled GitHub repository using an embedded personal access token. The code contains explicit obfuscation and cleanup to conceal activity. Treat this as a supply-chain/backdoor compromise: remove the script, revoke the embedded token and any exposed credentials, rotate affected keys and secrets, and investigate systems where the package ran.

This code extracts and silently executes a Windows executable (win32dll.exe) from package resources. The malicious behaviors include: 1) Copying the executable to the system's temporary directory, 2) Executing it using subprocess.Popen with CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag to hide the process window, 3) Running in a non-daemon thread to ensure persistence even after the main process exits, 4) Using broad exception handling to silently ignore any errors, 5) Employing misleading naming by placing an .exe file in a directory named 'Dll'. This represents a deliberate attempt to execute unauthorized code on the victim's system.

Live on PyPI for 8 hours and 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a loader that executes an opaque, compressed/base64-encoded Python payload at import time. That pattern defeats static code review and is a strong supply-chain risk indicator. Treat as high risk: do not import/run on sensitive systems until the embedded payload is decoded and audited in an isolated environment. If the decoded payload is benign and auditable, consider requiring the author to publish the plaintext or sign the payload for future verification.

This module intentionally conceals its functionality by executing a decompressed, base64-encoded payload at import/runtime. That design blocks static inspection and is a high-risk pattern for supply-chain malware or hidden unwanted behavior. Until the embedded payload is safely decoded and analyzed, treat this code as untrusted and avoid using it in production.

Live on PyPI for 3 hours and 35 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains high-risk constructs: frequent use of shell execution (subprocess.run with shell=True and os.system), dynamic function dispatch using globals(), and an explicit scripted flow that would exfiltrate local files and a pip3 dependency list to a hardcoded GitHub repository and identity. Although the provided fragment is syntactically broken and therefore unlikely to run as-is, the intent and patterns (hardcoded remote push, pip3 freeze, git push) are consistent with malicious or at least highly unsafe automation that could be abused in CI to leak secrets or repo contents. Recommendation: do not run this code in CI or on sensitive hosts; remove or thoroughly review any remote push logic, eliminate shell=True and os.system usage in favor of safer APIs, validate and sanitize any inputs used for command construction, and disallow dynamic globals() dispatch. Full repository review is required. Consider treating this package as potentially malicious until proven otherwise.

Live on PyPI for 6 hours and 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The CSSL runtime contains explicit high-risk vectors enabling arbitrary code execution and state manipulation from untrusted payloads (CSSLMOD pickled payloads, Python code executed via exec, and external scripts). Despite some protective measures, the combination of insecure deserialization, dynamic code execution, and runtime symbol manipulation constitutes a strong supply-chain and host-compromise risk. Production use should avoid untrusted payloads, sandbox dynamically loaded code, and implement strict provenance, integrity checks, and isolation (e.g., sandboxing, code signing, restricted APIs).

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

This file contains exploit code that attempts to manipulate snapd via a specially-named client UNIX socket and a raw POST request to '/v2/create-user' with 'force-managed': True. The code creates a temporary UNIX domain socket with a pathname containing ';uid=0;' in /tmp, then connects to '/run/snapd[.]socket' and sends a crafted HTTP request to create a managed user account. This technique exploits snapd's socket pathname parsing to potentially escalate privileges or create unauthorized user accounts. The code appears to be based on a proof-of-concept exploit and could be dangerous if executed on systems running snapd.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by exfiltrating system and project data to external servers without user consent. The use of infinite loops and data transmission to unknown domains poses significant security risks.

Live on npm for 5 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

This script is malicious. It implements terminal locking, prevents user interruption, respawns for persistence, opens an extortion contact link, repeatedly invokes a function from a module named 'botnet' (likely for network/attack activity), and calls a 'wiper' function when the user interacts — consistent with ransomware/wiper and botnet behavior. Do not run or install this package. Remove and investigate the imported modules (../botnet/https.js and ./wiper.js) as they likely contain the active malicious payload.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

Live on PyPI for 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a severe security risk due to fetching and executing remote code from a user-controlled source with disabled SSL verification. This enables arbitrary remote code execution and is a critical supply chain vulnerability. The code should not be used in production without strong validation, integrity checks, and secure TLS enforcement.

The fragment exhibits high-risk characteristics of a loader/backdoor with cross-platform memory manipulation, dynamic code loading, and native interop. Public distribution of such code without thorough de-obfuscation, auditable payloads, and strict containment would be dangerous. It should be treated as malicious or highly insecure in a supply-chain context and removed or aggressively sandboxed until a transparent, verifiable implementation is provided.

This source implements a clear and simple WireGuard-backed TCP forwarder (tunnel/proxy). The file contains no direct data-harvesting or obfuscated backdoor code, but it provides powerful covert networking capability (bidirectional TCP tunneling) that is commonly abused in post-exploitation scenarios. The code has a correctness bug in WaitGroup usage and lacks access controls, limits, or sanitization. In a supply-chain review, inclusion of this component from the Sliver implant framework is a strong contextual warning: while not overtly destructive, it materially increases risk for exfiltration and covert connectivity. I recommend treating this dependency as high-risk and removing or isolating it unless its presence is explicitly required and audited.

This file collects system details (such as hostname, username, process working directory, and network interfaces) and attempts to exfiltrate them to pingb[.]in without user consent. The code encodes the data in Base64 and sends it via the ping command, indicating a covert method of data exfiltration.

This module contains plaintext private keys and certificates exported for consumption. Although there is no active malicious behavior in the code, shipping or committing this file publicly constitutes a severe supply-chain security risk. The presence of a CA private key in source is especially critical: it enables certificate issuance and large-scale impersonation. Remediation: remove all private keys from source, rotate/revoke any certificates potentially exposed, use secure secret management (environment variables, OS key stores, Vault/cloud secret manager) at runtime, and treat these keys as compromised if they were ever in a public repo or published package.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code embodies severe supply-chain risk through dynamic execution of remote payloads. Remote code can alter program flow, access data, or perform network exfiltration, all under the guise of normal operation. Even with the syntax issue present, the core pattern is unacceptable for trusted code. Remove remote exec paths, replace with strict, vetted, self-contained logic, or implement a secure, sandboxed execution environment with strict whitelisting and input validation.

This module intentionally conceals its behavior by embedding a compressed base64 payload and executing it at import time. That pattern is high risk: it grants arbitrary code execution and prevents static review. While the wrapper itself does not show explicit malicious API calls, the use of exec on an opaque payload is a malicious-enabling construct and should be treated as suspicious. Do not import or run this module in production; decode and inspect the embedded payload in a secure, isolated environment before any execution.

This module appears to be legitimate protocol-handling code, not intentionally malicious. However it contains high-risk patterns: unpickling data directly from a network socket and dynamically invoking methods based on deserialized input. Those patterns allow remote attackers who can connect to the socket (or send crafted payloads) to achieve arbitrary code execution or to call unintended device/server methods. In short: not malware by intent, but unsafe for use in untrusted networks without strong authentication, encryption, and replacement of pickle with a safe serialization or explicit validation of incoming objects.

No definitive malware or backdoor detected in the provided fragment. The bundle appears to be a composite of legitimate UI/editor libraries (React internals, CodeMirror-like editors, Sandpack runtime, styling tools). The risk remains moderate due to potential data exposure paths in complex plugin ecosystems and the opaqueness of transitive dependencies in a large bundle. A full audit should include: dependency integrity checks, SAST/DAST on dynamic imports, and runtime data-flow tracing across all plugins/extensions.

Live on npm for 7 hours and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This script is malicious. It harvests environment variables and common credential files, encodes the collected data, and exfiltrates it by pushing to an attacker-controlled GitHub repository using an embedded personal access token. The code contains explicit obfuscation and cleanup to conceal activity. Treat this as a supply-chain/backdoor compromise: remove the script, revoke the embedded token and any exposed credentials, rotate affected keys and secrets, and investigate systems where the package ran.

This code extracts and silently executes a Windows executable (win32dll.exe) from package resources. The malicious behaviors include: 1) Copying the executable to the system's temporary directory, 2) Executing it using subprocess.Popen with CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag to hide the process window, 3) Running in a non-daemon thread to ensure persistence even after the main process exits, 4) Using broad exception handling to silently ignore any errors, 5) Employing misleading naming by placing an .exe file in a directory named 'Dll'. This represents a deliberate attempt to execute unauthorized code on the victim's system.

Live on PyPI for 8 hours and 28 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is a loader that executes an opaque, compressed/base64-encoded Python payload at import time. That pattern defeats static code review and is a strong supply-chain risk indicator. Treat as high risk: do not import/run on sensitive systems until the embedded payload is decoded and audited in an isolated environment. If the decoded payload is benign and auditable, consider requiring the author to publish the plaintext or sign the payload for future verification.

This module intentionally conceals its functionality by executing a decompressed, base64-encoded payload at import/runtime. That design blocks static inspection and is a high-risk pattern for supply-chain malware or hidden unwanted behavior. Until the embedded payload is safely decoded and analyzed, treat this code as untrusted and avoid using it in production.

Live on PyPI for 3 hours and 35 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains high-risk constructs: frequent use of shell execution (subprocess.run with shell=True and os.system), dynamic function dispatch using globals(), and an explicit scripted flow that would exfiltrate local files and a pip3 dependency list to a hardcoded GitHub repository and identity. Although the provided fragment is syntactically broken and therefore unlikely to run as-is, the intent and patterns (hardcoded remote push, pip3 freeze, git push) are consistent with malicious or at least highly unsafe automation that could be abused in CI to leak secrets or repo contents. Recommendation: do not run this code in CI or on sensitive hosts; remove or thoroughly review any remote push logic, eliminate shell=True and os.system usage in favor of safer APIs, validate and sanitize any inputs used for command construction, and disallow dynamic globals() dispatch. Full repository review is required. Consider treating this package as potentially malicious until proven otherwise.

Live on PyPI for 6 hours and 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The CSSL runtime contains explicit high-risk vectors enabling arbitrary code execution and state manipulation from untrusted payloads (CSSLMOD pickled payloads, Python code executed via exec, and external scripts). Despite some protective measures, the combination of insecure deserialization, dynamic code execution, and runtime symbol manipulation constitutes a strong supply-chain and host-compromise risk. Production use should avoid untrusted payloads, sandbox dynamically loaded code, and implement strict provenance, integrity checks, and isolation (e.g., sandboxing, code signing, restricted APIs).

The code exhibits a dangerous remote code execution pattern: it downloads and immediately runs a remote Python payload without integrity checks, sandboxing, or input validation. This creates a severe supply-chain and runtime security risk. Recommended mitigations include removing dynamic downloads, validating payloads with cryptographic hashes or signatures, using safe subprocess invocations with argument lists, and implementing strict input sanitization. If remote functionality must remain, switch to a trusted-internal mechanism (e.g., plugin architecture with signed components, offline verification) and add robust error handling and logging.

This file contains exploit code that attempts to manipulate snapd via a specially-named client UNIX socket and a raw POST request to '/v2/create-user' with 'force-managed': True. The code creates a temporary UNIX domain socket with a pathname containing ';uid=0;' in /tmp, then connects to '/run/snapd[.]socket' and sends a crafted HTTP request to create a managed user account. This technique exploits snapd's socket pathname parsing to potentially escalate privileges or create unauthorized user accounts. The code appears to be based on a proof-of-concept exploit and could be dangerous if executed on systems running snapd.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by exfiltrating system and project data to external servers without user consent. The use of infinite loops and data transmission to unknown domains poses significant security risks.

Live on npm for 5 hours and 11 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

This script is malicious. It implements terminal locking, prevents user interruption, respawns for persistence, opens an extortion contact link, repeatedly invokes a function from a module named 'botnet' (likely for network/attack activity), and calls a 'wiper' function when the user interacts — consistent with ransomware/wiper and botnet behavior. Do not run or install this package. Remove and investigate the imported modules (../botnet/https.js and ./wiper.js) as they likely contain the active malicious payload.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

Live on PyPI for 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a severe security risk due to fetching and executing remote code from a user-controlled source with disabled SSL verification. This enables arbitrary remote code execution and is a critical supply chain vulnerability. The code should not be used in production without strong validation, integrity checks, and secure TLS enforcement.

The fragment exhibits high-risk characteristics of a loader/backdoor with cross-platform memory manipulation, dynamic code loading, and native interop. Public distribution of such code without thorough de-obfuscation, auditable payloads, and strict containment would be dangerous. It should be treated as malicious or highly insecure in a supply-chain context and removed or aggressively sandboxed until a transparent, verifiable implementation is provided.

This source implements a clear and simple WireGuard-backed TCP forwarder (tunnel/proxy). The file contains no direct data-harvesting or obfuscated backdoor code, but it provides powerful covert networking capability (bidirectional TCP tunneling) that is commonly abused in post-exploitation scenarios. The code has a correctness bug in WaitGroup usage and lacks access controls, limits, or sanitization. In a supply-chain review, inclusion of this component from the Sliver implant framework is a strong contextual warning: while not overtly destructive, it materially increases risk for exfiltration and covert connectivity. I recommend treating this dependency as high-risk and removing or isolating it unless its presence is explicitly required and audited.

This file collects system details (such as hostname, username, process working directory, and network interfaces) and attempts to exfiltrate them to pingb[.]in without user consent. The code encodes the data in Base64 and sends it via the ping command, indicating a covert method of data exfiltration.

This module contains plaintext private keys and certificates exported for consumption. Although there is no active malicious behavior in the code, shipping or committing this file publicly constitutes a severe supply-chain security risk. The presence of a CA private key in source is especially critical: it enables certificate issuance and large-scale impersonation. Remediation: remove all private keys from source, rotate/revoke any certificates potentially exposed, use secure secret management (environment variables, OS key stores, Vault/cloud secret manager) at runtime, and treat these keys as compromised if they were ever in a public repo or published package.

The SweetAlert2 library code is mostly benign and serves as a UI modal dialog tool. However, it contains a suspicious and potentially malicious snippet that targets Russian users on certain domains to play an unsolicited audio prank, disabling pointer events and potentially disrupting user interaction. This behavior is unexpected and should be considered a moderate security risk and potential malware. The rest of the code shows no signs of malicious intent. The provided reports were invalid and unhelpful. Users should be cautious about this version of the library due to the embedded prank behavior.

The code embodies severe supply-chain risk through dynamic execution of remote payloads. Remote code can alter program flow, access data, or perform network exfiltration, all under the guise of normal operation. Even with the syntax issue present, the core pattern is unacceptable for trusted code. Remove remote exec paths, replace with strict, vetted, self-contained logic, or implement a secure, sandboxed execution environment with strict whitelisting and input validation.