[#59445] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9335][Open] dynamic rescue regression in Ruby 2.1 — "fdr (Daniel Farina)" <daniel@...>
[#59462] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9342][Open] [PATCH] SizedQueue#clear does not notify waiting threads in Ruby 1.9.3 — "jsc (Justin Collins)" <redmine@...>
[#59466] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9343][Open] [PATCH] SizedQueue#max= wakes up waiters properly — "normalperson (Eric Wong)" <normalperson@...>
Issue #9343 has been updated by Eric Wong.
[#59498] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9352][Open] [BUG] rb_sys_fail_str(connect(2) for [fe80::1%lo0]:3000) - errno == 0 — "kain (Claudio Poli)" <claudio@...>
[#59516] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9356][Open] TCPSocket.new does not seem to handle INTR — "charliesome (Charlie Somerville)" <charliesome@...>
Issue #9356 has been updated by Shugo Maeda.
[#59517] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9357][Open] TracePoint's c_return traces return from call to 'trace' — "andhapp (Anuj Dutta)" <anuj@...>
[#59538] [ruby-trunk - Feature #9362][Assigned] Minimize cache misshit to gain optimal speed — "shyouhei (Shyouhei Urabe)" <shyouhei@...>
Hi, I noticed a trivial typo in array.c, and it fails building struct.c
Eric Wong <[email protected]> wrote:
Btw, I just pushed a few trivial fixes up (a few more failures below):
OK, last update of the night :o I think everything is good on 32-bit...
Eric Wong <[email protected]> wrote:
Btw, I started working on cachelined-time branch on git://80x24.org/ruby
Eric Wong <[email protected]> wrote:
On 01/06/2014 12:02 PM, Eric Wong wrote:
Urabe Shyouhei <[email protected]> wrote:
Intersting challenge.
On 01/06/2014 04:52 PM, SASADA Koichi wrote:
On 01/06/2014 06:11 PM, Urabe Shyouhei wrote:
(2014/01/06 23:10), Urabe Shyouhei wrote:
On 01/07/2014 07:36 AM, SASADA Koichi wrote:
[#59564] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9365][Open] Sporadic TypeError (wrong argument type Thread (expected VM/thread)) from IO#close (via Net:HTTP) — "ggiesemann (Geoffrey Giesemann)" <geoffwa@...>
Issue #9365 has been updated by Geoffrey Giesemann.
[#59728] Ruby 2.1.0 in Production: known bugs and patches — Aman Gupta <[email protected]>
Last week, we upgraded the github.com rails app to ruby 2.1.0 in production.
Hello Aman,
[#59770] bug report did not propagate to ruby-core — Mean Login <meanlogin@...>
https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/9416
[#59791] About unmarshallable DRb objects life-time — Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <rr.rosas@...>
A while ago I created a proof-of-concept that I intended to use in my
On 15 Jan 2014, at 11:58, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <[email protected]> =
Em 15-01-2014 19:42, Eric Hodel escreveu:
On 16 Jan 2014, at 02:15, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <[email protected]> =
Em 16-01-2014 19:43, Eric Hodel escreveu:
On 17 Jan 2014, at 04:22, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <[email protected]> =
Em 17-01-2014 19:53, Eric Hodel escreveu:
On 18 Jan 2014, at 15:12, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <[email protected]> =
Em 20-01-2014 21:51, Eric Hodel escreveu:
On 21 Jan 2014, at 02:01, Rodrigo Rosenfeld Rosas <[email protected]> =
Em 21-01-2014 19:36, Eric Hodel escreveu:
[#59807] [ruby-trunk - misc #9421] [Open] [PATCH] doc/contributing.rdoc: allow/encourage other git hosts — normalperson@...
Issue #9421 has been reported by Eric Wong.
[#59882] [ruby-trunk - Feature #9428] [Rejected] Inline argument expressions and re-assignment — matz@...
Issue #9428 has been updated by Yukihiro Matsumoto.
On 2014/01/20 11:32, [email protected] wrote:
[#59909] [ruby-trunk - Feature #9425] [PATCH] st: use power-of-two sizes to avoid slow modulo ops — shyouhei@...
Issue #9425 has been updated by Shyouhei Urabe.
[email protected] wrote:
[#60229] [ruby-trunk - Feature #9427] [Feedback] [PATCH] io.c: remove socket check for sendfile — akr@...
Issue #9427 has been updated by Akira Tanaka.
[#60377] Re: [ruby-cvs:51920] nobu:r44775 (trunk): socket.c: suppress warnings — Eric Wong <normalperson@...>
[email protected] wrote:
[ruby-core:60089] [ruby-trunk - Bug #9424] ruby 1.9 & 2.x has insecure SSL/TLS client defaults
Issue #9424 has been updated by Shyouhei Urabe. B Kelly wrote: > Interesting. I feel I must be communicating unclearly. > > I'm not someone who blamed Debian. (It's my preferred Linux distro.) Indeed, the > Debian maintainer who removed lines of code affecting the OpenSSL PRNG first > posted on the OpenSSL mailing list explaining his situation and asked if it was > OK to remove the code. > > As I wrote in an earlier post, I think the details of what transpired in the > Debian/OpenSSL blunder are interesting. > > Particularly, I think the details show it's difficult to point fingers at a specific > person or part of the process in the Debian/OpenSSL situation. Mistakes were made; > and yet the actions taken at each discrete step in the process seemed fairly > reasonable. > > And in that /particular/ sense I recognize the parallels being drawn to the > debate here about hardening the OpenSSL defaults for Ruby. > > My position has simply been that I regard the following scenarios as categorically > distinct: > > 1. "I don't know what these lines of code in OpenSSL do, but Valgrind complains. > Is it OK if I remove them?" > > 2. "SSLv2, TLS compression, and certain specific ciphers are regarded by the > security community as weak or exploitable. Is it reasonable and beneficial to > Ruby users if we exclude them from our defaults?" > > To me, there appears to be a vast distance between #1 and #2. My recent posts on > this thread have been in part an attempt to understand the opposing view by > eliciting responses from those who disagree. > > > Regards, > > Bill Alright, I see you are not blaming Debian people. Thank you. But I see "I don't know what these lines of code in OpenSSL do, but Valgrind complains." is a completely valid reason to fix something. In fact I have just read the patch denbian introduced and still see no problem on it. So I can't draw a line between #1 and #2. They are equally true. And the history tells the patch was wrong; how can you say #2 is OK? Recap. Ruby is not just requested to have a particular patch. Ruby is requested to act as a sanity proxy over OpenSSL to prevent it from going mad. Without any patch you CAN operate Ruby safely already, right? But you say that's not sufficient. You request us to provide Ruby that you CANT fail. Then how can we say it's safe? I see no way but OpenSSL itself to get sane. No one else can be perfect. I believe the person behind Debian's failed patch was far more skillfull than me, perhaps anyone on this thread. That helped nothing. Those patches proposed here SEEMS to provide adequate defaults to OpenSSL and so what? I think that doesn't finish this story. Because no one can say those patches are ultimate solutions. And the request here is for us to provide ultimate solution for users. If not, Ruby provides something already. That's not a good option maybe, but that also applies to the patches here. ---------------------------------------- Bug #9424: ruby 1.9 & 2.x has insecure SSL/TLS client defaults https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/9424#change-44591 * Author: Jeff Hodges * Status: Assigned * Priority: Normal * Assignee: Martin Bosslet * Category: ext/openssl * Target version: current: 2.2.0 * ruby -v: ruby 2.1.0p0 (2013-12-25 revision 44422) [x86_64-darwin12] * Backport: 1.9.3: UNKNOWN, 2.0.0: UNKNOWN, 2.1: UNKNOWN ---------------------------------------- Ruby 1.9, 2.0, and 2.1 use insecure defaults for SSL/TLS client connections. They have inherited or overridden configs that make the OpenSSL-controlled connections insecure. Note: both OpenSSL's and Ruby's defaults in all tested versions are currently insecure. Confirmation of the issues with Ruby's TLS client can be done with the code in [1]. Ruby is using TLS compression by default. This opens Ruby clients to the CRIME attack[2]. Ruby also uses a variety of insecure cipher suites. These cipher suites either use key sizes much smaller than the currently recommended size, making brute forcing a decryption easy, or do not check the veracity of the server's certificate making them susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks[3][4]. Ruby also appears to allow SSLv2 connections by default. It does so by first trying to connect with a SSLv2 client hello with a higher SSL/TLS version inside of it which allows SSLv2 servers to work. SSLv2 was broken in the 1990s and is considered unsafe. These issues expose Ruby users to attacks that have been known for many years, and are trivial to discover. These defaults are often build specific, and are not the same across platforms, but are consistently poor (the code in [1] can evaluate the build). A patch from a core developer on the security@ list is attached. However, the patch does not correct the suspect SSLv2 configuration. It is believed that Ruby 1.8 is also a concern, but, since it was obsoleted, it's not been investigated. A report similar to this was sent to [email protected] four days ago. The Ruby core developers have been unable to patch these problems in a timely manner for it for what I and others believe are concerning reasons. This ticket is being made to allow engineers outside of the small group that are on security@ to protect themselves from these attacks. [1] https://gist.github.com/cscotta/8302049 [2] https://www.howsmyssl.com/s/about.html#tls-compression [3] https://www.howsmyssl.com/s/about.html#insecure-cipher-suites [4] TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - small keys TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - small keys TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - MITM TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - MITM TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - MITM TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA - MITM TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA - small keys TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA - MITM TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA - MITM TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA - MITM ---Files-------------------------------- ruby_ssl.patch (1.08 KB) change_ssl_defaults.diff (1.24 KB) -- http://bugs.ruby-lang.org/