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This file contains a malicious React router component that implements a supply chain attack through navigation data exfiltration. The code appears to be a legitimate StaticRouter component but secretly intercepts all user navigation events (push, replace, go, goBack, goForward) through the globalHistoryHandler function and forwards them to an external package 'mutants-microfx'. Every navigation action is captured and sent to _mutantsMicrofx.history methods, creating a covert channel for stealing user browsing patterns and routing information. The malicious functionality is disguised within standard React Router patterns, making it difficult to detect during code reviews. Any application using this component would unknowingly transmit all navigation data to the external package without user consent or awareness.

This fragment appears to be part of a legitimate DOS/pDOS post-processing tool for Quantum ESPRESSO, but it uses multiple high-risk patterns: executing external Python files (exec(open(...).read())), copying and injecting variable content into a script and then executing it, and using bare excepts that suppress errors. These behaviors make the module vulnerable to supply-chain or local-file-tampering attacks: if an attacker can modify files in main_dir or dir_files (or influence the variables used to build filenames), they can achieve arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running this script. I did not find explicit malicious payloads (no networking/exfiltration, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded secrets), so the code itself looks more insecure than intentionally malicious. Recommendation: avoid exec on arbitrary files; validate and/or cryptographically verify any scripts before executing; minimize use of globals and prefer importing modules safely; sanitize inputs and fail loudly rather than swallowing exceptions. Also review the rest of the project for places that set the variables used to build filenames. Note: the fragment contains multiple syntax errors and appears truncated which reduces certainty of the analysis.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 14 hours and 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is clearly performing a malicious action by sending sensitive system data over the network without consent. This behavior is consistent with data exfiltration, which is a form of malware.

Live on npm for 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This module performs unsafe dynamic execution of a packaged, obfuscated marshalled blob. The pattern is high risk: it permits arbitrary in-process code execution with no validation. Treat this package as untrusted until the blob '_parallel_miner.obfsbpm' is analyzed in an isolated environment. Recommended actions: extract and inspect the blob (unmarshal in a safe, isolated sandbox or disassemble the code object), deny use in production until verified, and if malicious indicators are found, remove or block the dependency.

Live on PyPI for 7 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains clear capability to read an arbitrary local file (hardcoded path in main) and upload it to a remote Telegram chat using an embedded bot token and chat id. The embedded credential and automatic upload constitute a high risk of data exfiltration if the code is run or distributed. Treat the token as compromised, revoke it, and remediate by removing hardcoded secrets and adding authentication/confirmation and secure secret management before trusting or publishing this code.

This file is a C2 URL generator used in the Sliver implant framework. It does not itself send data, but it is explicitly designed to supply command-and-control endpoints and timing parameters to an implant. It contains dangerous functionality in context (implant/C2 support). There are some robustness issues (no empty-list checks leading to possible panics) and use of math/rand for selection. Overall this code should be treated as part of malicious infrastructure; including it in software will enable C2 behavior. If you are auditing dependencies, treat this package as high risk and avoid inclusion unless you explicitly intend to build an implant.

This code appears to be a legitimate API client that has been compromised or designed for data exfiltration. It automatically sends all API response data to external Feishu webhooks and contains hardcoded credentials, representing a significant supply chain security risk.

The presence of obfuscated code that is executed at runtime is highly suspicious and indicative of potential malicious behavior. The code should be thoroughly analyzed to determine the intent and effect of the obfuscated payload.

Live on PyPI for 2 hours and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code collects sensitive system information, including the current directory, home directory, hostname, and username, and transmits it to an external server at 'https://securityhuman[.]pythonanywhere[.]com/confusion' without user consent. This behavior is consistent with data exfiltration and poses a significant privacy and security risk.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection and transmission of system information to external servers without user consent. The use of hardcoded IP addresses and fallback mechanisms for data transmission indicates potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 9 days, 5 hours and 56 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior by collecting and sending environment variables to a suspicious domain without user consent. This poses a significant security risk due to potential data leakage.

This source file is an explicit transport manager for a C2 implant (Sliver). It provides multi-protocol outbound connectivity, message forwarding, and persistent connection management enabling remote control and data exfiltration. While it contains no obfuscated code or hard-coded credentials, its behavior (establishing covert, persistent channels, modifying WireGuard device state, honoring proxy/userinfo in URIs) is inherently malicious in most benign deployments. If present in your supply chain and not explicitly required for offensive testing, treat this as high risk and remove or sandbox it. A complete assessment requires reviewing envelope handlers and underlying transport implementations for specifics of data collection/exfiltration.

This script is attempting to ping a remote server, which could be used for telemetry or data exfiltration. While this behavior may not be inherently malicious, it is suspicious and should be investigated further.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This code is a malicious orchestration tool for large-scale credential brute-forcing and IoT compromise. It actively scans random public IPs, probes common service ports, attempts username:password combinations in parallel, and stores discovered credentials. The module has no benign operational safeguards and is characteristic of botnet scanners. The highest risk components are the external 'bane' modules which carry out protocol-level attacks and could include further malicious payloads. Do not execute or import this code in trusted environments; treat any repository containing it as hostile and remove or quarantine. Audit and block outbound activity if observed in your network.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

This SQLite database file contains embedded explicit adult content and torrent distribution infrastructure instead of legitimate data. The file includes extensive HTML fragments with pornographic video metadata, download links to torrent files, and suspicious redirect URLs. Key malicious domains identified include rmdown[.]com, redircdn[.]com, 97p[.]org, qpic[.]ws, imgbox[.]com, and various other image hosting services. The content contains hash values for torrent files, BitTorrent magnet links, and obfuscated download URLs using multiple redirect layers to mask the true destinations. This represents a supply chain attack where adult content distribution infrastructure has been embedded within what appears to be a standard database file, potentially exposing users to inappropriate content and malicious download sites when accessed.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This script programmatically grants passwordless, root-equivalent sudo to specific groups and users and attempts to suppress sudo logging for those entries. Its design (use of plaintext PASSWORD env var, non-interactive sudo, ability to overwrite sudoers.d fragments, and disabling logging) is consistent with persistence/backdoor patterns and poses a high security risk. Treat the code as dangerous: do not run on production or sensitive hosts. If found on a system unexpectedly, treat as a compromise indicator, remove the created sudoers fragments, rotate credentials, and investigate for further persistence. Code should only be used in strictly controlled, auditable scenarios with explicit authorization.

This code contains a clear and dangerous anomaly: a hardcoded recipient address used instead of the fetched vault.address, which will redirect funds to a fixed address. Combined with logging of vault/PSBT and automated signing and broadcasting, this is consistent with a supply-chain backdoor or malicious sabotage in wallet code. Treat this module as compromised until the hardcoded address is justified and removed; remove sensitive logging and add validation/authorization checks. If this code is used in production wallets, invocation of transferBTC may result in theft of funds.

The Python module itself is not directly implementing typical malware behaviors, but it creates a high-risk execution surface: it runs local shell scripts (some with sudo) with unvalidated inputs and passes secrets on the command line. The deploy_fdb_from_file_service function contains a command-injection vulnerability (shell=True with joined args) and a coding bug (returncod typo). Recommend: remove shell=True; use argument lists always, avoid passing secrets via argv (use stdin, environment files with proper filesystem permissions, or secured IPC), eliminate unnecessary sudo calls and require callers to provide appropriate privileges if needed, validate/escape inputs (especially file paths), fix the returncod typo, and audit all invoked shell scripts before use. Treat package as risky until mitigations and script audits are performed.

This file contains a malicious React router component that implements a supply chain attack through navigation data exfiltration. The code appears to be a legitimate StaticRouter component but secretly intercepts all user navigation events (push, replace, go, goBack, goForward) through the globalHistoryHandler function and forwards them to an external package 'mutants-microfx'. Every navigation action is captured and sent to _mutantsMicrofx.history methods, creating a covert channel for stealing user browsing patterns and routing information. The malicious functionality is disguised within standard React Router patterns, making it difficult to detect during code reviews. Any application using this component would unknowingly transmit all navigation data to the external package without user consent or awareness.

This fragment appears to be part of a legitimate DOS/pDOS post-processing tool for Quantum ESPRESSO, but it uses multiple high-risk patterns: executing external Python files (exec(open(...).read())), copying and injecting variable content into a script and then executing it, and using bare excepts that suppress errors. These behaviors make the module vulnerable to supply-chain or local-file-tampering attacks: if an attacker can modify files in main_dir or dir_files (or influence the variables used to build filenames), they can achieve arbitrary code execution with the same privileges as the user running this script. I did not find explicit malicious payloads (no networking/exfiltration, no reverse shell code, no hardcoded secrets), so the code itself looks more insecure than intentionally malicious. Recommendation: avoid exec on arbitrary files; validate and/or cryptographically verify any scripts before executing; minimize use of globals and prefer importing modules safely; sanitize inputs and fail loudly rather than swallowing exceptions. Also review the rest of the project for places that set the variables used to build filenames. Note: the fragment contains multiple syntax errors and appears truncated which reduces certainty of the analysis.

Live on PyPI for 1 day, 14 hours and 7 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is clearly performing a malicious action by sending sensitive system data over the network without consent. This behavior is consistent with data exfiltration, which is a form of malware.

Live on npm for 15 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The script covertly ensures a background SSH local port-forward to a hard-coded external host as root, clearing any existing ssh on the same local port first. This pattern is consistent with establishing a covert access or exfiltration channel (notably to a MongoDB-like service on port 27017). It is high-risk: investigate origins of the script, the remote IP, root SSH keys and authorized_keys, and any processes or tools that use local:9999. If unexpected, remove and rotate credentials/keys and perform host compromise analysis.

This module performs unsafe dynamic execution of a packaged, obfuscated marshalled blob. The pattern is high risk: it permits arbitrary in-process code execution with no validation. Treat this package as untrusted until the blob '_parallel_miner.obfsbpm' is analyzed in an isolated environment. Recommended actions: extract and inspect the blob (unmarshal in a safe, isolated sandbox or disassemble the code object), deny use in production until verified, and if malicious indicators are found, remove or block the dependency.

Live on PyPI for 7 hours and 9 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module contains clear capability to read an arbitrary local file (hardcoded path in main) and upload it to a remote Telegram chat using an embedded bot token and chat id. The embedded credential and automatic upload constitute a high risk of data exfiltration if the code is run or distributed. Treat the token as compromised, revoke it, and remediate by removing hardcoded secrets and adding authentication/confirmation and secure secret management before trusting or publishing this code.

This file is a C2 URL generator used in the Sliver implant framework. It does not itself send data, but it is explicitly designed to supply command-and-control endpoints and timing parameters to an implant. It contains dangerous functionality in context (implant/C2 support). There are some robustness issues (no empty-list checks leading to possible panics) and use of math/rand for selection. Overall this code should be treated as part of malicious infrastructure; including it in software will enable C2 behavior. If you are auditing dependencies, treat this package as high risk and avoid inclusion unless you explicitly intend to build an implant.

This code appears to be a legitimate API client that has been compromised or designed for data exfiltration. It automatically sends all API response data to external Feishu webhooks and contains hardcoded credentials, representing a significant supply chain security risk.

The presence of obfuscated code that is executed at runtime is highly suspicious and indicative of potential malicious behavior. The code should be thoroughly analyzed to determine the intent and effect of the obfuscated payload.

Live on PyPI for 2 hours and 4 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code collects sensitive system information, including the current directory, home directory, hostname, and username, and transmits it to an external server at 'https://securityhuman[.]pythonanywhere[.]com/confusion' without user consent. This behavior is consistent with data exfiltration and poses a significant privacy and security risk.

The code contains patches that could weaken SSH security by disabling key verification and has the potential to hide tracks by deleting the .git directory. While there's no clear evidence of malicious intent like data theft or backdoor introduction, the changes do increase the security risk and could potentially be exploited in an attack.

The code is highly suspicious due to its collection and transmission of system information to external servers without user consent. The use of hardcoded IP addresses and fallback mechanisms for data transmission indicates potential malicious intent.

Live on npm for 9 days, 5 hours and 56 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code exhibits clear signs of malicious behavior by collecting and sending environment variables to a suspicious domain without user consent. This poses a significant security risk due to potential data leakage.

This source file is an explicit transport manager for a C2 implant (Sliver). It provides multi-protocol outbound connectivity, message forwarding, and persistent connection management enabling remote control and data exfiltration. While it contains no obfuscated code or hard-coded credentials, its behavior (establishing covert, persistent channels, modifying WireGuard device state, honoring proxy/userinfo in URIs) is inherently malicious in most benign deployments. If present in your supply chain and not explicitly required for offensive testing, treat this as high risk and remove or sandbox it. A complete assessment requires reviewing envelope handlers and underlying transport implementations for specifics of data collection/exfiltration.

This script is attempting to ping a remote server, which could be used for telemetry or data exfiltration. While this behavior may not be inherently malicious, it is suspicious and should be investigated further.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

This code is a malicious orchestration tool for large-scale credential brute-forcing and IoT compromise. It actively scans random public IPs, probes common service ports, attempts username:password combinations in parallel, and stores discovered credentials. The module has no benign operational safeguards and is characteristic of botnet scanners. The highest risk components are the external 'bane' modules which carry out protocol-level attacks and could include further malicious payloads. Do not execute or import this code in trusted environments; treat any repository containing it as hostile and remove or quarantine. Audit and block outbound activity if observed in your network.

The code exposes powerful administrative actions: arbitrary shell execution, arbitrary file reads, full environment dumps, and building/pushing Docker images to a hardcoded registry. These are not obfuscated but are high-risk capabilities that can be abused for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and supply-chain leakage if the superuser authentication is compromised or misconfigured. The presence of a hardcoded remote image name for docker push is suspicious for unintended outbound artifact exfiltration. Recommendation: avoid including these endpoints in public packages or ensure strict, auditable authentication and input validation; remove hardcoded push targets and avoid returning full environment variables or arbitrary file contents.

This SQLite database file contains embedded explicit adult content and torrent distribution infrastructure instead of legitimate data. The file includes extensive HTML fragments with pornographic video metadata, download links to torrent files, and suspicious redirect URLs. Key malicious domains identified include rmdown[.]com, redircdn[.]com, 97p[.]org, qpic[.]ws, imgbox[.]com, and various other image hosting services. The content contains hash values for torrent files, BitTorrent magnet links, and obfuscated download URLs using multiple redirect layers to mask the true destinations. This represents a supply chain attack where adult content distribution infrastructure has been embedded within what appears to be a standard database file, potentially exposing users to inappropriate content and malicious download sites when accessed.

The code sends sensitive credentials from environment variables over an unencrypted HTTP connection to an external API service at api[.]sqhyw[.]net:90. It authenticates using username/password from the YEZI_USER environment variable, retrieves access tokens, and automates the process of obtaining mobile phone numbers and SMS verification codes. This behavior poses significant supply chain security risks through: (1) leakage of environment variable credentials over unencrypted HTTP, (2) interaction with a suspicious external domain on a non-standard port, (3) logging of potentially sensitive API responses including tokens and SMS codes, and (4) facilitation of SMS verification bypass which could enable fraudulent account creation or spam activities. The code continuously polls the external API for up to 120 seconds to retrieve SMS codes, creating additional operational risks. While not containing traditional malware payloads, the credential exfiltration and suspicious external communication patterns justify classification as malware due to the significant security risks posed to systems that deploy this code.

This script programmatically grants passwordless, root-equivalent sudo to specific groups and users and attempts to suppress sudo logging for those entries. Its design (use of plaintext PASSWORD env var, non-interactive sudo, ability to overwrite sudoers.d fragments, and disabling logging) is consistent with persistence/backdoor patterns and poses a high security risk. Treat the code as dangerous: do not run on production or sensitive hosts. If found on a system unexpectedly, treat as a compromise indicator, remove the created sudoers fragments, rotate credentials, and investigate for further persistence. Code should only be used in strictly controlled, auditable scenarios with explicit authorization.

This code contains a clear and dangerous anomaly: a hardcoded recipient address used instead of the fetched vault.address, which will redirect funds to a fixed address. Combined with logging of vault/PSBT and automated signing and broadcasting, this is consistent with a supply-chain backdoor or malicious sabotage in wallet code. Treat this module as compromised until the hardcoded address is justified and removed; remove sensitive logging and add validation/authorization checks. If this code is used in production wallets, invocation of transferBTC may result in theft of funds.

The Python module itself is not directly implementing typical malware behaviors, but it creates a high-risk execution surface: it runs local shell scripts (some with sudo) with unvalidated inputs and passes secrets on the command line. The deploy_fdb_from_file_service function contains a command-injection vulnerability (shell=True with joined args) and a coding bug (returncod typo). Recommend: remove shell=True; use argument lists always, avoid passing secrets via argv (use stdin, environment files with proper filesystem permissions, or secured IPC), eliminate unnecessary sudo calls and require callers to provide appropriate privileges if needed, validate/escape inputs (especially file paths), fix the returncod typo, and audit all invoked shell scripts before use. Treat package as risky until mitigations and script audits are performed.