Conflicts by Ariel Rusila

A Pause in the Israeli Fronts

December 7, 2025

Israel’s victorious seven-front war is now in a lull in December 2025. As for Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, the Middle East is in a state of hiatus, a new war on these fronts could escalate at any time in the next couple of months. Iran’s proxy armies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the arming Palestinian territories are gathering their forces but, in my opinion, are not capable of a significant, larger-scale attack on Israel.

On the first civil front – the information war – Israel is still losing. Hamas has succeeded in its marketing campaign, among other things by spreading massive disinformation, in gaining support for its cause in the West, and since its massive terrorist attack on 7/10/2023, anti-Semitic attacks have multiplied worldwide and especially in the West. The situation may now be improving as the disinformation transmitted by Hamas and even uncritically shared by Western countries, as well as the misinformation propagated by the UN and other organizations about starvation and genocide, is revealed. The participation of Muslim countries in the peace plan, which has also been discussed at the UN, paves the way for the search for peaceful solutions.

The second civilian front, or home front, in Israel seems to be returning to the pre-war era with the peace plan, with the stance on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the reform of the judiciary and the extension of conscription to members of religious extremist groups as sticking points.

Gaza

On October 9, 2025, US President Donald Trump’s so-called 20-point peace plan for Gaza, which was later approved by the UN Security Council, was also signed. The first phase of the plan included, among other things, the handover of hostages taken by Hamas to Israel, the release of Palestinians sentenced or detained by Israel, a ceasefire, increased humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army (IDF) to the so-called Yellow Line within 72 hours. Now, almost two months after the agreement, the first phase is still underway, with Hamas delaying, in particular, the handover of the bodies of the dead hostages. Hamas has used the time to execute and eliminate its local opponents in Gaza and to attack Israel across the Yellow Line. The latest example of the “civil war” in Gaza is the leader of the anti-Hamas militia, Yasser Abu Shabab, who led the “people’s forces” allied with Israel against Hamas. He was seriously wounded, evacuated to Soroka Hospital in Israel, and died of his injuries there.

All this so that the second phase of the peace plan – including, among other things, the disarmament of Hamas – could not begin.

There are conflicting reports about Hamas’s grip on Gaza and its future plans as the first phase of the ceasefire draws to a close. In practice, Gaza is divided: The eastern sector, known as the “Green Zone,” lies east of the Yellow Line and is under full IDF control. This Green Zone is home to five Palestinian militia groups that oppose Hamas and provide an internal counterweight to Hamas’s influence in the area. The western area, the “Red Zone,” is under Hamas control, extending west of the Yellow Line. At its widest point, this Hamas-controlled strip is about 5 km wide. Between the Philadelphia Corridor on the Egyptian border and the Red Zone, Israel maintains a 1.7 km wide corridor that it controls. This strip is intended to prevent smuggling and to prevent the flow of weapons and supplies into Hamas-controlled territory.

The most recent body released from Gaza has been identified as Sudthisak Rinthalak, a native of northern Thailand who had been working in Israel as a farm laborer since 2017. On October 7, a total of 39 Thai citizens were murdered and 31 were taken prisoner. Israeli police officer Ran Givili, who is said to have eliminated 14 terrorists before he was killed and his body was taken to Gaza, remains hostage in Gaza.

Lebanon

The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, which was signed a year ago, is breaking down. Lebanese sources claim (whether it was a deliberate leak or not) that the decision to attack Lebanon has already been made, and was “leaked” by high-ranking Americans.

The Israel Defense Forces have begun construction of a new concrete wall on the northern border at the tip of Jal al-Deir – opposite the village of Maroun al-Ras. The new fence is reportedly located about two kilometers inside Lebanese territory. Israel is pressuring the Lebanese army to search for Hezbollah weapons in private homes in the south after the group repositioned itself (after finding extensive rocket launchers in people’s attics and bedrooms). Lebanon is slowing down, fearing unrest and an expansion of the operation that could trigger a new conflict.

According to a Lebanese source, the United States gave Lebanon a month (actually until the end of the year) to resolve the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament, the United States has begun evacuating embassy personnel, and Israel is launching targeted strikes and is awaiting Hezbollah’s response. Syrian regime leader Julian Assange has reduced surveillance of border crossings with Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah to increase arms smuggling.

Direct talks between Israeli and Lebanese civil authorities were held on December 4, 2025, in Naqoura, on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanese border, under the leadership of US Ambassador Morgan Ortagus. Israel was represented in Naqoura by Uri Resnick, a senior official in the National Security Council, and Lebanon by Simon Karam, a Maronite Christian who previously served as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations. Representatives from the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and the United Nations also attended the meeting. The meeting was rare in that it was the first direct meeting between Israeli and Lebanese civilian officials since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.

The talks focused not only on the implementation of the 2024 ceasefire agreement, but also on issues such as the maritime border, gas exploration, the return of residents to border communities and even possible cooperation in agriculture. The entire process is underpinned by the US demand for Hezbollah to disarm by December 31.

Iran

The Institute for National Security Studies claimed that Iran has sent Hezbollah around $1 billion in the past four months through smuggling routes in northern Iraq, Syria and Turkey, despite an unprecedented domestic water crisis, ongoing power outages and severe air pollution. Intelligence sources reveal that Iran is rapidly arming Palestinian factions in Judea and Samaria through Hezbollah and Syrian smuggling networks. The weapons include missiles, explosive drones, anti-tank guided missiles (RPGs). According to reports, Syrian authorities have relaxed controls on the Lebanese border, allowing Hezbollah to rearm with more than 4,000 rockets and 250 drones. This escalation underscores Tehran’s broader regional strategy to entrench proxies beyond Israel’s borders.

In November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a new resolution demanding access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and information on Iran’s uranium stockpiles at facilities targeted by the United States and Israel. Iran has given no indication of what happened to these stockpiles. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated publicly that the agency was ready to continue inspections and re-engage with Iran, but so far the Iranians are not interested in any kind of cooperation.

Several Israeli news sources have reported, citing unnamed Israeli security officials, that a new “preventive measure” against the Iranian regime’s ballistic missile program is considered “imminent.” Officials are concerned that the program is rapidly recovering and expanding, and assessments suggest that Israel may act again to disrupt its growing capabilities.

Iran’s proxy armies

Iran has reportedly transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah over the past year through a network of companies based in Dubai. Political tensions between Iran and Lebanon have risen after remarks by a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, who claimed that Hezbollah’s existence was more important to Lebanon than bread and water. Iran and the Houthis condemned the Israeli military’s operation to arrest terror suspects in Beit Jinn, southern Syria. Iran’s foreign ministry praised the “resistance” of young Syrians in the face of “Israeli aggression.”

“Expert sources in Yemen” claimed that there are differences of opinion among the Houthis over the movement’s continued relations with Iran. The report states that the Houthi movement is in a phase of reorganization, with two competing approaches to the extent of relations with Iran and the level of independence that the Houthis should maintain in the next phase: the “independence stream,” which includes young field commanders and influential figures who believe the movement has reached a position where it can make its own military decisions without turning to a de-empowered Iran; and the “full-connection stream,” which includes Houthi ideological and cultural leaders who see Iran as a strategic guarantee of the Houthis’ existence and argue that any attempt to break away from it would expose the Houthis to a regional and international confrontation that they cannot tolerate.

Arab media claims that the reorganization of the Houthi movement is a competition between two different approaches to the future of relations with Iran. A senior official in a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia said they were working with the Houthis to upgrade their military capabilities and threatened to prepare an updated list of targets that would “harm the usurping community [Israel]” if a new campaign broke out. The US special envoy for Syria and Lebanon reportedly warned the Iraqi prime minister that Israel would attack Iraq if the militias helped Hezbollah.

Iraq’s pro-Iran Nujaba movement claimed that the Iraqi “resistance movement” was working with the Houthis in Yemen to “upgrade their weapons and military technology” in preparation for future operations. In an interview with Iran’s Tasnim news agency, al-Yasser said that the Houthis’ advanced missile technology, precision operations, and GPS technologies opened up space for broader cooperation that the militia could use to develop its own capabilities.

According to Kurdish sources, the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Assets has frozen all movable, immovable and financial assets of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and the Yemeni Ansarullah movement (Huthi), citing their “participation in a terrorist attack”.

The situation in Syria is volatile. Israel is bracing for the possibility that extremist groups such as ISIS and others could take control of Syria if al-Sharaa is assassinated. This reflects growing concerns that the internal collapse in Syria could open the door for jihadist organizations to expand their influence on Israel’s northern front. On the other hand, the current Syrian regime has – unofficially – indicated that there is no obstacle to the establishment of an American base in the Damascus area to ensure stability in southern Syria.

The recent Israeli ground attack in the Beit Jinn area of Syria has angered Syrians, who have pressured their government to retaliate. Israeli officials said the operation targeted Hezbollah and Hamas members operating in Syria who were planning imminent attacks against Israel. The village of Beit Jinn has served as a terrorist base.

Famine at the forefront of information warfare

“They couldn’t find a famine – so they made one” (COGAT)

From the very beginning of the war, Hamas has been marketing the Israeli-caused famine in Gaza. UN agencies and the media “bought” these stories for political reasons.

Richard Goldberger, a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, bluntly states:

“The IPC quietly changed its guidelines only for Gaza, hoping that no one would notice before an unfounded famine declaration could be made. This is not just a potential global fraud; it is a serious undermining of the important guidelines and measurement standards that aid agencies follow in areas in need around the world.”

The recent resignation of the BBC management after an internal report showed that much of the BBC’s reporting on Gaza was deeply flawed and contained manipulated material, quotes from terrorists and terrorist sympathizers posing as impartial observers, and outright lies. (Previously, the BBC’s senior management resigned due to systematic bias regarding Gaza and the editing of Trump’s speech).Yle, which operates in Finland, has not yet revised its policy, let alone dismissed it.

With the help of the information war, Hamas managed to mislead the UN and other organizations and the media, as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which justified the arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant on the grounds that starvation was used as a tool of warfare and a crime against humanity.

Home Front

“What is needed is bold, determined and transformative leadership. Leadership that both recognizes failures and dares to drive change. Not leadership that intimidates and suppresses, but leadership that uplifts – leadership that inspires. Not leadership that evades, but one that looks the truth in the eye and sets a new direction.” (IDF Commander Eyal Zamir)

According to reports, Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided in the coming weeks to push through controversial legislation that would formalize draft exemptions for Israel’s ultra-Orthodox minority. Logically, this is the only way to prevent early elections (which he has reportedly been considering in recent weeks) now, and the only way to hold on to his ultra-Orthodox partners after the next election.

Netanyahu may face opposition within his own ruling Likud party, with up to five coalition lawmakers reportedly opposing the bill, drafted by Netanyahu ally Boaz Bismuth. Bismuth replaced Yuli Edelstein as chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

The draft law for the ultra-Orthodox has been a long-standing challenge. For the prime minister, it pits his commitment to his ultra-Orthodox allies in protecting and maintaining the religious studies of ultra-Orthodox men against the nation’s desire for a more even burden-sharing. The problem has been exacerbated by the disproportionate sacrifices made by reservists over the past two years.

The scandal pits coalition politicians against the judiciary, in parallel with a controversial judicial reform that was widely discussed in the months leading up to October 7 and has been a source of intense public discord in Israel. A good background on this topic is in BICOM’s analysis The ultra-Orthodox and the future of the People’s Army .

In addition to the ultra-Orthodox conscription law, Israeli domestic politics is characterized by an ongoing dispute between the government and the Supreme Court (judicial reform) and, now, a new issue, the pardon application submitted by Benjamin Netanyahu to President Isaac Herzog. The president is currently considering the conditions under which the pardon could be granted in order to end the corruption and other trials that have been going on against Netanyahu for years and to remove the threat of punishment against him.

Epilogue

Events in the Middle East have a much greater significance than the regional conflict, both indirectly through the media and directly through the parties to the conflict. For example, the disarmament of Hamas is not necessarily limited to Gaza. On November 19, 2025, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced the end of a complex counter-terrorism operation carried out in cooperation with Mossad and European law enforcement agencies. The operation led to the dismantling of a Hamas network preparing terrorist attacks in Europe. According to the announcement, arrests were made in Germany, Austria and Great Britain, and large weapons caches were found in Austria and possibly elsewhere. The terrorists coordinated their activities with Hamas operatives in Turkey and Qatar.

In summary, I estimate that the ceasefire in Gaza will end at the turn of the year when Hamas refuses to lay down its weapons and when the international forces under the peace plan do not disarm, this will remain the responsibility of the IDF. In Lebanon, the ceasefire with Hezbollah could end in the same way after the turn of the year, although there are hopes that US pressure will finally get the Lebanese government to act as planned in the ceasefire agreement; according to some estimates, there is a growing shift in Lebanese thinking – more and more people now see that dismantling Hezbollah serves the interests of Israel, Lebanon and the whole world. In Iran, a repeat of the 12-day war is, in my opinion, very likely at any time, as Iran continues its nuclear and missile programs. In Syria, Israel is trying to get the al-Sharaa regime to commit to a demilitarized southern Syria.

Sources e.g: BICOM, Science , Times of Israel , BICOM , The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, , SoMe

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This is the English version of an article (in Finnish) that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi .

Comments Off on A Pause in the Israeli Fronts | Conflicts | Tagged: Gaza, Gaza war 23/24/25, Hamas, Iran, Israel, politics | Permalink
Posted by Ariel Rusila

Gaza War Ended – Conflict Still Unresolved

October 14, 2025

Simhat Torah Day, October 13, 2025, will remain indelible in Middle Eastern history: The Gaza War is over, and both Israelis and Palestinians have celebrated the release of hostages and their ransoms. President Trump – the undisputed hero of the day – gave a long speech in the Knesset to thunderous applause and live coverage by international news agencies, then headed straight to Egypt for his 20-point peace plan in Sharm el-Sheikh in the presence of more than 20 heads of state.

The Swords of Iron War is over. Israel has all its hostages back and defeated Hamas as a military force. As a side effect, Israel won on six other fronts, destroying Iran’s “Ring of Fire” against Israel.

On the eighth front – the information war – Israel is still losing. The situation is now improving as the disinformation conveyed by Hamas and even uncritically shared by Western countries, as well as the misinformation about starvation and genocide propagated by the UN and other organizations, is being exposed.

In the midst of joy, we must remember the multifaceted conflict between Israel and the so-called Palestine and the broader context of the Middle East, as well as the time frame associated with resolving these. In addition to the implementation of Phase 2 of the Gaza peace plan and the reconstruction of Gaza, the normalization of Israel’s relations with the wider Arab and Muslim world and the vision of a future Palestinian state are also on the agenda for the future. The implementation of these entities may take decades.

The beginning of the peace process

With the remaining hostages presumably released within a day, intensive negotiations will continue to implement the next stages of President Trump’s 20-point peace plan. Hamas has only agreed to a ceasefire and the release of hostages, the release of about 2,000 detained or convicted Palestinians paid as ransom, and the return of a Palestinian who died in custody.

It is unclear if Hamas will hand over the remains of its all dead hostages or whether it considers the rest as bargaining chips in coming negatiations.

The situation in Gaza is, in my opinion, somewhat chaotic for the next few days and perhaps weeks. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announces that Israel will destroy the rest of Hamas’s weapons depots and workshops and destroy the rest of the tunnel network. Of the estimated 700 km long “Gaza Metro”, a couple of hundred km are still to be destroyed, mainly in the Gaza City area. This could not be done before because the core Hamas forces and their hostages were in the tunnels.

During the weekend before the liberation, several Palestinian media sources reported on violence between Palestinians, as some 7,000 Hamas members quickly regained control of the areas ceded by the Israeli Defense Forces and clashed with rival clans. For example, on Sunday 12.10.25 Hamas killed 52 members of the Dagmoush clan, losing 12 fighters themselves; on the same day, in clashes between the clans, among others, Palestinian influencer Saleh al-Jafaravi, known as Mr FAFO, was killed. The situation further complicates the next phase of the agreement, which is intended to include the disarmament of Hamas.

Continuing the peace process

“I can say that a two-state solution is in Israel’s strategic interest. And I know that the path is no less important than the goal.” (Yair Golan)

The central themes of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit are the establishment of a Hamas-free administrative body in Gaza, the formation of a multinational security force, and the disarmament of Hamas. In all of this, a central role – in leadership – will be played by Arab and Muslim countries, who will also bear the main responsibility for financing the reconstruction of Gaza.

As the situation calms down and the international administration assumes a leadership role in Gaza, the implementation of the future-oriented part of the peace process should begin, which in my opinion should include the Palestinians living in the West Bank.

One central issue not only for Gaza but also for the broader Palestinian entity is the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza. In Trump’s 2020 peace plan, this was conditional on several reforms, and in the new 20-year plan, Article 19 seems to be in line with this. The reforms include provisions on the rule of law, economic reform, an end to incitement and changes to school textbooks, and a weapons monopoly for the PA’s civilian law enforcement agencies.

The plan recognizes Palestinian “aspirations” but does not guarantee a state as an outcome. Palestinian self-determination is therefore conditional on attention to a reformed PA.

In my opinion, the time for recognizing a Palestinian state is when the current quasi-state of Palestine meets the criteria for a state according to the Montevideo Agreement (permanent population, delimited territory, government and the ability to enter into relations with other states). In this case, the two-state solution widely supported by the international community could be realized.

Of course, the outcome of the negotiation and development process may be some other solution than a unified Palestinian state. In a two-entity solution, Israel could continue as a traditional state, but the Palestinian entity could be formed, for example, on the basis of an emirate model or be a self-governing territory or part of a federation or confederation.

In my opinion, a good basis would be if the final phase of the peace process that followed the Oslo Accords (1993-1995), which led to the impasse at Camp David (2000), were continued until an actual peace agreement through direct or mediated negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian representatives should not be representatives of terrorist organizations – such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc. If you remember from recent history, there was no negotiation with ISIS/Daesh or Al-Qaeda, they were destroyed.

In order to secure a permanent peaceful coexistence in the territory of the desired Palestinian state, I believe that a process of deradicalization of the population should be implemented in the same way as was done in Germany and Japan after IIMS.

After the fighting ended, the armed factor that contributed to Hamas’s departure from Gaza is that most of Gaza is a ruined and uninhabitable demolition site, meaning that Gazans no longer have homes to return to. Making Gaza habitable requires clearance work, in which booby traps and explosives in the ruins are dismantled. This clearance work is expected to take at least a year and even longer if the bodies are searched for under the rubble. More time and difficulty will come if the contaminated soil is replaced, for example to remove asbestos, a popular building material in Gaza. However, this will probably be necessary for both the safety of the builders and the health of future residents.

After the clearance work, new construction can begin, and once financing is arranged, it is estimated to last at least 10-15 years.

The Israeli religious far-right’s dream of a new settlement in Gaza, the return of Gazans to their homes, and the tourist destinations of Trump’s Riviera are not realistic for a decade or so. Instead, humanitarian aid – regardless of different visions of the future – was needed earlier and is now even more urgent.

Humanitarian city

“The enemy of a good plan is the dream of a perfect plan.” (Carl von Clausewitz)

Given the time required to clear and rebuild the Gaza “demolition site,” the Israeli government and IDF’s plan to establish a “humanitarian city” in Gaza, which I previously presented on July 14, 2025 in my article “A Humanitarian City in Gaza?,” becomes even more timely.

According to the Israeli government, the “humanitarian city” will initially house 600,000 Palestinians who currently live in tents in the overcrowded al-Mawas area on the southern coast of Gaza. Ultimately, however, the entire population of the area, over two million people, is planned to be relocated there. According to Israeli media, construction could take more than a year and cost up to 15 billion shekels ($4.5 billion). According to unnamed military officials, the project “would take three to five months from the start of construction until the humanitarian city is operational.” Preliminary plans describe the camps as “large” and “voluntary” places where the Gazan population could “temporarily reside, deradicalize, re-adapt and prepare for relocation if they so wish.” According to opponents of the plan, the “humanitarian city” would violate international law because civilians would be prevented from returning to their homes in the north, which would be a form of ethnic cleansing.

Credit: MEE, public domain

Epilogue

“Peace is nothing but the continuation of war by other means” (Ariel Rusila, paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz)

An interesting detail is that although Hamas is reportedly not attending the Gaza peace signing ceremony, the Iranian president has been invited to attend an event in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on Monday. This highlights the changing diplomatic situation in the region as Israel and international mediators finalize the implementation of the ceasefire and exchange agreement.

Domestically, Israel is also in a state of flux. Trump’s 20-point peace plan itself has very broad support, perhaps excluding the government’s extremist religious parties. If the government were to threaten to fall because of coalition members who oppose it, the opposition would come to Netanyahu’s aid.

It will also be interesting to see how the Israeli opposition responds to President Trump’s appeal to President Isaac Herzog in his speech to the Knesset to pardon Prime Minister Netanyahu for the corruption and other charges that have been dropped against him. I think such a pardon would be justified in the name of public interest, just as was recently done with regard to the released Palestinian prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment for terrorist attacks and multiple murders.

For the Palestinian Authority, it is crucial to find an accepted and sufficiently strong leader after President Abbas who is able to carry out the reforms and the deradicalization process, or at least get them off to a good start. Such a person could be Marwan al-Barghuthi, who is serving five life sentences in prison; Barghuthi is probably the only person currently able to unite the Palestinians who support Fatah and Hamas, and as a charismatic figure he has many times the support for the next Palestinian leader compared to other candidates to succeed Abbas, such as Mohammad Dahlan. I think the Israeli judiciary should acquit Barghuthi on the same pragmatic grounds as Netanyahu from his charges.

Neither case (Netanyahu/Barghuthi) may not necessarily be legal, but still legitimate.

Ariel by Ariel Rusila is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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This is the English version of an article (in Finnish) that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi .

Comments Off on Gaza War Ended – Conflict Still Unresolved | Conflicts, Israel, Israel-Palestine conflict, U.S. foreign policy | Tagged: Gaza, Gaza war 23/24/25, Hamas, Israel, Palestine, politics, Swords of Iron, Trump 20-point Gaza plan | Permalink
Posted by Ariel Rusila

The Iranians made the Mossad operation possible

August 17, 2025

The Israeli military intelligence agency Aman and the foreign intelligence agency Mossad conducted extensive, multi-year intelligence gathering and covert operations inside Iran, developing capabilities and conducting covert operations that could have led to the success of Operation Rising Lion. The operation used commando teams, precision weapons and explosive drones on Iranian soil while eliminating nuclear scientists and security officials.

Now, more details about the operation have emerged than ever before, as 10 current and former Israeli intelligence officials described commando raids and undisclosed targets in interviews with ProPublica describing the country’s decades-long secret operation to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb. They requested anonymity in order to speak freely.

Commando teams in Iran

The Mossad recruited and trained two commando units. Each had 14 teams of four to six members. Some of them were already in Iran, having received months of regular training from Iranian intelligence agents. Others were refugees from the country’s regime who had slipped into the country the day before.

For months, Mossad agents had been keeping an eye on the radar and missile batteries protecting Iran’s enrichment facilities – and just before the attack, they were also doing key things, from hacking into Iranian computers to jamming early warning radars.

Israeli-trained commando teams recruited from across the country, from Iran and neighboring countries, were preparing to attack Iran’s defenses from within.

Mossad commando units operated throughout central Iran, and were positioned in strategic open areas near Iranian anti-aircraft missile systems.

The commandos were old-fashioned in the June airstrikes, officials interviewed by ProPublica said, as it is impossible for the Israeli Air Force to go from wave to wave without losing a single aircraft. According to intelligence gathered by Mossad agents in the country, Israeli warplanes bombed nuclear facilities, destroyed about 3,000 of Iran’s ballistic missiles and 80% of its launch vehicles, and fired missiles into the rooms of Iranian nuclear scientists and military commanders.

Mossad’s secret drone base in Iran

One unique feature of Operation Rising Lion was that the Mossad established an “explosive drone base” deep inside Iran, near Tehran. Mossad apparently even set up a factory on the main road to manufacture drones and smuggled in parts for assembly, in addition to smaller, ready-made drones, in suitcases, trucks, and shipping containers. The goods were stored in “safe houses” and later, among other places, to the drone base.

In some cases, several transactions were made with partners who were unaware of the cargo being transported. Mossad agents inside Iran then collected the equipment and distributed it to teams that prepared the drones for use. The team leaders were trained at Iran’s request, and they then returned to transfer the skills to teams on the ground.

The drones were activated during the n to be used not only to launch the drones themselves but also from smuggled and re-equipped mobile platforms that were used to destroy Iranian surface-to-surface missile launchers, including the Esdaf near Tehran.

These systems destroyed Iranian air defenses and gave Israeli aircraft air superiority and freedom of action at Iran’s request.

In a separate operation, the Mossad secretly installed “attack and advanced technology on vehicles” to “neutralize Iran’s air defense capabilities.” These systems were also activated “at the onset of surprise.”

Precision strikes on leaders and nuclear scientists

With the Hezbollah pager operation, Israeli spies exploited their ability to hack into Iranian communications systems. In the early stages of the operation, Israeli cyberwarriors sent a fake message to Iranian military leaders luring them to a ghostly underground bunker, which was then destroyed in a precision strike. Twenty were killed, according to three chiefs of staff.

The Mossad compiled general information on the habits and whereabouts of 11 Iranian nuclear scientists. The files even mapped the locations of the rooms in the men’s homes. On the morning of June 13, Israeli Air Force aircraft fired air-to-ground missiles at all coordinates, killing 11 participants.

Mossad had been planning the final attack on Iran’s nuclear program for over a year, but had been operating in the country for years before that. Recall that in 2018, Israeli-trained operatives broke into an unguarded Tehran warehouse, using plasma cutters to break open safes containing blueprints, data, computer disks, and design books. The material, weighing about 500 kg, was loaded onto two trucks and driven to neighboring Azerbaijan. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented the material at a press conference in Tel Aviv, proving that Iran had lied about its nuclear weapons intentions.

Two years later, Mossad killed one of Iran’s top physicists by using AI-enhanced facial recognition to control a remote-controlled machine gun parked on the side of the road near his weekend home.

Local actors’ role emphasized

In Operation Rising Lion, all strikes inside Iran were carried out solely by local agents and without the entry of Israeli fighters into Iranian territory. This reflects a fundamental shift in Mossad’s approach that began about 15 years ago.

Previously, Mossad operatives—likely Israelis posing as Europeans to install or maintain equipment—wandered around Natanz in double-soled shoes to collect dust and soil samples. Tests eventually revealed that Iranian-made centrifuges were enriching uranium well above the 5 percent level required for a nuclear power plant. (Medical isotopes use 20 percent enriched uranium; bombs use 90 percent.)

Now, the Iranian Mossad agents who broke into safes, planted machine guns, blew up air defenses, and monitored scientists’ apartments were not Israelis. All were either Iranian or third-country nationals.

According to officials interviewed by ProPublica, the growing unpopularity of the Iranian regime has made it much easier to attract agents. In addition, about 40 percent of Iran’s 90 million people are ethnic minorities: Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis, Kurds and others. The motives of Mossad’s local agents were a mix of personal and political. Some wanted revenge against the oppressive, theocratic regime, while others were attracted by money, the promise of medical care for family members or the opportunity to study abroad.

Iran borders Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, and Mossad had connections with smugglers – and often government intelligence services – in all seven countries. Smuggling is a daily occurrence in the region, as thousands of people earn their living by driving donkeys, camels, cars and trucks transporting drugs, fuel and electronics across borders. These locals, in turn, facilitated the delivery of weapons and other materials to Iran, along with the individuals being trained.

My own conclusion is that Mossad’s changed approach – relying on local actors – could also play a major role in the future as Iran continues to implement its nuclear weapons program and Israel prevents its completion. Similarly, if expanded, this approach could play a major role in the potential overthrow of Iran’s current theocratic regime by local actors.

Sources include ProPublica , Israel Hayom , IDF , SoMe

This is the English version of an article that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israel in Finnish.

Comments Off on The Iranians made the Mossad operation possible | Conflicts, Iran, Israel, MENA, Middle-East | Tagged: Aman, Iran, Israel, Israel air-strike, Middle-East, Mossad, news, Operation Rising Lion, politics | Permalink
Posted by Ariel Rusila

Gaza’s humanitarian city?

July 14, 2025

Israel’s small war cabinet met on Sunday evening [13/07/2025] with the aim of preventing the collapse of the Doha hostage and ceasefire talks. The key issue remains Hamas’s demand for Israel to withdraw from southern Gaza, the extent of the withdrawal and, in particular, whether the IDF can maintain the so-called Morag Corridor that bisects Gaza. After Israel has already accepted US Special Envoy Witkoff’s mediation proposal on several occasions, the talks remain stalled due to Hamas’ demands.

The other main topic of the meeting was Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s initiative to build a so-called “humanitarian city” in Rafah, southern Gaza. Katz had asked the Israeli military (IDF) to prepare a plan for the war cabinet meeting based on the initiative.

A tent camp housing displaced Palestinians in Rafah, southern Gaza, last year. Credit:Hatem Ali/Associated Press

Humanitarian city?

The Israeli government says the “humanitarian city” will initially house 600,000 Palestinians currently living in tents in the overcrowded al-Mawas area on the southern Gaza Strip. Eventually, the entire population of more than two million people in the area will be relocated there.

Israeli media reports say construction could take more than a year and cost up to 15 billion shekels ($4.5 billion). Unnamed military officials said the project “would take three to five months from the start of construction until the humanitarian city is operational.”

Proponents of the “humanitarian city” plan argue that its establishment would be the first opportunity for an entity outside Hamas to take control of the area. Preliminary plans describe the camps as “large” and “voluntary” places where Gazans could “temporarily reside, deradicalize, re-integrate and prepare for relocation if they so wish.”

According to opponents of the plan, a “humanitarian city” would violate international law because civilians would be prevented from returning to their homes in the north, which would be a form of ethnic cleansing.

My analysis

The planned “humanitarian city” in Rafah has been subject to justified criticism – even descriptions of a concentration camp have been used – and there have been demands, among others, from Palestinians and international organizations for the right of Gazans to return to their homes. In my opinion, this criticism completely ignores the real situation and the time frame. Here are a few points of view that clarify this:

Firstly, Gaza is currently largely a war zone and I believe that every effort should be made to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the combat zones.
Secondly, when the fighting sometimes ends with a ceasefire agreement and/or the withdrawal/elimination of Hamas in Gaza, a contributing factor is that most of Gaza is a ruined and uninhabitable demolition site, meaning that Gazans no longer have homes to return to.
Thirdly, making Gaza habitable requires clearance work, in which booby traps and explosives in the ruins are dismantled, and the tunnel weapons depots and tunnels are generally destroyed. This clearance work is estimated to last at least a year and even longer if bodies are searched for under the rubble. More time and impact will be required if the contaminated soil is replaced, for example to remove asbestos, a popular building material used in Gaza.
Fourthly, after the clearance work, new construction can begin and, if financing is arranged, it is estimated to last at least 10-15 years.

In light of the above situation, the “return home” of the Gazans, the Israeli religious far-right’s dream of a new settlement in Gaza, and Trump’s Riviera tourist destinations are not realistic for a decade or so. Instead, humanitarian aid – regardless of different visions of the future – was needed long ago and is now even more urgent.

I personally have considered the so-called Sinai option to be the best solution, where the Gazans and other Palestinians could establish their future-oriented autonomy/state, but at least so far Egypt has not agreed to provide “wasteland” for this purpose. I think that a “humanitarian city” offers the best emergency solution at this moment until better ones emerge. (About the Sinai option earlier, for example, in my analysis A Day After the Gaza War -Plan by Ariel Rusila )

“Final relief”

Finally, some trivia: Iranian authorities simulated a nuclear attack on Israel in the image they edited below, and most recently, religious scholars threatened destruction on both Israel and the United States during Friday prayers.

It is understandable that Israel takes Iran’s nuclear weapons program seriously with these dream images. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned President Trump during his recent visit to the United States that if Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons, Israel will respond with new military strikes.

This is the English version of an article that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israel in Finnish.

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Posted by Ariel Rusila

Iran’s regime change difficult but possible

July 3, 2025

During and after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, which is now in a ceasefire, Iranians have been encouraged to hold demonstrations against the current Iranian regime and in support of Israel not only in various parts of the Western world but also inside Iran – although in Iran they are small and life-threatening. At the same time, citizens in many places have openly opposed members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) when they remarked on women without headscarves. Abroad, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is trying to unite the now fragmented opposition that opposes the current Iranian regime.

The situation now raises hopes of a popular uprising and a change of power, and the opportunity for this is the best in decades. The success of the popular uprising is not at all self-evident, as the theocracy-supporting IRGC has taken major countermeasures, including mass arrests of representatives of Iran’s Jewish minority on charges of supporting Israel.

War as an enabler of the uprising

During the 12-day war, Iran launched nearly 600 missiles and over 1,000 drones at civilian population centers, killing about 30 civilians. For example, the attacks on May 23, 2025, killed more than 700 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), especially in the cities of Tehran and Karaj. This underscores the scale of the Israeli operation and its potentially devastating impact on Iran’s military leadership and infrastructure. Iran’s much-touted regional proxy network—Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis—largely refrained from joining the war. Hezbollah did not fire a single rocket, while the Houthis launched only two missiles in 12 days. Iran’s close backers—Russia and China—provided no assistance to the country. This isolation of Iran greatly strengthened Israel’s international legitimacy to carry out its attacks.

The war was effectively ended by a US bunker buster strike on Iran’s key underground facilities, Iran’s apparent response to it, and a ceasefire brokered by Qatar and the US, among others, between Israel and Iran.

The 12-day war significantly weakened Iran’s theocratic regime; in addition to the planners of the nuclear program, Israel eliminated a significant number of the IRGC’s top military leadership. At the same time, unconfirmed reports have emerged from inside Iran of a possible assassination of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Mojtaba, widely known as a radical hardliner and likely successor to his aging father, was killed at close range in Tehran. If confirmed, this could send shockwaves through the Iranian leadership and deepen the crisis further.

As a small detail, Israel also directly attacked Iran’s Evin prison, a facility for political prisoners, blowing up its entrance.

Israel’s role

The good relations between Israel and Persia go back far into history, to the time of Cyrus the Great (c. 576–529 BCE); he allowed Jews expelled by the Babylonians to return to Israel and even financed the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Iran’s secularization is beneficial to Israel. This is not surprising, since Israel and Iran had excellent relations before the 1978-79 Islamic revolution. The Jewish community in Iran is the oldest continuously existing Jewish community in the world. The community is as significant in the diaspora as it is in Iran. Many now envision the so-called “Cyrus Accords,” i.e. a renewed friendship between Iranians and Israelis, similar to the already partially realized “Abraham Accords,” by which Israel has normalized its relations with several Muslim countries. In this way, Israel would, as it were, repay its debt from the time of Cyrus by freeing Iranians from the shackles of theocracy.

Israel’s unofficial goal has been to overthrow the current Iranian regime. Mossad was very active even before the war and, with the support of the Iranian state, even established a drone factory in Iran; during the war, these drones were used “at close range” to destroy Iran’s air defenses and other military infrastructure. Similarly, cells operating in Iran played a significant role in eliminating nuclear program experts and the military leadership of the Revolutionary Guard. However, Israel’s goals were mainly military and not directly related to overthrowing the current regime.

During the time of Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Israel and Iran had good relations for about 30 years. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was essentially a democratic revolution, aiming to expand people’s freedoms and establish a truly democratic state. Although Iran had achieved great material progress under the Shah, the brutality of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, and the lack of political freedom forced the people to rise up to achieve greater freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, as a result of the internal struggle between the various democratic forces and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the leader of the revolution, the mullahs came to control all structures of power.

Supporters and Opponents of the Uprising

News coverage of Iran, as in the past, often focuses on large-scale demonstrations in the country’s largest cities. In doing so, Western media ignores the class composition of the competing demonstrations – the fact that the current Iranian regime received and receives support from a larger section of the population, namely the poor working class, peasants, artisans and public sector workers, while the majority of opposition protesters are upper- and middle-class students, business people and educated professionals.

Most of the coverage has come from English-speaking students active on social media in Tehran, ignoring the provinces, small and medium-sized towns and villages where the current theocratic regime has a broad base of support. The situation for the uprising is weakened by the fact that the educated urban youth and their supporters have social media as their weapon, but they are faced with a fanatical, Koran-educated and, on top of that, well-armed rural population, led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The opposition supporters are usually students who can be easily mobilized for street action, while the Ebemmist group of working youth and domestic workers have expressed their views at the ballot box and have little time or desire to participate in street politics. The current administration has previously enjoyed broad support, for example, in oil and chemical-producing provinces, which may reflect the opposition of energy workers to reformist plans to privatize public companies. A large proportion of the current regime’s supporters probably believe that national security interests, the country’s unity, and the social security system, with all their shortcomings and excesses, could be better defended and improved with the current regime than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented, privileged youth who value individual lifestyles over community values and solidarity.

The main opponent of the uprising can be considered the IRGC, which consists of a motivated army, navy, and air force (approximately 125,000–190,000 personnel) and the Basij militia (300,000 active soldiers) that can mobilize up to about 600,000 volunteers. The IRGC’s power is built into Iran’s political, economic, and social framework, which gives it the durability and potential to guide the country’s future.

A significant factor in facilitating or resisting the uprising is the Artesh, formed from the pre-revolutionary army, which serves as Iran’s conventional defense force, tasked with protecting the country’s borders, seas, airspace, and territorial integrity. The number of personnel is estimated at 340,000–420,000. Historically, the army has been subordinate to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, receiving a smaller share of funding and modern weapons, and is often seen as less politically reliable.

Factors behind the uprising

According to some opinion polls, only 15% of the population supports the Islamic regime and its Sharia law, and about 70% of the population would like to break away from the current theocratic regime. If the figures are even remotely accurate, the conditions for an uprising would be very good. However, the problem is the fragmentation of the groups that want a change of power.

First of all, exiled political coalitions are pushing for a change of power, such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), led by Maryam Rajavi. It supports the overthrow of the regime and also has an internal network of “Resistance Units” that spread anti-regime communications. The NCRI includes the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), which the United States previously (until 2012) considered a terrorist group, and it carries out operations both abroad and secretly inside Iran.

Second are monarchist and nationalist groups such as the exiled son of the deposed Shah, Reza Pahlavi, who is pushing for a non-violent regime change. He has limited domestic support, and many inside Iran are skeptical of his close ties to Israel and the West. These groups also include the Constitutional Party of Iran and the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of Iran (Tondar), who want to restore the monarchy. Tondar has historically been reported to have used violent tactics.

Third are ethnic nationalist insurgents such as Khabat (Kurdish) and Jaish ul Adl (Baluchi), who are active in Iran’s border regions, carrying out attacks and pushing for autonomy.

The fourth group is secular and left-wing democratic groups such as the United Republicans of Iran, which promote democratic socialism and secular republicanism, or the “Neighborhood Youth Union” (United Youth of Iran), a grassroots movement that emerged during the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. It organizes urban youth to challenge the clerical regime and demand human rights reforms.

The fifth group is independent activists and grassroots mobilizers who support democratic reforms and constitutional changes inside Iran, including by distributing leaflets, organizing strikes, and using secret messages to incite opposition.

The fragmentation of those opposing the current regime is evident between the exiled and domestic groups. There is a lack of unity and strategic organization. Domestic activists are wary of large-scale protests due to the regime’s brutal repression and the risks to civilians. Armed minority groups (Kurds, Baloch) escalate local resistance, but their goals often range from regime change to ethnic autonomy or separatism.

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as Leader of the Uprising?

In February 2025, various Iranian opposition factions elected Pahlavi as the leader of the opposition and the head of a future transitional government to “form the first national assembly and begin democratic rule through free elections.”

Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the Shah who was overthrown in Iran’s final 1979 Islamic Revolution, released a video message on June 17, 2025, in which he reiterated his call for regime change in Tehran, adding that the Islamic Republic of Iran was collapsing and that the time had come for the Iranian people to “retake Iran.” He said Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had “hid underground” and lost control of the country, describing the moment as “irreversible.” “The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation… Now is the time to rise up. Now all that is needed is a nationwide uprising to end this nightmare (…) I hope I will be with you soon.”

On his website, Pahlavi has said that the Iranian state should become democratic and secular, and that human rights should be respected. He would like to leave it to the Iranian people to decide whether the form of government is a constitutional monarchy or a republic.

The crown prince is hampered by the memory among older citizens of his Shah father, who, on his peacock throne, held power with the help of the SAVAK secret police torture gang, with the support of Britain and the CIA, and who overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammed Mosaddegh in 1953, who wanted the Iranian people to benefit from Iran’s oil wealth instead of BP and other Western plunderers. This image may lead some Iranians to view the crown prince as a puppet ruler controlled by foreign powers.

Summary

The Iranian opposition is a diverse ecosystem: exiled political fronts, ethnic rebels, secular leftists, monarchists, and underground youth movements. While the current situation offers opportunities, fragmentation, fear of repression, and the lack of a unified internal leadership remain significant obstacles. To achieve meaningful change, grassroots unity—across ethnic, ideological, and strategic lines—is essential.

A group of Iranian businessmen, politicians, military figures, and senior clerics have begun to plan how to run Iran without Khamenei—whether he dies or is ousted. The plan includes a leadership committee that will take over the country and negotiate with the United States to extend the Israeli ceasefire.

From my point of view, a successful uprising requires the defection of every elite from the IRGC or the government, or especially from the military. The uprising also requires armed force, if necessary, from either the military or ethnic groups, because otherwise the fanatical and well-armed supporters of the current regime cannot be dislodged.

In my opinion, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi would be a good and credible unifying force for the scattered groups opposing the current theocratic regime in Iran. After the change of power, he could act as a transitional ruler until free elections are held in Iran and the elected representatives then decide on the future form of government, whether it is a constitutional monarchy or some other secular system.

Previously on the topic:

This is the English version of an article that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israel in Finnish.

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Iran’s nuclear weapons program destroyed

June 22, 2025

President Donald Trump on Saturday (June 21, 25) announced a “very successful strike” on three of Iran’s nuclear weapons sites, including Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan. In my article about the Israel-Iran war and how it will end less than a week ago, I presented another scenario

The destruction of the US nuclear weapons program, or to borrow a strategy, its bombers will respond by carrying the heaviest bunker busters from their facilities, such as Fordow, nearly a hundred meters underground.

This scenario now appears to have come true.

Earlier in May 2025, the IAEA estimated that more than 400 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas had already been enriched to 60 percent – a level that is considered highly enriched. This material is under international control and is enough for about 10 nuclear weapons.

Trump has publicly criticized his national intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard and said she was wrong when she claimed that there was no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear weapon. Israel has claimed that Iran is capable of producing a nuclear warhead.

The Iranian foreign minister toured the world last week, meeting with EU leaders, among others, to convince them that Iran may have a nuclear weapons program. It would be sensible for him to convey the message that the program in question will be terminated unconditionally. This would have taken a couple of days for the B2 bombers that left Missouri to refuel, which is why they were not sent without full fuel tanks on board due to the payload (=MOB bunker busters). Well, now the negotiations are continuing because Iran does not (anymore) have a nuclear weapons program.

Two days ago, Trump gave about two weeks to get a result from the negotiations on the war between Israel and Iran. Now Trump seems to be implementing the same negotiation strategy as in the first term by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and thus removing it from the negotiation agenda. Now Iran’s nuclear program has apparently been removed from the agenda, now it is necessary to take care of ending the external war between Israel and Iran and ending Iran’s support for the Houthis. Overly optimistic, negotiations on the human rights of Iran or the rights of Kurdistan will be expected, at least the EU did not have the space to be too careless. Trump said – after the Iranian attack – “now is the time for peace”.

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How The Israel-Iran War Will End

June 18, 2025

Iran has responded with massive missile and drone strikes to Israel’s preemptive airstrike on nuclear facilities and military targets on Friday, June 13, 2025, supported by smaller-scale operations inside Iran by the Mossad. Israel’s initial strike caused severe damage to the Natanz and Isfahan nuclear facilities and crippled numerous defense systems and ballistic missile production facilities.

Israel’s stated goals are, first, to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program and, second, to stop the country’s missile program. An unofficial indirect goal, I assume, is to change Iran’s theocratic regime.

There are no signs yet of regime change in Iran, although on the other hand, there have been demonstrations in Iran and abroad supporting Israel’s strikes. Inside Iran, the current government is based on the religious population of the countryside and the Revolutionary Guard. The civilized, secular, young and unarmed population of the cities is too powerless to make a change; the situation may change in the future if Iran’s ethnic groups on the periphery – such as the Kurds – begin to demand greater autonomy after the Revolutionary Guard’s power has been sufficiently weakened.

Attacks on Israel’s home front reinforce the urgency of Israel’s campaign to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Any of the hundreds of ballistic missiles launched at Israel could have been equipped with nuclear warheads if Iran had been allowed to achieve its goal.

As things stand, Israel will not achieve its first goal. Although several nuclear facilities [Natanz and Parchin being the most important] have already been largely destroyed, the most significant of them, the Fordow facility, located about 80 meters below sea level, has not yet been significantly damaged.

The second goal seems to be being met. Iran still possesses thousands of ballistic and cruise missiles, so at the current intensity of the war it can carry out attacks on Israel for a couple of weeks, while Israel can do this for even longer with its air superiority and capacity. It is also possible that Iran will quickly manufacture a so-called dirty bomb from the radioactive material it possesses, which could be used by cells operating in the West.

Against the background presented above, I see three alternative scenarios for the end of the war:

1) Israel destroys Iran’s nuclear weapons program using its tactical nuclear weapons,

2) The US destroys Iran’s nuclear weapons program using or lending its strategic bombers capable of carrying the heaviest bunker busters with which, for example, the Fordow facility, which is almost a hundred meters underground, can be destroyed.

3) Iran is ready to give up its nuclear weapons program in the nuclear negotiations and guarantee international inspectors full and free access to its country to verify the promised abandonment.

My own assessment is that the US will use any aid it may give to Israel as leverage to persuade Iran to sign an agreement to ensure the destruction of its nuclear weapons program.

The full version of this article first appeared in the Finnish online publication Ariel-Israelista Suomeksi

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Iran’s Nuclear Program to Be Stopped This Weekend

June 13, 2025

Today – coincidentally Friday the 13th – there are very strong indications that Israel will, at long last, stop Iran’s nuclear program this weekend. The US announcement that it will withdraw its diplomats from Iraq and allow military families to voluntarily leave the Gulf states seems to point to an imminent attack on Iran. International news agencies have also reported, citing various sources, that Israel was considering launching an attack on Iran within days.

Negotiations between the US and Iran in Oman have been deadlocked over the issue of uranium enrichment. The removal of American personnel from the region could be a signal to Iran that the US is serious about its position, hoping that the Iranians will move closer to a deal.

Iran’s military and government leaders have met to plan an immediate response with hundreds of ballistic missiles in the event of an Israeli attack. A senior Iranian official told Reuters that a “friendly country” warned Iran of a possible Israeli strike. The country has been identified in the media as Oman.

USA

A level four travel alert has been issued for Iraq, the highest level, due to terrorism, armed conflict and unrest. American government employees in Israel have been advised not to travel outside the Tel Aviv area, Jerusalem and Beersheba due to rising tensions in the region.

President Trump has said that an Israeli strike on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure is “absolutely possible,” adding: “I don’t want to say immediate, but it looks like it could very well happen.” He stressed the growing risk of conflict and admitted that he had made a difficult choice about whether to warn American personnel in the region: “I don’t want to be the one who didn’t warn.”

IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors has adopted a resolution declaring Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. The resolution cites Iran’s failure to explain uranium residues found at several undeclared sites. The resolution was adopted by 19 votes to 11, with three against – Russia, China and Burkina Faso.

This is the first such resolution since 2022 and the first formal notification of a violation since 2005. The resolution calls on Iran to provide “technically credible answers” about uranium residues found at sites such as Lavisan-Shian, Varamin and Turquzabad, where the IAEA has suspected undeclared nuclear activities. The organization also accused Iran of obstructing verification efforts by cleaning up sites and giving false explanations.

A confidential, leaked IAEA report found that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium had increased by about 50 percent and now totals more than 400 kilograms—enough for one nuclear bomb if further enriched. The agency called the situation “a matter of serious concern.”

Israel

A direct strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities now would be very challenging without U.S. support. The reason is that the most important facilities are located at a depth of more than 60 meters, and the most effective US bunker buster bomb currently reaches a maximum depth of 61 meters. [The GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) is a precision-guided, 14,000 kg bunker buster, which due to its size (weight and length of 6 meters) can only be carried by large bombers such as the B-2 Spirit.] If Israel were to use its own bunker busters – like the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership deep underground in Beirut – in the case of Iran, these would have to be dropped in large numbers one after the other into the same crater.

Israel itself is capable of destroying the deepest facilities of Iran’s nuclear weapons program if necessary, but this would require the use of its own nuclear warheads and the threshold for use is very high, requiring an existential threat to Israel.

Israel’s conditions for an air strike are now good. Long-range strikes with intermediate refueling have been successfully tested in Yemen, and Iran’s air defense system was also almost completely destroyed in the fall of 2024. Iran is replacing the damage with the S-300 anti-aircraft system, but the vulnerability is now obvious.

A completely new method was tested in September 2024 when 120 Israeli army (IDF) commandos destroyed an Iranian underground missile factory deep in Syria. The facility built by Iran was 70–130 meters (230–430 feet) underground, making it practically impossible to destroy from the air. (Previously, IDF commandos destroyed an Iranian missile factory in Syria )

There have been attempts to prevent Iran’s nuclear weapons program in several different ways. The diplomatic effort was the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement negotiated in 2015, from which the US withdrew in 2018.

Israel, on the other hand, has used a targeted killing program against Iranian leaders’ nuclear and missile experts and has carried out several sabotage attacks on the program’s facilities and equipment. The most famous is probably the Stuxnet cyberattack.

My assessment

For years, I have predicted that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons program is imminent, but a decisive attack has not occurred. My assessment is based on the so-called <6 month time window, meaning that Israel, either alone or with US support, will stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program about six months before a nuclear bomb is ready. For years, either diplomatic or military solutions have managed to keep the threat outside the time window.

From Israel’s perspective, a decisive attack on Iran would cut off the head of the BS snake, i.e. the source of the “ring of fire” surrounding Iran. The Houthis are part of Iran’s proxy armies and have continuously attacked Israel with ballistic missiles. An attack on Iran could cut off Iranian missile deliveries to Yemen. In addition, the Houthis are said to be about to attack Israel with new weapons, including missiles equipped with “cluster warheads.”

I think it is quite possible that Iran’s nuclear program will be stopped in the coming days. The solution could also be diplomatic if Iran were to suddenly, faced with destruction, make a U-turn and agree to remove its enriched uranium beyond civilian use and to have all its nuclear facilities under free international supervision. It remains to be seen

Previously on the subject:

Iran Nuke Deal And Israel

Iran Nuke Deal Enables The Détente

End Game Approaches on Nuclear Iran

Iran’s nuclear program at the crossroads

P.S: This article lacks sources because some of it is general information shared by international news agencies and some of it is private social media discussions.

The article first appeared in the Finnish online publication Ariel-Israelista Suomeksi

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Serbia – Overthrow of the President Is the Easy Part

March 16, 2025

Student-led protests in Serbia reached their peak this weekend [March 15-16, 2025] when more than 100,000 anti-government protesters gathered in Belgrade to demand the resignation of President Vucic. At the same time also some students and former paramilitary fighters loyal to President Vucic have been camping outside the presidency building in Belgrade from March 13, 2025 fueling fears of violent incidents during antigovernment rally this weekend. This could be
a provocation by the government to order police to quell the growing anti-government movement.

*A sticker with a message reading, “15.03. See you in Belgrade,” is seen on a tractor parked near the Serbian presidency building and the National Assembly in Belgrade.* Credit: [Andrej Isakovic/AFP]

The protests were sparked by the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, killing 15 people (Background on this in my article -in Finnish- Serbiassa asemakatos romahti – 14 kuoli ). The station had been recently renovated under opaque infrastructure contracts – mainly including companies from Serbia and China, but reportedly also from France and Hungary – awarded under a credit agreement with China.

Serbian anticorruption protesters, riot police and supporters of President Aleksandar Vucic have faced off – so far -without major incident in central Belgrade as people gathered for the biggest antigovernment rally in years. At least 107,000 people from across Serbia have joined on Saturday 15 an anti-corruption rally in Belgrade, in what is regarded as the culmination of months of protest that have shaken the grip of the country’s autocratic president, Aleksandar Vučić, the interior minister reported.

Agence France-Presse reported that known ultranationalists, including members of a former militia linked to the assassination of then prime minister, Zoran Djindjic in 2003, have been seen among the group of activists camped near the presidential palace. Djindjic, who led street protests that deposed Slobodan Milošević in 2000, was assassinated 22 years ago this week by a paramilitary police group known by its unofficial name, the Red Berets. According Dragan Djilas, the leader of the opposition Freedom and Justice party, Vučić “has mobilised criminals, thugs and Red Beret members, bringing people from Kosovo and stationing them in Pionirski Park, knowing hundreds of thousands will gather there on Saturday”.

Near-daily student protests began in December, 2024, after the deaths of 15 people when a roof at a railway station collapsed on November 1 in the northern city of Novi Sad, which critics blame on corruption under Vucic. Sporadic clashes occurred overnight before Saturday’s rally, in front of the National Assembly, from which protesters were to march to Slavija Square. Police deployed hundreds of officers in full riot gear in and around Pionirski Park and across the street.Thousands of veterans from elite military brigades in maroon berets and bikers who support the students also stood for 15 minutes of silence beginning at 11:52am (10:52 GMT) to honour the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy at the time of the roof collapse.

A prelude: The overthrow of Milošević

Yugoslav and former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was cracking down on opposition, non-government organisations and independent media. From 1991 onwards there were campaigns of civil resistance against his administration that were to culminate in the largely non-violent revolution of October 2000. In 1998, a dozen students met to form Otpor! ( “resistance”). Analysing the mistakes of the 1996–97 protests, they realised they needed more effective organisation, strategy, planning, recruiting, and everything necessary for a sustained fight. Galvanised by outrage over new laws that imposed political control of their universities and harassment of independent media, the Otpor! students called for the removal of Milošević and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law.

To unify opposition, eighteen parties in Serbia formed the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, with Vojislav Koštunica as the candidate to confront Milošević. The vote took place on 24 September 2000. The DOS coalition reported that Vojislav Koštunica won over half of the votes, enough to defeat Milošević in a single round. The government-controlled Federal Electoral Committee claimed that no candidate won over 50% of the votes and that a second round between Koštunica and Milošević would take place. Some obvious irregularities could be found in the Federal Electoral Committee official results.

The protests initially started with strikers at the Kolubara mines on 29 September, which produced most of Serbia’s electricity. The protest reached its height on 5 October 2000. Several hundred thousand protesters from all over Serbia arrived in Belgrade to protest. The key symbol of the campaign was the slogan Gotov je! ( meaning “He is finished!”), created by Otpor!. Unlike previous protests, there was no large scale police crackdown.

For a year leading up to the elections, the United States-funded consultants played a crucial role in the anti-Milošević campaign. The International Republican Institute trained 400 activists outside the country, who returned to Serbia and trained another 15,000 people to observe polling stations inside the country. Each observer’s participation was paid at $5 – money provided by the West (in 2000, the average monthly salary in the country was $30). Other Western organizations to support Otpor! were e.g. the Open Society Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy and Freedom House. Otpor! activists honed the lessons of nonviolent resistance developed by American scholar Gene Sharp and retired U.S. Army Colonel Robert Helvey. Most Serbs did not realize that the U.S. was directing the opposition’s electoral strategy and funding the creation and distribution of campaign materials.

Second act: From Otpor! To Color revolutions and Arab Spring

After the overthrow of Milošević Student-dominated youth movements have played a central role in the “color revolutions” seen in post-communist societies in recent years. Otpor! has inspired other youth movements in Eastern Europe, such as Kmara in Georgia, which played an important role in the Rose Revolution, and PORA in Ukraine, which was key in organising the demonstrations that led to the Orange Revolution. Like Otpor, these organisations have consequently practiced non-violent resistance in opposing authoritarian leaders. Similar movements include KelKel in Kyrgyzstan, Zubr in Belarus and MJAFT! in Albania. Serbia’s opposition organisation Otpor! has been involved in training students in civil disobedience in Georgia as well in over 20 other countries.

The uprisings witnessed throughout the Middle East have lent new credence to the power of youth movements and nonviolent resistance in authoritarian settings; youth activities from Egypt to Algeria have benefited from the lessons of their contemporaries in post-Communist Europe. Otpor! activists not only inspired, but shared insights with aspiring Egyptian revolutionaries in the years preceding the February 2011 changes..

There is evidence that Egyptian groups such as Kefaya, the April 6 Youth Movement, and Youth for Change built upon and adapted revolutionary models employed by young activists in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Adhering to the tenants of nonviolent resistance, their strategies and tactics evoked those so successfully employed by youth movements such as Otpor! in the run-up to the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s.

Act Three: From Vučić to Real Time

Aleksandar Vučić, who had previously been a member of Milošević’s Serbian Radical Party, founded the more moderate and pro-EU Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in 2008 with Tomislav Nikolić. In 2012, Nikolić won the presidential election and was replaced by Aleksandar Vučić as party leader. The Progressive Party won a landslide victory in the elections in 2014, and Vučić was elected Prime Minister and in 2017 Vucic was elected president. The line of Prime Minister and then president Vučić’s populist government became increasingly authoritarian and restrictive of media freedom. Vučić also selects the t prime minister of Serbia and in practice holds the highest political power in his hands.

During Vučić rule Serbia has suffered from democratic backsliding into authoritarianism, followed by a decline in media freedom and civil liberties. Opposition figures accused the SNS of using public resources for political purposes and election monitor CRTA complained before the vote of a “chronic lack of pluralism” in Serbia. Recently government policy is characterised as one of human rights violations, restrictions on freedom of expression and campaigns of harassment against the opposition figures, journalists and media outlets. Today the largest political parties in the National Assembly are the populist Serbian Progressive Party and Socialist Party of Serbia, that with its partners, hold more than a supermajority number of seats.

President Aleksandar Vucic claimed a re-election victory in the country’s snap December 2023 elections, with his SNS, winning some 47% of the vote. Opposition parties under the Serbia Against Violence (SPN) banner were well behind with around 23%. The vote was almost immediately marred by accusations of irregularities. The International Election Observation Mission said in a statement that “serious irregularities, including vote-buying and ballot box stuffing were observed”.

Milos Vucevic, the leader of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party became prime minister in May 2024 and he resigned in January 2025 amid student-led anti-corruption protests following the November 2024 collapse of roof of a railway station in Novi Sad on 1 November, which killed 15 people. Vučić, widely seen to have sacrificed his prime minister to protect his position, has ruled out forming a transitional government and holding elections in six months. Echoing Russian narratives, he has described the protests as a western-orchestrated ploy to oust him from power and destroy Serbia.

Epilogue: My conclusions

The current protests in Serbia, if successful, could lead to the ouster of the country’s current president, especially if the student movement receives direct support from the broad middle class. What is essential for me to see is whether the situation will get worse, better, or remain the same without Vučić.

I would personally describe an Otpor!-type strategy as an anarchist but well-organized, military but non-violent method of organizing mass demonstrations, coups, or even revolutions. Post-coup governance is another matter entirely.

In the years that followed overthrow of Slobodan Milošević Serbia underwent a protracted transition that included the assassination of a reformist prime minister, the resurgence of the far-right Serbian Radical Party and a legacy of corruption and nepotism that continues to pervade its politics. Otpor! disbanded soon after Milošević’s departure. An intensely heterogeneous movement comprised of leftists and conservatives, monarchists and republicans, nationalists and cosmopolitans, Otpor! lost the glue that bound it together, Otpor! members could not agree on how to proceed.

The overthrow of Milosevic eventually led to the current situation, the Arab Spring, initiated by a liberal student movement, led to the rise of the conservative Muslim Brotherhood and then the military in Egypt. Iran’s “green movement” shrank when the government restricted the use of social media and the internet by urban youth, and when the uneducated rural population rushed to support the government.

Even in traditional constitutional states, mass demonstrations do not necessarily lead to results. For example, in Israel, I have participated in massive demonstrations in Tel Aviv several times before and during the current war. Despite legitimate demands and demonstrations involving hundreds of thousands of citizens every weekend for a couple of years, and despite the fact that, according to opinion polls, about 70% of the citizens support the demands of the demonstrators, power in Israel will not change until the current government loses its slim majority in the Knesset, either through internal factors or elections.

Lessons learned: Movements that are defined solely on the basis of a dictator’s ousting have little merit once that dictator is gone. Moreover, movements that fail to identify themselves in positive terms—as for something beyond the abstraction of “democracy,” rather than simply against a sitting regime—are unlikely to withstand the tests of time.

Sources e.g: The Guardian, From Resistance to Revolution and Back Again: What Egyptian Youth Can Learn From Otpor When Its Activists Leave Tahrir Square, Carnegie Council

Article first published in Conflicts by Ariel Rusila online publication

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Gaza – Saturday, March 1, 2025~~?

February 28, 2025

The first phase of the three-phase hostage and ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas ends on Saturday, March 1, 2025. Under the agreement, 602 terrorist prisoners will then be released in exchange for the bodies of four slain Israeli hostages. Of the prisoners to be released, 50 are serving life sentences, many of whom were responsible for orchestrating the horrific suicide bombings of the mid-1990s.

Saturday’s exchange of hostages for terrorists marks the end of the first phase of the agreement. There are no signs from either side of the warring parties or the various mediators that Israel and Hamas are close to reaching an agreement on implementing the second phase of the hostage and ceasefire agreement.

Saturday, March 1, 2025~~?

US Ambassador Steve Witkoff has been trying to broker an extension of the first phase of the ceasefire. Such an extension would specifically include the release of hostages deemed to be in need of immediate medical attention. The remaining hostages are all men under 50, and each would require Israel to pay higher “ransoms” than convicted terrorists to be released. It is unlikely that an extension of the first phase would cover all living hostages, as Hamas can be expected to want to hold some to achieve its larger political goals in the war.

The hardening of attitudes in Israel is also illustrated by the announcement on Thursday, February 27, 2025, by Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen that Israel will not withdraw from the so-called Philadelphia Corridor in Gaza as required by the ceasefire agreement. He stated that Israeli forces would not withdraw until three key goals were achieved: the full return of prisoners, the removal of Hamas from power, and the complete disarmament of Gaza. Israeli forces also consider their presence in the area essential to prevent weapons smuggling. Israel was expected to begin withdrawing from the Philadelphia Corridor on Saturday, the last day of the first phase of the ceasefire, and to complete the withdrawal within eight days.

Israeli politicians outside the government have presented their own “after-the-day” plans for Gaza. Left-wing leader Yair Golan called for moderate Palestinian forces to control Gaza while preserving the IDF’s freedom of action.

Yair Lapid, the leader of the center-right opposition, presented a plan that called for Egypt to take responsibility for Gaza for 15 years, during which the international community would wipe out Egypt’s $155 billion foreign debt. Lapid explained that Israel cannot accept Hamas remaining in power, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is unable to govern Gaza, the Israeli occupation is undesirable, and the continued chaos poses a serious security threat to Israel. At the same time, Egypt’s economy is on the verge of collapse and threatens the stability of Egypt and the entire Middle East. Lapid said that over the course of 15 years, Gaza would be rebuilt and the conditions for self-rule would be created.

Lapid proposed that the current ceasefire be ended until all hostages are released, with Egypt assuming control of Gaza through a UN Security Council resolution, defined as “custodianship,” with the goal of transferring the Gaza Strip to the PA government after a process of reform and deradicalization, with measurable criteria. At the same time, a reconstruction process would begin under Egyptian supervision, with Saudi Arabia and the Abraham Accords signatories participating in working groups, and the United States investing in Gaza. He also called on Egypt to allow any Gazan who wants to leave and has somewhere to go to do so in a regulated manner.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is currently (27/02/2025) in Riyadh to discuss an Arab plan for Gaza. Arab states are expected to discuss a post-war reconstruction plan for Gaza, possibly to counter US President Donald Trump’s proposal to redevelop the Strip under US control. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are reviewing the Arab plan in Riyadh before it is presented at a planned Arab summit in Cairo on March 4. The plan for Gaza could include up to $20 billion for reconstruction in the territory. The proposal includes the formation of a Palestinian national committee to govern Gaza without Hamas involvement and international participation in reconstruction without transferring Palestinians abroad. Egypt’s initial proposal is reported to have been a five-year plan for Gaza reconstruction, during which Gazans would be resettled in safe zones inside Gaza.

The EU, a major donor to the Palestinians, presented its position to the Israeli authorities in talks in Brussels on 24 February as part of the EU-Israel Association Council, the first such meeting since 2022. The EU supports the return of Gazans to their homes in Gaza and has pledged to contribute to their reconstruction.

According to Maher al-Namoura, a Fatah spokesman, the Palestinian Authority is capable of governing and rebuilding Gaza. He made his remarks in a recent discussion on the social media of Saudi Arabia’s interactive news channel Al Hadath. This reflects the PA’s policy since 2007 – when Hamas illegally pushed it out of Gaza in 2007 – that it should govern Gaza. Fatah is the largest faction in the PA.

My assessment

My assessment of the implementation of the second phase of the Hamas-Israel agreement, at least in the form previously outlined, is even more pessimistic than before. The reason is the numerous violations of the first agreement and the treatment of the hostages, which shocked the Israelis in particular. Tensions are also increasing due to the bus bombing in the Tel Aviv area a week ago, which, if successful (only two buses exploded at the depot), would have been very devastating. The attack was carried out by West Bank terrorists but Hamas took responsibility for them.

The first shock was the starving appearance of the three released hostages, the second was the inferior carnivalization of the release event by Hamas, the third was the return of the mother, baby and child under 5 years old of the Bibas family in coffins, the fourth was that one body was a completely unknown Arab woman (later corrected to the right person) and the fifth was when it was discovered that a 9-month-old baby and a 4-year-old had been slaughtered by Hamas already in November 2023 (Hamashan claimed that the family died in Israeli airstrikes, so no signs were found in the autopsies).

If no agreement is reached to extend the first phase, Israel is preparing to resume intense fighting with US support. It is hoped that the credibility of this threat will persuade Hamas to extend the agreement.

In the second phase of the ceasefire, the remaining 59 hostages would be released, Israel would withdraw completely from Gaza, and a permanent ceasefire would be established. Of the hostages, 24-27 are believed to still be alive. The current Israeli government does not want to withdraw from Gaza until all hostages are returned, and as long as Hamas poses a military threat to the country,

A renewed outbreak of fighting, should the ceasefire collapse, will occur in a vastly different global strategic environment than the one that prevailed when the war broke out in October 2023. The Iranian “ring of fire” that surrounded Israel in 2023 has broken in Lebanon and Syria (but not in Yemen), while the US administration today no longer places limits on Israeli firepower.

In any case, I assume that in the coming weeks there will be intensive negotiations on extending the first phase of the agreement. During this time, Israel will probably conclude the purge of Hamas terrorist cells in the West Bank, and the moderate Arab countries will present their own post-war plan for Gaza.

Sources include Jerusalem Post, BICOM , TheNewArab

Article first published (in Finnish) in Ariel-Israelista suomeksi online publication