<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" ><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="3.10.0">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" /><updated>2026-03-13T09:57:11+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/feed.xml</id><title type="html">Nick Gill</title><subtitle></subtitle><entry><title type="html">Congratulations to Kimeu Arphaxad Ngwava</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/kimeu-arphaxad-ngwava-phd" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Congratulations to Kimeu Arphaxad Ngwava" /><published>2026-03-12T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2026-03-12T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/kimeu-arphaxad-ngwava-phd</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/kimeu-arphaxad-ngwava-phd"><![CDATA[<p><img src="../kimeu1.jpg" width="450pt" alt="me" /></p>

<p>Congratulations to Kimeu Arphaxad Ngwava who has been awarded his PhD. His PhD thesis was entitled <em>Calculating the minimal size of a nilpotent cover of the finite symmetric, alternating and dihedral groups</em>. I was the lead supervisor for Kimeu; my colleague, Ian Short, and Fredrick Nyamwala from Moi University in Kenya were the other supervisors. Kimeu’s PhD was awarded by Moi University. Ian and I were remote supervisors.</p>

<p>Kimeu’s work was impressive for many reasons. First, it produced two lovely papers:</p>
<ul>
  <li><a href="https://projecteuclid.org/journals/bulletin-of-the-belgian-mathematical-society-simon-stevin/volume-29/issue-2/Nilpotent-covers-of-symmetric-and-alternating-groups/10.36045/j.bbms.220218.short">Nilpotent covers of symmetric and alternating groups</a>. The authors were Kimeu, Ian Short and I.</li>
  <li><a href="https://combinatorialpress.com/article/ars/Volume%20160/nilpotent-covers-of-dihedral-groups.pdf">Nilpotent covers of dihedral groups</a>. The authors were Kimeu and I.</li>
</ul>

<p>That Kimeu was able to produce such interesting mathematics, despite having supervisors in another country, is a testament to his talent.</p>

<p>Second, I want to pay tribute to Kimeu’s astounding perseverance and indefatigability in the face of tremendous obstacle. Kimeu enrolled in the doctoral programme at Moi in 2014 and spent two years completing courses. Then, in 2016, Ian and I started work with Kimeu, funded by the London Mathematical Society’s <a href="https://www.lms.ac.uk/grants/marm">Mentoring African Research in Mathematics</a> programme. That funding lasted for 2 years and during that period we initiated the programme of research that was the basis for Kimeu’s PhD.</p>

<p>After several international visits (I visited Kenya twice, Kimeu came to the UK once), Kimeu was able to submit his thesis in 2021. He then had to wait <strong>four years</strong> before he was able to defend his thesis in a viva. The delay was caused by a multitude of complicated bureaucratic obstacles, strikes at Moi University, and the like. At times we wondered if the end would ever come.</p>

<p>But Kimeu kept at it. Throughout all of this time he was providing for his four children, Jane, Kelly, Emma and Yvonne. To make matters that much harder, he had to cope with a severe bout of malaria.</p>

<p>But, still, he kept at it.</p>

<p>On 16 September 2025 Kimeu successfully defended his thesis. He faced one final hurdle: the final tranche of fees for his studies at Moi University were due – <a href="https://www.justgiving.com/crowdfunding/kenya-phd">with the generous help of many supporters</a> Kimeu was able to pay the fees. On 19 December 2025 Kimeu graduated. Cue much rejoicing.</p>

<p>Well done Kimeu, it has been a pleasure to work with you.</p>

<p><img src="../kimeu2.jpg" width="1000pt" alt="me" /></p>

<p><em>Kimeu is second from the left. Dr Nyamwala, who supervised Kimeu along with Ian Short and I, is on the far left.</em></p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><category term="supervision" /><category term="research" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Congratulations to Kimeu Arphaxad Ngwava who has been awarded his PhD. His PhD thesis was entitled Calculating the minimal size of a nilpotent cover of the finite symmetric, alternating and dihedral groups. I was the lead supervisor for Kimeu; my colleague, Ian Short, and Fredrick Nyamwala from Moi University in Kenya were the other supervisors. Kimeu’s PhD was awarded by Moi University. Ian and I were remote supervisors. Kimeu’s work was impressive for many reasons. First, it produced two lovely papers: Nilpotent covers of symmetric and alternating groups. The authors were Kimeu, Ian Short and I. Nilpotent covers of dihedral groups. The authors were Kimeu and I. That Kimeu was able to produce such interesting mathematics, despite having supervisors in another country, is a testament to his talent. Second, I want to pay tribute to Kimeu’s astounding perseverance and indefatigability in the face of tremendous obstacle. Kimeu enrolled in the doctoral programme at Moi in 2014 and spent two years completing courses. Then, in 2016, Ian and I started work with Kimeu, funded by the London Mathematical Society’s Mentoring African Research in Mathematics programme. That funding lasted for 2 years and during that period we initiated the programme of research that was the basis for Kimeu’s PhD. After several international visits (I visited Kenya twice, Kimeu came to the UK once), Kimeu was able to submit his thesis in 2021. He then had to wait four years before he was able to defend his thesis in a viva. The delay was caused by a multitude of complicated bureaucratic obstacles, strikes at Moi University, and the like. At times we wondered if the end would ever come. But Kimeu kept at it. Throughout all of this time he was providing for his four children, Jane, Kelly, Emma and Yvonne. To make matters that much harder, he had to cope with a severe bout of malaria. But, still, he kept at it. On 16 September 2025 Kimeu successfully defended his thesis. He faced one final hurdle: the final tranche of fees for his studies at Moi University were due – with the generous help of many supporters Kimeu was able to pay the fees. On 19 December 2025 Kimeu graduated. Cue much rejoicing. Well done Kimeu, it has been a pleasure to work with you. Kimeu is second from the left. Dr Nyamwala, who supervised Kimeu along with Ian Short and I, is on the far left.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">A story of my friend Don Miller</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/don-miller" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="A story of my friend Don Miller" /><published>2025-11-09T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2025-11-09T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/don-miller</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/don-miller"><![CDATA[<p>I started writing this piece several months ago, in part inspired by a phone conversation with my friend, Don Miller. About two weeks ago I received the devastating news that Don had died – that phone conversation was the last time I would speak with Don. Even writing those words hurts. Breathe…</p>

<p>Despite the sadness that I feel, there is also some joy: what a rare and beautiful thing to witness a life lived well. To come into contact with a human doing their best to live a <em>good life</em>, guided by love… and who helped others try and do the same.</p>

<p>So, remembering Don, I will share below some of the thoughts I’ve had that bubbled up after that last conversation, and in the days since Don died. Appropriately, I was thinking very much about what it means to live a good life – rereading what I wrote, I can hear Don’s voice and I am grateful.</p>

<hr />

<p>Some years ago I read <em>The man who mistook his wife for a hat</em> by Oliver Sacks: a brilliant book, and a fine option if you’re playing charades. Sacks is a neurologist and the book is an account of some of the fascinating people he has encountered in his professional life.</p>

<p>One of these people was a patient of his who, for a reason I can’t recall, had lost all of his short-term memory: he could remember his childhood but he could not retain new memories for longer than a very short period (5 minutes?). All of his recent past was a complete blank to him.</p>

<p>As Sacks contemplated this man’s terrible affliction, he mused on the place of story or narrative in human life. Could it be that, in some sense, humans are defined by story? We use story to make sense of the world around us; we place ourselves and those we encounter inside narrative arcs that explain who we are and give meaning and purpose for what we do and are. What must it be like to be human and, like this man perhaps, unable to construct a story in which to dwell?</p>

<p>I was reminded of this, recently, while reading Susan Fletcher’s beautiful book <em>Witch light</em>. It tells a fictionalised story of a real woman, Corrag, who lived in Scotland in the 1600’s. The Corrag in the book is a beautiful character: richly alive, wild, full of love. But she is also an outsider, called “witch” by local people, like her mother before her, and blamed by them for all manner of misfortune. They do not see her beauty but, instead, revile her and force her to flee.</p>

<p>The book is told from the point of view of Corrag and one gets a clear sense of her bewilderment at the way people treat her: she sees love and life in the natural world that surrounds her and cannot understand why people feel so threatened by her. It is as if Corrag does not fit into the story that the “ordinary people” of the day inhabit – she has a way of being in the world which cannot be accommodated by their sense of how to live.</p>

<p>Is this, perhaps, what the word “witch”, this poisonous centuries-old epithet, really signifies? Your story does not fit ours, and so we mark you, we cast you out. We feel threatened by your different way of living because it shines a light on the choices we have made, the boxes within which we have chosen to dwell.</p>

<p>How many have been cast out in this way? For being Jewish, or black, or gay, or being a wild woman, or a wyrd gender… From this point of view, bigotry and prejudice are a consequence of a failure of imagination: We let our stories set too hard, become too rigid, and we lose the capacity to let them flex and bend and take new and different and unexpected turns.</p>

<p>Well, that’s not quite right: in fact, our imagination can be all too vivid when it comes to telling stories of the “other”. When I first arrived in the UK in 2001 I remember an eruption of tabloid outrage at reports of migrants killing swans in parks and eating them. This was seen as particularly egregious because, according to some ancient law, the monarch is the “Seigneur of swans” and the migrants were effectively stealing from the queen.</p>

<p>The same story erupted again just a few months ago. There were reports in the newspapers for a few days… until, just as happened 24 years previously, it transpired that there was in fact no evidence whatsoever that any swans had been killed, by migrants or anyone else.</p>

<p>But, evidence or no, how delicious is can be to tell someone else’s story for them! Especially, when it is an “othering” story: by attributing shame and disrepute to someone else, we take the moral highground for ourselves. We give affirmation to the story we tell about ourselves and, in so doing, that story sets just a little harder.</p>

<p>What would it mean to allow the stories we tell about ourselves to be open, soft? I’m currently half-way through Sangarakshita’s “Vision and transformation”, an account of the Buddha’s noble eightfold path. The first step on this path to enlightenment is typically translated as “perfect vision” or “complete vision” or “right vision”.</p>

<p>There are several thousand years worth of thinking and writing about this idea, so I won’t attempt a precis… but my sense is that the impedance to complete vision could be characterised, in some sense, as our attachment to the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves. If we are ever, truly, to look at the world around us, at the table on which our hands lie, and truly <strong>see</strong> it, we have no choice but to abandon the complex of filters and pre-conceptions that we have spent a lifetime weaving into story.</p>

<p>Which brings me to that final conversation with Don: in the last decade of his life, Don spent a lot of time translating and retranslating the gospels from their original language into English. In that last conversation he told me about the journey of understanding he has gone through with regard to the word “repent”. The call to repent is a central notion in Christianity – it is the refrain of prophet after prophet throughout both testaments – and is typically interpreted as an injunction to feel and express remorse for sinful acts.</p>

<p>However, in that last conversation, Don shared how he had come to see the call to repent as a much more general exhortation for us to <strong>change our minds</strong>. It is a demand for us to re-evaluate, reassess and reconsider. We must turn our gaze upon the story we tell ourselves about the world around us, and our place in it, and we must <strong>tear that story down</strong>.</p>

<p>With what, then, do we replace it? On the one hand, I’d like to say “with as little as possible” – maybe this is how one takes a step towards the Buddha’s complete unfiltered vision? On the other hand, though, we all still need stories within which to dwell, that help us to understand the complex world in which we live. Where do we source these stories? Who are today’s prophets and how do we recognise them?</p>

<p>Clearly, for all that no story will ever be perfect, perhaps never as good as no story at all, still some stories are definitely better than others. In the current marketplace, there is a plethora of demagogues and influencers who are happy to provide a narrative for the willing listener. But these false prophets have a “tell”: they offer too much certainty. The Buddha said “Believe nothing, no matter where you read it or who has said it, not even if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your own common sense.” So: a true prophet will actively undermine herself, will encourage your critical faculties, your doubt and dissent.</p>

<p>The other “tell” of a false prophet that occurs to me pertains to the othering I describe above: a false prophet’s stories <strong>exclude</strong>: they draw boundaries and they shout “witch” at anyone who trespasses outside. Any prophet who devalues a human for who they are, whose story denies <strong>love</strong>, is telling a flawed story.</p>

<p>Don did neither of these things for he was a true prophet: This was a man who lived a large portion of his life at a cultural interface – the  meeting point of aboriginal Australia and white Australia – where “othering” is a pestilence. Yet, for all that, no one was “other” to Don. He refused to construct other people’s stories for them; rather he was relentless in his commitment to critiquing his own way of life and how he needed to shift and change to more truly love the people he encountered.</p>

<p>How hard, when everyone else is scrabbling to cast the first stone, to be the one who refuses! Who doesn’t just refuse, but actively stands in the way. Who refuses the easy way, because it’s wrong, and instead does the work needed to tread the more difficult path.</p>

<p>Thank you, Don, you are an inspiration. Remembering you with love.</p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[I started writing this piece several months ago, in part inspired by a phone conversation with my friend, Don Miller. About two weeks ago I received the devastating news that Don had died – that phone conversation was the last time I would speak with Don. Even writing those words hurts. Breathe… Despite the sadness that I feel, there is also some joy: what a rare and beautiful thing to witness a life lived well. To come into contact with a human doing their best to live a good life, guided by love… and who helped others try and do the same. So, remembering Don, I will share below some of the thoughts I’ve had that bubbled up after that last conversation, and in the days since Don died. Appropriately, I was thinking very much about what it means to live a good life – rereading what I wrote, I can hear Don’s voice and I am grateful. Some years ago I read The man who mistook his wife for a hat by Oliver Sacks: a brilliant book, and a fine option if you’re playing charades. Sacks is a neurologist and the book is an account of some of the fascinating people he has encountered in his professional life. One of these people was a patient of his who, for a reason I can’t recall, had lost all of his short-term memory: he could remember his childhood but he could not retain new memories for longer than a very short period (5 minutes?). All of his recent past was a complete blank to him. As Sacks contemplated this man’s terrible affliction, he mused on the place of story or narrative in human life. Could it be that, in some sense, humans are defined by story? We use story to make sense of the world around us; we place ourselves and those we encounter inside narrative arcs that explain who we are and give meaning and purpose for what we do and are. What must it be like to be human and, like this man perhaps, unable to construct a story in which to dwell? I was reminded of this, recently, while reading Susan Fletcher’s beautiful book Witch light. It tells a fictionalised story of a real woman, Corrag, who lived in Scotland in the 1600’s. The Corrag in the book is a beautiful character: richly alive, wild, full of love. But she is also an outsider, called “witch” by local people, like her mother before her, and blamed by them for all manner of misfortune. They do not see her beauty but, instead, revile her and force her to flee. The book is told from the point of view of Corrag and one gets a clear sense of her bewilderment at the way people treat her: she sees love and life in the natural world that surrounds her and cannot understand why people feel so threatened by her. It is as if Corrag does not fit into the story that the “ordinary people” of the day inhabit – she has a way of being in the world which cannot be accommodated by their sense of how to live. Is this, perhaps, what the word “witch”, this poisonous centuries-old epithet, really signifies? Your story does not fit ours, and so we mark you, we cast you out. We feel threatened by your different way of living because it shines a light on the choices we have made, the boxes within which we have chosen to dwell. How many have been cast out in this way? For being Jewish, or black, or gay, or being a wild woman, or a wyrd gender… From this point of view, bigotry and prejudice are a consequence of a failure of imagination: We let our stories set too hard, become too rigid, and we lose the capacity to let them flex and bend and take new and different and unexpected turns. Well, that’s not quite right: in fact, our imagination can be all too vivid when it comes to telling stories of the “other”. When I first arrived in the UK in 2001 I remember an eruption of tabloid outrage at reports of migrants killing swans in parks and eating them. This was seen as particularly egregious because, according to some ancient law, the monarch is the “Seigneur of swans” and the migrants were effectively stealing from the queen. The same story erupted again just a few months ago. There were reports in the newspapers for a few days… until, just as happened 24 years previously, it transpired that there was in fact no evidence whatsoever that any swans had been killed, by migrants or anyone else. But, evidence or no, how delicious is can be to tell someone else’s story for them! Especially, when it is an “othering” story: by attributing shame and disrepute to someone else, we take the moral highground for ourselves. We give affirmation to the story we tell about ourselves and, in so doing, that story sets just a little harder. What would it mean to allow the stories we tell about ourselves to be open, soft? I’m currently half-way through Sangarakshita’s “Vision and transformation”, an account of the Buddha’s noble eightfold path. The first step on this path to enlightenment is typically translated as “perfect vision” or “complete vision” or “right vision”. There are several thousand years worth of thinking and writing about this idea, so I won’t attempt a precis… but my sense is that the impedance to complete vision could be characterised, in some sense, as our attachment to the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves. If we are ever, truly, to look at the world around us, at the table on which our hands lie, and truly see it, we have no choice but to abandon the complex of filters and pre-conceptions that we have spent a lifetime weaving into story. Which brings me to that final conversation with Don: in the last decade of his life, Don spent a lot of time translating and retranslating the gospels from their original language into English. In that last conversation he told me about the journey of understanding he has gone through with regard to the word “repent”. The call to repent is a central notion in Christianity – it is the refrain of prophet after prophet throughout both testaments – and is typically interpreted as an injunction to feel and express remorse for sinful acts. However, in that last conversation, Don shared how he had come to see the call to repent as a much more general exhortation for us to change our minds. It is a demand for us to re-evaluate, reassess and reconsider. We must turn our gaze upon the story we tell ourselves about the world around us, and our place in it, and we must tear that story down. With what, then, do we replace it? On the one hand, I’d like to say “with as little as possible” – maybe this is how one takes a step towards the Buddha’s complete unfiltered vision? On the other hand, though, we all still need stories within which to dwell, that help us to understand the complex world in which we live. Where do we source these stories? Who are today’s prophets and how do we recognise them? Clearly, for all that no story will ever be perfect, perhaps never as good as no story at all, still some stories are definitely better than others. In the current marketplace, there is a plethora of demagogues and influencers who are happy to provide a narrative for the willing listener. But these false prophets have a “tell”: they offer too much certainty. The Buddha said “Believe nothing, no matter where you read it or who has said it, not even if I have said it, unless it agrees with your own reason and your own common sense.” So: a true prophet will actively undermine herself, will encourage your critical faculties, your doubt and dissent. The other “tell” of a false prophet that occurs to me pertains to the othering I describe above: a false prophet’s stories exclude: they draw boundaries and they shout “witch” at anyone who trespasses outside. Any prophet who devalues a human for who they are, whose story denies love, is telling a flawed story. Don did neither of these things for he was a true prophet: This was a man who lived a large portion of his life at a cultural interface – the meeting point of aboriginal Australia and white Australia – where “othering” is a pestilence. Yet, for all that, no one was “other” to Don. He refused to construct other people’s stories for them; rather he was relentless in his commitment to critiquing his own way of life and how he needed to shift and change to more truly love the people he encountered. How hard, when everyone else is scrabbling to cast the first stone, to be the one who refuses! Who doesn’t just refuse, but actively stands in the way. Who refuses the easy way, because it’s wrong, and instead does the work needed to tread the more difficult path. Thank you, Don, you are an inspiration. Remembering you with love.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Stop the genocide in Gaza</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/gaza-genocide" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Stop the genocide in Gaza" /><published>2025-05-30T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2025-05-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/gaza-genocide</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/gaza-genocide"><![CDATA[<p>A week ago 300 writers signed a letter demanding an immediate Gaza ceasefire. The purpose of this post is to endorse, without reservation, the <a href="https://medium.com/@horatioclare/writers-demand-immediate-gaza-ceasefire-65ae44bd7241">text of that letter</a>.</p>

<p>What is happening in Gaza is terrible. I feel entirely helpless to effect any change for the people of Gaza but at the very least I can add my voice to those bearing witness to what is happening. To that end I reproduce the final sentence of the writers’ letter:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>This genocide implicates us all. We bear witness to the crimes of genocide, and we refuse to approve them by our silence.</p>
</blockquote>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[A week ago 300 writers signed a letter demanding an immediate Gaza ceasefire. The purpose of this post is to endorse, without reservation, the text of that letter. What is happening in Gaza is terrible. I feel entirely helpless to effect any change for the people of Gaza but at the very least I can add my voice to those bearing witness to what is happening. To that end I reproduce the final sentence of the writers’ letter: This genocide implicates us all. We bear witness to the crimes of genocide, and we refuse to approve them by our silence.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Finite classical groups</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/finite-classical-groups-2025" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Finite classical groups" /><published>2025-01-13T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2025-01-13T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/finite-classical-groups-2025</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/finite-classical-groups-2025"><![CDATA[<p>This is the webpage for my course with the <a href="http://www.ltcc.ac.uk">London Taught Course Centre</a>. Practical matters:</p>

<ul>
  <li><strong>Lectures</strong>: There are 5 lectures, given every Monday from 13th January until 10th February 2025, 3:10pm – 5:10pm at De Morgan house in London.</li>
  <li><strong>Lecture notes</strong>: These will be put online the morning after the lecture is given. Each lecture contains many exercises which students are encouraged to attempt. Answers to starred exercises will be put online after one week.</li>
  <li><strong>Exam</strong>: Information will be provided in due course.</li>
</ul>

<p>Course material follows.</p>

<ul>
  <li>Useful reading:
    <ul>
      <li><a href="https://www.ltcc.ac.uk/media/london-taught-course-centre/An-introduction-to-the-Finite-Classical-Groups-abstract.pdf">Course description</a>, including a list of background texts;</li>
      <li>Peter Cameron’s notes on <a href="http://www.maths.qmul.ac.uk/~pjc/class_gps/">Classical Groups</a>;</li>
      <li>Peter Cameron’s notes on <a href="http://www.maths.qmul.ac.uk/~pjc/pps/">Projective and polar spaces</a>.</li>
    </ul>
  </li>
  <li>Lecture notes:
    <ul>
      <li><a href="cg_lect_0.pdf">Lecture 0</a> on <em>Group theory background</em> (this was not covered in class);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_lect_1.pdf">Lecture 1</a> on <em>Permutation Groups</em> and <em>Fields and Vector Spaces</em>;</li>
      <li><a href="cg_lect_2.pdf">Lecture 2</a> on <em>Projective space</em> and <em>Linear groups</em> (we didn’t cover Chapter 4 in class but, still, it’s included for interest);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_lect_3.pdf">Lecture 3</a> on <em>Forms and polar spaces</em> and <em>Isometries and Witt’s Lemma</em>;</li>
      <li><a href="cg_lect_4.pdf">Lecture 4</a> on <em>Polar spaces</em> and <em>Symplectic groups</em>;</li>
      <li><a href="cg_lect_5.pdf">Lecture 5</a> on <em>Unitary groups</em> and <em>Orthogonal groups</em>.</li>
    </ul>
  </li>
  <li>Solutions for starred exercises (these are the ones that I think are most important):
    <ul>
      <li><a href="cg_ex_0.pdf">Exercises 0</a> (including solutions);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_ex_1.pdf">Exercises 1</a> (including solutions);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_ex_2.pdf">Exercises 2</a> (including solutions);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_ex_3.pdf">Exercises 3</a> (including solutions);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_ex_4.pdf">Exercises 4</a> (including solutions);</li>
      <li><a href="cg_ex_5.pdf">Exercises 5</a> (including solutions).</li>
    </ul>
  </li>
</ul>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><category term="Teaching" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[This is the webpage for my course with the London Taught Course Centre. Practical matters: Lectures: There are 5 lectures, given every Monday from 13th January until 10th February 2025, 3:10pm – 5:10pm at De Morgan house in London. Lecture notes: These will be put online the morning after the lecture is given. Each lecture contains many exercises which students are encouraged to attempt. Answers to starred exercises will be put online after one week. Exam: Information will be provided in due course. Course material follows. Useful reading: Course description, including a list of background texts; Peter Cameron’s notes on Classical Groups; Peter Cameron’s notes on Projective and polar spaces. Lecture notes: Lecture 0 on Group theory background (this was not covered in class); Lecture 1 on Permutation Groups and Fields and Vector Spaces; Lecture 2 on Projective space and Linear groups (we didn’t cover Chapter 4 in class but, still, it’s included for interest); Lecture 3 on Forms and polar spaces and Isometries and Witt’s Lemma; Lecture 4 on Polar spaces and Symplectic groups; Lecture 5 on Unitary groups and Orthogonal groups. Solutions for starred exercises (these are the ones that I think are most important): Exercises 0 (including solutions); Exercises 1 (including solutions); Exercises 2 (including solutions); Exercises 3 (including solutions); Exercises 4 (including solutions); Exercises 5 (including solutions).]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">On karma</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/on-karma" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="On karma" /><published>2024-11-03T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2024-11-03T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/on-karma</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/on-karma"><![CDATA[<p>I’ve just finished a 7 week course at the Cardiff Buddhist Centre, led by Sagaradana and Celia. I wanted to record a few things that I found particularly helpful.</p>

<p>First, on the session about wisdom, Sagaradana asserted:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>You only have to be wise enough to be kind.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>I think he was quoting someone – I’m not sure who…</p>

<p>Another quote that, for now, I can only ascribe to Sagaradana:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Your task is to take down, brick by brick, the wall which you have built between you and love.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>I was particularly drawn to the conception of Buddhism as providing some kind of “handbook” or “guide” for life. Both quotes should be read in this context: they are addressing the problem of how to live a good life, whatever that means.</p>

<p>With that in mind, I was particularly struck by the discussion we had of <em>karma</em>.  This is a notion that I think is much misrepresented in everyday discourse, and was one that I felt somewhat uncomfortable about approaching in the class. Nonetheless I ended with a sense that there was something deep to understand here. Let me explain where I got to.</p>

<p>Sagaradana proposed, first, that we live in an “ethical universe”: that is, one in which “good” actions bring benefit to the actor, whereas “bad” actions bring damage. Distinguishing between good and bad is difficult, of course. But if we are willing to accept that notions of good and bad exist, a more profound concern is that karma seems to lead to a philosophy of “everyone gets what they deserve”. I think no one in the room was prepared to accept that, myself included.</p>

<p>After some discussion, though, I conclude that this concern arises from a misunderstanding. Let me give a specific, personal example: a few years ago I was in a workplace where I experienced bullying and toxicity; eventually I had to leave. I was left with a lot of feelings: sadness, anger, distress, resentment, bitterness. This experience was something I wanted to work through via meditation: I wanted to understand how I was to process this experience and to hold the memory of it inside me; the notion of karma was useful for me here.</p>

<p>To begin, Sagaradana made the point that “anger is karmically neutral” – it has no ethical implications or effects. Nonetheless, it often signals that an ethical decision is to be made. In this case my choice is this: I can choose to nurse resentment, bitterness, even hatred towards those who I perceive wronged me in that workplace. That process of nursing can feel incredibly sweet and potent but, at the same time, I’m keenly aware that it offers no hope of resolution or peace – the karma of this “bad” response causes me damage, whether I like it or not.</p>

<p>The alternative is that I seek to respond, insofar as I am able, with compassion towards those who I believe wronged me. I can be angry about what they did, but I do not seek to hate them. This is not a naive response: I do not, for instance, trust them to do differently next time, nor do I excuse what has happened, but, in the lexicon of Buddhism, I extend <em>metta</em> towards them as best I can. The karma of this “good” response yields benefit to me: I can feel the poison of the experience lessen each time I undertake this practice.</p>

<p>Some comments: first, although my experience was a very painful one, there are much worse – traumatic experiences bearing no comparison with my own. It is not for me to pontificate on how one should respond to serious trauma. I can only testify to my experience in this particular situation (and in others like it). Perhaps the Buddhist teaching of karma is useful in other situations, but that is not for me to say.</p>

<p>Second, it is clear that the notion of karma I’m discussing here is very restricted: it speaks only to the effect of ethical actions on the actor. It is, to my mind, a helpful notion within the “handbook for life” model of Buddhism. It is most definitely <em>not</em> a philosophy that can be used to explain, for instance, why some people seem to suffer inordinately while others do not. It does not allow me to point at a beggar in the street and conclude that they must have done something wrong in a past life to have ended up in penury in this one.</p>

<p>Let me explain why I think we can be confident that this broader philosophy is a misrepresentation of the Buddha’s notion of karma. The evidence lies within the two quotes I started with: both speak to the Buddha’s fundamental injunction that the purpose of life is to cultivate metta, loving kindness, compassion. We live so that we can love.</p>

<p>And this love is deeply practical. In the course of the session on karma, we read a story about the Buddha who, together with his friend, Ananda, visited a community of bhikkhus (monks). One of the bhikkhus was very ill with dysentry, and had been abandoned by his fellow monks – the Buddha found him lying in his own waste unable to wash or feed himself. The Buddha felt deep compassion for the ill bhikkhu and immediately started to clean him and care for him. The Buddha later chastised the other bhikkhus, saying, “Bhikkhus, when we leave our homes to follow the Way, we leave parents and family behind. If we don’t look after each other when we are sick, who will? Whoever would tend to me, should tend to the sick.”</p>

<p>The Buddha’s teaching of compassion directly contradicts the popular notion of karma being a philosophy of “you get what you deserve”. If the latter were the case, then the Buddha would have seen the sick monk and concluded that he had done something wrong to have ended up in his current state – compassion would constitute unhelpful meddling with the karmic scales of justice, and the bhikkhu should be left to get what he deserved. The Buddha’s compassionate response gives the lie to this mistaken point of view.</p>

<p>Putting karma in its correct place, we see it not as malign judgment on past sins but, rather, a helpful insight into how our psychology can cope with the dukkha (suffering) of life. It does not counteract the fundamental injunction to cultivate compassion, rather it reinforces it. We should be compassionate because that is what we are here to do, and the ethical universe in which we reside, will reward us with, for instance, increased peace of mind.</p>

<p>One final remark: All this has led me to wonder how it has come to pass that karma has become so dramatically misrepresented in modern discourse. My personal sense is that it is connected to people’s desire to turn Buddhism from a “handbook for life” into a religion that explains all of human experience. In this regard, the teachings of the Buddha can suffer the same fate as those of Jesus, or other great spiritual leaders: the profound wisdom that those great hearts share with those around them somehow gets corrupted by people’s desire for some kind of “explanation”: people don’t want to do the hard work of cultivating compassion and moving towards true enlightenment if, instead, they can simply sign up to a religion for some easy answers.</p>

<p>I am reminded of Kipling’s poem <a href="https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_disciple.htm">The Disciple</a>, the first verse of which is:</p>
<blockquote>
  <p>He that hath a Gospel<br />
  To loose upon Mankind,<br />
Though he serve it utterly—<br />
  Body, soul and mind—<br />
Though he go to Calvary<br />
  Daily for its gain—<br />
It is His Disciple<br />
  Shall make his labour vain.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Profound as Kipling’s words are, they are too cynical for me to end on them! For all that karma, for instance, can be mispresented, my experience of discussing and thinking about it, in a curious and critical way, has been very helpful. This process of shared inquiry and practice, which lies at the heart of the Buddhist method, is robust and powerful and I look forward to doing more of it.</p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[I’ve just finished a 7 week course at the Cardiff Buddhist Centre, led by Sagaradana and Celia. I wanted to record a few things that I found particularly helpful. First, on the session about wisdom, Sagaradana asserted: You only have to be wise enough to be kind. I think he was quoting someone – I’m not sure who… Another quote that, for now, I can only ascribe to Sagaradana: Your task is to take down, brick by brick, the wall which you have built between you and love. I was particularly drawn to the conception of Buddhism as providing some kind of “handbook” or “guide” for life. Both quotes should be read in this context: they are addressing the problem of how to live a good life, whatever that means. With that in mind, I was particularly struck by the discussion we had of karma. This is a notion that I think is much misrepresented in everyday discourse, and was one that I felt somewhat uncomfortable about approaching in the class. Nonetheless I ended with a sense that there was something deep to understand here. Let me explain where I got to. Sagaradana proposed, first, that we live in an “ethical universe”: that is, one in which “good” actions bring benefit to the actor, whereas “bad” actions bring damage. Distinguishing between good and bad is difficult, of course. But if we are willing to accept that notions of good and bad exist, a more profound concern is that karma seems to lead to a philosophy of “everyone gets what they deserve”. I think no one in the room was prepared to accept that, myself included. After some discussion, though, I conclude that this concern arises from a misunderstanding. Let me give a specific, personal example: a few years ago I was in a workplace where I experienced bullying and toxicity; eventually I had to leave. I was left with a lot of feelings: sadness, anger, distress, resentment, bitterness. This experience was something I wanted to work through via meditation: I wanted to understand how I was to process this experience and to hold the memory of it inside me; the notion of karma was useful for me here. To begin, Sagaradana made the point that “anger is karmically neutral” – it has no ethical implications or effects. Nonetheless, it often signals that an ethical decision is to be made. In this case my choice is this: I can choose to nurse resentment, bitterness, even hatred towards those who I perceive wronged me in that workplace. That process of nursing can feel incredibly sweet and potent but, at the same time, I’m keenly aware that it offers no hope of resolution or peace – the karma of this “bad” response causes me damage, whether I like it or not. The alternative is that I seek to respond, insofar as I am able, with compassion towards those who I believe wronged me. I can be angry about what they did, but I do not seek to hate them. This is not a naive response: I do not, for instance, trust them to do differently next time, nor do I excuse what has happened, but, in the lexicon of Buddhism, I extend metta towards them as best I can. The karma of this “good” response yields benefit to me: I can feel the poison of the experience lessen each time I undertake this practice. Some comments: first, although my experience was a very painful one, there are much worse – traumatic experiences bearing no comparison with my own. It is not for me to pontificate on how one should respond to serious trauma. I can only testify to my experience in this particular situation (and in others like it). Perhaps the Buddhist teaching of karma is useful in other situations, but that is not for me to say. Second, it is clear that the notion of karma I’m discussing here is very restricted: it speaks only to the effect of ethical actions on the actor. It is, to my mind, a helpful notion within the “handbook for life” model of Buddhism. It is most definitely not a philosophy that can be used to explain, for instance, why some people seem to suffer inordinately while others do not. It does not allow me to point at a beggar in the street and conclude that they must have done something wrong in a past life to have ended up in penury in this one. Let me explain why I think we can be confident that this broader philosophy is a misrepresentation of the Buddha’s notion of karma. The evidence lies within the two quotes I started with: both speak to the Buddha’s fundamental injunction that the purpose of life is to cultivate metta, loving kindness, compassion. We live so that we can love. And this love is deeply practical. In the course of the session on karma, we read a story about the Buddha who, together with his friend, Ananda, visited a community of bhikkhus (monks). One of the bhikkhus was very ill with dysentry, and had been abandoned by his fellow monks – the Buddha found him lying in his own waste unable to wash or feed himself. The Buddha felt deep compassion for the ill bhikkhu and immediately started to clean him and care for him. The Buddha later chastised the other bhikkhus, saying, “Bhikkhus, when we leave our homes to follow the Way, we leave parents and family behind. If we don’t look after each other when we are sick, who will? Whoever would tend to me, should tend to the sick.” The Buddha’s teaching of compassion directly contradicts the popular notion of karma being a philosophy of “you get what you deserve”. If the latter were the case, then the Buddha would have seen the sick monk and concluded that he had done something wrong to have ended up in his current state – compassion would constitute unhelpful meddling with the karmic scales of justice, and the bhikkhu should be left to get what he deserved. The Buddha’s compassionate response gives the lie to this mistaken point of view. Putting karma in its correct place, we see it not as malign judgment on past sins but, rather, a helpful insight into how our psychology can cope with the dukkha (suffering) of life. It does not counteract the fundamental injunction to cultivate compassion, rather it reinforces it. We should be compassionate because that is what we are here to do, and the ethical universe in which we reside, will reward us with, for instance, increased peace of mind. One final remark: All this has led me to wonder how it has come to pass that karma has become so dramatically misrepresented in modern discourse. My personal sense is that it is connected to people’s desire to turn Buddhism from a “handbook for life” into a religion that explains all of human experience. In this regard, the teachings of the Buddha can suffer the same fate as those of Jesus, or other great spiritual leaders: the profound wisdom that those great hearts share with those around them somehow gets corrupted by people’s desire for some kind of “explanation”: people don’t want to do the hard work of cultivating compassion and moving towards true enlightenment if, instead, they can simply sign up to a religion for some easy answers. I am reminded of Kipling’s poem The Disciple, the first verse of which is: He that hath a Gospel To loose upon Mankind, Though he serve it utterly— Body, soul and mind— Though he go to Calvary Daily for its gain— It is His Disciple Shall make his labour vain. Profound as Kipling’s words are, they are too cynical for me to end on them! For all that karma, for instance, can be mispresented, my experience of discussing and thinking about it, in a curious and critical way, has been very helpful. This process of shared inquiry and practice, which lies at the heart of the Buddhist method, is robust and powerful and I look forward to doing more of it.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Erratum: On a conjecture of Degos</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/a-correction-to-paper-on-degos-conjecture" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Erratum: On a conjecture of Degos" /><published>2024-08-01T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2024-08-01T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/a-correction-to-paper-on-degos-conjecture</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/a-correction-to-paper-on-degos-conjecture"><![CDATA[<script type="text/x-mathjax-config">
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<p>Some years ago I wrote a paper called <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.03341"><em>On a conjecture of Degos</em></a> appearing as <em>Cah. Topol. Géom. Différ. Catég.</em> 57, No. 3, 229-237 (2016). Some years later, <a href="https://blogs.gwu.edu/jblewis/">Joel Brewster Lewis</a> got in touch with me to say that the main theorem of that paper was not true when $n=2$. The correct statement should be:</p>

<p><strong>Theorem</strong>: Let $f,g\in \mathbb{F}_q[x]$ be distinct monic polynomials of degree $n&gt;2$ such that $f$ is primitive and the constant term of $g$ is non-zero. Then $\langle C_f, C_g\rangle=\textrm{GL}_n(q)$.</p>

<p>(Here $C_f$ means the <em>companion matrix of f</em>.) My error was in omitting that “$&gt;2$”.</p>

<p>I should have published an erratum but I did not get to it and, in the meantime, Joel has written up a paper on a connected subject, where he explains the error completely. Joel’s paper is called <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.20347">$\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$-analogues of some properties of $n$-cycles in $S_n$</a>.</p>

<p>I am very grateful to Joel for, first, taking the time to find and correct my error; and, second, for then writing up a proper account of it – a task that I should have done myself. At the very least, then, to show my gratitude I should advertise the main result of his paper! It is a very striking result which, as the title of his paper indicates, gives two properties of the general linear group, $\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q),$ which are direct analogues of properties of the symmetric group, $S_n$. Here is his result:</p>

<p><strong>Theorem</strong></p>
<ol>
  <li>An element $g\in \textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a Singer cycle if and only if the factors in every minimum-length factorization of $g$ as a product of reflections form a generating set for $\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$.</li>
  <li>Suppose that $c\in \textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a Singer cycle and $t\in \textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a reflection that does not normalize the cyclic subgroup $\langle c \rangle$; then $\langle c, t\rangle=\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$.</li>
</ol>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><category term="research" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Some years ago I wrote a paper called On a conjecture of Degos appearing as Cah. Topol. Géom. Différ. Catég. 57, No. 3, 229-237 (2016). Some years later, Joel Brewster Lewis got in touch with me to say that the main theorem of that paper was not true when $n=2$. The correct statement should be: Theorem: Let $f,g\in \mathbb{F}_q[x]$ be distinct monic polynomials of degree $n&gt;2$ such that $f$ is primitive and the constant term of $g$ is non-zero. Then $\langle C_f, C_g\rangle=\textrm{GL}_n(q)$. (Here $C_f$ means the companion matrix of f.) My error was in omitting that “$&gt;2$”. I should have published an erratum but I did not get to it and, in the meantime, Joel has written up a paper on a connected subject, where he explains the error completely. Joel’s paper is called $\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$-analogues of some properties of $n$-cycles in $S_n$. I am very grateful to Joel for, first, taking the time to find and correct my error; and, second, for then writing up a proper account of it – a task that I should have done myself. At the very least, then, to show my gratitude I should advertise the main result of his paper! It is a very striking result which, as the title of his paper indicates, gives two properties of the general linear group, $\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q),$ which are direct analogues of properties of the symmetric group, $S_n$. Here is his result: Theorem An element $g\in \textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a Singer cycle if and only if the factors in every minimum-length factorization of $g$ as a product of reflections form a generating set for $\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$. Suppose that $c\in \textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a Singer cycle and $t\in \textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$ is a reflection that does not normalize the cyclic subgroup $\langle c \rangle$; then $\langle c, t\rangle=\textrm{GL}_n(\mathbb{F}_q)$.]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Upgrading democracy</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/upgrade-democracy" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Upgrading democracy" /><published>2023-08-04T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-08-04T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/upgrade-democracy</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/upgrade-democracy"><![CDATA[<p>In February, I wrote a blog for Extinction Rebellion entitled <a href="https://rebellion.global/blog/2023/02/15/politiciansmakingbaddecisions/">Why do politicians keep making bad decisions?</a>.</p>

<p>The blog was tied in with XR’s third main demand for governments “to create and be led by the decisions of citizens’ assemblies on climate and ecological justice”. XR’s point of view is, I think, that governments are, typically, not great at making decisions on the environment and it would be far better, and more democratic, if these decisions were made by randomly selected members of the public, i.e. made by <em>Citizens’ Assemblies</em>.</p>

<p>Part of my work at Sortition Foundation involves advocating for citizens’ assemblies, not just for decisions about the environment, but for all areas of public policy. Sortition Foundation doesn’t take a position on <strong>what</strong> those decisions should be (e.g. our job is not to tell people how to respond to climate change), rather we advocate around <strong>how</strong> those decisions should be made.</p>

<p>The blog caused a bit of a kerfuffle, with some <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/group-that-wants-to-abolish-mps-wins-government-cash-525btrj7k">coverage in <em>The Times</em></a>.</p>

<p>The basic thesis of the blog is this: the strapline for democracy is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettysburg_Address"><em>government of the people, for the people, by the people</em></a>… And this is a strapline that I wholeheartedly believe in! Yet, it seems to me that the way democracy is currently configured means that the government we are getting meets none of these aspirations: it is neither of the people, by the people, nor for the people. I was interested in trying to understand why that is, and what could be done about it.</p>

<p>My approach was one of a mathematician: start with some basic axioms and see where those axioms, and logic, get us. My first axiom is simply that, <em>the aim of democracy is government of the people, for the people and by the people</em>. I interpret this to mean that we wish our system of decision making to enable decisions to be made by the people affected by those decisions, and for the benefit of those same people, and of the people as a whole.</p>

<p>The second axiom is this: <em>humans have trouble making decisions that conflict with their own self-interest</em>. This doesn’t seem too contentious to me! And I was thinking about it because I wanted to avoid writing a piece that said “democracy would be fine if our politicians weren’t such a horrible bunch”. This seems a lazy criticism to me and, moreover, it is a criticism aimed at inducing less engagement with democracy rather than more. I wanted a better, truer answer.</p>

<p>These two axioms, taken together, form a kind of <em>specification for a democratic system</em>. The first axiom tells us what we want from our democratic system; the second axiom tells us one of the problems that such a democratic system must overcome. Now the question is whether our current democratic system satisfies these axioms: i.e. it achieves the stated aim, despite the existence of the stated problem.</p>

<p>In the blog I sought to interrogate our current system, in which representatives are elected at regular intervals by the citizens, with representatives arranged into parties, etc. I highlighted four problems that seem to arise:</p>
<ol>
  <li><strong>Short-termism</strong>: decisions are made with an eye on the electoral cycle;</li>
  <li><strong>Vested interests</strong>: decision makers need resources to win elections, and so make decisions that are more likely to attract support (donations) from those with resources;</li>
  <li><strong>Lack of representation</strong>: again, due to the need for significant resourcing to be elected, decision makers are typically drawn from a particular stratum of society and our axiom implies that they will make decisions that benefit that stratum;</li>
  <li><strong>Adversarial discourse</strong>: parliamentary debate is adversial; decision makers are not incentivized to change their mind, or to moderate their point of view in light of other people’s experience, for fear of being perceived as weak or (heaven bid) as having performed a u-turn.</li>
</ol>

<p>All of these four problems constitute a failure of our current democratic system to achieve the aim laid out in our first axiom. What is more, each of these problems is a direct consequence of the way the problem of self-interest laid out in our second axiom interacts with our current democratic system. If we are looking for ways to improve, or upgrade, our democractic system so that it achieves our stated aim, then we should look at systems that <strong>mitigate against</strong> the problems I’ve just described.</p>

<p>In the blog, I propose that such an upgrade should involve <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deliberative_democracy">deliberative democracy</a> based on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition">sortition</a> (reminisicent of the way the Athenians did democracy in the first place).</p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[In February, I wrote a blog for Extinction Rebellion entitled Why do politicians keep making bad decisions?. The blog was tied in with XR’s third main demand for governments “to create and be led by the decisions of citizens’ assemblies on climate and ecological justice”. XR’s point of view is, I think, that governments are, typically, not great at making decisions on the environment and it would be far better, and more democratic, if these decisions were made by randomly selected members of the public, i.e. made by Citizens’ Assemblies. Part of my work at Sortition Foundation involves advocating for citizens’ assemblies, not just for decisions about the environment, but for all areas of public policy. Sortition Foundation doesn’t take a position on what those decisions should be (e.g. our job is not to tell people how to respond to climate change), rather we advocate around how those decisions should be made. The blog caused a bit of a kerfuffle, with some coverage in The Times. The basic thesis of the blog is this: the strapline for democracy is government of the people, for the people, by the people… And this is a strapline that I wholeheartedly believe in! Yet, it seems to me that the way democracy is currently configured means that the government we are getting meets none of these aspirations: it is neither of the people, by the people, nor for the people. I was interested in trying to understand why that is, and what could be done about it. My approach was one of a mathematician: start with some basic axioms and see where those axioms, and logic, get us. My first axiom is simply that, the aim of democracy is government of the people, for the people and by the people. I interpret this to mean that we wish our system of decision making to enable decisions to be made by the people affected by those decisions, and for the benefit of those same people, and of the people as a whole. The second axiom is this: humans have trouble making decisions that conflict with their own self-interest. This doesn’t seem too contentious to me! And I was thinking about it because I wanted to avoid writing a piece that said “democracy would be fine if our politicians weren’t such a horrible bunch”. This seems a lazy criticism to me and, moreover, it is a criticism aimed at inducing less engagement with democracy rather than more. I wanted a better, truer answer. These two axioms, taken together, form a kind of specification for a democratic system. The first axiom tells us what we want from our democratic system; the second axiom tells us one of the problems that such a democratic system must overcome. Now the question is whether our current democratic system satisfies these axioms: i.e. it achieves the stated aim, despite the existence of the stated problem. In the blog I sought to interrogate our current system, in which representatives are elected at regular intervals by the citizens, with representatives arranged into parties, etc. I highlighted four problems that seem to arise: Short-termism: decisions are made with an eye on the electoral cycle; Vested interests: decision makers need resources to win elections, and so make decisions that are more likely to attract support (donations) from those with resources; Lack of representation: again, due to the need for significant resourcing to be elected, decision makers are typically drawn from a particular stratum of society and our axiom implies that they will make decisions that benefit that stratum; Adversarial discourse: parliamentary debate is adversial; decision makers are not incentivized to change their mind, or to moderate their point of view in light of other people’s experience, for fear of being perceived as weak or (heaven bid) as having performed a u-turn. All of these four problems constitute a failure of our current democratic system to achieve the aim laid out in our first axiom. What is more, each of these problems is a direct consequence of the way the problem of self-interest laid out in our second axiom interacts with our current democratic system. If we are looking for ways to improve, or upgrade, our democractic system so that it achieves our stated aim, then we should look at systems that mitigate against the problems I’ve just described. In the blog, I propose that such an upgrade should involve deliberative democracy based on sortition (reminisicent of the way the Athenians did democracy in the first place).]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Congratulations to Scott Hudson</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/scott-hudson-phd" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Congratulations to Scott Hudson" /><published>2023-01-26T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2023-01-26T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/scott-hudson-phd</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/scott-hudson-phd"><![CDATA[<script type="text/x-mathjax-config">
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<p>Congratulations to Scott Hudson who has successfully defended his PhD thesis entitled <em>Calculating the height and relational complexity of the primitive actions of $PSL_2(q)$ and $PGL_2(q)$</em>. I supervised Scott with Pablo Spiga from Milan; Scott’s PhD examiners were Gareth Tracey and Derek Holt, both of Warwick University.</p>

<p>Scott’s main result gives the first complete computation of the relational complexity of the primitive actions of an infinite family of finite simple groups. The family in the question are the groups $PSL_2(q)$. Thanks to a result of Martin Liebeck and I, we know that the relational complexity of the primitive actions of these groups must be bounded above by an absolute constant, however this bound is, in general, not likely to be close to the true value.</p>

<p>Indeed, for the family $PSL_2(q)$, Martin and I proved that the relational complexity is at most 175, whereas Scott’s main result implies that it cannot exceed 4! His main result is this:</p>

<p><strong>Theorem</strong> 
Let $G=PSL_2(q)$ with $q\geq 11$, and consider the action of $G$ on the cosets of a maximal subgroup $H$. The height and relational complexity of this action are as follows:</p>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Structure of $H$</th>
      <th>Height</th>
      <th>Relational Complexity</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Borel</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>4</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Dihedral</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>3</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>$A_4$</td>
      <td>2</td>
      <td>3</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>$S_4$</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>3 or 4</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>$A_5$</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>4</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Subfield</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>4</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<p>Scott was able to extend this result to $PGL_2(q)$.</p>

<p><strong>Theorem</strong> 
Let $G=PGL_2(q)$ with $q\geq 11$, and consider the action of $G$ on the cosets of a maximal subgroup $H$. The height and relational complexity of this action are as follows:</p>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Structure of $H$</th>
      <th>Height</th>
      <th>Relational Complexity</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>PSL_2(q)</td>
      <td>1</td>
      <td>2</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Borel</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>4</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Dihedral</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>3</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>$S_4$</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>3 or 4</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Subfield</td>
      <td>3</td>
      <td>4</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<p>The case when $q&lt;11$ is easy to deal with using a computer. It is not included in the statement because there are some strange anomalies there, typically due to isomorphisms with other simple groups. For instance $PGL_2(5)$ acts on the cosets of a maximal $S_4$ subgroup with relational complexity equal to $2$ (you might say that this is due to the fact that $PGL_2(5)\cong S_5$).</p>

<h2 id="extensions">Extensions</h2>

<p>Given Scott’s beautiful results for the relational complexity of the primitive actions of $PSL_2(q)$ and $PGL_2(q)$, one might ask to what extent these can be extended. Two natural questions occur to me:</p>
<ul>
  <li>Is there an absolute upper bound for the relational complexity of the primitive actions of all almost simple groups with socle $PSL_2(q)$?</li>
  <li>Is there an absolute upper bound for the relational complexity of the <strong>transitive</strong> actions of the simple group $PSL_2(q)$?</li>
</ul>

<p>A nice example shows that the answer to the second question is <strong>No</strong>. To explain it, a little notation: for a group $G$ acting on a set $\Omega$, we write $RC(G,\Omega)$ for the relational complexity of the action. For a subgroup $H$ in $G$, we write $(G:H)$ for the set of right cosets of $H$ in $G$, so $RC(G,(G:H))$ is the relational complexity of the group $G$ acting naturally on the set of right cosets of $H$ in $G$.</p>

<p>Now let $G=SL_2(2^a)$, let $B$ be a Borel subgroup of $G$ and let $U=O_2(B)$. We know that $RC(G,(G:U))=2$. I mention this just because it contrasts with what is to follow… Now define $H$ to be an index 2-subgroup of $U$. We will see that if $a\geq 2$, then $RC(G, (G:H))=a+1$.</p>

<p>I will use a bunch of standard results about relational complexity, all of which can be found in Chapter 1 of <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.05154">this book</a>. One particularly useful result is that if $H &lt; B &lt; G$, then we have $RC(G:(G,H))\geq RC(B, (B:H))$. In what follows we write $\Omega$ for $(G:H)$ and $\Gamma$ for $(B:H)$. so we have $RC(G,\Omega)\geq RC(B,\Gamma)$. First, a lemma that will allow us to work inside $B$.</p>

<p><strong>Lemma 1</strong>. Either $RC(G,\Omega)=RC(B,\Gamma)$ or else $RC(B,\Gamma)=2$ and $RC(G,\Omega)=3$.</p>

<p><strong>Proof</strong> Assume, first that $RC(B,\Gamma)\geq 3$. If the result is false, then, proceeding for a contradiction, we can find tuples $I=(I_1,\dots, I_{k+1})$ and $J=(I_1,\dots,I_k, J_{k+1})$ with entries in $(G:H)$ that are $k$-equivalent in $G$ but not $(k+1)$-equivalent in $G$ and $k\geq RC(B,\Gamma)$.</p>

<p>We can assume that $I_1$ is stabilized by $H$ and we must have a $j\in{1,\dots, k}$ such that $I_j$ stabilized by some conjugate of $H$ that does not lie in $B$ (otherwise we would have $I_1,\dots, I_{k+1}$ all in $B$ which would mean that $J_{k+1}\subset B$ and this is a contradiction. We might as well take $j=2$.</p>

<p>But now, distinct Sylow $p$-subgroups of $G$ intersect trivially, hence the pointwise stabilizer of ${I_1, I_2}$ is trivial. Now the fact that $I$ and $J$ are $k$-equivalent with $k\geq 3$ implies that $I_{k+1}=J_{k+1}$, a contradiction.</p>

<p>We are left with the case when $RC(B,\Gamma)=2$. The same argument works here since assuming the result is false allows us to take $k\geq 3$. <strong>QED</strong></p>

<p>We can describe the action of $B$ on $(B:H)$ in a particularly easy way. We think of $U$ as an $a$-dimensional vector space over $\mathbb{F}_2$. Notice that $H$ is a hyperplane in $U$ and notice that there are $q-1$ of these. We let $\Delta$ be the set of all <strong>affine hyperplanes</strong> – these are the usual linear hyperplanes as well as their translates. Since we are working over $\mathbb{F}_2$, each hyperplane has 2 cosets (itself and one other) thus $\Delta$ has size $2q$. It is easy enough to see that $B$ acts transitively on $\Delta$ with stabilizers conjugates of $H$. Thus the action of $B$ on $\Gamma$ is isomorphic to the action of $B$ on $\Delta$.</p>

<p>For any action of a group $G$ on a set $\Omega$ we write $I(G,\Omega)$ for the maximum length of an irredundant base; we write $B(G,\Omega)$ for the maximum size of a minimal base; we write $H(G,\Omega)$ for the height of the action (as considered by Scott in the results above). The definitions imply that $B(G,\Omega)\leq I(G,\Omega)$. It is also not to hard to show that, for any action, $RC(G,\Omega)\leq H(G,\Omega)+1$.</p>

<p><strong>Lemma 2</strong>. $B(B,\Delta)=B(G,\Omega)=H(G,\Omega)=I(G,\Omega)=a$.</p>

<p><strong>Proof</strong>. Since $H$ has order $2^{a-1}$, the longest possible stabilizer chain is of length $a$. Thus $I(G,\Omega)\leq a$. Since $B(B,\Delta)=B(B,\Gamma)$ and, clearly, $B(B,\Gamma)\leq B(G,\Omega)$ it is sufficient to show that $B(B,\Delta)\geq a$. To do this we let $e_1,\dots, e_a$ be the usual vectors in the natural basis of $U$ (so $e_i$ has $0$’s in all places except the $i$-th where the entry is $1$). Now, for $i=1,\dots, a$, define</p>

\[I_i:=\langle e_1,\dots, e_{i-1}, e_{i+1},\dots, e_a\rangle.\]

<p>Here $I_1,\dots, I_a$ are hyperplanes in $U$ hence are elements of $\Delta$. 
It is clear that ${I_1,\dots, I_a}$ is an independent set (intersections just decrease by a dimension each time) and the stabilizer is trivial. Thus ${I_1,\dots, I_a}$ is a minimal base of size $a$ and $B(B,\Delta)=a$ as required.<strong>QED</strong></p>

<p><strong>Lemma 3</strong>. If $a \geq 2$, then $RC(G,\Omega)=a+1$.</p>

<p><strong>Proof</strong>. Lemma 1 implies that it is sufficient to prove that $RC(B,\Gamma)=a+1$. Since $B(B,\Delta)=a$ we know that $B(B,\Gamma)=a$ and so $RC(B,\Gamma)\leq a+1$.</p>

<p>Thus, to show that $RC(B,\Gamma)=a+1$ we need to find $I=(I_1,\dots, I_{a+1})$ and $J=(I_1,\dots, I_a, J_{a+1})$ such that $I$ and $J$ are $a$-equivalent but not $(a+1)$-equivalent.</p>

<p>To do this take $I_1,\dots, I_a$ as above. Take $I_{a+1}$ to be the hyperplane whose vectors contain an even number of $1$’s; let $J_{a+1}$ be the other coset of this hyperplane, so $J_{a+1}$ is the affine hyperplane whose vectors contain an odd number of $1$’s.</p>

<p>The intersection of $I_1,\dots, I_a$ is trival. Since $I_{a+1}\neq J_{a+1}$ it is therefore clear that $I$ is not $(a+1)$-equivalent to $J$.</p>

<p>On the other hand, for $i=1,\dots, a$, the intersection of $I_1,\dots, I_{i-1}, I_{i+1},\dots, I_a$ is $\langle e_i\rangle$. But note that $I_{a+1}+e_i=J_{i+1}$ (since $e_i$ has an odd number of 1’s). Thus $I$ is $a$-equivalent to $J$. We are done. <strong>QED</strong></p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><category term="supervision" /><category term="research" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Congratulations to Scott Hudson who has successfully defended his PhD thesis entitled Calculating the height and relational complexity of the primitive actions of $PSL_2(q)$ and $PGL_2(q)$. I supervised Scott with Pablo Spiga from Milan; Scott’s PhD examiners were Gareth Tracey and Derek Holt, both of Warwick University. Scott’s main result gives the first complete computation of the relational complexity of the primitive actions of an infinite family of finite simple groups. The family in the question are the groups $PSL_2(q)$. Thanks to a result of Martin Liebeck and I, we know that the relational complexity of the primitive actions of these groups must be bounded above by an absolute constant, however this bound is, in general, not likely to be close to the true value. Indeed, for the family $PSL_2(q)$, Martin and I proved that the relational complexity is at most 175, whereas Scott’s main result implies that it cannot exceed 4! His main result is this: Theorem Let $G=PSL_2(q)$ with $q\geq 11$, and consider the action of $G$ on the cosets of a maximal subgroup $H$. The height and relational complexity of this action are as follows: Structure of $H$ Height Relational Complexity Borel 3 4 Dihedral 3 3 $A_4$ 2 3 $S_4$ 3 3 or 4 $A_5$ 3 4 Subfield 3 4 Scott was able to extend this result to $PGL_2(q)$. Theorem Let $G=PGL_2(q)$ with $q\geq 11$, and consider the action of $G$ on the cosets of a maximal subgroup $H$. The height and relational complexity of this action are as follows: Structure of $H$ Height Relational Complexity PSL_2(q) 1 2 Borel 3 4 Dihedral 3 3 $S_4$ 3 3 or 4 Subfield 3 4 The case when $q&lt;11$ is easy to deal with using a computer. It is not included in the statement because there are some strange anomalies there, typically due to isomorphisms with other simple groups. For instance $PGL_2(5)$ acts on the cosets of a maximal $S_4$ subgroup with relational complexity equal to $2$ (you might say that this is due to the fact that $PGL_2(5)\cong S_5$). Extensions Given Scott’s beautiful results for the relational complexity of the primitive actions of $PSL_2(q)$ and $PGL_2(q)$, one might ask to what extent these can be extended. Two natural questions occur to me: Is there an absolute upper bound for the relational complexity of the primitive actions of all almost simple groups with socle $PSL_2(q)$? Is there an absolute upper bound for the relational complexity of the transitive actions of the simple group $PSL_2(q)$? A nice example shows that the answer to the second question is No. To explain it, a little notation: for a group $G$ acting on a set $\Omega$, we write $RC(G,\Omega)$ for the relational complexity of the action. For a subgroup $H$ in $G$, we write $(G:H)$ for the set of right cosets of $H$ in $G$, so $RC(G,(G:H))$ is the relational complexity of the group $G$ acting naturally on the set of right cosets of $H$ in $G$. Now let $G=SL_2(2^a)$, let $B$ be a Borel subgroup of $G$ and let $U=O_2(B)$. We know that $RC(G,(G:U))=2$. I mention this just because it contrasts with what is to follow… Now define $H$ to be an index 2-subgroup of $U$. We will see that if $a\geq 2$, then $RC(G, (G:H))=a+1$. I will use a bunch of standard results about relational complexity, all of which can be found in Chapter 1 of this book. One particularly useful result is that if $H &lt; B &lt; G$, then we have $RC(G:(G,H))\geq RC(B, (B:H))$. In what follows we write $\Omega$ for $(G:H)$ and $\Gamma$ for $(B:H)$. so we have $RC(G,\Omega)\geq RC(B,\Gamma)$. First, a lemma that will allow us to work inside $B$. Lemma 1. Either $RC(G,\Omega)=RC(B,\Gamma)$ or else $RC(B,\Gamma)=2$ and $RC(G,\Omega)=3$. Proof Assume, first that $RC(B,\Gamma)\geq 3$. If the result is false, then, proceeding for a contradiction, we can find tuples $I=(I_1,\dots, I_{k+1})$ and $J=(I_1,\dots,I_k, J_{k+1})$ with entries in $(G:H)$ that are $k$-equivalent in $G$ but not $(k+1)$-equivalent in $G$ and $k\geq RC(B,\Gamma)$. We can assume that $I_1$ is stabilized by $H$ and we must have a $j\in{1,\dots, k}$ such that $I_j$ stabilized by some conjugate of $H$ that does not lie in $B$ (otherwise we would have $I_1,\dots, I_{k+1}$ all in $B$ which would mean that $J_{k+1}\subset B$ and this is a contradiction. We might as well take $j=2$. But now, distinct Sylow $p$-subgroups of $G$ intersect trivially, hence the pointwise stabilizer of ${I_1, I_2}$ is trivial. Now the fact that $I$ and $J$ are $k$-equivalent with $k\geq 3$ implies that $I_{k+1}=J_{k+1}$, a contradiction. We are left with the case when $RC(B,\Gamma)=2$. The same argument works here since assuming the result is false allows us to take $k\geq 3$. QED We can describe the action of $B$ on $(B:H)$ in a particularly easy way. We think of $U$ as an $a$-dimensional vector space over $\mathbb{F}_2$. Notice that $H$ is a hyperplane in $U$ and notice that there are $q-1$ of these. We let $\Delta$ be the set of all affine hyperplanes – these are the usual linear hyperplanes as well as their translates. Since we are working over $\mathbb{F}_2$, each hyperplane has 2 cosets (itself and one other) thus $\Delta$ has size $2q$. It is easy enough to see that $B$ acts transitively on $\Delta$ with stabilizers conjugates of $H$. Thus the action of $B$ on $\Gamma$ is isomorphic to the action of $B$ on $\Delta$. For any action of a group $G$ on a set $\Omega$ we write $I(G,\Omega)$ for the maximum length of an irredundant base; we write $B(G,\Omega)$ for the maximum size of a minimal base; we write $H(G,\Omega)$ for the height of the action (as considered by Scott in the results above). The definitions imply that $B(G,\Omega)\leq I(G,\Omega)$. It is also not to hard to show that, for any action, $RC(G,\Omega)\leq H(G,\Omega)+1$. Lemma 2. $B(B,\Delta)=B(G,\Omega)=H(G,\Omega)=I(G,\Omega)=a$. Proof. Since $H$ has order $2^{a-1}$, the longest possible stabilizer chain is of length $a$. Thus $I(G,\Omega)\leq a$. Since $B(B,\Delta)=B(B,\Gamma)$ and, clearly, $B(B,\Gamma)\leq B(G,\Omega)$ it is sufficient to show that $B(B,\Delta)\geq a$. To do this we let $e_1,\dots, e_a$ be the usual vectors in the natural basis of $U$ (so $e_i$ has $0$’s in all places except the $i$-th where the entry is $1$). Now, for $i=1,\dots, a$, define \[I_i:=\langle e_1,\dots, e_{i-1}, e_{i+1},\dots, e_a\rangle.\] Here $I_1,\dots, I_a$ are hyperplanes in $U$ hence are elements of $\Delta$. It is clear that ${I_1,\dots, I_a}$ is an independent set (intersections just decrease by a dimension each time) and the stabilizer is trivial. Thus ${I_1,\dots, I_a}$ is a minimal base of size $a$ and $B(B,\Delta)=a$ as required.QED Lemma 3. If $a \geq 2$, then $RC(G,\Omega)=a+1$. Proof. Lemma 1 implies that it is sufficient to prove that $RC(B,\Gamma)=a+1$. Since $B(B,\Delta)=a$ we know that $B(B,\Gamma)=a$ and so $RC(B,\Gamma)\leq a+1$. Thus, to show that $RC(B,\Gamma)=a+1$ we need to find $I=(I_1,\dots, I_{a+1})$ and $J=(I_1,\dots, I_a, J_{a+1})$ such that $I$ and $J$ are $a$-equivalent but not $(a+1)$-equivalent. To do this take $I_1,\dots, I_a$ as above. Take $I_{a+1}$ to be the hyperplane whose vectors contain an even number of $1$’s; let $J_{a+1}$ be the other coset of this hyperplane, so $J_{a+1}$ is the affine hyperplane whose vectors contain an odd number of $1$’s. The intersection of $I_1,\dots, I_a$ is trival. Since $I_{a+1}\neq J_{a+1}$ it is therefore clear that $I$ is not $(a+1)$-equivalent to $J$. On the other hand, for $i=1,\dots, a$, the intersection of $I_1,\dots, I_{i-1}, I_{i+1},\dots, I_a$ is $\langle e_i\rangle$. But note that $I_{a+1}+e_i=J_{i+1}$ (since $e_i$ has an odd number of 1’s). Thus $I$ is $a$-equivalent to $J$. We are done. QED]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Congratulations to Margaret Stanier</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/margaret-stanier-phd" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Congratulations to Margaret Stanier" /><published>2022-09-21T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2022-09-21T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/margaret-stanier-phd</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/margaret-stanier-phd"><![CDATA[<script type="text/x-mathjax-config">
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<p>Congratulations to Margaret Stanier who has successfully defended her PhD thesis entitled <em>Farey maps, spectra and integer continued fractions</em>. I was a second supervisor for Margaret; my colleague, Ian Short was the Director of Studies for Margaret’s research.</p>

<p>Margaret’s research has resulted in two papers, both connected closely to the <em>Farey map</em>, a beautiful mathematical object with connections to many areas of mathematics. The papers are:</p>

<p>Stanier, M. <em>Regular coverings and parallel products of Farey maps</em>, Acta Math. Univ. Comen., New Ser. 91, No. 1, 1-18 (2022).</p>

<p>Short, I. and Stanier, M. <em>Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of integer continued fractions</em>, Proc. Am. Math. Soc. 150, No. 2, 617-631 (2022).</p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><category term="supervision" /><category term="research" /><summary type="html"><![CDATA[Congratulations to Margaret Stanier who has successfully defended her PhD thesis entitled Farey maps, spectra and integer continued fractions. I was a second supervisor for Margaret; my colleague, Ian Short was the Director of Studies for Margaret’s research. Margaret’s research has resulted in two papers, both connected closely to the Farey map, a beautiful mathematical object with connections to many areas of mathematics. The papers are: Stanier, M. Regular coverings and parallel products of Farey maps, Acta Math. Univ. Comen., New Ser. 91, No. 1, 1-18 (2022). Short, I. and Stanier, M. Necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of integer continued fractions, Proc. Am. Math. Soc. 150, No. 2, 617-631 (2022).]]></summary></entry><entry><title type="html">Refugees are welcome!</title><link href="https://nickpgill.github.io/refugees-are-welcome" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Refugees are welcome!" /><published>2021-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</published><updated>2021-09-30T00:00:00+00:00</updated><id>https://nickpgill.github.io/refugees-are-welcome</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://nickpgill.github.io/refugees-are-welcome"><![CDATA[<p>This post is about an interview I didn’t listen to and a book I didn’t read. Well, sort of. Really it’s about me wanting to say loud and clear that I want my country to do the right thing and welcome asylum seekers into our country to make their new home.</p>

<p>So, to the interview: it was the TODAY programme last week some time. The host was welcoming Alexander Downer to the programme to talk about Australia’s policy on migrants and refugees. I know that name, Alexander Downer, well: he was a minister in the Howard government when I was growing up in Australia in the late 90’s. It’s not a happy memory – I turned the radio off.</p>

<p>I didn’t need to hear Alexander Downer explaining his involvement in the immigration debate because I remember it well. The Howard government, Downer included, used immigration as an election tactic: they whipped up fear about people arriving on boats and they demonstrated their tough-guy credentials by refusing to let people land. This led, ultimately, to subsequent Australian Governments setting up detention centres (read: concentration camps) on nearby islands, most notably, most infamously, on Manus Island and on Nauru.</p>

<p>Politically this policy was brilliant. The Howard government romped to election victory after election victory. Howard (and Downer) were at the helm of government in Australia for a decade and the country became a different place because of it – being “tough on migrants” has become the norm across the Australian political spectrum. No wonder this policy is being looked at admiringly by our current Tory masters.</p>

<p>Ethically, though, this policy was appalling. In human terms it was devastating. People who had hoped to seek asylum in the richest country in the region instead spent years in appalling conditions in detention. Self-harm and suicide occurred in these centres at <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/may/18/self-harm-suicide-and-assaults-brutality-on-manus-revealed">incredible levels</a>, sexual abuse <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/aug/10/the-nauru-files-2000-leaked-reports-reveal-scale-of-abuse-of-children-in-australian-offshore-detention">likewise</a>. Perhaps most appalling of all, many of the people suffering these brutalities were <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-45327058">children</a>. The policy continues despite <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/16/australia-8-years-abusive-offshore-asylum-processing">fierce criticism</a>.</p>

<p>THIS is the future that Priti Patel evisions for the UK. It is a future where the UK ducks its obligations under international law; it is a future where innocent people who need our help are, instead, subjected to detention and abuse. It is a future that, in some ways, <a href="https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/immigration-removal-detention-centres/">has already arrived</a>. It is not the future that I want for my country.</p>

<p>I am writing this because it is easy to listen to radio interviews with (apparently) reasonable people and to be taken in by their sober tone, their claims of “the reality of the world today”, their talk of “difficult decisions”. It seems important to me to state very clearly that “I disagree”. In fact these decisions are not so difficult at all – we are a wealthy country and we have more than enough resources to help the people who need it. The only decision we need to make is to commit to honouring our obligations under international law and to providing the help and assistance that people need to get themselves on their feet. After this, we can feel certain that the contribution they make to our country will be a benefit to us all – not that this is the reason for welcoming them in their hour of need, it is just an added bonus.</p>

<p>Let me emphasise one point: I mentioned international law just now and it pertains directly here because Australia has been criticised by the UNHCR on a number of occasions for violating their legal obligations in international law. Australia’s response has been to <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/5ef99e0a4.pdf">repeatedly double-down</a>. It is despicable that such a law-breaking regime should be considered a valid model for our own government to emulate – despicable, but hardly surprising given the people in charge in the UK right now. It is perhaps more of an aberration, though, that the BBC considers this a legitimate question to debate, to the point that they would invite an Australian politician to extol the virtues of law-breaking on the BBC’s flagship political programme. I would argue that the only platform Downer should be given to discuss Australian immigration policy is in the dock at The Hague.</p>

<p>And so to the book I haven’t read: It is called “No friend but the mountains” and was written by Behrouz Boochani. Boochani was illegally detained on Manus Island for a number of years; the book was written during this time on his mobile phone, using his thumb, text by text, and sent out via Whatsapp. The book describes this ordeal. It is on my desk as I write; I expect it to be a difficult read.</p>

<p>One line from the foreword has struck me: the writer Richard Flanagan discusses the politics of immigration in Australia and speaks of “policies in which both our major parties have publicly competed in cruelty”. This line sums it up beautifully (and awfully ) – this has indeed been the story in Australia for the last 25 years. We need to make damn sure that it isn’t the story in the UK for the next 25.</p>]]></content><author><name>nickgill</name></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[This post is about an interview I didn’t listen to and a book I didn’t read. Well, sort of. Really it’s about me wanting to say loud and clear that I want my country to do the right thing and welcome asylum seekers into our country to make their new home. So, to the interview: it was the TODAY programme last week some time. The host was welcoming Alexander Downer to the programme to talk about Australia’s policy on migrants and refugees. I know that name, Alexander Downer, well: he was a minister in the Howard government when I was growing up in Australia in the late 90’s. It’s not a happy memory – I turned the radio off. I didn’t need to hear Alexander Downer explaining his involvement in the immigration debate because I remember it well. The Howard government, Downer included, used immigration as an election tactic: they whipped up fear about people arriving on boats and they demonstrated their tough-guy credentials by refusing to let people land. This led, ultimately, to subsequent Australian Governments setting up detention centres (read: concentration camps) on nearby islands, most notably, most infamously, on Manus Island and on Nauru. Politically this policy was brilliant. The Howard government romped to election victory after election victory. Howard (and Downer) were at the helm of government in Australia for a decade and the country became a different place because of it – being “tough on migrants” has become the norm across the Australian political spectrum. No wonder this policy is being looked at admiringly by our current Tory masters. Ethically, though, this policy was appalling. In human terms it was devastating. People who had hoped to seek asylum in the richest country in the region instead spent years in appalling conditions in detention. Self-harm and suicide occurred in these centres at incredible levels, sexual abuse likewise. Perhaps most appalling of all, many of the people suffering these brutalities were children. The policy continues despite fierce criticism. THIS is the future that Priti Patel evisions for the UK. It is a future where the UK ducks its obligations under international law; it is a future where innocent people who need our help are, instead, subjected to detention and abuse. It is a future that, in some ways, has already arrived. It is not the future that I want for my country. I am writing this because it is easy to listen to radio interviews with (apparently) reasonable people and to be taken in by their sober tone, their claims of “the reality of the world today”, their talk of “difficult decisions”. It seems important to me to state very clearly that “I disagree”. In fact these decisions are not so difficult at all – we are a wealthy country and we have more than enough resources to help the people who need it. The only decision we need to make is to commit to honouring our obligations under international law and to providing the help and assistance that people need to get themselves on their feet. After this, we can feel certain that the contribution they make to our country will be a benefit to us all – not that this is the reason for welcoming them in their hour of need, it is just an added bonus. Let me emphasise one point: I mentioned international law just now and it pertains directly here because Australia has been criticised by the UNHCR on a number of occasions for violating their legal obligations in international law. Australia’s response has been to repeatedly double-down. It is despicable that such a law-breaking regime should be considered a valid model for our own government to emulate – despicable, but hardly surprising given the people in charge in the UK right now. It is perhaps more of an aberration, though, that the BBC considers this a legitimate question to debate, to the point that they would invite an Australian politician to extol the virtues of law-breaking on the BBC’s flagship political programme. I would argue that the only platform Downer should be given to discuss Australian immigration policy is in the dock at The Hague. And so to the book I haven’t read: It is called “No friend but the mountains” and was written by Behrouz Boochani. Boochani was illegally detained on Manus Island for a number of years; the book was written during this time on his mobile phone, using his thumb, text by text, and sent out via Whatsapp. The book describes this ordeal. It is on my desk as I write; I expect it to be a difficult read. One line from the foreword has struck me: the writer Richard Flanagan discusses the politics of immigration in Australia and speaks of “policies in which both our major parties have publicly competed in cruelty”. This line sums it up beautifully (and awfully ) – this has indeed been the story in Australia for the last 25 years. We need to make damn sure that it isn’t the story in the UK for the next 25.]]></summary></entry></feed>