August 16, 2013 · 8:45 pm

Introduction

Welcome to Tim Harding’s blog of writings and talks about logic, rationality, philosophy and skepticism. There are also some reblogs of some of Tim’s favourite posts by other writers, plus some of his favourite quotations and videos.  This blog has a Facebook connection at The Logical Place.

There are over 2,900 posts here about all sorts of topics – please have a good look around before leaving.

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July 3, 2013 · 9:35 pm

What is logic?

The word ‘logic‘ is not easy to define, because it has slightly different meanings in various applications ranging from philosophy, to mathematics to computer science. In philosophy, logic determines the principles of correct reasoning. It’s a systematic method of evaluating arguments and reasoning, aiming to distinguish good (valid and sound) reasoning from bad (invalid or unsound) reasoning.

The essential difference between informal logic and formal logic is that informal logic uses natural language, whereas formal logic (also known as symbolic logic) is more complex and uses mathematical symbols to overcome the frequent ambiguity or imprecision of natural language. Reason is the application of logic to actual premises, with a view to drawing valid or sound conclusions. Logic is the rules to be followed, independently of particular premises, or in other words using abstract premises designated by letters such as P and Q.

So what is an argument? In everyday life, we use the word ‘argument’ to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement (which is actually a clash between two or more arguments put forward by different people). This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophical logic, where arguments are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given conclusion. In this sense, an argument consist of statements or propositions, called its premises, from which a conclusion is claimed to follow (in the case of a deductive argument) or be inferred (in the case of an inductive argument). Deductive conclusions usually begin with a word like ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘so’ or ‘it follows that’.

A good argument is one that has two virtues: good form and all true premises. Arguments can be either deductive, inductive  or abductive. A deductive argument with valid form and true premises is said to be sound. An inductive argument based on strong evidence is said to be cogent. The term ‘good argument’ covers all three of these types of arguments.

Deductive arguments

A valid argument is a deductive argument where the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, because of the logical structure of the argument. That is, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. Conversely, an invalid argument is one where the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. However, the validity or invalidity of arguments must be clearly distinguished from the truth or falsity of its premises. It is possible for the conclusion of a valid argument to be true, even though one or more of its premises are false. For example, consider the following argument:

Premise 1: Napoleon was German
Premise 2: All Germans are Europeans
Conclusion: Therefore, Napoleon was European

The conclusion that Napoleon was European is true, even though Premise 1 is false. This argument is valid because of its logical structure, not because its premises and conclusion are all true (which they are not). Even if the premises and conclusion were all true, it wouldn’t necessarily mean that the argument was valid. If an argument has true premises and its form is valid, then its conclusion must be true.

Deductive logic is essentially about consistency. The rules of logic are not arbitrary, like the rules for a game of chess. They exist to avoid internal contradictions within an argument. For example, if we have an argument with the following premises:

Premise 1: Napoleon was either German or French
Premise 2: Napoleon was not German

The conclusion cannot logically be “Therefore, Napoleon was German” because that would directly contradict Premise 2. So the logical conclusion can only be: “Therefore, Napoleon was French”, not because we know that it happens to be true, but because it is the only possible conclusion if both the premises are true. This is admittedly a simple and self-evident example, but similar reasoning applies to more complex arguments where the rules of logic are not so self-evident. In summary, the rules of logic exist because breaking the rules would entail internal contradictions within the argument.

Inductive arguments

An inductive argument is one where the premises seek to supply strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a sound deductive argument is supposed to be certain, the conclusion of a cogent inductive argument is supposed to be probable, based upon the evidence given. Here’s a classic example of an inductive argument:

  1. Premise: Every time you’ve eaten peanuts, you’ve had an allergic reaction.
  2. Conclusion: You are likely allergic to peanuts.

In this example, the specific observations are instances of eating peanuts and having allergic reactions. From these observations, you generalize that you are probably allergic to peanuts. The conclusion is not certain, but if the premise is true (i.e., every time you’ve eaten peanuts, you’ve had an allergic reaction), then the conclusion is likely to be true as well.

Whilst an inductive argument based on strong evidence can be cogent, there is some dispute amongst philosophers as to the reliability of induction as a scientific method. For example, by the problem of induction, no number of confirming observations can verify a universal generalization, such as ‘All swans are white’, yet it is logically possible to falsify it by observing a single black swan.

Abductive arguments

Abduction may be described as an “inference to the best explanation”, and whilst not as reliable as deduction or induction, it can still be a useful form of reasoning. For example, a typical abductive reasoning process used by doctors in diagnosis might be: “this set of symptoms could be caused by illnesses X, Y or Z. If I ask some more questions or conduct some tests I can rule out X and Y, so it must be Z.

Incidentally, the doctor is the one who is doing the abduction here, not the patient. By accepting the doctor’s diagnosis, the patient is using inductive reasoning that the doctor has a sufficiently high probability of being right that it is rational to accept the diagnosis. This is actually an acceptable form of the Argument from Authority (only the deductive form is fallacious).

References:

Hodges, W. (1977) Logic – an introduction to elementary logic (2nd ed. 2001) Penguin, London.
Lemmon, E.J. (1987) Beginning Logic. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.

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June 19, 2013 · 2:59 pm

Reasoning

Rationality may be defined as as the quality of being consistent with or using reason, which is further defined as the mental ability to draw inferences or conclusions from premises (the ‘if – then’ connection). The application of reason is known as reasoning; the main categories of which are deductive and inductive reasoning. A deductive argument with valid form and true premises is said to be sound. An inductive argument based on strong evidence is said to be cogent. It is rational to accept the conclusions of arguments that are sound or cogent, unless and until they are effectively refuted.

A fallacy is an error of reasoning resulting in a misconception or false conclusion. A fallacious argument can be deductively invalid or one that has insufficient inductive strength. A deductively invalid argument is one where the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. That is , the conclusion can be false even if the premises are true. An example of an inductively invalid argument is a conclusion that smoking does not cause cancer based on the anecdotal evidence of only one healthy smoker.

By accident or design, fallacies may exploit emotional triggers in the listener (e.g. appeal to emotion), or take advantage of social relationships between people (e.g. argument from authority). By definition, a belief arising from a logical fallacy is contrary to reason and is therefore irrational, even though a small number of such beliefs might possibly be true by coincidence.

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January 17, 2026 · 2:55 pm

The Law of Unintended Consequences

The Law of Unintended Consequences is the idea that deliberate actions—especially by governments or large organisations—often produce effects that were not anticipated, and these effects may be harmful, neutral, or occasionally beneficial.

In short: trying to solve one problem frequently creates others.

Core idea

When people intervene in complex systems (economies, societies, ecosystems, technologies), they rarely understand allthe interacting variables. As a result:

  • Actions aimed at a specific goal can have side effects
  • Those side effects may undermine or reverse the original intention
  • The more complex the system, the more likely unintended outcomes become

Common categories of unintended consequences

  1. Perverse effects
    The intervention makes the problem worse.
    • Example: Rent controls intended to make housing affordable end up reducing supply, raising long-term prices.
  2. Unanticipated costs
    The policy works, but at a cost that wasn’t foreseen.
    • Example: Environmental regulations that improve air quality but bankrupt small firms unable to comply.
  3. Offsetting behaviour
    People change their behaviour in response, cancelling the benefit.
    • Example: Safer cars encouraging riskier driving, reducing safety gains.
  4. Unexpected benefits
    Rarely, positive effects occur that were not planned.
    • Example: Military technologies leading to civilian innovations.

Why unintended consequences happen

  • Incomplete knowledge: Decision-makers can’t see the whole system.
  • Human incentives: People adapt strategically to rules and policies.
  • Time lags: Effects emerge years later, beyond planning horizons.
  • Complex feedback loops: Small changes ripple unpredictably.

Historical origin

The phrase is commonly associated with sociologist Robert K. Merton, who analysed how social actions systematically generate unforeseen results—but the underlying idea goes back much further, appearing in economics, political philosophy, and even ancient literature.

Why the law matters

The Law of Unintended Consequences is often invoked to argue for:

  • Caution in policy-making
  • Incremental change rather than sweeping reform
  • Respect for evolved systems (markets, traditions, institutions)
  • Humility about human rationality and foresight

It does not mean “never act,” but rather:

Act with awareness that control is limited and consequences are rarely confined to intentions.

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January 16, 2026 · 11:33 am

“The enemy of my enemy is my friend”

The saying “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” has superficial appeal. It promises strategic clarity in a complex world by reducing moral and political judgment to a single axis: opposition. But as a principle for thought or action, it is deeply flawed—logically, morally, and practically.

1. It confuses alignment of interests with shared values

Two parties may oppose the same enemy for entirely different reasons. That coincidence of hostility does not create trust, compatibility, or friendship. At most, it creates a temporary overlap of interests.

History repeatedly shows that alliances built purely on shared enemies collapse once the common threat recedes—or worse, mutate into new conflicts. Treating such alliances as friendships mistakes convenience for commitment.

Friendship, whether personal or political, rests on positive qualities: trustworthiness, shared aims, and moral reliability. Mere opposition supplies none of these.

2. It erases moral evaluation

The phrase encourages a dangerous moral shortcut: anyone who fights my enemy must therefore be acceptable. This dissolves ethical judgment and replaces it with tribal logic.

By this reasoning, brutality, oppression, or fanaticism can be excused so long as it is directed at the “right” target. The maxim thus invites moral blindness, allowing people to ally themselves with forces they would otherwise condemn—simply because those forces point their weapons elsewhere.

In effect, the saying subordinates ethics to expediency.

3. It treats enemies as static and intentions as irrelevant

Enemies change. Interests shift. Today’s ally of convenience may become tomorrow’s adversary. The maxim ignores intentions, long-term goals, and character, focusing only on the present alignment of hostility.

This is strategically naïve. A group may oppose your enemy not to defend your interests, but to advance its own incompatible or hostile agenda. Once the common enemy is defeated, nothing prevents that group from turning against you—often from a stronger position gained through your assistance.

4. It collapses complexity into binary thinking

The saying reduces the world to a crude friend/enemy dichotomy. In reality, political and moral landscapes are multi-dimensional. One may oppose an enemy’s actions while also rejecting the methods or aims of those who oppose them.

Binary thinking discourages nuance, caution, and proportional judgment. It pressures people to “pick a side” even when all available sides are morally compromised or strategically unwise.

5. It encourages short-term thinking at the expense of long-term consequences

Aligning with an enemy’s enemy may produce immediate tactical gains, but it often sows the seeds of future disasters. Weapons, legitimacy, or moral cover granted today can empower far worse outcomes tomorrow.

The maxim embodies a present-focused opportunism that treats future costs as someone else’s problem.

Conclusion

“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is not wisdom; it is a slogan for abandoning judgment. At best, the enemy of your enemy is a temporary partner of convenience—and even that requires careful scrutiny.

A more responsible principle would be:

Shared enemies justify caution, not trust.

Friendship—whether personal, political, or moral—cannot be inferred from hostility alone. It must be earned by shared values, reliable conduct, and compatible long-term aims.

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January 15, 2026 · 4:36 pm

The ethics of a one-way trip to Mars

A return human visit to Mars is currently impossible, for energy/weight reasons. NASA would probably have ethical concerns about sending astronauts on a one-way trip to Mars, but would it bother Elon Musk? 

Short answer: yes, it probably would bother Elon Musk too—just in a different way, and for different reasons.

Here’s how the contrast usually plays out.

🧭 NASA: ethics, law, and public accountability

NASA operates under intense ethical, legal, and political constraints.

  • Informed consent isn’t enough
    Even if astronauts volunteered, NASA is bound by medical ethics, international space law, and US public-sector standards. A planned one-way mission would be seen as institutional acceptance of death.
  • Duty of care
    NASA’s culture is built around risk minimisation, not risk normalisation. Astronauts accept danger, but NASA does not design missions where death is the expected outcome.
  • Political reality
    A government agency knowingly sending people on a one-way trip would be politically radioactive. Congressional oversight alone would likely kill the program.

Historically, NASA has rejected even de facto one-way concepts, such as early Mars proposals where return capability was highly uncertain.

🚀 Elon Musk: radically different incentives—but not indifference

Elon Musk, via SpaceX, operates under a different ethical framework—but that doesn’t mean “anything goes.”

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What Musk has actually said and implied

  • Musk has joked that going to Mars means a “high probability of death,” but he consistently frames it as voluntary, informed risk, not abandonment.
  • His stated goal is a self-sustaining city on Mars, not heroic suicide missions.

Where Musk differs from NASA

  • Risk tolerance: Musk is willing to accept far higher early-phase risk, especially if volunteers knowingly consent.
  • Private vs public ethics: As a private actor, SpaceX isn’t bound by the same public-sector norms, though it still answers to regulators and insurers.
  • Civilisational framing: Musk sees Mars as a species-level insurance policy. That framing changes the moral calculus for him.

But there are real limits

Even Musk would face:

  • Legal barriers (launch licensing, international treaties)
  • Reputational damage if people were perceived as being “sent to die”
  • Recruitment reality: the most capable astronauts and engineers generally don’t want suicide missions

Importantly, Musk has repeatedly insisted that early missions must aim at return, even if success is uncertain. That’s ethically very different from declaring a mission one-way from the outset.

🧠 The deeper philosophical difference

You might put it this way:

  • NASA ethics: “We must not plan missions where death is an intended outcome.”
  • Musk’s ethics: “If informed adults freely choose extreme risk for a higher purpose, preventing them may itself be unethical.”

That’s a classic tension between institutional responsibility and individual autonomy, rather than between morality and immorality.

Bottom line

  • A deliberate one-way Mars mission would almost certainly be unacceptable to NASA.
  • Elon Musk is more permissive about risk, but not indifferent to human life.
  • In practice, both converge on the same operational conclusion: missions should attempt return, even if failure is possible.

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January 14, 2026 · 3:43 pm

Most popular posts of 2025

During 2025, the six most popular posts on this blog, apart from the Home Page, were:

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January 14, 2026 · 1:13 pm

Western Leftists and Islamic States

Western leftists do criticise Islamic states at times—but they rarely prioritise opposing them, and often treat them with conspicuous restraint. That asymmetry is not accidental. It follows from the same ideological lenses that drive anti-Zionism.

Here are the main reasons.

1. Anti-imperialism outweighs liberal values

For much of the Western Left, opposition to Western power is the overriding moral principle.

States like Iran are viewed primarily as:

  • adversaries of the United States, the alleged citadel of capitalism
  • targets of sanctions, regime-change rhetoric, or military pressure
  • symbols of resistance to Western dominance

Once a state is categorised as anti-imperialist, its internal repression becomes secondary—or is reframed as a reaction to Western aggression.

So the moral logic becomes:

“Yes, Iran is illiberal—but Western hegemony is the greater evil.”

2. Power asymmetry determines moral attention

Left-wing moral focus tends to follow who is perceived to hold global power, not who behaves worst internally.

Islamic states like Iran are seen as:

  • economically constrained
  • geopolitically encircled
  • historically exploited or humiliated

This places them in the “weaker party” role, which triggers caution, sympathy, or silence—even when they:

  • jail dissidents
  • execute protesters
  • suppress women and minorities
  • criminalise homosexuality

By contrast, liberal democracies or Western-aligned states are judged harshly because they are powerful.

3. Cultural relativism blocks moral clarity

A strong current in left-wing thought holds that:

  • liberal norms are culturally specific
  • judging non-Western societies risks “imposing Western values”
  • criticism may reproduce colonial arrogance

This produces an odd result:

  • Western states are judged by universal moral standards
  • non-Western states are judged by contextual or relativist standards

Practices that would provoke outrage in Europe or Australia—religious courts, morality police, blasphemy laws—are often treated as “complex cultural realities” elsewhere.

4. Identity politics creates a hierarchy of victimhood

Modern leftism often organises moral concern around identity categories, not institutions.

In that framework:

  • Muslims are treated as a marginalised minority in the West
  • Muslim-majority states are therefore implicitly associated with oppressed identities
  • criticism risks being labelled “Islamophobia”

This collapses a crucial distinction:

  • Muslims as people (who deserve protection)
  • Islamic regimes as political systems (which deserve scrutiny)

Fear of crossing that line leads to self-censorship, not principled restraint.

5. The Left’s historic blind spot for religious authoritarianism

The Western Left is structurally better at recognising:

  • capitalist exploitation
  • racial hierarchy
  • colonial domination

It is worse at recognising religious authoritarianism, especially when it is:

  • non-Christian
  • non-Western
  • framed as anti-liberal rather than capitalist

As a result, clerical regimes like Iran’s are not analysed with the same moral vocabulary applied to, say, military juntas or right-wing dictatorships.

6. “The enemy of my enemy” logic

In activist coalitions, Islamic states are often tacitly aligned with:

  • anti-US movements
  • anti-Israel movements
  • “Global South resistance”

Openly opposing them would fracture those coalitions.

So silence—or deflection—becomes the path of least resistance.

7. Consequences are externalised

When Islamic regimes repress:

  • women
  • dissidents
  • religious minorities
  • LGBTQ people

the harm is treated as:

  • tragic but internal
  • not the West’s responsibility
  • less urgent than Western misdeeds

By contrast, Western actions are seen as morally binding because they implicate “us”.

In short

Western leftists often do not oppose Islamic states like Iran because:

  • anti-Westernism outranks liberal universalism
  • power asymmetry trumps human rights consistency
  • cultural relativism dilutes moral judgment
  • identity politics discourages criticism
  • religious authoritarianism is a conceptual blind spot

The result is selective moral outrage, not principled neutrality.

A telling paradox

Many Western leftists will:

  • denounce a liberal democracy for imperfect equality
  • excuse a theocratic state for systematic repression

That is not because they secretly admire theocracy—but because their primary moral compass points away from the West, not toward universal human freedom.

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January 13, 2026 · 4:35 pm

Sabotage of the Adelaide Writers Festival

The sabotage of the Adelaide Writers Festival and the Posturing Parade of Australian authors

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January 13, 2026 · 3:11 am

Identity politics and racism

Identity politics can include support for racism, depending on how identity is defined and how moral boundaries are drawn.

The key point is that identity politics is morally neutral as a method. It becomes morally good or bad based on which identities are privileged and how others are treated.

1. What identity politics is (at minimum)

At its core, identity politics means:

Political claims or moral authority grounded in membership of a particular group (race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexuality, etc.), rather than in universal principles.

That structure alone does not guarantee egalitarianism.

2. How identity politics can become racist

Identity politics becomes racist when it does one or more of the following:

(a) Assigns moral status by race

If moral authority, innocence, guilt, or entitlement is determined by racial identity, racism has already entered—even if the intention is “anti-racist”.

Example patterns:

  • “Members of race X are inherently privileged or culpable”
  • “Members of race Y are inherently virtuous or oppressed”

This is racial essentialism, regardless of which race is favoured.

(b) Justifies discrimination as corrective justice

Some forms of identity politics argue that present discrimination is justified to compensate for past injustice.

This can slide into:

  • Exclusion of individuals because of race
  • Lowered standards or double standards by group
  • Collective punishment or reward

Once discrimination is justified because of race, the moral logic of racism has been accepted—even if the rhetoric says otherwise.

(c) Treats individuals as representatives of a group

Racism thrives when individuals are not judged as individuals.

Identity politics supports racism when it insists:

  • “You speak as your race”
  • “Your argument is invalid because of your identity”
  • “Your experience counts less (or more) because of your group”

This directly contradicts liberal moral traditions that treat persons as moral equals.

3. The asymmetry argument — and why it fails

A common defence is:

“Racism requires power, so prejudice against dominant groups isn’t racism.”

This fails for two reasons:

  1. It redefines racism to protect favored groups, rather than describing a moral wrong.
  2. It excuses identical moral behavior (racial hostility, exclusion, stereotyping) by relabelling it.

If the moral wrong of racism is judging or treating people by race, then power is a secondary factor—not a defining one.

4. Historical reality: identity politics has often been racist

Historically, identity politics has been used to justify:

  • Ethno-nationalism
  • Racial supremacy doctrines
  • Caste systems
  • Sectarian violence
  • Apartheid and segregation

These were not failures of identity politics—they were expressions of it.

5. A crucial distinction

Not all identity-based movements are racist.

Legitimate uses:

  • Defending civil rights when universal rights are denied
  • Protecting minorities from discrimination
  • Correcting legal inequalities

Illegitimate uses:

  • Treating race as destiny
  • Assigning guilt or virtue by ancestry
  • Replacing universal justice with tribal moral accounting

The danger arises when identity replaces principle.

6. Bottom line

Yes—identity politics can include support for racism, especially when:

  • Group identity overrides individual moral equality
  • Race determines moral standing
  • Discrimination is justified by ancestry
  • Power is used to excuse prejudice

In short:

Racism doesn’t disappear when you flip the target.
It disappears only when race stops being a moral category.

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January 12, 2026 · 2:58 pm

Against Pacifism and Appeasement

Pacifism is often defended as a morally superior stance in political life. By refusing violence, it claims to rise above the brutal logic of power and coercion. Yet this claim rests on a serious misunderstanding—both of human nature and of how conflict actually arises. Far from preventing violence, pacifism frequently enables it. Appeasement, its practical corollary, does not restrain aggressors but encourages them.

A philosophy that cannot account for aggression does not abolish it; it merely leaves it unanswered.

The Error at the Heart of Pacifism

Pacifism assumes that conflict is fundamentally a failure of communication or goodwill. If parties can be brought to understand one another, violence will recede. This assumption confuses a moral aspiration with a descriptive claim about reality.

Human beings—and the political communities they form—do not act solely from misunderstanding. They act from ambition, fear, ideology, greed, and the pursuit of dominance. Some conflicts are not accidental but intentional. Any political doctrine that refuses to recognise this fact substitutes hope for analysis.

From a realist perspective, pacifism commits a basic philosophical error: it treats what ought to motivate human action as though it already does. Politics conducted on this assumption is not ethical idealism but moral negligence.

Deterrence and the Logic of Incentives

Armed deterrence is often caricatured as a love of force or a cynical embrace of violence. In reality, deterrence is grounded in a sober assessment of incentives. Aggression is discouraged not by moral appeal alone, but by the certainty of cost.

The purpose of deterrence is not to fight wars, but to prevent them. When the costs of aggression are clear, credible, and immediate, rational actors refrain from initiating violence. Where deterrence fails, it is usually because it was not credible, not because it existed.

The long absence of direct war between major powers after 1945 was not achieved by pacifism. It was achieved by a balance of power in which escalation promised catastrophe. That catastrophe never occurred precisely because deterrence worked.

Appeasement as Moral and Strategic Failure

Appeasement arises from the same mistaken psychology as pacifism: the belief that concessions will satisfy aggressors. History offers repeated evidence to the contrary.

The most cited example remains the treatment of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The territorial demands of Adolf Hitlerwere met with concession rather than resistance, culminating in the Munich Agreement, defended by Neville Chamberlain as the price of peace. The lesson drawn by the aggressor was unmistakable: threats worked. Almost everybody now realises that the appeasement of Hitler was a catastrophic misjudgment, and that Winston Churchill made the right call.

Appeasement does not signal goodwill; it signals vulnerability. Each unopposed demand lowers the perceived cost of the next. When resistance finally comes, it does so under worse conditions, at greater human cost. As Churchill said ‘An appeaser is one who feeds the crocodile, hoping that it will eat him last’.

Appeasement fails not because its intentions are malicious, but because it misunderstands how power responds to weakness.

The Moral Asymmetry Pacifism Refuses to See

Pacifism insists on collapsing the moral distinction between violence and resistance to violence. This is a grave error. There is an asymmetry between aggression and defence that pacifism cannot accommodate without dissolving moral judgment altogether.

To defend oneself—or one’s political community—is not to endorse violence as a good, but to refuse injustice as a norm. A society that renounces defence does not become morally pure; it transfers moral agency to those least constrained by conscience.

The tragedy is not that force exists, but that it is sometimes necessary. Moral seriousness requires acknowledging tragic necessities, not denying them.

Peace Requires Enforcement

Modern international order rests on rules, norms, and institutions—but these do not sustain themselves. They endure because they are enforceable. Alliances such as NATO deter aggression precisely because their commitments are credible. Law without enforcement is aspiration; order requires capacity.

Diplomacy matters. Law matters. Ethical restraint matters. But none of these function in a vacuum. Where force is entirely renounced, the scrupulous are governed by the unscrupulous.

Conclusion

Pacifism offers moral comfort at the price of political irresponsibility. By denying the persistence of aggression, it disarms those who wish to live peacefully while empowering those who do not. Appeasement compounds this failure by rewarding coercion and punishing restraint.

Armed deterrence is not a celebration of violence but an acknowledgement of reality. It seeks peace not by denying human nature, but by constraining its worst expressions. The refusal to defend the innocent is not moral purity; it is abdication.

Peace is preserved not by wishing violence away, but by ensuring that those who would unleash it know they will fail.

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January 11, 2026 · 11:57 am

Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism

The relationship between Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism is real, contested, and often confused. They are not identical, but they overlap in important and historically dangerous ways. The clearest way to understand the connection is to distinguish conceptual differences from practical realities.

1. What the terms mean (in principle)

Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism is hostility toward Jews as Jews—whether religious, ethnic, cultural, or racial. It treats Jews as a group as morally suspect, dangerous, or illegitimate.

This includes:

  • Conspiracy theories about Jewish power
  • Collective blame of Jews for social or political problems
  • Denial of Jewish historical suffering (including the Holocaust)
  • Claims that Jews are alien, disloyal, or uniquely malevolent

Antisemitism is about people.

Anti-Zionism

Zionism is the belief that Jews are entitled to a national homeland (historically realised in Israel).
Anti-Zionism is opposition to that idea, or to the legitimacy of the Jewish state.

In theory, anti-Zionism is about a political project, not a people.

2. Why they are not logically identical

It is possible in principle to oppose Zionism without hating Jews, for example:

  • Someone who rejects all nation-states (including Jewish ones)
  • Someone who opposes nationalism on pacifist or anarchist grounds
  • A critic of Israeli government policies who (mistakenly or not) rejects statehood itself

Some Jews themselves are anti-Zionist, especially in certain religious or ideological traditions.

So anti-Zionism ≠ antisemitism by definition.

3. Why they are deeply connected in practice

This is where the difficulty lies.

A. Jews are treated as the only people denied national self-determination

Anti-Zionism typically demands something no other people are asked to do:
to abandon their sole state and political refuge.

  • There are dozens of ethno-national states
  • Only the Jewish one is widely described as uniquely illegitimate

This selective denial strongly suggests discrimination, not neutral principle.

B. Israel becomes “the Jew among nations”

Classic antisemitic tropes are often recycled, but applied to Israel:

Old Anti-Semitic tropeModern anti-Zionist version
Jews are uniquely evilIsrael is uniquely evil
Jews control the worldIsrael/Jews control governments & media
Jews exaggerate persecutionHolocaust minimisation or denial
Jews provoke hatred“Israel causes antisemitism”

This is sometimes called “Anti-Semitism with a passport”.

C. Collective responsibility

Anti-Zionist rhetoric often slides into blaming Jews everywhere for Israel’s actions:

  • Synagogues attacked after Middle East conflicts
  • Jewish students harassed as “Zionists” regardless of views
  • Demands that Jews publicly denounce Israel to be accepted
  • Vandalism of Jewish property

Holding ordinary Jews accountable for a foreign state is textbook Anti-Semitism.

D. Historical amnesia

Zionism did not arise from abstract ideology, but from centuries of exclusion, pogroms, and genocide.

Anti-Zionism often:

  • Treats Jewish statelessness as morally preferable
  • Ignores why Jews no longer trusted minority status
  • Treats Jewish security concerns as cynical or invented

This refusal to take Jewish historical experience seriously is itself a form of prejudice.

4. A useful moral test

A criticism of Israel or Zionism tips into Anti-Semitism when it:

  • Denies Jews a right granted to others
  • Applies double standards not applied elsewhere
  • Uses classic antisemitic imagery or conspiracies
  • Treats Jews collectively as guilty or suspect
  • Erases Jewish history or suffering
  • Treats Jewish self-defence as uniquely illegitimate

Criticism that avoids these is legitimate. Much anti-Zionism does not.

5. Why the distinction matters — but can’t do all the work

Saying “I’m anti-Zionist, not antisemitic” is like saying “I oppose women’s suffrage, but I don’t hate women.”
It might be true in a narrow theoretical sense, but it demands scrutiny.

In today’s world:

  • Anti-Semitism often hides behind anti-Zionism
  • Anti-Zionism functions as its most socially acceptable vehicle
  • Jews experience the effects regardless of stated intent

6. Bottom line

  • Anti-Semitism targets Jews as people
  • Anti-Zionism targets Jewish nationhood
  • They are conceptually distinct, but frequently converge
  • In practice, anti-Zionism is one of the primary contemporary expressions of Anti-Semitism

Or more bluntly:

Not all Anti-Zionism is Anti-Semitic — but most modern Anti-Semitism is anti-Zionist.

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January 9, 2026 · 5:48 pm

The Moral Limits to Free Speech

Free speech is rightly regarded as one of the great moral achievements of liberal civilisation. It protects inquiry, dissent, scientific progress, political accountability, and the individual conscience against coercion. Yet it does not follow that all speech is morally permissible merely because it is spoken. The existence of a legal right to speak does not exhaust the moral question of whether one ought to speak. The moral limits to free speech arise not from the fact that speech can offend, challenge, or disturb, but from the fact that speech can also function as a form of harm.

Free Speech and the Harm Principle

The most plausible moral constraint on speech is the principle of harm. Speech, like any other human action, is subject to moral evaluation insofar as it causes—or is reasonably intended to cause—serious harm to others. Importantly, harm here must be understood as more than discomfort or wounded feelings. Human beings are routinely challenged, criticised, contradicted, and offended in any free society, and such experiences are not moral injuries but conditions of intellectual and moral growth.

Harm, in the morally relevant sense, involves the violation of basic interests: bodily safety, security, equal civic standing, and the conditions required for agency and participation in social life. Speech that deliberately promotes violence, intimidation, or systematic dehumanisation of others crosses this threshold. It ceases to be an exercise in expression and becomes a form of moral aggression.

Racism and Dehumanisation

Racist speech illustrates this distinction clearly. Mere discussion of race, differences between cultures, or even controversial hypotheses about group outcomes does not in itself constitute moral wrongdoing, however provocative it may be. But speech that asserts the inherent inferiority of a group as persons, denies their moral standing, or portrays them as subhuman does more than express an opinion. It attacks the shared moral framework that underpins social cooperation.

Such speech is morally objectionable not because it offends, but because it corrodes the moral equality upon which free speech itself depends. A society cannot coherently defend the equal right to speak while tolerating speech that denies the equal humanity of some speakers. Racist dehumanisation is therefore self-undermining: it seeks to enjoy the protections of free expression while eroding the moral conditions that justify those protections in the first place.

Advocacy of Harm and Incitement

Even clearer is the moral case against speech that advocates harm to individuals or groups. Calls for violence, expulsion, or collective punishment are not merely expressions of belief; they are attempts to mobilise others toward injury or destruction. The moral wrong lies not in persuasion as such, but in persuasion aimed at violating basic rights.

One need not wait until violence occurs to recognise the moral fault. Intentionally encouraging foreseeable harm is itself morally culpable, just as urging someone to commit a crime is blameworthy even if the crime never takes place. Here again, the issue is not offence or emotional impact but the deliberate targeting of others’ safety and agency.

The Moral Status of Offence and Disagreement

By contrast, disagreement—even sharp, passionate, or unsettling disagreement—does not constitute moral harm. To be offended is to experience a negative emotional response, not to suffer an injustice. A society that treats offence as a moral veto on speech collapses the distinction between harm and discomfort, and in doing so undermines the very possibility of open inquiry.

Moral progress has often depended on speech that offended prevailing sensibilities: abolitionism, religious dissent, feminism, and scientific challenges to orthodoxy all provoked outrage in their time. To grant offence moral authority over speech is to grant the most easily upset the greatest power, and to convert moral discourse into a competition in emotional sensitivity.

Moral Responsibility Without Legal Prohibition

Recognising moral limits to speech does not require legal censorship. Moral judgment and legal enforcement are distinct domains. A speaker may have a legal right to say something while still acting immorally in saying it. Social criticism, moral condemnation, and refusal to endorse or amplify harmful speech are legitimate moral responses that stop short of coercion.

Indeed, preserving this distinction is essential. When every moral judgment is converted into a legal prohibition, the state becomes the arbiter of permissible thought. Conversely, when all speech is declared morally neutral, public discourse becomes ethically hollow, unable to distinguish courage from cruelty or truth-seeking from incitement.

Conclusion

The moral limits to free speech are not defined by offence, discomfort, or the mere fact of disagreement. They arise where speech is deliberately used to dehumanise, to deny moral equality, or to advocate harm to others. Such speech violates the very moral foundations that make free speech valuable: respect for persons as rational agents and equal participants in a shared moral community.

A mature defence of free speech therefore requires moral discrimination, not moral indifference. To insist that all speech is morally permissible is not a defence of liberty, but an abdication of moral responsibility.

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