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The assembly mixes benign-looking messaging functionality with a heavily obfuscated runtime loader/packer that performs decryption of embedded resources, anti-debug/tamper checks, low-level native memory operations, in-memory payload allocation and runtime method pointer patching. Those capabilities are consistent with an in-memory loader/backdoor or a strong protector/packer. Given the opaque nature, native memory writes, and runtime modification, treat this package as high-risk and do not deploy it until the embedded loader is fully explained, deobfuscated and audited. Recommend removing or isolating this dependency, performing a complete code provenance review, and conducting dynamic/forensic analysis in a controlled environment.

This module contains deliberate data-exfiltration behavior: it sends an externally-supplied token to a hard-coded Telegram bot/chat and archives plus uploads a local 'Accounts' directory to a specific Telegram user, then attempts to delete the archive. Treat as malicious backdoor: remove from systems, investigate for additional compromisation, rotate any potentially leaked credentials, and block the hard-coded bot token/recipient IDs. Forensic recovery of deleted files may be required.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

High-risk bootstrap pattern: runs remote scripts via bit.ly shortened URLs piped directly to bash and sources local startup scripts. Treat as potentially dangerous until remote targets are resolved and their contents inspected or cryptographically verified. Do not run this on sensitive systems; if already run, inspect ~/.bashrc, the fetched scripts, and monitor for unexpected network/cron/systemd services and new user accounts.

Live on PyPI for 1 hour and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This setup script exhibits multiple high-risk behaviors: importing package code at setup time, attempting to install a system compiler via pip (network fetch and arbitrary install-time code execution), and compiling + installing a native binary intended to provide sudo-like functionality without password prompts. These combined behaviors create a strong supply-chain and privilege-escalation risk. Do not install this package in privileged or production environments without thorough offline code review (including the C source), integrity checks, and restricting install privileges. Treat the package as potentially malicious until proven otherwise.

Malicious code designed to automate Facebook account takeover by systematically bypassing the platform's security checkpoint system. The code implements a four-phase process that navigates through Facebook's epsilon security verification: (1) STEPPER_CONFIRMATION with token extraction, (2) CONTACT_POINT_REVIEW to bypass contact verification, (3) CHANGE_PASSWORD for credential modification, and (4) OUTRO to finalize the compromise. It makes requests to facebook[.]com/checkpoint/ endpoints and facebook[.]com/api/graphql/ to extract LSD tokens and manipulate authentication flows. The Find_And_Parse function extracts sensitive tokens from HTML script tags, specifically targeting 'any_eligible_challenges' data. This represents a serious security threat that could be used to compromise user accounts without authorization by circumventing Facebook's multi-factor security verification mechanisms.

This bundle contains a legitimate-looking account-balance UI component that fetches account data and listens for server-sent events using session tokens. However, it contains an unrelated, hard-coded political/propaganda payload executed via setTimeout that calls alert(...) and window.open(...) to external sites (including a .onion URL and a change.org petition). This is an unexpected and malicious/unwanted insertion for a UI component and indicates a supply-chain compromise or deliberate sabotage. Remove or refuse to use this package until the source/maintainer explains and fixes the injected behavior.

This file contains exploit code that attempts to manipulate snapd via a specially-named client UNIX socket and a raw POST request to '/v2/create-user' with 'force-managed': True. The code creates a temporary UNIX domain socket with a pathname containing ';uid=0;' in /tmp, then connects to '/run/snapd[.]socket' and sends a crafted HTTP request to create a managed user account. This technique exploits snapd's socket pathname parsing to potentially escalate privileges or create unauthorized user accounts. The code appears to be based on a proof-of-concept exploit and could be dangerous if executed on systems running snapd.

This module contains high-risk functionality: it executes shell commands (subprocess.Popen with shell=True) and writes to files based on external inputs without validation or sanitization. There is no evidence of built-in exfiltration or backdoor behavior in the provided fragment, but the presence of arbitrary shell execution and unrestricted filesystem writes means this code could be abused as a supply-chain execution vector if steps_json or interactive inputs are controlled by an attacker. Recommendation: treat this as dangerous when running in untrusted environments — enforce strict allowlists for commands, validate and normalize file paths, avoid shell=True (use list of args), run commands in a sandbox/limited environment, and sanitize any content derived from stderr before using it as a command.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 4 hours and 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The Oracle class implements a covert data exfiltration mechanism by sending fetch response data, timestamps, and random numbers to an external callback URL without user knowledge or consent. This behavior constitutes a serious privacy and security risk and can be considered malicious. The code is not obfuscated and contains no other obvious malware payloads, but the data leakage alone justifies a high security risk and malware score.

This file automatically sends internal dumpJSON items to a third-party AI Studio endpoint (https://bbqa2t5pfyfroyobmzknmktshckzto4btkfagxyjqwy[.]did[.]abtnet[.]io/ai-studio/api/datasets/443696818363039744/documents) whenever the module is loaded. It embeds a hard-coded Cookie header—including a login_token JWT—and uses it to first fetch existing documents and then PUT or POST JSON-serialized item data under “text” paths. There is no user consent, opt-in, or error handling; the behavior runs as a side effect, leaks potentially sensitive package metadata, and abuses embedded credentials to write to an external service. This is a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor indicator.

The code collects and sends system information to a Discord webhook without user consent, which poses a significant security risk. The use of a hardcoded passphrase for encryption further exacerbates the issue.

This module's intended purpose is to collect repository files, images, and user prompts to produce image-design plans via an external AI gateway. The main security issue is privacy/data-exfiltration risk: local file contents, focused files, and full absolute paths are concatenated into prompts and sent to a remote AI service (self.ai.arch_stream_prompt). The code contains clear logic bugs (attachment filtering inversion) and syntax truncation that prevent execution as-is, but if fixed, the design would leak repository structure and file contents unless the AIGateway and its endpoint are trusted. No direct malware (reverse shell, hardcoded creds, obfuscation) was found in the fragment, but the behavior is high-risk from a data-leakage perspective. Recommendations: do not send full absolute paths or unnecessary file contents to external services; sanitize or limit which files are read; fix attachment filtering logic; validate and audit AIGateway endpoint and transport security; and fix syntax errors before deployment.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 10 hours and 53 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is mainly metadata for UI components, but it contains explicit data-forwarding logic that posts assembled 'bigDataBody' payloads to external endpoints and uses a hard-coded token in at least one path. It also extracts tokens from the host runtime (history.location.query.token, window.__token__) and includes them in headers. This is behavior consistent with data collection/exfiltration and represents a supply-chain/backdoor risk. I assess this as likely malicious or at least highly privacy-invasive if the behavior is undocumented to integrators. Recommend removing or isolating the network-sending code, auditing the endpoints and the hard-coded token, and treating the package as untrusted until justification is provided.

Malicious bash initialization script that performs destructive filesystem operations on macOS systems. When the external helper script 'isuserdarwin.sh' returns true, the script silently executes 'sudo rm -rf' to delete critical user directories including ~/Applications, ~/Movies, ~/Music, ~/Pictures, ~/Public, and ~/Sites without user confirmation. It also removes the macOS sleepimage file at /private/var/vm/sleepimage. The script modifies SSH directory permissions using 'sudo chmod -R go-rw' which can break SSH access or expose credentials. All destructive operations have their output suppressed with '>/dev/null 2>&1' to hide failures and make the actions stealthy. The script uses eval to execute the output of /usr/bin/dircolors, creating a command injection risk if the binary is compromised. It depends on external scripts (paper.sh, isuserdarwin.sh, debug.sh) whose contents are unknown and could execute arbitrary code. The destructive operations are embedded within what appears to be routine shell configuration code, likely to disguise the malicious intent.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting and exfiltrating system information using DNS queries. The heavy obfuscation further suggests an intent to hide these actions. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module implements a covert HTTP tunneling SOCKS server (client-side of an HTTP-based tunnel) that forwards arbitrary local TCP/SOCKS traffic to remote web endpoints using randomized headers and encoded payloads. That functionality is potentially malicious in most contexts because it provides a stealthy remote-access/data-exfiltration channel and can be used to bypass firewall controls. If found in a dependency or package, it should be treated as high risk and investigated/removed unless you explicitly expect this behavior and trust the remote endpoints and accompanying server-side component (tunnel.php).

The install-time behavior itself is not directly executing remote code or obvious malware: it only sets executable permission on the packaged CLI. However, the package explicitly exposes modules and example scripts for cyber/real-cyber attacks and provides convenient demo commands to run them. This makes the package high-risk and potentially malicious or dual-use. If you intend to install or run its CLI/examples, inspect the source (especially dist/core/* and examples/*) carefully and avoid running the provided cyber demos on production or internet-connected systems.

The code exhibits characteristics of data exfiltration by sending potentially sensitive information to a remote server using encrypted and obfuscated methods. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 10 days, 8 hours and 29 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Possible typosquat of azure - Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles legitimate Azure package naming conventions, which could confuse users. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. Therefore, it is likely a typosquat.

Live on npm for 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is an orchestrator for generating cryptocurrency keypairs and immediately delegating them to a 'steal' component. The explicit naming and message strings (e.g., 'Start to steal!!!') plus the direct flow of private keys into stealer.Steal make it highly likely this package is malicious and intended to exfiltrate or misuse keys. Do not execute. Block or remove the package, and audit/remove referenced dependencies and any network endpoints they contact.

The assembly mixes benign-looking messaging functionality with a heavily obfuscated runtime loader/packer that performs decryption of embedded resources, anti-debug/tamper checks, low-level native memory operations, in-memory payload allocation and runtime method pointer patching. Those capabilities are consistent with an in-memory loader/backdoor or a strong protector/packer. Given the opaque nature, native memory writes, and runtime modification, treat this package as high-risk and do not deploy it until the embedded loader is fully explained, deobfuscated and audited. Recommend removing or isolating this dependency, performing a complete code provenance review, and conducting dynamic/forensic analysis in a controlled environment.

This module contains deliberate data-exfiltration behavior: it sends an externally-supplied token to a hard-coded Telegram bot/chat and archives plus uploads a local 'Accounts' directory to a specific Telegram user, then attempts to delete the archive. Treat as malicious backdoor: remove from systems, investigate for additional compromisation, rotate any potentially leaked credentials, and block the hard-coded bot token/recipient IDs. Forensic recovery of deleted files may be required.

The fragment contains a high-risk pattern: it downloads a Python script from a remote source and immediately executes it without integrity verification or sandboxing. This creates a critical supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk, as the remote payload could perform any action on the host, including data exfiltration, credential access, or system compromise. Even though defaults use placeholders, the mechanism itself is unsafe and should be disallowed or hardened (e.g., verify hashes, use signed modules, avoid executing remote code).

High-risk bootstrap pattern: runs remote scripts via bit.ly shortened URLs piped directly to bash and sources local startup scripts. Treat as potentially dangerous until remote targets are resolved and their contents inspected or cryptographically verified. Do not run this on sensitive systems; if already run, inspect ~/.bashrc, the fetched scripts, and monitor for unexpected network/cron/systemd services and new user accounts.

Live on PyPI for 1 hour and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This setup script exhibits multiple high-risk behaviors: importing package code at setup time, attempting to install a system compiler via pip (network fetch and arbitrary install-time code execution), and compiling + installing a native binary intended to provide sudo-like functionality without password prompts. These combined behaviors create a strong supply-chain and privilege-escalation risk. Do not install this package in privileged or production environments without thorough offline code review (including the C source), integrity checks, and restricting install privileges. Treat the package as potentially malicious until proven otherwise.

Malicious code designed to automate Facebook account takeover by systematically bypassing the platform's security checkpoint system. The code implements a four-phase process that navigates through Facebook's epsilon security verification: (1) STEPPER_CONFIRMATION with token extraction, (2) CONTACT_POINT_REVIEW to bypass contact verification, (3) CHANGE_PASSWORD for credential modification, and (4) OUTRO to finalize the compromise. It makes requests to facebook[.]com/checkpoint/ endpoints and facebook[.]com/api/graphql/ to extract LSD tokens and manipulate authentication flows. The Find_And_Parse function extracts sensitive tokens from HTML script tags, specifically targeting 'any_eligible_challenges' data. This represents a serious security threat that could be used to compromise user accounts without authorization by circumventing Facebook's multi-factor security verification mechanisms.

This bundle contains a legitimate-looking account-balance UI component that fetches account data and listens for server-sent events using session tokens. However, it contains an unrelated, hard-coded political/propaganda payload executed via setTimeout that calls alert(...) and window.open(...) to external sites (including a .onion URL and a change.org petition). This is an unexpected and malicious/unwanted insertion for a UI component and indicates a supply-chain compromise or deliberate sabotage. Remove or refuse to use this package until the source/maintainer explains and fixes the injected behavior.

This file contains exploit code that attempts to manipulate snapd via a specially-named client UNIX socket and a raw POST request to '/v2/create-user' with 'force-managed': True. The code creates a temporary UNIX domain socket with a pathname containing ';uid=0;' in /tmp, then connects to '/run/snapd[.]socket' and sends a crafted HTTP request to create a managed user account. This technique exploits snapd's socket pathname parsing to potentially escalate privileges or create unauthorized user accounts. The code appears to be based on a proof-of-concept exploit and could be dangerous if executed on systems running snapd.

This module contains high-risk functionality: it executes shell commands (subprocess.Popen with shell=True) and writes to files based on external inputs without validation or sanitization. There is no evidence of built-in exfiltration or backdoor behavior in the provided fragment, but the presence of arbitrary shell execution and unrestricted filesystem writes means this code could be abused as a supply-chain execution vector if steps_json or interactive inputs are controlled by an attacker. Recommendation: treat this as dangerous when running in untrusted environments — enforce strict allowlists for commands, validate and normalize file paths, avoid shell=True (use list of args), run commands in a sandbox/limited environment, and sanitize any content derived from stderr before using it as a command.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 4 hours and 1 minute before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module is an automation/scraping worker that intentionally executes code provided by task descriptions. That design requires trusting the task source. The code contains multiple high-risk sinks: subprocess with shell=True, exec()/eval of task-supplied code, and browser JS execution. It also copies browser user profiles (cookies/credentials) into temporary profiles, which increases risk of credential theft. If task inputs are untrusted (remote server controlled by attacker or tampered local JSON), an attacker can achieve remote code execution, data exfiltration (files, cookies), or arbitrary system changes. Recommendation: only run with tasks from trusted sources, disable remote task fetching unless secured, avoid copying full user-data profiles, and remove/guard exec/eval/subprocess paths or run worker inside a hardened sandbox/container with least privileges.

The Oracle class implements a covert data exfiltration mechanism by sending fetch response data, timestamps, and random numbers to an external callback URL without user knowledge or consent. This behavior constitutes a serious privacy and security risk and can be considered malicious. The code is not obfuscated and contains no other obvious malware payloads, but the data leakage alone justifies a high security risk and malware score.

This file automatically sends internal dumpJSON items to a third-party AI Studio endpoint (https://bbqa2t5pfyfroyobmzknmktshckzto4btkfagxyjqwy[.]did[.]abtnet[.]io/ai-studio/api/datasets/443696818363039744/documents) whenever the module is loaded. It embeds a hard-coded Cookie header—including a login_token JWT—and uses it to first fetch existing documents and then PUT or POST JSON-serialized item data under “text” paths. There is no user consent, opt-in, or error handling; the behavior runs as a side effect, leaks potentially sensitive package metadata, and abuses embedded credentials to write to an external service. This is a high-risk supply-chain/backdoor indicator.

The code collects and sends system information to a Discord webhook without user consent, which poses a significant security risk. The use of a hardcoded passphrase for encryption further exacerbates the issue.

This module's intended purpose is to collect repository files, images, and user prompts to produce image-design plans via an external AI gateway. The main security issue is privacy/data-exfiltration risk: local file contents, focused files, and full absolute paths are concatenated into prompts and sent to a remote AI service (self.ai.arch_stream_prompt). The code contains clear logic bugs (attachment filtering inversion) and syntax truncation that prevent execution as-is, but if fixed, the design would leak repository structure and file contents unless the AIGateway and its endpoint are trusted. No direct malware (reverse shell, hardcoded creds, obfuscation) was found in the fragment, but the behavior is high-risk from a data-leakage perspective. Recommendations: do not send full absolute paths or unnecessary file contents to external services; sanitize or limit which files are read; fix attachment filtering logic; validate and audit AIGateway endpoint and transport security; and fix syntax errors before deployment.

Live on PyPI for 5 days, 10 hours and 53 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is mainly metadata for UI components, but it contains explicit data-forwarding logic that posts assembled 'bigDataBody' payloads to external endpoints and uses a hard-coded token in at least one path. It also extracts tokens from the host runtime (history.location.query.token, window.__token__) and includes them in headers. This is behavior consistent with data collection/exfiltration and represents a supply-chain/backdoor risk. I assess this as likely malicious or at least highly privacy-invasive if the behavior is undocumented to integrators. Recommend removing or isolating the network-sending code, auditing the endpoints and the hard-coded token, and treating the package as untrusted until justification is provided.

Malicious bash initialization script that performs destructive filesystem operations on macOS systems. When the external helper script 'isuserdarwin.sh' returns true, the script silently executes 'sudo rm -rf' to delete critical user directories including ~/Applications, ~/Movies, ~/Music, ~/Pictures, ~/Public, and ~/Sites without user confirmation. It also removes the macOS sleepimage file at /private/var/vm/sleepimage. The script modifies SSH directory permissions using 'sudo chmod -R go-rw' which can break SSH access or expose credentials. All destructive operations have their output suppressed with '>/dev/null 2>&1' to hide failures and make the actions stealthy. The script uses eval to execute the output of /usr/bin/dircolors, creating a command injection risk if the binary is compromised. It depends on external scripts (paper.sh, isuserdarwin.sh, debug.sh) whose contents are unknown and could execute arbitrary code. The destructive operations are embedded within what appears to be routine shell configuration code, likely to disguise the malicious intent.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

The code exhibits malicious behavior by collecting and exfiltrating system information using DNS queries. The heavy obfuscation further suggests an intent to hide these actions. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 59 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code uses the exec function to run shell commands, which poses a significant security risk. It could potentially execute malicious code if the input to exec is manipulated. Redirecting output to /dev/null to hide execution details is suspicious.

Live on npm for 31 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module implements a covert HTTP tunneling SOCKS server (client-side of an HTTP-based tunnel) that forwards arbitrary local TCP/SOCKS traffic to remote web endpoints using randomized headers and encoded payloads. That functionality is potentially malicious in most contexts because it provides a stealthy remote-access/data-exfiltration channel and can be used to bypass firewall controls. If found in a dependency or package, it should be treated as high risk and investigated/removed unless you explicitly expect this behavior and trust the remote endpoints and accompanying server-side component (tunnel.php).

The install-time behavior itself is not directly executing remote code or obvious malware: it only sets executable permission on the packaged CLI. However, the package explicitly exposes modules and example scripts for cyber/real-cyber attacks and provides convenient demo commands to run them. This makes the package high-risk and potentially malicious or dual-use. If you intend to install or run its CLI/examples, inspect the source (especially dist/core/* and examples/*) carefully and avoid running the provided cyber demos on production or internet-connected systems.

The code exhibits characteristics of data exfiltration by sending potentially sensitive information to a remote server using encrypted and obfuscated methods. This poses a significant security risk.

Live on npm for 10 days, 8 hours and 29 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

Possible typosquat of azure - Explanation: The package 'azure-graphrbac' is labeled as a 'security holding package', which often indicates a placeholder to prevent typosquatting. The name 'azure-graphrbac' closely resembles legitimate Azure package naming conventions, which could confuse users. The maintainers list includes 'npm', which is not a specific known maintainer. Therefore, it is likely a typosquat.

Live on npm for 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file is an orchestrator for generating cryptocurrency keypairs and immediately delegating them to a 'steal' component. The explicit naming and message strings (e.g., 'Start to steal!!!') plus the direct flow of private keys into stealer.Steal make it highly likely this package is malicious and intended to exfiltrate or misuse keys. Do not execute. Block or remove the package, and audit/remove referenced dependencies and any network endpoints they contact.