By Robert F. Fortuin

After being asked to respond to David Bentley Hart’s provocative substack reflections on Neo-Palamism,1 I’m taking the opportunity to revisit the essence/energies distinction and to argue that Neo-Palamism deserves a firm, grateful Heave Ho. Hart’s polemic against Neo-Palamism is memorable partly for its stylistic relish and partly for the severity of its verdict (nothin new under David’s sun): Neo-Palamism is “a silly school of thought” that has “done grievous harm” to Orthodox self-understanding. Yet the deeper philosophical interest of his essay is not the insult; it is the diagnosis. Neo-Palamism—at least in the modern form Hart has in view—does not merely propose an imprecise distinction between divine essence and “energies.” It reconstructs the past, narrows the range of legitimate Orthodox thought, and installs a metaphysical architecture that subtly changes the grammar of God, the Trinity, and theosis.
In what follows, I want to build on Hart’s critique by naming a pattern that helps connect his metaphysical objections to his sociological and ecclesial ones. I will call that pattern ontological quarantine: the impulse to protect transcendence by placing God behind an ontological barricade, then offering a regulated form of access to what has been cordoned off. If this sounds more like cultural theory than theology, that is exactly the point: a metaphysics can become a strategy of identity and control. Hart hints at this when he says Neo-Palamism functions like “grand systems of ideological or institutional or ethnic identity,” involving a “reconstruction of the past” that can be “violent or confining.” Ontological quarantine is how that reconstruction becomes spiritually persuasive.
The burden of my claim is simple: a quarantined God is not the God of Nicaea, and a quarantined theosis is not deification but managed proximity. The tragedy, if Hart is right, is that the quarantine has come to be mistaken for Orthodoxy itself—especially by those “recent converts who have been fooled” into thinking Neo-Palamism is “convertible with Orthodoxy as such.”
Neo-Palamism builds a barricade and calls it intimacy
Hart’s most incisive observation is that Palamas (whatever his own coherence) aimed to articulate and defend the possibility of divine intimacy with deified creatures, while Neo-Palamite frameworks often sound like they are doing the opposite: building an “insurmountable barricade” between God’s “eternal energies” and God “in himself.” If that is accurate, it is not merely an interpretive mistake; it is an inversion of the spiritual telos. Theosis becomes a doctrine about why we cannot touch God, rather than how God has drawn near.
Here is where ontological quarantine clarifies the dynamics. Modern Eastern Orthodox imaginations—formed by a strong apophatic instinct, and often by a certain philosophical anxiety about the limits of creaturely knowing—are tempted to treat God’s essence (ousia) not merely as inexhaustible but as absolutely unknowable in such a way that any immediate communion with God must be ruled out in principle. God becomes the ultimate unapproachable reality: not simply beyond comprehension, but beyond any immediate encounter with God “as God is.”
Quarantine is comforting because it seems to preserve two claims at once:
- Transcendence: God remains inaccessible “in himself,” the ousia sealed off from creaturely participation; and
- Religious access: we still have a robust spiritual life because we can “participate” by way of something else: God’s operations, effects, “energies,” or modes.
But notice the cost: the very structure meant to safeguard the unknowability of the ousia risks reifying that unknowability into a metaphysical architecture: a real, not conceptual distinction in God; that is to say—essence behind, operations in front so that transcendence becomes not simply the infinite depth of God, but a kind of ontological remoteness. What begins as apophatic humility can harden into a layered model of God, where God’s essence is treated as a distinct, unreachable object and “energies” function as an intermediate zone of contact. And when Hart complains that Neo-Palamites expend “neurotic” energy insisting on the barricade, he is diagnosing not reverence but a pathology of mediation: the fear that any claim of immediate communion would trespass upon the inviolability of the divine essence.
A quarantined God, on this model, is not primarily worshiped as Father, Son, and Spirit encountered in the economy of salvation; rather, God is approached through a metaphysical interface that promises genuine participation while ensuring that the ousia remains untouched, unentered, and functionally absent from communion.
Essence and operations: everyone distinguishes—so what is the dispute?
Hart insists (correctly it seems to me) that “all Christian tradition, East and West,” distinguishes divine essence from divine operations, and that the question is whether this is a conceptual distinction or a real one. That move matters because it deprives Neo-Palamite apologetics of its favorite posture: We have a unique Orthodox metaphysical key that the West lacks. Hart’s counterclaim is: no, everyone has the distinction; what differs is the ontological weight assigned to it. This is where philosophical precision is indispensable. A conceptual distinction can mark two true ways of speaking about one and the same reality: God as unknowable in essence, God as knowable in action; God as infinite depth, God as self-manifestation. A real distinction, however, implies that there are two (or more) ontologically distinct items: essence as one “thing,” operations as other “things,” perhaps multiple operations each with their own subsistence.
The logic of ontological quarantine pushes toward the real distinction, because quarantine is only effective if what mediates is not simply a way of speaking but a reified layer. If “energies” are merely the living God in act, then the barricade collapses. If “energies” are ontologically distinct, then the barricade stands: you can have communion with what is “of God” without communion with God “in himself.” The quarantine has been secured.
Hart believes that once you do this you have left the mainstream patristic grammar behind: Neo-Palamism is “irreconcilable with the Eastern Patristic tradition,” including the Cappadocians and Maximus. Indeed. But whether one accepts that full historical claim or not, the philosophical point is yet sharper: a real distinction in God invites composition. It turns God into a layered reality. And a layered absolute is not absolute.
The “logical cypher” problem: why a real distinction fails even as metaphysics
Hart’s metaphysical critique peaks in his claim that “the very notion of a real distinction of essence and operations is a logical cypher,” one that “means nothing much even in regard to finite beings,” and is “preposterously nonsensical” when applied to the infinite God. That is a strong charge, but it can be stated as a crisp argument:
- If essence and operations are really distinct in God, then either God is composed (essence + operations), or there is some further principle that unites them, or they are simply un-unified.
- If composed, God depends on constituents and is not ultimate.
- If united by a higher principle, that principle is more ultimate than God.
- If not unified, God is internally divided.
A real distinction therefore runs afoul of the doctrine of divine simplicity. The typical attempt to avoid this, claiming the distinction is real but “not like creaturely composition”, often sounds like an exemption from intelligibility. One may certainly say God is not comprehensible; but to say the doctrine is not even coherent is a different matter. Hart’s point is that the real distinction, as often deployed, is not merely mysterious but vacuous.
Ontological quarantine again helps explain why such a logically unstable notion can nevertheless feel compelling. When a community needs an identity marker, a “clear enunciation of a true Orthodox system,” as Hart describes the historical conditions, coherence can be traded for boundary maintenance. A doctrine can function as a badge even if it is metaphysically brittle.
“To be is to act”: the metaphysics of presence and the illusion of a hidden substrate
Hart’s section title “To be is to act” signals that the dispute is not only about a particular distinction, but about the basic metaphysical grammar of being. David argues that in finite beings there is a conceptual distinction between essence and any particular activity, but that we do not treat the activity as something ontologically other than the agent. He pushes the thought further: what is an operation “other than a mode of real presence,” and what is real presence “other than the immediate reality of an ‘essence’”?
This is the point at which ontological quarantine is revealed as a category mistake. Quarantine imagines essence as a hidden substrate behind presence, a “thing unto itself” separable from manifestation. But that is precisely the metaphysical picture that classical theism resists. God is not a substrate. God is not an entity that “has” operations the way a creature “has” actions. If God is the source of being, then God is pure actuality actus purus and thus cannot be divided between what God is and what God does. Hart recounts being “corrected” by David Bradshaw, who suggested God must have unrealized potential because God could have created infinitely many worlds he did not create. Hart treats this as philosophical ineptitude, and rightly so, but the deeper point to be made here is metaphysical: Bradshaw’sargument imagines God as a being among possibilities, standing before external options, defining himself by a choice among them. That is exactly the “modern” picture of freedom many analytic philosophers assume. And it is precisely the picture that the patristic insistence on divine simplicity is meant to refuse.
A quarantined God is typically a God with “room” in himself—unrealized potential, internal reserve, layers of accessibility. But the God of Nicene metaphysics is not a being with internal slack; God is infinite fullness. If one accepts that, the real distinction between essence and operations becomes not a safeguard but a distortion.
The trinitarian corruption: essence as an object “distinct from the Trinity”
Hart’s “greatest objection” is that Neo-Palamism corrupts both trinitarian theology and metaphysical cogency. The trinitarian critique is perhaps the most theologically consequential: Neo-Palamite discourse can depict the divine essence as an unattainable object “distinct from the order of trinitarian relations.” Hart even cites the notorious formulation ascribed to Palamas: “In God, there are these three: the essence, the trinity, and the energies”—a statement Hart calls clumsy.
Why is this so destructive? Because Nicene trinitarianism is not a theory about three divine individuals “over there” and an essence “behind” them. The logic of Nicaea is that we know God as Father, Son, and Spirit precisely through the economy of salvation: the Spirit unites us to the Son, and thus we are brought into the presence of the Father. The “taxis” of trinitarian relations is known through the “taxis” of the economy, and this depends on the absence of any subsistent mediation between us and God.
But ontological quarantine requires mediation. It requires something that is “of God” but not God-in-himself. That is why quarantine tends to push the Trinity to the margins: the Trinity becomes, at best, a community of hypostases behind the energetic interface. The “energies” do most of the work; trinitarian relations become an afterthought.
This is not merely a doctrinal inconvenience. It changes the meaning of deification. If theosis is entry into trinitarian life, then any framework that places an ontological layer between us and that life risks turning theosis into participation in a divine periphery rather than communion with God.
The sociological engine: identity systems, reconstruction, and convert enforcement
Hart’s essay is not only metaphysics; it is ecclesial sociology. He explains why Neo-Palamism gained prominence: it filled a vacuum, served a survival strategy for embattled churches, and offered an identity differentiator, especially against Roman Catholic manualist Thomism. Then he adds the sharper claim: the system’s triumph has been enforced with “strident” zeal by “converts who know nothing of the wider tradition,” producing an “incalculable impoverishment” of Orthodox intellectual life.
This is the social ecology of ontological quarantine. Quarantine is not only about God; it is about boundaries: who is “inside” true Orthodoxy and who is suspect. A doctrine becomes attractive as a marker precisely when it can be used to police belonging. Once it becomes a marker, its metaphysical deficiencies can be ignored because its social function is fulfilled.
Hart’s recounting of the effacement of Byzantine scholasticism and suspicion of the Russian Silver Age illustrates how a system can “reconstruct the past” and confine present imagination. Neo-Palamism, in this telling, becomes not an interpretive option but a gate: it tells you which Fathers count, which centuries matter, which modern Orthodox thinkers are “gnostic,” which philosophical vocabularies are permitted. Sounds familiar?
This is why Hart is so harsh with the claim that many converts have been “fooled” into equating Neo-Palamism with Orthodoxy. The question is not whether converts are sincere; it is whether the system they inherit has been packaged as “the tradition” in a way that flattens the tradition’s actual plurality.
Ontological quarantine thus appears as a spiritual-political technology: it provides a metaphysical rationale for why God must remain behind a boundary, and an ecclesial rationale for why Orthodoxy must remain behind a boundary to safeguard against the corruption of the West.
The analytic infection and the domestication of mystery
Hart adds an especially modern twist: Neo-Palamism in the Anglophone world has been amalgamated with analytic philosophy of religion—often through former evangelicals accustomed to formalizing fundamentalism. That is significant because it reveals a peculiar double movement:
- Neo-Palamism is marketed as mystical, anti-scholastic, beyond “logic-chopping.”
- Yet it is increasingly expressed in the idioms of analytic metaphysics, with their own hidden assumptions about possibility, freedom, and being.
This is not a harmless translation. Analytic habits tend to treat “possibility” as a landscape of options external to the agent and “freedom” as selection among those options. That model almost forces the Bradshaw-style claim that God has unrealized potentials because he could have done otherwise.
But if God is the infinite act of being, “possibility” cannot be an external field in which God is a chooser. The more one imports that model, the more one is tempted to picture God as finite—qualified by relations, modified by choices, internally structured by options. Hart thinks Maximus would have found this abhorrent.
Ontological quarantine thrives in such conditions because it can appear as a solution to analytic anxieties of converts. If God is one item among many, we need a theory of access and mediation. If God is pure act, we do not.
Toward an unquarantined transcendence: what the essence/operations distinction should do
If the real distinction collapses into incoherence or composition, why does the essence/operations language persist? Because it is genuinely useful when used as a conceptual distinction that protects two truths simultaneously:
- God is incomprehensible (no finite concept exhausts God).
- God is immediately present (God is not hidden behind a layer of being).
An “unquarantined” account would say: we encounter God in God’s operations not because operations are something other than God, but because our knowledge of essence is always knowledge of essence as in act. Hart appeals to John of Damascus precisely to show that knowing a thing through its operations does not imply operations are ontologically distinct entities; it is how all knowledge works—of God and neighbor alike. The traditional wisdom here is not “God is behind a curtain,” but “God is inexhaustible.” Inexhaustibility is not distance; it is depth. The error of ontological quarantine is to treat depth as separation.
If we accept Hart’s principle that “all ousia is parousia” that being is presence, presence is encounter, then the “energies” are not a buffer zone but the living God as personally present. Theosis then becomes intelligible again: not attachment to divine emanations, but participation in the trinitarian life into which the Spirit incorporates us.
Theosis without intermediaries: communion as participation in trinitarian life
Hart’s claim that Neo-Palamism undermines theosis is not incidental; it is central. He argues that Gregory of Nyssa condemned Eunomius’ proto-Palamite move because it renders deification “fundamentally meaningless” by breaking the logic of Spirit–Son–Father communion. If there are enduringly subsistent, ontologically distinct “energies” mediating between creature and God, then deification risks becoming participation in those entities rather than entry into God’s own life.
An unquarantined vision of theosis emphasizes that:
- The Spirit’s indwelling is not contact with an intermediary level but immediate union with God.
- The Son is not a veil behind which essence hides; the Logos is the eternal manifestation of divine depth.
- The Father as archē is not a metaphysical object “distinct from the Trinity” but the personal source of the one divine life.
On this account, transcendence is not secured by distance but by the very fact that the divine life we enter is inexhaustible. We do not become God by nature; we participate by grace in the divine communion. No quarantine is required because intimacy does not threaten God’s otherness; it reveals it as non-competitive.
Why the quarantined God became plausible: modernity’s allergy to immediacy
It is worth asking why ontological quarantine has such appeal now. Modernity has trained many of us to believe that immediacy is either impossible or dangerous:
- In epistemology: immediacy sounds naïve; everything is mediated by language, culture, interpretation.
- In politics: immediacy sounds authoritarian; power must be checked by procedures.
- In technology: immediacy is risky; access must be gated by interfaces.
Hart is outraged because, on his reading, this is not merely a modern adaptation but a betrayal of Nicene logic. The Fathers did not invent intermediaries to protect God from us; they confessed that God gives himself: Spirit to Son to Father, in the economy that reveals the eternal life. This also explains why the quarantine approach can be so attractive to converts. Converts often need clarity; they want a system. In a fragmented world, a system that claims to be uniquely “Orthodox” and absolutely necessary for theosis is intoxicating. Hart notes exactly this apologetic posture: the essence/energies distinction is treated as uniquely Orthodox and indispensable.
Once the doctrine becomes the badge of authenticity, its internal incoherences become less visible, because its primary work is social and psychological.
A constructive proposal: replace quarantine with covenantal immediacy
If one wants to preserve what is spiritually motivating in Neo-Palamite language (God’s unknowability, the reality of participation) without importing the quarantining structure, one might reframe the entire matter in a more personalist and trinitarian key:
- Essence names God’s inexhaustible depth: God is never captured by our concepts.
- Operations name God’s personal self-giving: God is truly present, truly acting, truly encountered.
- The distinction is conceptual (our modes of speech and knowledge), not an ontological cleavage within God.
This framing preserves both apophatic humility and sacramental realism without turning divine transcendence into a locked room.
It also undercuts the tendency to treat the Trinity as decorative. If God’s operations are God’s presence, then God’s presence is trinitarian: the Spirit unites to the Son, the Son brings to the Father.
There is no “third realm” of energies between us and God.
Ending where Hart ends: the curious triumph of a “rickety” touchstone
Hart closes with astonishment: how strange that a “rickety” and “jarringly un-patristic” school has become the touchstone of Orthodoxy for so many, even for those who presume to speak for “the tradition of the fathers.” That line can sound like mere lament, but it names a genuine philosophical and ecclesial problem: when identity systems capture a tradition, they often mistake the badge for the body.
Ontological quarantine is a name for that capture at the metaphysical level. It is what happens when a tradition, anxious to preserve transcendence or distinctiveness, reimagines God as an inaccessible core and reimagines participation as regulated contact with a mediating realm. It is not simply a bad theory; it is a posture toward God. And it has consequences: it can impoverish intellectual life, flatten historical memory, marginalize trinitarian grammar, and turn theosis into something like managed exposure to divine “energies.”
If Hart is right, the antidote is not to reject all distinctions, nor to collapse mystery into easy familiarity, but to recover a more classical metaphysics of presence: to be is to act; God is pure act; and the divine life we enter by grace is not behind a barricade, but infinitely deep. Unquarantined transcendence is not less reverent. It is more trinitarian. It dares to say that the God who is incomprehensible is also the God who gives himself—without intermediaries—because the only “distance” between creature and Creator is not a metaphysical wall but the joyful, endless asymmetry of participation: ever truly united, never exhausted, always drawn deeper into the life of love and knowledge that is God. For that we will have to give the Heave Ho to Neo-Palamism.
Footnotes
1 David Bentley Hart, “Thoughts In and Out of Season 16,” Leaves in the Wind (1 July 2025).








