Now I’m not one to rub your nose
In reams and reams of purple prose
(Which is why I wrote this song)
And I’m not one to chew the fat
When all that need be said is that
There’s something very wrong
– Edwyn Collins
Back in February I looked at opinion polling since the 2024 election – and, in particular, since the 2024 election campaign, over whose six weeks Labour’s support dropped by 10-12% – and asked, ‘is this normal?’. Short answer: no, it isn’t. Losing a few % points during a General Election campaign – well, it never happened to the last guy, but it’s certainly been known. But after the election Labour’s support just went on falling, and that isn’t just one of those things. It’s not (just) the kind of thing that happens to Labour support after an election; or to the incoming governing party after an election; or to Labour support in years they win an election; or… It’s not normal; and the key factor underlying this situation – the fact that Nigel Farage’s Reform UK is polling in the mid- to high 20%s and has been for some time – is very abnormal indeed; unprecedented, even. UKIP has polled in the high teens; at one point in the second half of 2019, the Brexit Party repeatedly broke 20%. But, quoting my earlier post,
Never before have we seen a substantial and sustained growth in support for the Farage party, either continuing over nine months or taking their support to the mid-20%s – not in 2019, not in 2015 or 2016. I’ll go further: never before – literally never – have we seen a substantial and sustained growth in support for any party to the Right of the Conservatives, continuing over nine months (or anything close to it), taking their support to the mid-20%s (or anywhere near it).
How new and different is our current situation, though – and should it, as I wrote in February, be treated “as an emergency, on a par with the rise of Trump or Marine Le Pen”? To put it another way, are we looking at the inexorable rise of a far-Right party to dominate British politics, or something less permanent in its effects, less threatening, or both – just another twist in the long history of British parliamentary democracy?
Very much in the “life’s rich pageant” school is Peter Kellner’s Prospect article headed “The UK’s Labour-Tory duopoly is over”, which was discussed and elaborated on by Simon Wren-Lewis and, somewhat less respectfully (“banal when not fatuous”), by David. Both take the view that a series of long-term changes have brought us to the point where there are four significant nationally-organised parties in Britain, not three as before, and that this will make future elections a lot more unpredictable; Wren-Lewis also sketches out a route whereby we might find our way back to a three-party system, if the Labour and Tory parties play their cards right.
I confess, I see things in more alarmist terms. The headline, for me, is that Reform UK’s support in opinion polls has doubled – from 14% to 28% – since the 2024 election, while Labour has lost 11% – from 34% to 23%. Moreover, that’s a double understatement of Labour’s loss of support: firstly because it’s calculated from the already startlingly low base of the 2024 election, which would otherwise be seen as a problem in its own right; secondly, because the Labour vote at that election was depressed in part by local protest votes, so should if anything have recovered slightly – presumably nobody’s telling pollsters that if there was a General Election tomorrow they’d vote for Ajmal Masroor or Andrew Feinstein. Worst of all, neither the rise in Reform support nor the loss of Labour support was a one-off event: both were continuing processes, and as far as we can tell still are continuing processes. The Faragists are up a lot, Labour are down a lot, and there’s no end in sight.
Kellner states that one of the most significant shifts in voter opinion since the 2024 election has been a 4% shift from Labour (currently down 10%) to the Lib Dems (up 1.5%); this is second only to the 5% shift from the Tories (down 2%) to Reform UK (up 10%). (I don’t know what we do with the other 6% and 5%. I’m sure Kellner knows what he’s talking about, but I’d like to see the workings.) Diagnosis: redistribution within centre-left and centre-right blocs, Labour to Lib Dem and Tory to NF. The next stop is a familiar narrative, the secular decline of the Labour-Tory duopoly as measured in joint General Election vote share. Here are the relevant numbers (although they don’t match Kellner’s, as he was using Britain-wide statistics – more accurate, but (as I’ve found) harder to get hold of). Each of these paired charts shows the UK-wide vote distribution in nine successive General Elections, 1966-1997 and 1992-2024; two columns (1992 and 1997) are repeated, because in some significant respects those elections were both the end of something and the beginning of something else (I can be less specific).

Kellner’s time series begins in 1997 – the second column on the second row here – and on that basis he reads the data as a simple story of declining polarisation, interrupted by a single, two-election blip. The name of the blip, of course, is Brexit, which “polarised the electorate, not between left and right but between in and out”. Once that single issue had been resolved, normal politics resumed, the 2024 figure in effect picking up and continuing the steady decline of 1997-2010 (the Britain-wide figures Kellner quotes don’t have that inconvenient uptick in 2015).
As for the causes of that secular decline, you hardly need me to tell you. We’re no longer in the world where “[w]orking-class voters identified overwhelmingly with Labour, middle-class with the Tories”, or even in “the days when ‘working-class’ and ‘middle-class’ had clear-cut meanings”. On one hand, the decline of heavy industry ate into Labour’s core vote; on the other, the growing predominance of the service sector required an increasing take-up of higher education, which in turn eroded the Tory vote. These processes of disaffiliation continued, fed on each other and gained a momentum of their own, and suddenly there we were with (in the words of Kellner’s headline writer) “a tight three-way race in Britain between Labour, Reform and the Conservatives, with the Lib Dems not far behind”. Yes, the Liberal Democrats are certainly the story of the moment. I mean, they’re up a point and a half since the 2024 election, which was itself half a point higher than their 2019 result! Can’t argue with numbers like that!
Two points. Firstly, did heavy industry not decline at all before Tony Blair? Because, while the figures do show the Labour/Tory vote declining as prescribed from 1992 (high 70%s) to 2010 (mid-60%s), earlier elections – shown in the first row above – show nothing like as clear a pattern. There’s an abrupt drop between 1970 and 1974, as the Liberals establish themselves as a viable third party rather than as also-rans, but it’s a one-off; after that we’re looking at mid-70%s for both 1974 elections, 80% in 1979, 70% in 1983, then back up to the mid- and high 70%s for the next two. Unless Kellner would argue that class-based politics wasn’t declining before 1992, but fluctuating year to year – and that 1992 saw its highest level since 1979 – the ‘decline of class identification’ thesis seems to be in trouble.
Secondly, about those Brexit elections. Is it really the case that the electorate was polarised, in both 2017 and 2019, around Getting Brexit Done? Calling 2017 a Brexit election raises the question of why the Remainer bloc would rally to a party which made a lot of noise about social justice and anti-imperialism, but generally avoided saying anything about Brexit at all. In 2019 Labour was at least committed to a second referendum – but for that election the evidential bar for a Labour Remain bloc is even higher, considering that Remain-leaning centrists had been noisily dissociating themselves from Labour for most of the previous year. A simpler explanation is surely that, as much as Theresa May and Boris Johnson might have wanted it to happen, it wasn’t Brexit that polarised the vote in those two elections. At least, it wasn’t only Brexit: May and Johnson both built a substantial bloc of Tory votes by invoking Brexit, but Labour weren’t playing the same game. The 2017 vote was heavily polarised, to Left as well as Right, because Labour’s campaign was independently popular – and, just as importantly, because the Right saw this as a threat and rallied to the Tories in response. The 2019 vote in turn was rather less polarised because, while the Right continued to rally to the Tories – both for the sake of Brexit and to stop Labour – many of Labour’s voters were led astray by centrist will-o-the-wisps. To put it more bluntly, the polarisation of 2017 was partially unwound in 2019 by the operation of a third campaign, which had the wholly negative aim of disaggregating the left bloc and preventing a Labour victory under Jeremy Corbyn – even at the cost of a Tory victory. But accepting this analysis would require accepting that a left-wing Labour Party – and not the prospect of stopping Brexit – did in fact attract 40% of the vote in 2017, and that in turn would make the deterministic narrative of inexorable depolarisation fundamentally untenable. So best not go there. We don’t talk about 2017!
Simon Wren-Lewis for his part broadly accepts the “long-term depolarisation (2017 and 2019 don’t count)” narrative, but argues that the decline hasn’t been continuous. Looking at election results over a longer time period than Kellner, he identifies two ‘step changes’. The first is the enduring drop in the two-party vote which took place (as we’ve seen) in 1974, with a sharp rise in support for the Liberals. The next step change came in 2024, when the combined vote share of minor parties (and independents) topped 40%. Before going any further with Wren-Lewis’s analysis, we may pause for a moment to ask what we’re actually explaining. Hypothesising that changes in party identification happen in a kind of punctuated equilibrium, with a relatively dramatic ‘step change’ followed by a period of stability, certainly explains what happened (or didn’t happen) between 1970 and 1997. The trouble is, it supplies the same explanation for what happened between then and 2019. In particular, it treats as irrelevant the steady decline in the major-party vote between 1992 and 2010 which was Kellner’s original explanandum, incidentally removing any need to explain the return of polarisation in 2017 and 2019. It might be valid to replace a trend with “a series of step changes”, but when it’s a series of two events, fifty years apart, we may wonder how much explanatory power it can have.
In any case, Wren-Lewis has a relatively simple explanation for both step changes, based on ‘median voter’ theory. In the early 1970s public opinion shifted against trade union power and against the Labour government’s attempts at industrial management. From the point of view of the median voter, Labour had shifted to the Left; this created an open goal for the Liberals and their dynamic and personable leader. Later in the decade Margaret Thatcher’s election as Tory leader sealed the deal by shifting the Conservatives to the Right, meaning that former Conservative votes as well as former Labour votes were now up for grabs. This was the cue for a new centrist party to emerge and sweep all before it, pushing Labour’s support down below 30% and turning an unpopular Conservative leader’s single term into three (not that I’m bitter).
As for the second step change, that shoe dropped in 2024 when the median voter was deserted once more, this time by the Labour Party following the Tories to the Right. On one hand, we (in England, at least) may now be in a four- or even five-party system, with Labour unwisely scrapping with both the Tories and Reform UK over the “socially conservative/economic Right” area of a liberal/authoritarian – economic Left/Right quadrant chart. In this case Labour is likely to come out ahead, owing to its toehold in the “socially conservative/economic Left” quadrant (“the Lib Dems have a good chance of keeping their high seat total … [o]therwise the main beneficiary of this Reform/Tory battle is Labour”). If Labour are wise they will edge further into the “economic Left” and “socially liberal” zones, taking votes back from the Lib Dems and Greens while leaving the Tories and Reform UK to fight it out; if the Tories are wise (although clearly we’re moving deeper into counterfactual territory here) they will also look to their “socially liberal” flank. A couple of years of that and we’ll have three-party politics back! So, yes, 2024 was a step change, but nothing that can’t be fixed by politicians having a bit of sense.
What’s that, Sooty? What about the 2015 step change? What step change – the Tories and Labour between them took 68% of the vote in 2005, 65% in 2010 and 67% in 2015: nothing to see there, surely? Well, maybe. Let’s look at the figures another way.

The third- to nth-party vote, previously shown as a single yellow-shading-to-purple block, has been split into four categories. ‘Left’ includes the Greens/Ecology Party and all minor Left parties, including an estimate for Left independent candidates in 2024; ‘Lib/Nat’ includes the Liberals/SDP/Alliance/Liberal Democrats, the SNP and Plaid Cymru; ‘Right’ includes the National Front, British National Party, Referendum Party, UKIP, Veritas, Brexit Party and Reform UK; and ‘Other’ includes Northern Ireland parties, plus all other small parties and independents.
This doesn’t do much to the first row, but some quite interesting trends start to emerge from 1997 on. Firstly, the declining major-party vote share from 2001 to 2010 is clearly due to growth in both the ‘Lib/Nat’ bloc and the ‘Right’ bloc (up from 21% to 25% and from 2% to 5%, respectively). Secondly, 2015 sees a substantial fall in the ‘Lib/Nat’ bloc, corresponding to the collapse in the Lib Dem vote, and an almost exactly equivalent jump in the ‘Right’ bloc: the two account for 25%+5%=30% of the vote in 2010, 13%+13%=26% in 2015. (There’s also a glimmer of life on the independent Left that year, with the Greens profiting from the Lib Dem collapse and taking nearly 4% of the vote.) Thirdly, polarisation in 2017 squeezes the Lib/Nat and Left votes and collapses the Right vote, down to 11%, 2% and 2% respectively; in 2019, partial depolarisation on the Left sees the Lib/Left vote share rising to 16%, with the Right share unchanged.
An alert reader may infer from this that Corbyn’s Labour, in 2017 and 2019, was able to attract substantial numbers of 2015 UKIP voters. To that reader I would say, “yes, and a good thing too”. Also, “if only they’d gone on voting Labour, wouldn’t that have been good?”. Concluding (bet you’re wishing you hadn’t said anything now, alert reader!) with, “if you’re suggesting that Jeremy Corbyn’s brand of Labour politics might have some kind of affinity with the Faragists, you should perhaps compare his policy statements with those of the current leadership“. There’s more than one way to skin a cat, and the art of attracting Labour voters who might also find Reform UK appealing doesn’t only consist of taking a leaf out of Reform UK’s book of policies; in fact, it may not involve that at all.
None of this really figures in Simon Wren-Lewis’s model. He does acknowledge that there were changes under the surface in 2015 – “the LibDem vote collapsed, but the UKIP vote, and to a lesser extent the Green party vote, rose to almost compensate” – but under the surface is where he leaves them. But it seems to me that the UKIP vote share quadrupling in 2015 is a story in itself, not just a footnote to the Lib Dem vote falling by two-thirds (as dramatic as that was). I can only see two possible readings. One is that a far-right populist party gained a lot of support at the same time that the Lib Dems lost most of theirs (owing to disappointment/disillusionment with their role in the Coalition): this would say something alarming about the reserves of support that the far Right can tap into and the failures of gatekeeping which allowed them to do so. The other is that a far-right populist party gained a lot of support because the Lib Dems lost most of theirs. While this would suggest that there wasn’t quite so much latent far-Right support out there, it would say something almost equally alarming about the reserves of anti-political populism that the Liberal Democrats tapped into, until they discredited themselves by joining a Tory government – and in particular about their failure to develop that bloc of support, to build any kind of political consciousness beyond “the big parties are all the same”. (The alert reader from the last sidebar might say that Corbyn’s Labour didn’t do any better hanging on to the ex-UKIP voters of 2017 and 2019, to which I would say, “you’re really not letting this go, are you?” – but also “the next electoral test wasn’t till 2024, so the blame really has to lie with Starmer’s Labour”.)
Either way, what happened in 2015 really can’t be brought under the heading of “the median voter, having been deserted by both Left and Right, opted for the centre” – and what happened in 2024 certainly can’t. In 2024 the independent Left took 9% of the vote, up from 3% in 2019; the Right bloc showed even more dramatic growth, taking it from 2% up to 14%; and the Lib/Nat bloc (surely the home of the median voter) was slightly down, with 15% of the vote from 16% in 2019. (And, while a 14-day average of current polling puts the combined Lib Dem + SNP + PC vote right up at 17.5%, it also puts Reform UK on 28% – up 14% from the election.) The door that UKIP were allowed to push open in 2015 was closed firmly in 2017 by the return of left-right polarisation, and rather less firmly in 2019 by Boris Johnson’s personal hegemonisation of the Brexit vote. Come 2024, the door was wide open – and, rather than cannibalising the anti-system portion of the Lib Dem (and Green) vote, the Faragists are now preying on the main parties’ vote. The result is to drive the main parties’ support down as never before, with nobody profiting from it apart from Farage (and, to a much smaller extent, the Greens), and no reason to imagine that the process is not going to continue.
The story of 2024, in other words, is not about the centre ground or the median voter. Wren-Lewis’s summing-up
Essentially the Conservatives first moved to neoliberalism, and then to right wing populism, and now Labour has moved in that direction leaving a large part of policy space empty for other parties to fill.
is so inadequate that it would work better as the statement of the problem: if both the main parties have moved into the populist Right, leaving almost all the policy space vacant to their Left, why is it the populist Right that is profiting?
David usefully complicates the picture by bringing in turnout: not what proportion of people voted for the main parties but how many. What happens if we revisit those voting figures with that in mind, by including non-voters?

Once again, there’s nothing much to report on the top row. Turnout dips a bit in 1970 – the first election at which 18- to 20-year-olds could vote – but only to 72%; thereafter it wavers between 70% and 80% until 1992 (78%) and 1997 (71%). However, the second row shows that towards the end of the century there was a step-change in turnout, called “New Labour”: after falling from 78% to 71% in 1997, turnout falls again in 2001 to 59%, and never reaches 70% thereafter. (Even the highly polarised 2017 election only saw turnout of 69%.) The two main parties’ share of the electorate falls below 50% in 2001, and only goes above the 50% mark in 2017 and 2019. 2024 combines the depolarisation of 2015 with the disaffection of 2001, taking the Labour/Tory vote share of the electorate below 40%; for the first time, voters for the two leading parties were outnumbered by non-voters.
David suggests that the process underlying all these changes is the “disenchantment of politics by economics”: the progressive sequestration of political process from democratic control through the continuing consolidation of neoliberalism. Which, of course, was not invented in 2024, or even 1997:
[Labour and the Conservatives] have both subscribed to the Thatcherite dispensation since the late-1980s, which has ultimately put them at odds with the public. This has led both to salutary landslides, whose purpose was to “kick the bums out” … and to the determination of the political cartel and its media to extinguish any glimmers of democratic hope, as happened after 2017.
Perhaps we can tell the whole story of this period in terms of alternating waves of popular disaffection and enthusiasm, aroused by some new and different political force which seems to promise to reinvent politics – or, at least, to make it work the way it used to. While positive in itself, and a potential vector for democratic renewal, that enthusiasm is necessarily fragile – and the seeming inevitability of the moments when hope is dashed gives the returning mood of disaffection added bitterness and alienation.
- 1974: Mild disaffection with two main parties allows Liberals to establish themselves as a credible third party (step change). Two main parties’ share of vote does not go above 80% after this, with rare exceptions (1979 (81%), 2017 (83%)).
- 1979: Enthusiasm for Conservatives under Thatcher takes Labour/Tory vote share back up to 80%.
- 1983: Enthusiasm for Liberals and SDP entrenches large Lib/Nat block of votes, which in turn entrenches Conservative government.
- 1997: Enthusiasm for New Labour. Disaffection with Conservatives under Major, aggravated by seeming inevitability of Labour victory, prompts substantial alienation from democratic politics on the Right; turnout falls relative to 1992.
- 2001: Disaffection with New Labour, whose first term has redefined Labour government as managerial and politically unaccountable, hits Labour vote, driving turnout even lower (step change). Turnout does not go above 70% after this. Low turnout means that those who do vote are proportionately more likely to be motivated by ideology and/or by anti-system resentment.
- 2010: Continuing disaffection with Labour amplifies mild enthusiasm for Liberal Democrats, enabling Lib Dems to gain 57 seats on a 1% increase in vote share.
- 2015: Disaffection with Liberal Democrats, who have discredited themselves as vehicle for anti-system votes; partial reversal of first step change. Some enthusiasm for Faragists, who effectively take the place of the Lib Dems, taking the far-Right vote above 10% for the first time and legitimising their presence in mainstream politics (step change).
- 2017: Enthusiasm for Labour under Corbyn, leading to partial reversal of second and third step changes: turnout is the highest since 1997 and UKIP vote below 2%.
- 2019: Disaffection with Labour and enthusiasm for Conservatives under Johnson. Polarisation slackens, with lower turnout, higher Lib Dem and Green vote shares, and a low but targeted Faragist vote (2% overall, but with more than 100 saved deposits and four second places).
- 2024: Disaffection with the Conservatives. Some disaffection with Labour, particularly on the Left: limited gains in vote share are undercut by losses to the Lib Dems, Greens and left independents. Some enthusiasm for Faragists, but overall a general lack of enthusiasm, leading to lowest ever turnout. The Lib Dems make huge seat gains while Labour gain a large overall majority; in both cases the party’s gain in vote share since 2019 is trivial, and the number of votes cast for the party is actually down. Large-scale loss of Conservative votes to the Faragists is responsible for most Labour and Lib Dem seat gains.
Putting it all together, I think we can see that all the people I’ve cited have got part of the picture. Even Kellner was right to identify a long-running process of declining polarisation – indeed, declining political structuration of society and social life – although he was clearly wrong to date it no further back from 1997. Simon for his part was right to single out the drop in the main parties’ vote caused by the rise of the Liberals in 1974: in retrospect we can now see Jeremy Thorpe as the first prominent and successful anti-system politician in British politics. Simon was also right, or partially right, in identifying certain changes as particularly significant; I’ll even grant that 2017 and 2019 represented a partial reversal of an earlier trend, which reasserted itself in 2024, although I don’t agree with Simon (or Peter Kellner) as to how. Lastly, David was right in identifying the slump in turnout of 2001 as significant, and in naming the overall process as one of disaffection and disenchantment: a process whereby politics ceases to work, either in the sense of affecting tangible change or in the sense of commanding loyalty, making some kind of emotive sense.
I think what the above rundown of recent election demonstrates is that the process of disaffection is cumulative. A ‘step change’ is unusual not in being irreversible but simply in its scale; almost all the recent elections listed above made an enduring change (if not necessarily a permanent one) to the political landscape. Disaffection is hard to reverse – all the more so when it follows a preceding wave of enthusiasm – and, as successive elections pass, more and more political forces are hit by popular disaffection. Who now will run up flags for Margaret Thatcher (1979) or Tony Blair (1997)? Who now agrees with Nick (2010)? Who now believes Jeremy Corbyn will change the world (2017), or that Boris Johnson got Brexit done (2019)? It’s particularly noticeable that, while both Labour and the Conservatives have come back from one episode of disaffection (2001, 1997) to a renewed wave of enthusiasm (2017, 2019), in both cases a second wave of disaffection followed within a couple of years.
The cumulative effect is that, as time passes fewer and fewer people engage with politics at all – and let’s face it, voting once in five years is about as low a bar as they come. Of those who do engage, a larger and larger proportion are motivated by anti-system beliefs, while fewer and fewer have any enthusiasm for established political forces, which now come to us pre-disaffected. Small wonder that the only political forces putting on support are those which have never gone through the enthusiasm/disaffection process – and that by far the biggest gains in support are going to the one whose political programme is the clearest, the simplest, and the most intransigently and resentfully anti-system.
Is the Labour/Conservative duopoly over? My answer would be, yes, but that’s the least of our worries. I think the duopoly ended some time in June 2024, when large numbers of former Conservative voters decided that they wouldn’t continue to lend their support to Labour, but they wouldn’t go back to their old political home either. I don’t know quite what Keir Starmer did to pull the plug on Labour’s polling – which drained away from 44% to 34% in six weeks, and then went right on draining – and perhaps that’s the wrong question. Perhaps Labour’s polling had only risen as high as 44%, under Starmer’s assiduously Tory-courting leadership, because people assumed that we were still in a Labour/Tory duopoly, so that getting rid of the Conservatives would require them to vote Labour. Perhaps, once the election was called, the election result looked like a foregone conclusion, meaning that voters disaffected with the Conservatives could go elsewhere (as in 2015) or stay at home (as in 2001). Perhaps, as in 2001, disaffection with both the main parties led to an unprecedented slump in turnout, leading to wildly disproportionate results. And perhaps, as in 2015, the anti-system cynics and reactionaries of the Farage party were well-placed to profit – as they have continued to do ever since.
I don’t think 2024 was a ‘step change’, though; nothing particularly new happened. We’ve known for a long time that a political party that arouses positive enthusiasm can sweep all before it, particularly if it’s presented as in some way an outsider to or an opponent of the existing system: 1979, 1997, 2017. We’ve known for a long time that when parties lose popular support they can lose it rapidly and hard, and that a party that used to arouse enthusiasm but no longer does is as attractive as yesterday’s chewing gum: 1997, 2010, 2015, 2019. We also know that the Tories are led by people who worked with Johnson and Truss, and that Labour’s led by someone who worked with Corbyn and looks up to Blair (and how, if I were thinking about this as an ordinary punter, would that even work?). The Lib Dems haven’t put their partnership with the Tories behind them, and in any case they’re still irrelevant, having got fewer votes in 2024 than in the wipeout that cost Jo Swinson her seat. You can’t associate Nigel Farage with any of those things, though. He represents something different, without being an unknown quantity – he’s been a minor political celebrity since 2014. And it’s not like anybody’s got any problems with him – not any real problems, they would have come out by now – and he’s an MP now, so there you go. It was time for something new and different – again – and this time round the far Right supplied it. They’re good at getting a foot in the door (especially the doors of TV studios, ho ho), and this time they can claim democratic legitimacy. They aren’t going away.
Nothing particularly new happened in 2024 – nothing that wasn’t a continuation of some well-established trends. But we’re in a new situation now, and a very alarming one. There’s many a slip between now and the next election, but right now the question isn’t whether Labour and the Conservative Party will continue to dominate British politics but whether Labour and the Conservative Party will survive – and in what form.
Postscript While thinking about this morning-after revision (a bad habit of mine as a blogger), I came across this on Twitter:

Right now, I’m expecting Reform UK to form the next government. Hopefully it won’t come to that – I’ve made lots of predictions that didn’t come true, and I’d be delighted for that to be one of them. But with a Labour government like this, they’re already winning.