InsurgoTech

I suggest you read this response from Thierry in another thread.

We look forward to it!

Full disclosure: This account represents Insurgo. This post represents our views of the key differences between our products.

First, Insurgo laptops have been certified by the Qubes OS Project. This means a portion of each sale is given to Qubes development. In addition, 25% of sales profits are donated back to the funding of open source projects.

On a technical level our laptops are more resilient to tampering especially in transit. Read here: https://github.com/Nitrokey/qubes-oem#initial-luks-password

Here is a description of our setup copy and pasted from our website:

Insurgo preinstalls latest QubesOS on it, with diceware randomly selected passphrases to encrypt disk content,  seals the boot and firmware integrity with the provided Librem Key/Nitrokey Pro v2 for you to visually validate that nothing has been tampered with during transit. Insurgo also owns the Librem Key/Nitrokey Pro v2 with diceware selected Admin and User PINs, injecting a temporary public GPG key into the firmware. Insurgo seals the integrity of the firmware both through TPMTOTP (using laptop’s Trusted Platform Module) which is also sealed into NitroKey/Librem Key, providing the user with two ways of making sure the hardware has not been tampered with since it left his hands: with a QRCode to scan on his smartphone prior to hardware reception and by plugging the NitroKey Pro v2/Librem Key at first boot, which should flash green to attest laptop firmware and boot configuration trustability.

Upon reception, you will be asked to re-own your new hardware by: re-encrypting your QubesOS installation, selecting a new Recovery Disk Key passphrase to replace OEM’s, factory resetting your Librem Key/Nitrokey Pro which will generate a new GPG key pair for desired e-mail address, asking you to choose your own Admin and User PINs to use this USB GPG SmartKey also externally, to encrypt/sign files and E-Mails. At the end of this re-ownership process, the firmware will contain your public key injected in it. Your GPG card will be required to sign each QubesOS boot related upgrades, the signature of the files digest (sha256sum of files) being validated against signed version with your public key present in ROM, automatically at each boot. Your new Librem Key/NitroKey will need to be plugged in at each boot, visually attesting that the boot firmware (root of trust of the computer) has not been tampered with by a third party, by flashing its LED green if in a known state or red if taken measurements mismatches.