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This file contains a mix of benign WPF utility classes and a large, intentionally obfuscated runtime component that reads embedded resource data, decrypts/decodes it, allocates native executable memory, writes payload bytes, and patches/invokes runtime function pointers. Those operations (VirtualAlloc/VirtualProtect/OpenProcess/WriteProcessMemory, runtime pointer writes and dynamic invocation) are strong indicators of in-memory code loading/injection and runtime tampering. Given the obfuscation, SkipVerification, and native memory manipulation, treat this module as malicious or extremely high risk for supply chain attacks: it can silently load and execute arbitrary code from embedded resources and patch the process/JIT. Do not trust or run this package without full provenance and code deobfuscation and review.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The codebase contains high-risk execution paths that can be abused to run arbitrary code, spawn privileged commands, and manipulate the host file system. The Function deserialization path in /pinokio/fs and the forked worker.js execution with deserialized arguments constitute core remote code execution sinks. Privilege escalation via sudo_exec, combined with expansive filesystem mutations and network exposure, create a substantial security risk if this module is deployed in any environment reachable by untrusted users. Immediate hardening is required: disallow dynamic Function creation from client input, sandbox or restrict worker execution, enforce authentication/authorization on sensitive endpoints, sanitize inputs, and audit data exposure through /raw, /pinokio/fs, /env, and related paths.

This module implements a covert HTTP tunneling SOCKS server (client-side of an HTTP-based tunnel) that forwards arbitrary local TCP/SOCKS traffic to remote web endpoints using randomized headers and encoded payloads. That functionality is potentially malicious in most contexts because it provides a stealthy remote-access/data-exfiltration channel and can be used to bypass firewall controls. If found in a dependency or package, it should be treated as high risk and investigated/removed unless you explicitly expect this behavior and trust the remote endpoints and accompanying server-side component (tunnel.php).

The code enables dynamic generation and execution of code obtained from external sources, plus inter-process communication via a dill-serialized meta payload. This creates a substantial surface for supply chain and runtime attacks if the sourceCode or meta payload are untrusted. While the module might be intended for legitimate dynamic demos, the combination of spawning a background process, using dill.loads on external content, and deserializing potentially untrusted data constitutes a real security risk. It should be treated as moderately to highly risky until sourceCode and meta payloads are strictly validated, sandboxed, or signed.

This VS Code extension reads project environment variables (including JSON‐formatted .env contents) into LocalStorageService and then automatically posts those storage objects to a hard-coded external endpoint: https://webhook[.]site/5735b3ca-a2d0-4759-80c1-392f3d2439cd. It also issues a GET to a remote API to decrypt a token (RestConstants.DECRYPT_CLOUDLAB_TOKEN), potentially enabling further telemetry, and contains logic to back up and overwrite Python test files in the user’s workspace. The combination of unauthorized data exfiltration and silent file manipulation constitutes malicious behavior.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code operates as a malicious dropper/loader: it decodes an embedded payload, writes it to disk, executes it without validation, and cleans up. This creates a strong risk for remote code execution, persistence, and potential data exfiltration. The inline payload and immediate execution pattern indicate a severe supply-chain/security risk and should not be trusted.

The code is designed to collect and transmit sensitive system information to a remote server, which constitutes a serious security risk and is indicative of malicious behavior. The use of a potentially suspicious domain further raises concerns about the intent of this code.

Live on npm for 17 days, 12 hours and 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment is an opaque, binary/packed payload or heavily obfuscated content that cannot be reliably analyzed statically. While this alone does not prove malicious intent, it signals high risk and warrants isolation, request for a readable source or deobfuscated form, and controlled dynamic analysis to determine any harmful behavior or data leakage potential.

This module contains multiple strong indicators of malicious and dangerous behavior: hardcoded credentials for PyPI, self-modifying/self-deleting code, arbitrary shell execution driven by inputs and environment variables, runtime installation of packages, decryption and execution of encrypted payload files, destructive filesystem operations, and process-killing on Windows. These behaviors can enable remote code execution, data loss, unauthorized package publishing, and covert execution of hidden payloads. Do not run this code in production or on sensitive systems. Treat it as malicious/untrusted and remove or quarantine it.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code demonstrates highly suspicious behavior: it overwrites critical library files with an uploaded file without validation or integrity checks, enabling potential backdoors or supply-chain tampering. The silent error handling hides failures, increasing risk of unnoticed manipulation. This is a high-risk pattern and should be avoided or strictly gated with proper validation, integrity checks, and access controls.

This code fragment is highly suspicious and likely malicious. It exfiltrates system hostname and a project identifier to an external domain commonly used for security testing but also for malicious data collection. The disabling of TLS verification further suggests intent to bypass security controls. The code poses a significant security risk and should be treated as malware with data theft capabilities.

Live on npm for 13 hours and 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a mix of legitimate error handling functionality and highly suspicious, likely malicious behavior characteristic of ransomware. There is a high probability that this package is intended to cause harm by encrypting user files without consent and then providing instructions or a ransom note.

Live on npm for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module proxies many LinkedIn operations through a hardcoded external API and repeatedly sends the user's LinkedIn session cookies (li_at and JSESSIONID) in the JSON body to that third-party endpoint. That pattern constitutes likely credential exfiltration and account takeover risk. Do not use this package with real LinkedIn session tokens. Replace the proxy endpoint with trusted code or remove sending cookies to external services. Overall, this is a high-risk supply-chain behavior (exfiltration of authentication cookies).

This script is a high-risk launcher: it unconditionally fetches Python code from a hardcoded remote repo and executes it locally via a shell-invoked Python process while passing unsanitized user inputs directly into the shell command. Even if the upstream repository is currently benign, the pattern enables trivial supply-chain compromise and shell injection. Mitigations: remove runtime download-and-exec; if fetching is necessary, pin and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures, validate content, avoid os.system (use subprocess with argument lists or importlib), sanitize inputs, and add error handling and logging. Treat this module as unsafe in security-sensitive environments until hardened.

This module is high risk. It intentionally hides behavior via base64 + zlib packing and executes it automatically on import. That prevents meaningful static review and enables arbitrary actions in the importing process. Do not import or run this package in production or on sensitive hosts. Decode and audit the decompressed payload in a controlled, isolated environment before using.

Live on PyPI for 2 days, 22 hours and 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information and files to a remote server, which is indicative of malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 6 days, 17 hours and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This setup script contains multiple high-risk, malicious behaviors: it overwrites pip's module file with the contents of another module, executes destructive shell commands (rm -rf) and makes persistent filesystem modifications (symbolic links, copying modules) under /content, and contains a utility that can delete all files in a directory. These actions can subvert package manager behavior and persist code in user environments (e.g., Colab). Do not run or install this package. It is likely a supply-chain sabotage/backdoor attempt.

The code is designed to collect and send sensitive information to a remote server without the user's knowledge or consent. It poses a high risk of data exfiltration and should be reviewed thoroughly.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 53 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This file contains a mix of benign WPF utility classes and a large, intentionally obfuscated runtime component that reads embedded resource data, decrypts/decodes it, allocates native executable memory, writes payload bytes, and patches/invokes runtime function pointers. Those operations (VirtualAlloc/VirtualProtect/OpenProcess/WriteProcessMemory, runtime pointer writes and dynamic invocation) are strong indicators of in-memory code loading/injection and runtime tampering. Given the obfuscation, SkipVerification, and native memory manipulation, treat this module as malicious or extremely high risk for supply chain attacks: it can silently load and execute arbitrary code from embedded resources and patch the process/JIT. Do not trust or run this package without full provenance and code deobfuscation and review.

The code contains a critical security flaw: untrusted input can be executed via eval(op), enabling arbitrary code execution. The presence of an incomplete assertion at the end adds unreliability and potential crashes. While there is a structured path for known operations, the fallback to eval constitutes a severe vulnerability that undermines supply-chain safety for any package exposing decode_op. Recommend removing eval usage, implementing a safe expression evaluator or whitelist, and adding robust input validation and error handling.

The codebase contains high-risk execution paths that can be abused to run arbitrary code, spawn privileged commands, and manipulate the host file system. The Function deserialization path in /pinokio/fs and the forked worker.js execution with deserialized arguments constitute core remote code execution sinks. Privilege escalation via sudo_exec, combined with expansive filesystem mutations and network exposure, create a substantial security risk if this module is deployed in any environment reachable by untrusted users. Immediate hardening is required: disallow dynamic Function creation from client input, sandbox or restrict worker execution, enforce authentication/authorization on sensitive endpoints, sanitize inputs, and audit data exposure through /raw, /pinokio/fs, /env, and related paths.

This module implements a covert HTTP tunneling SOCKS server (client-side of an HTTP-based tunnel) that forwards arbitrary local TCP/SOCKS traffic to remote web endpoints using randomized headers and encoded payloads. That functionality is potentially malicious in most contexts because it provides a stealthy remote-access/data-exfiltration channel and can be used to bypass firewall controls. If found in a dependency or package, it should be treated as high risk and investigated/removed unless you explicitly expect this behavior and trust the remote endpoints and accompanying server-side component (tunnel.php).

The code enables dynamic generation and execution of code obtained from external sources, plus inter-process communication via a dill-serialized meta payload. This creates a substantial surface for supply chain and runtime attacks if the sourceCode or meta payload are untrusted. While the module might be intended for legitimate dynamic demos, the combination of spawning a background process, using dill.loads on external content, and deserializing potentially untrusted data constitutes a real security risk. It should be treated as moderately to highly risky until sourceCode and meta payloads are strictly validated, sandboxed, or signed.

This VS Code extension reads project environment variables (including JSON‐formatted .env contents) into LocalStorageService and then automatically posts those storage objects to a hard-coded external endpoint: https://webhook[.]site/5735b3ca-a2d0-4759-80c1-392f3d2439cd. It also issues a GET to a remote API to decrypt a token (RestConstants.DECRYPT_CLOUDLAB_TOKEN), potentially enabling further telemetry, and contains logic to back up and overwrite Python test files in the user’s workspace. The combination of unauthorized data exfiltration and silent file manipulation constitutes malicious behavior.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code operates as a malicious dropper/loader: it decodes an embedded payload, writes it to disk, executes it without validation, and cleans up. This creates a strong risk for remote code execution, persistence, and potential data exfiltration. The inline payload and immediate execution pattern indicate a severe supply-chain/security risk and should not be trusted.

The code is designed to collect and transmit sensitive system information to a remote server, which constitutes a serious security risk and is indicative of malicious behavior. The use of a potentially suspicious domain further raises concerns about the intent of this code.

Live on npm for 17 days, 12 hours and 27 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The fragment is an opaque, binary/packed payload or heavily obfuscated content that cannot be reliably analyzed statically. While this alone does not prove malicious intent, it signals high risk and warrants isolation, request for a readable source or deobfuscated form, and controlled dynamic analysis to determine any harmful behavior or data leakage potential.

This module contains multiple strong indicators of malicious and dangerous behavior: hardcoded credentials for PyPI, self-modifying/self-deleting code, arbitrary shell execution driven by inputs and environment variables, runtime installation of packages, decryption and execution of encrypted payload files, destructive filesystem operations, and process-killing on Windows. These behaviors can enable remote code execution, data loss, unauthorized package publishing, and covert execution of hidden payloads. Do not run this code in production or on sensitive systems. Treat it as malicious/untrusted and remove or quarantine it.

This fragment intends to install and start KasmVNC by running many shell commands that create certs, write VNC password files, adjust group membership, and launch a VNC server. The primary security issues are unsafe shell interpolation (command injection risk), programmatic persistence of a possibly predictable password, execution with sudo based on unvalidated env vars, starting a VNC server exposed on 0.0.0.0 with disabled/basic auth, and multiple unsafe filesystem operations performed via shell. There is no clear evidence of obfuscated or direct exfiltration malware, but the behavior can provide an unauthorized remote access vector (backdoor-like) if used maliciously. Do not run this code without fixing shell usage, validating inputs, using secure randomly generated passwords, enforcing proper file permissions, and not disabling authentication.

The code demonstrates highly suspicious behavior: it overwrites critical library files with an uploaded file without validation or integrity checks, enabling potential backdoors or supply-chain tampering. The silent error handling hides failures, increasing risk of unnoticed manipulation. This is a high-risk pattern and should be avoided or strictly gated with proper validation, integrity checks, and access controls.

This code fragment is highly suspicious and likely malicious. It exfiltrates system hostname and a project identifier to an external domain commonly used for security testing but also for malicious data collection. The disabling of TLS verification further suggests intent to bypass security controls. The code poses a significant security risk and should be treated as malware with data theft capabilities.

Live on npm for 13 hours and 12 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code contains a mix of legitimate error handling functionality and highly suspicious, likely malicious behavior characteristic of ransomware. There is a high probability that this package is intended to cause harm by encrypting user files without consent and then providing instructions or a ransom note.

Live on npm for 2 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This module proxies many LinkedIn operations through a hardcoded external API and repeatedly sends the user's LinkedIn session cookies (li_at and JSESSIONID) in the JSON body to that third-party endpoint. That pattern constitutes likely credential exfiltration and account takeover risk. Do not use this package with real LinkedIn session tokens. Replace the proxy endpoint with trusted code or remove sending cookies to external services. Overall, this is a high-risk supply-chain behavior (exfiltration of authentication cookies).

This script is a high-risk launcher: it unconditionally fetches Python code from a hardcoded remote repo and executes it locally via a shell-invoked Python process while passing unsanitized user inputs directly into the shell command. Even if the upstream repository is currently benign, the pattern enables trivial supply-chain compromise and shell injection. Mitigations: remove runtime download-and-exec; if fetching is necessary, pin and verify cryptographic hashes or signatures, validate content, avoid os.system (use subprocess with argument lists or importlib), sanitize inputs, and add error handling and logging. Treat this module as unsafe in security-sensitive environments until hardened.

This module is high risk. It intentionally hides behavior via base64 + zlib packing and executes it automatically on import. That prevents meaningful static review and enables arbitrary actions in the importing process. Do not import or run this package in production or on sensitive hosts. Decode and audit the decompressed payload in a controlled, isolated environment before using.

Live on PyPI for 2 days, 22 hours and 54 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

The code is designed to exfiltrate sensitive system information and files to a remote server, which is indicative of malicious behavior.

Live on npm for 6 days, 17 hours and 58 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.

This code implements an insecure, unauthenticated RPC mechanism that allows remote clients to cause arbitrary code execution and exfiltrate files/system information. Using pickle over an untrusted network and invoking methods by client-supplied names are severe supply-chain/backdoor risks. Do not deploy or reuse this code in production; it should be treated as a backdoor/untrusted remote-execution component unless wrapped with strong authentication, authorization, sandboxing, and safe serialization.

This setup script contains multiple high-risk, malicious behaviors: it overwrites pip's module file with the contents of another module, executes destructive shell commands (rm -rf) and makes persistent filesystem modifications (symbolic links, copying modules) under /content, and contains a utility that can delete all files in a directory. These actions can subvert package manager behavior and persist code in user environments (e.g., Colab). Do not run or install this package. It is likely a supply-chain sabotage/backdoor attempt.

The code is designed to collect and send sensitive information to a remote server without the user's knowledge or consent. It poses a high risk of data exfiltration and should be reviewed thoroughly.

Live on npm for 3 hours and 53 minutes before removal. Socket users were protected even while the package was live.