In 2004, one of Australia’s greatest teams toured India. They had come primed to finish the unfinished business from 2001, when Steve Waugh’s equally great outfit (with much overlap in squad composition – Hayden, Gilchrist, Ponting, McGrath, Warne) pushed India all the way but were denied a series win thanks to the Kolkata miracle you already know all about and a less heralded but almost as thrilling decider in Chennai that India clinched in a tense chase.
This time, Australia would not be denied. They stunned India with a convincing win in Bengaluru. Alleged antipathy between the Vidharbha Cricket Association President (and later BCCI chief) Shashank Manohar and Indian captain Sourav Ganguly led to Australia being offered an unusually grassy pitch at Nagpur, a gift they accepted gleefully. With rain denying an India push for victory in Chennai on the last day, Australia had already won the series 2-0 coming into the fourth Test in Mumbai.
That is, it was a dead rubber just like MCG 2025. And just like England in this Ashes, India too were playing for pride in Mumbai. Ponting, having missed the matches Gilchrist captained in his absence, was back too for Mumbai.
India prepared a rank turner, a day 1 viper, for Australia. Unlike today when that is basically the standard Indian Test pitch, rank turners were rare in India at that time. Additionally, unlike Chennai or Delhi, the Mumbai (Wankhede) pitch has always offered a bit more bounce. So conjuring up a rank turner at Mumbai makes for a thoroughly unplayable pitch. Not surprisingly the ICC certified the pitch unfit, in meaningful terms a comparable rating to the one for MCG. Arguably, the 2004 Mumbai pitch was even worse in terms of making spin impossible to face – as evidenced by Michael Clarke’s 6 wicket haul in the third innings of the match.
Now, here is where the story changes. After Australia shot out India for a mere 104 on day 1, Australia made 203 in their own first innings. This was followed by India somehow managing 205 in an innings mostly played on day 3 (when the pitch was worse than on day 1). Laxman and Tendulkar managed half centuries in these difficult conditions while handy 20s from Dravid and Kaif helped India along to a total that gave its spin trio – Kumble, Harbhajan and Kartik – something to defend. And defend they did! Chasing 107, Australia got bowled out for 93.
Why this lengthy prelude about a Test played more than 20 years ago? Because it shows what was obtainable even on similarly difficult pitches back when batsmen were habituated to long format batting. Or, red ball cricket as it is called now. That the teams were together able to put up more runs and bat out more overs, more time, than in MCG 2025 in spite of India having two great spinners and a very good third wheel in these conditions and in spite of Australia boasting McGrath, Gillespie and Kasprowicz in its seam attack (Gillespie got four wickets in the first innings of the match). This, to refute the contention being peddled that yesteryear blocking was actually ineffective compared to today’s swinging out with abandon.
There have been a slew of changes since 2004, not all related to the impact of Twenty20. One under-discussed impact is that of DRS – it has taken the strategy of padding up to the spinner with a huge forward stride out of the batsman’s playbook. When the batsman is forced to play every ball that has a slight chance of veering toward the stumps (to thwart LBW), it does make them more vulnerable than Tendulkar or Dravid may have been in the pre-DRS environment.
But most of the changes accrue due to the impact of T20. And perhaps, it has not been so starkly evident all this time only because we had a ‘residual stock’ of players honed on red ball cricket in a pre-T20 age.
Here’s an exhibit in favour of this argument. In India’s tour of Australia in 2020-21, India faced a steep chase in the final innings of the fourth Test in Sydney. With wickets falling, Hanuma Vihari and R Ashwin shut shop. Between them, they batted out nearly 300 balls (aka 50 overs, or the average Bazball innings length!). Being too worn out to attempt a chase and not wanting to get dismissed and expose the tail, they simply blocked and blocked until they had secured a draw.
What is common between Vihari and Ashwin? They had both honed their skills in an pre-T20 era. Vihari perhaps less so, being born in 1993, but he too would have been 15 by the time the first edition of the IPL had been played. That is, players weren’t yet being coached primarily to excel in the T20 format. Other key batsmen for India in the 2020-21 series include Pujara and Rahane who too had been groomed in red ball cricket and for a future that did not include T20. This is also borne out by India’s struggles with the gradual departures of such batsmen from the team. Gambhir filling up the batting line up with batting/bowling all rounders instead of specialist batsmen points to the paucity of existing international batsmen who fit the needs of Test cricket and the related need to look at Ranji talents (something that selectors everywhere have become curiously reluctant to do, with respect to their respective domestic circuits).
It does appear that the more batsmen of a pre-T20 age leave the game, the more Test batting struggles…to resemble itself. You may point to Rishabh Pant who contributed vitally to the 2020-21 win but there have always been maverick batsmen in the long game. India had K Srikkanth before even ODIs became the primary format. Sehwag in the 00s. Tendulkar himself could (and often did in the 90s) step on the gas and improvise.
But shutting shop, seen by the McCullum-Stokes firm as fundamentally a bad idea, has been an indispensable dimension of Test batting and indeed of Test cricket. As I have been absorbed in symphony-world for most of this year, let me draw an analogy here. If a Test match is a symphony (and its four innings format does resemble the four movement spread of a symphony), its shut shop phase is the slow movement, the Adagio/Andante/Largo. The shut shop phase is when nothing appears, in the eyes of the unversed, to be happening and yet a lot is happening. The more batsmen stonewall, the more they delay (and eventually deny) their opponents’push for victory. And in the context of a multi-match series, the one innings where one team’s attempt to bowl out the other was thwarted, not through swashbuckling ball striking but through obdurate defence, can make all the difference. As it did in the India-Australia 2020-21 series. By drawing in the Sydney Test, India ensured the match score would remain 1-1 going into the decider. Thus, even a draw (again) at Brisbane would allow them to retain the Border-Gavaskar trophy. Whereas Australia had no choice but to win to wrest back the trophy. Had India lost in Sydney, Australia could conversely pocket a series win with just a draw and even a loss would have kept honours even. Trophy retained but a second series win for India in Australia denied. This was all the significance built into Vihari and Ashwin’s last day resistance in Sydney.
This is but one of many, many examples of stonewalling in the annals of Test cricket (on similar but more consequential lines, Laxman-Dravid first shut shop in Kolkata 2001 and then, as they wore down the storied Aussie bowling attack with their indomitable resistance, began to break gradually into a gallop), but this is one of the more recent of the ones that have been consequential. Not to romanticize stonewalling – in an earlier time, it also often made for boring cricket when batsmen eschewed taking the initiative either because they weren’t in good nick or because they were simply risk-averse.
For a while, for about a decade or so, Twenty20 actually revitalized the Test format by bringing in welcome aggression and making teams less intent on seeking the safety of a draw and becominh more willing to attempt thrilling chases they would have bailed out of in the past. This was when the swashbucklers shared the stage with the blockers. And when some batsmen still remained who had all the gears. They are still not all gone. Heaven knows Joe Root has it in him if only the Bazball noise wouldn’t muddle his thinking as much as it seems to have. Stokes has shown he can crawl all day in first gear.
But by and by, it does appear that what a pitch like this year’s MCG pitch asks of the batsmen is something they may be simply no longer be equipped to handle, at least in the old sense associated with Test cricket. They handle it by going all out, by running into the danger, so to speak, because they are not trained to bat out all day and even if they are, are completely out of practice.
You can hardly blame them. White ball cricket dominates the game. T20 offers a lucrative plan-B to batsmen for when they are not chosen to play for the international team. A far more lucrative plan-B than playing domestic cricket. It is no surprise that batsmen focus their efforts on mastering the shorter formats. Tests are still attractive to advertisers because they are spread out over a maximum of 5 days and, in some cases like Australia, coincide with the holiday season in that nation.
But at MCG, even the prospect of filling up 90,000 seats on days 3 and 4 was thwarted by both teams between them failing to take the match beyond the 2nd day.
When all four innings are finished within two days, is it a Test match or just two ODI matches stuck together on back to back days? Hard to tell, especially when the batting isn’t particularly different. Mine isn’t really an outlier view. Greg Chappell exhorted batsmen to fight to honour the format that had made them who they are (current players would probably disagree about Test cricket making them who they are). Geoff Lemon wrote a version of this too. Barney Ronay in his appearance on The Grade Cricketer podcast came closest to articulating what’s gnawing at me – that this appears to herald the withering away of what is like an art form.
And that’s the rub. And it’s not like, unlike Ronay, I have to try very hard to like T20. I do watch T20 internationals, mostly only during World Cups (but that’s because of the sheer clutter of T20is and not because I find the format distasteful). But it offers a completely different product from Test cricket and it cannot match the capacity of Test cricket to offer multiple swings in momentum, twists in the tale in other words, simply because it doesn’t last long enough to.
In a rapidly commoditizing world, Test cricket has offered a window into an alternative universe where things take their time and where, upon your being willing to delay gratification, you may obtain untold delights not found in other forms of cricket and even in many sports generally. Will it continue to do so, though?
PS: An argument may be made by comparing the amount of runs scored in the MCG 2025 Test (572) with the Mumbai 2024 one (605) and the number of days (less than 2 full days for MCG v/s 2.5 for Mumbai) to say they are not materially different. To that, I would say that firstly 33 runs is a lot in such conditions. It’s almost equal to the first innings lead of 42 earned by Australia in MCG. Secondly, with spinners dominating in Mumbai, they bowled many more overs in much less time. So a lot more cricket was played in only nearly two sessions more of cricket – 202 overs v/s 141 overs. Again, 60 overs – which is roughly equal to the number of overs Eng faced in both innings put together in MCG!