The departure of Iran’s Supreme Leader – Ali Khamenei – has left a power vacuum in the country, a filling process to which the ongoing war and uprising bring their own twists. Formally, the new Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts (an 88-member expert body). The process is not a direct popular election, but an internal religious-political decision. As an interim solution, especially now during wartime, a leadership council bears the responsibility for his duties instead of a single Supreme Leader.
I personally see three different, more or less likely scenarios for Iran’s leadership during or immediately after the war:
A change of the power structure through an uprising towards parliamentarism,
The theocratic power structure remains, with continuity through a new leader,
The theocratic power structure transforms in a more technocratic, reformist direction, allowing superficial reforms and improvements in human rights.
The following is my assessment of the scenarios based on the situation on March 5, 2026.
Revolution through Uprising
If the Iranian uprising continues for a longer period, i.e., weeks, it could lead to a revolution, especially if the leadership and equipment of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) are significantly destroyed, and particularly if the army opens its weapons arsenals and/or the IRGC technocrats defect to the side of the uprising to preserve their economic and other interests.
Reza Pahlavi, Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0
A successful uprising would lead to an interim administration, with Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi likely as its formal leader. He is very popular among the diaspora; within Iran, opinions are divided and familiarity is weaker. In the absence of better-known or more prominent opposition figures, the Crown Prince, as a unifying factor, could lead the country to free elections and the replacement of the previous clerical rule with parliamentarism. The new parliament could then decide on the country’s constitution and, for example, whether the country develops into a constitutional monarchy or a traditional Western-style democracy.
A New Leader for the Old Power Structure
The Assembly of Experts has delayed the election of a new Supreme Leader under wartime conditions. Based on general analyses, the leading candidates in the current situation, assuming they are still alive, are as follows:
Mojtaba Khamenei Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0
1️⃣ Mojtaba Khameneiis the son of the slain former leader, Ali Khamenei, and has close ties to the Revolutionary Guard. He holds no official position in the top leadership but is often mentioned as a behind-the-scenes influencer. If the choice leans towards ensuring continuity, he is likely the next Supreme Leader of Iran.
2️⃣ Sadeq Larijani has been prominent during the war. He is a former head of the judiciary and a member of the Guardian Council, has long experience at the core of the system, and represents the conservative line.
3️⃣ Hassan Khomeini is the grandson of the charismatic founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and holds religious authority. He is perceived as more moderate than others and is therefore not the favorite of the system’s hard core.
4️⃣ Alireza Arafi is a member of the Assembly of Experts, holding a high religious position but with a lower political profile compared to others. He currently serves on the interim leadership council.
The Structure Remains by Reducing Theocracy and Increasing Technocracy
Hassan Khomeini, Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0
A key power factor is the IRGC, which can guide the Assembly of Experts’ choice behind the scenes. The pragmatic wing of the Revolutionary Guard would likely favor a candidate who guarantees its economic and military advantages. In this scenario, the religious leader would be more symbolic – with real power residing with the security apparatus.
Mojtaba Khamenei is the strongest guarantor of continuity, but his tenure could be very short if the war continues. The ongoing elimination of IRGC and religious “ultra-conservative” leaders could increase the importance of pragmatists.
In this scenario, Hassan Khomeini could, in theory, symbolize a “softer” phase of the system. Currently, the hardline IRGC or hardline clergy would not support him, but the situation could change with the war. Khomeini’s strength is his strong symbolic religious capital through his heritage, and his moderate image appeals to some reformists. Hassan Khomeini could also appeal to nostalgic circles of the revolution.
Hassan Rouani, Credit: Wikipedia, CC BY-SA 2.0
Another possible leader in this scenario, perhaps even more reform-minded but still preserving the structure, could be Iran’s former president, Hassan Rouhani. Although he is a cleric, he was not elected to the Assembly of Experts for being too moderate. Even though Rouhani is a long-time insider of the system (IRGC + conservative clergy), he is considered less reliable by the current IRGC, precisely because of his perceived pro-Western stance, for example, during the nuclear deal negotiations. Rouhani, as a technocrat, could, in my view, gain the support of reformists and the middle class and might engage in genuine dialogue with representatives of the uprising.
Epilogue
Of the three scenarios mentioned above, I consider the change of the power structure through an uprising the most desirable, while also deeming it the least likely option in the short term. Elections and parliamentarism do not in themselves guarantee a democratic, moderate Iran, as seen, for example, in the Palestinian territories following elections. In my view, democracy can be guaranteed by the Iranians themselves, who, unlike the Palestinians, represent an ancient culture that has kept them largely immune to decades of hate indoctrination. Especially the educated urban youth are oriented towards a better future, rather than wallowing in the past and hatred of Israel. I believe this internal force will lead to success in the longer term.
In the short term, Iran’s Assembly of Experts will likely elect Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader, and after his possible demise, a similar leader from the hard core of the power structure (IRGC + conservative clergy). As the war continues, the hard core will lose members and power to technocrats and pragmatists.
A critical factor for the outcome is when the war ends. The United States faces great internal pressure to end the war quickly, and President Donald Trump will likely make a deal at the first opportunity to celebrate a great victory and his own excellence. In that case, Israel’s activity regarding Iran would also decrease; it might prefer to focus its military efforts on disarming Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran’s technocratic leadership could very well make a new nuclear program deal and other formal concessions to ensure peace and preserve its power.
In my opinion, the most desirable outcome would be for the war to continue at least long enough for the hard core of Iran’s power structure to break, ensuring the possibility of replacing the theocratic system.
The Israeli and US airstrikes on Iran – which I have referred to in my previous articles as “Operations Rising Lion + Midnight Hammer II 2026” – began on the morning of February 28, 2026, as part of a coordinated operation that Israel called Operation Lion’s Roar and the US Operation Epic Fury.
As I see it, the momentum of the Iranian uprising in the coming days will be: will it succeed in breaking the oppressive regime maintained by the theocratic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or will there only be a change of power with the oppressive regime continuing in a weakened form after the current air operation ends.
The following is my initial assessment of the progress of the operation.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has reported that it has struck around 500 targets in Iran (air defense, ballistic missile armaments, command centers, nuclear-related targets). Around 200 Israeli aircraft participated in the strikes. The United States, in turn, launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at Iranian targets as part of the same campaign. According to unofficial estimates, over 800 strikes were carried out in the first ~12 hours, based on combined separate sources.
This is the largest airstrike in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). IAF Commander Major General Tomer Bar calls the strike (codenamed Genesis) the opening operation of Operation Roaring Lion, also describing it as a strong start. The operation was now exceptionally carried out mainly during the day due to the massive equipment in the air. No losses have been reported, so apparently the remnants of Iranian air defenses were completely destroyed.
According to the United States, its strikes have sunk at least nine Iranian warships – including a Jamaran-class corvette – during the latest operation. According to President Trump, the United States will continue the operation and ultimately aim to destroy or sink the entire Iranian navy.
In addition to the IRGC command centers (the HQ was also destroyed) and other military targets, the operation has at this point targeted the country’s political elite and government buildings more widely than I expected. Of particular note is the elimination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which exceptionally also took place during the day as soon as intelligence determined his real-time whereabouts. Other strikes have eliminated a significant part of the defense forces and the IRGC’s top leadership.
The Israeli-American strikes eliminated more than 40 Iranian top-level commanders and officials during the initial strike. The following is a list of the most prominent high-ranking Iranian government and military leaders who have been reported dead:
Ali Khamenei: Iran’s supreme leader and long-serving supreme leader. Ali Shamkhani: Former secretary of the National Security Council and a senior security official. Mohammad Pakpour: Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (head of the ground forces). Aziz Nasirzadeh: Iranian Minister of Defense. Saleh Asadi: IRGC Head of Intelligence Directorate (Khatam-al-Anbia Central Directorate). Hossein Jabal Amelian: Chairman of the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) and senior military research director. Reza Mozaffari Nia: Former SPND director and key figure in weapons development programs. Abdolrahim Mousavi: Chief of General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces. Majid Mousavi: IRGC Aerospace Force commander. Gholamreza Rezaian: Commander of the Iranian Police Intelligence Organization (SAFA). Mohammad Baseri: Senior intelligence official (Iranian Foreign Ministry spy chief).
Of the individual attacks, the missile strike that destroyed the Minab girls’ school was particularly devastating, killing mostly schoolchildren, from a few dozen to 148. The school in question is 600 meters from a Revolutionary Guard base, such a large deviation is rare during precision missiles. It is unclear whether the destruction was caused by an Israeli/US strike or whether it was the result of Iran’s own malfunctioning/deflected missile.
Iranian counterattacks
According to Israeli sources, just under a hundred Israelis have been wounded in Iranian counterattacks, especially with ballistic missiles.
What surprised me in the early stages of this operation was the number of ballistic, cruise and anti-ship missiles and drones launched by Iran, even though the main targets of the USA and Israel were precisely the missile locations and launch pads.
In the table below, I have compiled the missiles launched by Iran at Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East over a two-day period. In the absence of official data, the figures are rough estimates.
If the figures are correct in their magnitude, it can be estimated that Iran will still be able to launch a similar number in the coming days before Iran’s missile and anti-ship arsenal is practically exhausted.
The Momentum of the Uprising
President Trump has stated that after the current attack, the overthrow of the theocratic regime is in the hands of the Iranian people themselves and that the US and no one else is sending ground troops to carry out the regime change.
Before the attack, there were anti-regime protests in Iran involving millions of people, which spread across the country to more than 400 cities and 31 provinces. The regime’s repressive measures and internet shutdowns made and continue to make the uprising difficult. Since the attack, the most visible form of protests in Iran – supported by state media – have been rallies in defense of the regime and against foreign attacks, which have attracted tens of thousands of citizens, even more than the citizens who celebrated the death of Ali Khamenei. The situation may naturally change if the regime’s opponents manage to mobilize better in the context of the war or if the security forces end their heavy fire support.
On the second day of the attack, President Trump said he was ready to negotiate with the post-Khamenei regime in Iran. This could be a serious setback for the uprising. It is quite possible that the most pragmatic members of the clerical regime, the Revolutionary Guard, and the regime’s technocrats would accept Trump’s terms for a nuclear-free Iran and perhaps even get sanctions lifted. It would be pointless to dream about democracy and broader human rights, although as a bonus, the use of the headscarf might not be so strictly monitored anymore – the structures of the theocratic system would remain almost unchanged. It is also possible that the negotiations will not lead anywhere, and it will be seen whether Trump will implement a phase 2 operation to destroy the IRGC and the current regime. I personally do not trust the implementation of phase 2 anymore because Trump is under domestic pressure to declare a major victory as soon as possible.
Israel and the United States will probably continue airstrikes for a few more days, after which the Iranian missile threat will probably be removed, at least for the time being. I think that without weapons, the uprising will not happen and weapons will be available if the army opens its arsenal and/or there are splits in the security apparatus as the elite fights to fill the power vacuum created by Khamenei’s departure. So the momentum is there, the coming week will show which way the situation will turn.
Iran is under constant internal and external pressure, marked by widespread protests, economic damage from sanctions, and repression. Despite this pressure, the regime has remained intact. The Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij have maintained their loyalty and operational effectiveness, and there are no signs of significant defections in the armed forces (Artesh). The situation may become slightly more favorable for the uprising if Israel and the United States carry out a more extensive attack on the structures of Iran’s theocratic repressive regime than last year’s 12-Day War.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the United States to discuss regional issues in the Middle East with US President Donald Trump and his aides, particularly the coordination of a possible joint attack on Iran.
President Trump also stated after the talks, “I’m going to talk to the Iranians as long as I want. If we don’t make a deal with them, we’ll go to phase two. Phase two is going to be very difficult for them. I don’t expect that.”
Trump also asked Prime Minister Netanyahu not to surprise him with Iran, which was described as possibly implying that Israel would not launch a preemptive strike.
US Strike Readiness Strong and Growing
The INSS interactive map below highlights the deployment of US military assets and other relevant actors in the region. The current configuration conveys deterrence and readiness for offensive military operations while reflecting a strong desire to avoid a protracted conflict. Combined with Israeli actions and diplomatic communications, this configuration supports coercive diplomacy. The map is updated regularly and as accurately as possible based on open source intelligence and media reporting.
US forces in the region are ~40,000. The USS Abraham Lincoln-led carrier strike group operates off the coast of Oman with the AIS system disabled, with the carrier carrying F-35C, F/A-18E/F, EA-18G and E-2D squadrons. In addition, 8 × Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in the Arabian Sea, eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea. The air force continues to operate mainly in Jordan with ~36 × F-15E Strike Eagle fighters as anti-strike assets, as well as increased strategic and tactical airlift operations (C-5, C-17, KC-135, KC-46).
The mobility of US air defenses and the deployment of THAAD systems underscore regional readiness: Satellite images show US forces at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar loading missiles onto truck-mounted launchers, allowing for faster movement and rapid deployment, as well as the repositioning of strike or defensive positions.
Amid rising tensions with Iran, the US has deployed all THAAD systems at Muwaffaq al-Salt Air Base in eastern Jordan, including a command and control unit, an AN/TPY-2 radar, and six launchers, for a total of 36 interceptor missiles. Iranian media released a video threatening to strike Muwaffaq al-Salt Air Base in the event of war.
The force in the region is also set to grow in the coming weeks. The US has ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford-led carrier strike group to move from the Caribbean to the Middle East. The USS Gerald R. Ford is the world’s largest and most advanced aircraft carrier and is expected to arrive in the region in the coming weeks, where it is expected to operate alongside existing US naval forces.
📡 The Trump administration also secretly sent about 6,000 Starlink satellite internet terminals to Iran after Tehran cracked down on nationwide protests and the subsequent internet shutdown last month.
Israel ready to strike
Israel has been ready to strike Iran since late last year, as well as to repel a potential attack from Iran. In recent weeks, readiness has been increased, including by increasing reservist air warfare exercises. The operational readiness of Iron Dome has also been significantly increased in recent weeks, reflecting enhanced preparations for possible future conflict scenarios.
Israel has continued to equip and expand its already extensive local field organization in Iran. These cellular groups are tasked with monitoring targets – missile installations, research facilities, factories, IRGC and Basij command centers, as well as their researchers and leaders – and, if necessary, carrying out sabotage operations. This is precisely the intelligence that Israel provided to the United States during Netanyahu’s visit.
Israel announced on February 11, 2026, that it had completed tests of its upgraded David’s Sling air defense system. The Israeli Defense Ministry said in a statement that the tests were conducted by the Israel Missile Defense Agency in cooperation with the US Missile Defense Agency and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. “The test series was built on operational experience gained from recent combat and included a wide range of challenging scenarios that simulated existing and emerging threats,” the statement said.
The David Sling is designed to counter a variety of threats, including rockets, missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. According to unconfirmed reports, the upgraded David Sling can also be used to counter ballistic missiles. If so, the cost of countering it would be reduced from about €2.5 million to about €1 million per interception compared to the Arrow system, which is mainly used.
My final assessment: Strike before summer -26
Iran’s diplomatic negotiations with the United States appear to be about buying time rather than a genuine effort to defuse the situation. The United States has signaled that it is open to a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue, although it is unclear whether this reflects a sustainable or comprehensive approach. Iran, in turn, has stated that it refuses to negotiate on its nuclear and missile programs or support for its foreign proxy armies. On this basis, any kind of agreement – at least one that is acceptable to Israel – is highly unlikely, and a military solution is expected.
The movements of US, Israeli and also Iranian forces suggest preparation for a possible US attack on Iranian resources rather than mere symbolic posturing. The composition and messages of the forces reflect a credible readiness for military action, albeit with ongoing efforts to keep diplomatic channels open.
In my opinion, the attack on Iran will take place by early summer at the latest, so that the excessive strengthening of Iran’s missile forces (capacity, development work, moving launch sites further east, restoration of underground production facilities) can be prevented. President Trump is setting aside about a month for negotiations, and during this time Israel will not attack Iran independently, but together with the US or alone when the negotiation path has been exhausted.
“Look at Somaliland’s strategic location and you will understand everything.” (Israeli political official)
After recognizing Somaliland’s independence, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar revealed that Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi secretly visited Israel last summer, meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Sa’ar, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and Mossad Director David Barnea. Sa’ar also posted a photo of himself with the president. Sa’ar arrived on an official visit to Somaliland on January 6, 2026, where he also met with the country’s president.
Since Israel announced its recognition of Somaliland on December 26, 2025, a wave of condemnatory statements has swept across the Arab world, expressing support for the Somali state and its right to self-determination. As part of the growing backlash, Somalia has requested an urgent debate in the United Nations Security Council on Israeli recognition of Somaliland; the debate took place on December 29, 2025 and did not result in any condemnatory resolutions or even votes.
UAE
One country that did not explicitly condemn Israel was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is also a member of the Abraham Accords. This was no coincidence: in recent years, reports have indicated that the UAE has been developing relations with Somaliland, even though it has not officially recognized it as a state.
Credit: Grey Dynamics, public domain The United Arab Emirates has a military base in the port city of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden after the Somaliland parliament approved the base in 2017. In return, the UAE was to train Somaliland’s armed forces. Berbera is located less than 300 kilometers south of war-torn Yemen, where UAE forces have been fighting the Iran-allied Houthi group since 2015.
The Berbera military base includes an air base, a naval base, hangars and logistics. Berbera’s runway is about four kilometers long, allowing heavy aircraft and fighter jets to land. The field is also planned to be used for civilian air traffic.
Credit: Grey Dynamics, public domain Satellite images show expansions by 2025 (including underground hangars, new piers). On December 28, 2025, Paltimesnews claimed that Israel had built 12 underground hangars for fighter jets and drones. Somaliland denied the claims of an Israeli military base or the reception of Palestinians in exchange for recognition in January 2026.
Credit: Grey Dynamics, public domain
While the Somaliland Defense Forces – strength of about 12,500 soldiers in mechanized brigades – focus mainly on internal operations in the border areas, logistics and maritime surveillance (piracy, smuggling) have been carried out from Berbera. The UAE operates Yemen-related operations from there (e.g. drones, navy). No active offensive operations of Somaliland.
It should be noted that the UAE has already shown its activity in addition to operations in Yemen, striking, among other things, a clan leader who opposed their access to Puntland’s gold and mineral deposits.
Somaliland Security Environment
Grey Dynamics is a London-based independent intelligence firm founded in 2017, specialising in advanced analysis and threat intelligence, providing actionable insights to government, military and private sector clients. A recent Somalia analysis summarypublished on 29 December 2025 states the following:
The armed conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Jubaland administration shows no signs of abating, despite mediation efforts by their mutual ally Kenya. The FGS and Jubaland administration are likely to continue military coordination to retake towns captured by Al-Shabaab in July 2025.
The FGS has a unique political and economic dynamic; it has six federal member states, two of which are the semi-autonomous Jubaland state and Puntland state, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Since July 2025, the FGS and the Jubaland administration have been engaged in a violent conflict that has resulted in civilian deaths. This is likely to continue unabated unless the allied countries engage in immediate mediation.
Somalia is also a victim of the Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremist group Al-Shabaab. In July 2025 alone, it captured several strategic towns across Somalia. In order to retake the towns captured by Al-Shabaab, the Federal Federal Armed Forces and the Jubaland administration must continue to coordinate their military operations.
Puntland, Somaliland, and Jubaland are rich in natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical rare earth minerals. The potential for economic growth has attracted several countries and non-state actors, all competing for control of these natural resources.
New confrontation with Turkey
Turkey has significantly expanded its influence in Somalia in recent decades. This is based on a strategy combining soft and hard power: humanitarian aid, infrastructure projects, military cooperation and economic investments. Turkey maintains its largest foreign military base in Somalia; Camp TURKSOM (in Mogadishu, opened in 2017): has trained over 15,000 Somali soldiers, including special forces (Gorgor commandos).
Under a 10-year defense and economic agreement signed in 2024, Turkey will protect Somali maritime areas, build a navy and patrol the waters (in exchange for economic benefits).
Turkey supplies drones (e.g. Bayraktar), weapons and intelligence support, making it a key partner of the Somali National Army (SNA). As AU forces withdraw. Turkey also controls key infrastructure, including the Mogadishu airport and port.
President Erdogan called Israel’s recognition of Somaliland “illegal and unacceptable,” accusing Israel of destabilizing the region.
My View
Somaliland was historically a British protectorate and briefly gained independence in 1960 before merging with Somalia. Due to political instability and conflict, it later declared independence.
⚓ Somaliland is located near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a major global shipping route; an estimated 12% of world trade passes through it. Now, the port of Berbera is becoming a strategically important trade and logistics hub. The port and military base are seen as a vantage point for monitoring the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandab Strait, monitoring Yemeni military activity, including missile and drone launches, and monitoring Iranian naval movements.
This role fits in with Israel’s broader efforts to balance the influence of key regional powers, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and Turkey’s expanding strategic presence in Somalia. In particular, the recognition of Somaliland creates a new – Hamas, Gaza, Syria, Kurds – confrontation between Israel and Turkey.
Logistical and military access to the port of Berbera could provide broader options for naval or air force deployments and facilitate supply and support operations in the Horn of Africa.
Main points of the background of Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” according to AI Grok
Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, commonly known as Irro (or Cirro), is the sixth and current President of Somaliland ( assumed office on 12 December 2024). He is an experienced diplomat, politician and statesman whose career spans diplomacy, business and politics.
Born on 24 or 29 April 1955 in Hargeisa, his father was a member of the British colonial police force. His mother, Amina Jama Ashuur, died when Irro was a child.
Primary and secondary education in Somaliland: Master of Business Administration (MBA) from the United States; degrees and diplomas in African studies, conflict resolution and economics from institutions in Russia, the United States and Ethiopia.
Began his career in Somalia in the 1980s: worked at the Settlement Development Agency (Dan-wadaagaha) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1981 to 1996.
Moved to Finland with his family in 1996 due to the civil war, obtained Finnish citizenship and was in the process of establishing a Somali diaspora community in Helsinki.
Returned to Somaliland in 1999, initially worked as an investor and development project manager; founded the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID) opposition party in 2001/2002 with Faisal Ali Warabe, was elected to parliament in 2005 and served as Speaker of the House of Representatives from 2005–2017 – the longest-serving speaker in Somaliland’s history.
Founded the Waddani Party in 2012, which became the leading opposition party. Presidential candidate in 2017, received 41% of the vote, narrowly losing to Muse Bihi Abdi (55%).
Won the presidential election on 13 November 2024 as the Waddani candidate with ~64% of the vote; peaceful transfer of power.
Irro is known for his calm, consensus-seeking leadership style, multilingualism (Somali, English, Arabic, Russian, Finnish), and commitment to democracy. During his term, Israel became the first country to recognize Somaliland in December 2025, which was a significant diplomatic achievement.
Israel’s victorious seven-front war is now in a lull in December 2025. As for Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, the Middle East is in a state of hiatus, a new war on these fronts could escalate at any time in the next couple of months. Iran’s proxy armies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the arming Palestinian territories are gathering their forces but, in my opinion, are not capable of a significant, larger-scale attack on Israel.
On the first civil front – the information war – Israel is still losing. Hamas has succeeded in its marketing campaign, among other things by spreading massive disinformation, in gaining support for its cause in the West, and since its massive terrorist attack on 7/10/2023, anti-Semitic attacks have multiplied worldwide and especially in the West. The situation may now be improving as the disinformation transmitted by Hamas and even uncritically shared by Western countries, as well as the misinformation propagated by the UN and other organizations about starvation and genocide, is revealed. The participation of Muslim countries in the peace plan, which has also been discussed at the UN, paves the way for the search for peaceful solutions.
The second civilian front, or home front, in Israel seems to be returning to the pre-war era with the peace plan, with the stance on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the reform of the judiciary and the extension of conscription to members of religious extremist groups as sticking points.
Gaza
On October 9, 2025, US President Donald Trump’s so-called 20-point peace plan for Gaza, which was later approved by the UN Security Council, was also signed. The first phase of the plan included, among other things, the handover of hostages taken by Hamas to Israel, the release of Palestinians sentenced or detained by Israel, a ceasefire, increased humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army (IDF) to the so-called Yellow Line within 72 hours. Now, almost two months after the agreement, the first phase is still underway, with Hamas delaying, in particular, the handover of the bodies of the dead hostages. Hamas has used the time to execute and eliminate its local opponents in Gaza and to attack Israel across the Yellow Line. The latest example of the “civil war” in Gaza is the leader of the anti-Hamas militia, Yasser Abu Shabab, who led the “people’s forces” allied with Israel against Hamas. He was seriously wounded, evacuated to Soroka Hospital in Israel, and died of his injuries there.
All this so that the second phase of the peace plan – including, among other things, the disarmament of Hamas – could not begin.
There are conflicting reports about Hamas’s grip on Gaza and its future plans as the first phase of the ceasefire draws to a close. In practice, Gaza is divided: The eastern sector, known as the “Green Zone,” lies east of the Yellow Line and is under full IDF control. This Green Zone is home to five Palestinian militia groups that oppose Hamas and provide an internal counterweight to Hamas’s influence in the area. The western area, the “Red Zone,” is under Hamas control, extending west of the Yellow Line. At its widest point, this Hamas-controlled strip is about 5 km wide. Between the Philadelphia Corridor on the Egyptian border and the Red Zone, Israel maintains a 1.7 km wide corridor that it controls. This strip is intended to prevent smuggling and to prevent the flow of weapons and supplies into Hamas-controlled territory.
The most recent body released from Gaza has been identified as Sudthisak Rinthalak, a native of northern Thailand who had been working in Israel as a farm laborer since 2017. On October 7, a total of 39 Thai citizens were murdered and 31 were taken prisoner. Israeli police officer Ran Givili, who is said to have eliminated 14 terrorists before he was killed and his body was taken to Gaza, remains hostage in Gaza.
Lebanon
The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, which was signed a year ago, is breaking down. Lebanese sources claim (whether it was a deliberate leak or not) that the decision to attack Lebanon has already been made, and was “leaked” by high-ranking Americans.
The Israel Defense Forces have begun construction of a new concrete wall on the northern border at the tip of Jal al-Deir – opposite the village of Maroun al-Ras. The new fence is reportedly located about two kilometers inside Lebanese territory. Israel is pressuring the Lebanese army to search for Hezbollah weapons in private homes in the south after the group repositioned itself (after finding extensive rocket launchers in people’s attics and bedrooms). Lebanon is slowing down, fearing unrest and an expansion of the operation that could trigger a new conflict.
According to a Lebanese source, the United States gave Lebanon a month (actually until the end of the year) to resolve the issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament, the United States has begun evacuating embassy personnel, and Israel is launching targeted strikes and is awaiting Hezbollah’s response. Syrian regime leader Julian Assange has reduced surveillance of border crossings with Lebanon, allowing Hezbollah to increase arms smuggling.
Direct talks between Israeli and Lebanese civil authorities were held on December 4, 2025, in Naqoura, on the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanese border, under the leadership of US Ambassador Morgan Ortagus. Israel was represented in Naqoura by Uri Resnick, a senior official in the National Security Council, and Lebanon by Simon Karam, a Maronite Christian who previously served as Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations. Representatives from the Israel Defense Forces, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and the United Nations also attended the meeting. The meeting was rare in that it was the first direct meeting between Israeli and Lebanese civilian officials since the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.
The talks focused not only on the implementation of the 2024 ceasefire agreement, but also on issues such as the maritime border, gas exploration, the return of residents to border communities and even possible cooperation in agriculture. The entire process is underpinned by the US demand for Hezbollah to disarm by December 31.
Iran
The Institute for National Security Studies claimed that Iran has sent Hezbollah around $1 billion in the past four months through smuggling routes in northern Iraq, Syria and Turkey, despite an unprecedented domestic water crisis, ongoing power outages and severe air pollution. Intelligence sources reveal that Iran is rapidly arming Palestinian factions in Judea and Samaria through Hezbollah and Syrian smuggling networks. The weapons include missiles, explosive drones, anti-tank guided missiles (RPGs). According to reports, Syrian authorities have relaxed controls on the Lebanese border, allowing Hezbollah to rearm with more than 4,000 rockets and 250 drones. This escalation underscores Tehran’s broader regional strategy to entrench proxies beyond Israel’s borders.
In November, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a new resolution demanding access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and information on Iran’s uranium stockpiles at facilities targeted by the United States and Israel. Iran has given no indication of what happened to these stockpiles. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated publicly that the agency was ready to continue inspections and re-engage with Iran, but so far the Iranians are not interested in any kind of cooperation.
Several Israeli news sources have reported, citing unnamed Israeli security officials, that a new “preventive measure” against the Iranian regime’s ballistic missile program is considered “imminent.” Officials are concerned that the program is rapidly recovering and expanding, and assessments suggest that Israel may act again to disrupt its growing capabilities.
Iran’s proxy armies
Iran has reportedly transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah over the past year through a network of companies based in Dubai. Political tensions between Iran and Lebanon have risen after remarks by a senior adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, who claimed that Hezbollah’s existence was more important to Lebanon than bread and water. Iran and the Houthis condemned the Israeli military’s operation to arrest terror suspects in Beit Jinn, southern Syria. Iran’s foreign ministry praised the “resistance” of young Syrians in the face of “Israeli aggression.”
“Expert sources in Yemen” claimed that there are differences of opinion among the Houthis over the movement’s continued relations with Iran. The report states that the Houthi movement is in a phase of reorganization, with two competing approaches to the extent of relations with Iran and the level of independence that the Houthis should maintain in the next phase: the “independence stream,” which includes young field commanders and influential figures who believe the movement has reached a position where it can make its own military decisions without turning to a de-empowered Iran; and the “full-connection stream,” which includes Houthi ideological and cultural leaders who see Iran as a strategic guarantee of the Houthis’ existence and argue that any attempt to break away from it would expose the Houthis to a regional and international confrontation that they cannot tolerate.
Arab media claims that the reorganization of the Houthi movement is a competition between two different approaches to the future of relations with Iran. A senior official in a pro-Iranian Iraqi militia said they were working with the Houthis to upgrade their military capabilities and threatened to prepare an updated list of targets that would “harm the usurping community [Israel]” if a new campaign broke out. The US special envoy for Syria and Lebanon reportedly warned the Iraqi prime minister that Israel would attack Iraq if the militias helped Hezbollah.
Iraq’s pro-Iran Nujaba movement claimed that the Iraqi “resistance movement” was working with the Houthis in Yemen to “upgrade their weapons and military technology” in preparation for future operations. In an interview with Iran’s Tasnim news agency, al-Yasser said that the Houthis’ advanced missile technology, precision operations, and GPS technologies opened up space for broader cooperation that the militia could use to develop its own capabilities.
According to Kurdish sources, the Iraqi Committee for Freezing Terrorist Assets has frozen all movable, immovable and financial assets of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement and the Yemeni Ansarullah movement (Huthi), citing their “participation in a terrorist attack”.
The situation in Syria is volatile. Israel is bracing for the possibility that extremist groups such as ISIS and others could take control of Syria if al-Sharaa is assassinated. This reflects growing concerns that the internal collapse in Syria could open the door for jihadist organizations to expand their influence on Israel’s northern front. On the other hand, the current Syrian regime has – unofficially – indicated that there is no obstacle to the establishment of an American base in the Damascus area to ensure stability in southern Syria.
The recent Israeli ground attack in the Beit Jinn area of Syria has angered Syrians, who have pressured their government to retaliate. Israeli officials said the operation targeted Hezbollah and Hamas members operating in Syria who were planning imminent attacks against Israel. The village of Beit Jinn has served as a terrorist base.
Famine at the forefront of information warfare
“They couldn’t find a famine – so they made one” (COGAT)
From the very beginning of the war, Hamas has been marketing the Israeli-caused famine in Gaza. UN agencies and the media “bought” these stories for political reasons.
Richard Goldberger, a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, bluntly states:
“The IPC quietly changed its guidelines only for Gaza, hoping that no one would notice before an unfounded famine declaration could be made. This is not just a potential global fraud; it is a serious undermining of the important guidelines and measurement standards that aid agencies follow in areas in need around the world.”
The recent resignation of the BBC management after an internal report showed that much of the BBC’s reporting on Gaza was deeply flawed and contained manipulated material, quotes from terrorists and terrorist sympathizers posing as impartial observers, and outright lies. (Previously, the BBC’s senior management resigned due to systematic bias regarding Gaza and the editing of Trump’s speech).Yle, which operates in Finland, has not yet revised its policy, let alone dismissed it.
With the help of the information war, Hamas managed to mislead the UN and other organizations and the media, as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC), which justified the arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant on the grounds that starvation was used as a tool of warfare and a crime against humanity.
Home Front
“What is needed is bold, determined and transformative leadership. Leadership that both recognizes failures and dares to drive change. Not leadership that intimidates and suppresses, but leadership that uplifts – leadership that inspires. Not leadership that evades, but one that looks the truth in the eye and sets a new direction.” (IDF Commander Eyal Zamir)
According to reports, Prime Minister Netanyahu has decided in the coming weeks to push through controversial legislation that would formalize draft exemptions for Israel’s ultra-Orthodox minority. Logically, this is the only way to prevent early elections (which he has reportedly been considering in recent weeks) now, and the only way to hold on to his ultra-Orthodox partners after the next election.
Netanyahu may face opposition within his own ruling Likud party, with up to five coalition lawmakers reportedly opposing the bill, drafted by Netanyahu ally Boaz Bismuth. Bismuth replaced Yuli Edelstein as chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.
The draft law for the ultra-Orthodox has been a long-standing challenge. For the prime minister, it pits his commitment to his ultra-Orthodox allies in protecting and maintaining the religious studies of ultra-Orthodox men against the nation’s desire for a more even burden-sharing. The problem has been exacerbated by the disproportionate sacrifices made by reservists over the past two years.
The scandal pits coalition politicians against the judiciary, in parallel with a controversial judicial reform that was widely discussed in the months leading up to October 7 and has been a source of intense public discord in Israel. A good background on this topic is in BICOM’s analysis The ultra-Orthodox and the future of the People’s Army .
In addition to the ultra-Orthodox conscription law, Israeli domestic politics is characterized by an ongoing dispute between the government and the Supreme Court (judicial reform) and, now, a new issue, the pardon application submitted by Benjamin Netanyahu to President Isaac Herzog. The president is currently considering the conditions under which the pardon could be granted in order to end the corruption and other trials that have been going on against Netanyahu for years and to remove the threat of punishment against him.
Epilogue
Events in the Middle East have a much greater significance than the regional conflict, both indirectly through the media and directly through the parties to the conflict. For example, the disarmament of Hamas is not necessarily limited to Gaza. On November 19, 2025, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced the end of a complex counter-terrorism operation carried out in cooperation with Mossad and European law enforcement agencies. The operation led to the dismantling of a Hamas network preparing terrorist attacks in Europe. According to the announcement, arrests were made in Germany, Austria and Great Britain, and large weapons caches were found in Austria and possibly elsewhere. The terrorists coordinated their activities with Hamas operatives in Turkey and Qatar.
In summary, I estimate that the ceasefire in Gaza will end at the turn of the year when Hamas refuses to lay down its weapons and when the international forces under the peace plan do not disarm, this will remain the responsibility of the IDF. In Lebanon, the ceasefire with Hezbollah could end in the same way after the turn of the year, although there are hopes that US pressure will finally get the Lebanese government to act as planned in the ceasefire agreement; according to some estimates, there is a growing shift in Lebanese thinking – more and more people now see that dismantling Hezbollah serves the interests of Israel, Lebanon and the whole world. In Iran, a repeat of the 12-day war is, in my opinion, very likely at any time, as Iran continues its nuclear and missile programs. In Syria, Israel is trying to get the al-Sharaa regime to commit to a demilitarized southern Syria.
Simhat Torah Day, October 13, 2025, will remain indelible in Middle Eastern history: The Gaza War is over, and both Israelis and Palestinians have celebrated the release of hostages and their ransoms. President Trump – the undisputed hero of the day – gave a long speech in the Knesset to thunderous applause and live coverage by international news agencies, then headed straight to Egypt for his 20-point peace plan in Sharm el-Sheikh in the presence of more than 20 heads of state.
The Swords of Iron War is over. Israel has all its hostages back and defeated Hamas as a military force. As a side effect, Israel won on six other fronts, destroying Iran’s “Ring of Fire” against Israel.
On the eighth front – the information war – Israel is still losing. The situation is now improving as the disinformation conveyed by Hamas and even uncritically shared by Western countries, as well as the misinformation about starvation and genocide propagated by the UN and other organizations, is being exposed.
In the midst of joy, we must remember the multifaceted conflict between Israel and the so-called Palestine and the broader context of the Middle East, as well as the time frame associated with resolving these. In addition to the implementation of Phase 2 of the Gaza peace plan and the reconstruction of Gaza, the normalization of Israel’s relations with the wider Arab and Muslim world and the vision of a future Palestinian state are also on the agenda for the future. The implementation of these entities may take decades.
With the remaining hostages presumably released within a day, intensive negotiations will continue to implement the next stages of President Trump’s 20-point peace plan. Hamas has only agreed to a ceasefire and the release of hostages, the release of about 2,000 detained or convicted Palestinians paid as ransom, and the return of a Palestinian who died in custody.
It is unclear if Hamas will hand over the remains of its all dead hostages or whether it considers the rest as bargaining chips in coming negatiations.
The situation in Gaza is, in my opinion, somewhat chaotic for the next few days and perhaps weeks. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announces that Israel will destroy the rest of Hamas’s weapons depots and workshops and destroy the rest of the tunnel network. Of the estimated 700 km long “Gaza Metro”, a couple of hundred km are still to be destroyed, mainly in the Gaza City area. This could not be done before because the core Hamas forces and their hostages were in the tunnels.
During the weekend before the liberation, several Palestinian media sources reported on violence between Palestinians, as some 7,000 Hamas members quickly regained control of the areas ceded by the Israeli Defense Forces and clashed with rival clans. For example, on Sunday 12.10.25 Hamas killed 52 members of the Dagmoush clan, losing 12 fighters themselves; on the same day, in clashes between the clans, among others, Palestinian influencer Saleh al-Jafaravi, known as Mr FAFO, was killed. The situation further complicates the next phase of the agreement, which is intended to include the disarmament of Hamas.
Continuing the peace process
“I can say that a two-state solution is in Israel’s strategic interest. And I know that the path is no less important than the goal.”(Yair Golan)
The central themes of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit are the establishment of a Hamas-free administrative body in Gaza, the formation of a multinational security force, and the disarmament of Hamas. In all of this, a central role – in leadership – will be played by Arab and Muslim countries, who will also bear the main responsibility for financing the reconstruction of Gaza.
As the situation calms down and the international administration assumes a leadership role in Gaza, the implementation of the future-oriented part of the peace process should begin, which in my opinion should include the Palestinians living in the West Bank.
One central issue not only for Gaza but also for the broader Palestinian entity is the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza. In Trump’s 2020 peace plan, this was conditional on several reforms, and in the new 20-year plan, Article 19 seems to be in line with this. The reforms include provisions on the rule of law, economic reform, an end to incitement and changes to school textbooks, and a weapons monopoly for the PA’s civilian law enforcement agencies.
The plan recognizes Palestinian “aspirations” but does not guarantee a state as an outcome. Palestinian self-determination is therefore conditional on attention to a reformed PA.
In my opinion, the time for recognizing a Palestinian state is when the current quasi-state of Palestine meets the criteria for a state according to the Montevideo Agreement (permanent population, delimited territory, government and the ability to enter into relations with other states). In this case, the two-state solution widely supported by the international community could be realized.
Of course, the outcome of the negotiation and development process may be some other solution than a unified Palestinian state. In a two-entity solution, Israel could continue as a traditional state, but the Palestinian entity could be formed, for example, on the basis of an emirate model or be a self-governing territory or part of a federation or confederation.
In my opinion, a good basis would be if the final phase of the peace process that followed the Oslo Accords (1993-1995), which led to the impasse at Camp David (2000), were continued until an actual peace agreement through direct or mediated negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian representatives should not be representatives of terrorist organizations – such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc. If you remember from recent history, there was no negotiation with ISIS/Daesh or Al-Qaeda, they were destroyed.
In order to secure a permanent peaceful coexistence in the territory of the desired Palestinian state, I believe that a process of deradicalization of the population should be implemented in the same way as was done in Germany and Japan after IIMS.
After the fighting ended, the armed factor that contributed to Hamas’s departure from Gaza is that most of Gaza is a ruined and uninhabitable demolition site, meaning that Gazans no longer have homes to return to. Making Gaza habitable requires clearance work, in which booby traps and explosives in the ruins are dismantled. This clearance work is expected to take at least a year and even longer if the bodies are searched for under the rubble. More time and difficulty will come if the contaminated soil is replaced, for example to remove asbestos, a popular building material in Gaza. However, this will probably be necessary for both the safety of the builders and the health of future residents.
After the clearance work, new construction can begin, and once financing is arranged, it is estimated to last at least 10-15 years.
The Israeli religious far-right’s dream of a new settlement in Gaza, the return of Gazans to their homes, and the tourist destinations of Trump’s Riviera are not realistic for a decade or so. Instead, humanitarian aid – regardless of different visions of the future – was needed earlier and is now even more urgent.
Humanitarian city
“The enemy of a good plan is the dream of a perfect plan.”(Carl von Clausewitz)
Given the time required to clear and rebuild the Gaza “demolition site,” the Israeli government and IDF’s plan to establish a “humanitarian city” in Gaza, which I previously presented on July 14, 2025 in my article “A Humanitarian City in Gaza?,”becomes even more timely.
According to the Israeli government, the “humanitarian city” will initially house 600,000 Palestinians who currently live in tents in the overcrowded al-Mawas area on the southern coast of Gaza. Ultimately, however, the entire population of the area, over two million people, is planned to be relocated there. According to Israeli media, construction could take more than a year and cost up to 15 billion shekels ($4.5 billion). According to unnamed military officials, the project “would take three to five months from the start of construction until the humanitarian city is operational.” Preliminary plans describe the camps as “large” and “voluntary” places where the Gazan population could “temporarily reside, deradicalize, re-adapt and prepare for relocation if they so wish.” According to opponents of the plan, the “humanitarian city” would violate international law because civilians would be prevented from returning to their homes in the north, which would be a form of ethnic cleansing.
“Peace is nothing but the continuation of war by other means” (Ariel Rusila, paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz)
An interesting detail is that although Hamas is reportedly not attending the Gaza peace signing ceremony, the Iranian president has been invited to attend an event in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on Monday. This highlights the changing diplomatic situation in the region as Israel and international mediators finalize the implementation of the ceasefire and exchange agreement.
Domestically, Israel is also in a state of flux. Trump’s 20-point peace plan itself has very broad support, perhaps excluding the government’s extremist religious parties. If the government were to threaten to fall because of coalition members who oppose it, the opposition would come to Netanyahu’s aid.
It will also be interesting to see how the Israeli opposition responds to President Trump’s appeal to President Isaac Herzog in his speech to the Knesset to pardon Prime Minister Netanyahu for the corruption and other charges that have been dropped against him. I think such a pardon would be justified in the name of public interest, just as was recently done with regard to the released Palestinian prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment for terrorist attacks and multiple murders.
For the Palestinian Authority, it is crucial to find an accepted and sufficiently strong leader after President Abbas who is able to carry out the reforms and the deradicalization process, or at least get them off to a good start. Such a person could be Marwan al-Barghuthi, who is serving five life sentences in prison; Barghuthi is probably the only person currently able to unite the Palestinians who support Fatah and Hamas, and as a charismatic figure he has many times the support for the next Palestinian leader compared to other candidates to succeed Abbas, such as Mohammad Dahlan. I think the Israeli judiciary should acquit Barghuthi on the same pragmatic grounds as Netanyahu from his charges.
Neither case (Netanyahu/Barghuthi) may not necessarily be legal, but still legitimate.
The Israeli military intelligence agency Aman and the foreign intelligence agency Mossad conducted extensive, multi-year intelligence gathering and covert operations inside Iran, developing capabilities and conducting covert operations that could have led to the success of Operation Rising Lion. The operation used commando teams, precision weapons and explosive drones on Iranian soil while eliminating nuclear scientists and security officials.
Now, more details about the operation have emerged than ever before, as 10 current and former Israeli intelligence officials described commando raids and undisclosed targets in interviews with ProPublica describing the country’s decades-long secret operation to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb. They requested anonymity in order to speak freely.
Commando teams in Iran
The Mossad recruited and trained two commando units. Each had 14 teams of four to six members. Some of them were already in Iran, having received months of regular training from Iranian intelligence agents. Others were refugees from the country’s regime who had slipped into the country the day before.
For months, Mossad agents had been keeping an eye on the radar and missile batteries protecting Iran’s enrichment facilities – and just before the attack, they were also doing key things, from hacking into Iranian computers to jamming early warning radars.
Israeli-trained commando teams recruited from across the country, from Iran and neighboring countries, were preparing to attack Iran’s defenses from within.
Mossad commando units operated throughout central Iran, and were positioned in strategic open areas near Iranian anti-aircraft missile systems.
The commandos were old-fashioned in the June airstrikes, officials interviewed by ProPublica said, as it is impossible for the Israeli Air Force to go from wave to wave without losing a single aircraft. According to intelligence gathered by Mossad agents in the country, Israeli warplanes bombed nuclear facilities, destroyed about 3,000 of Iran’s ballistic missiles and 80% of its launch vehicles, and fired missiles into the rooms of Iranian nuclear scientists and military commanders.
Mossad’s secret drone base in Iran
One unique feature of Operation Rising Lion was that the Mossad established an “explosive drone base” deep inside Iran, near Tehran. Mossad apparently even set up a factory on the main road to manufacture drones and smuggled in parts for assembly, in addition to smaller, ready-made drones, in suitcases, trucks, and shipping containers. The goods were stored in “safe houses” and later, among other places, to the drone base.
In some cases, several transactions were made with partners who were unaware of the cargo being transported. Mossad agents inside Iran then collected the equipment and distributed it to teams that prepared the drones for use. The team leaders were trained at Iran’s request, and they then returned to transfer the skills to teams on the ground.
The drones were activated during the n to be used not only to launch the drones themselves but also from smuggled and re-equipped mobile platforms that were used to destroy Iranian surface-to-surface missile launchers, including the Esdaf near Tehran.
These systems destroyed Iranian air defenses and gave Israeli aircraft air superiority and freedom of action at Iran’s request.
In a separate operation, the Mossad secretly installed “attack and advanced technology on vehicles” to “neutralize Iran’s air defense capabilities.” These systems were also activated “at the onset of surprise.”
Precision strikes on leaders and nuclear scientists
With the Hezbollah pager operation, Israeli spies exploited their ability to hack into Iranian communications systems. In the early stages of the operation, Israeli cyberwarriors sent a fake message to Iranian military leaders luring them to a ghostly underground bunker, which was then destroyed in a precision strike. Twenty were killed, according to three chiefs of staff.
The Mossad compiled general information on the habits and whereabouts of 11 Iranian nuclear scientists. The files even mapped the locations of the rooms in the men’s homes. On the morning of June 13, Israeli Air Force aircraft fired air-to-ground missiles at all coordinates, killing 11 participants.
Mossad had been planning the final attack on Iran’s nuclear program for over a year, but had been operating in the country for years before that. Recall that in 2018, Israeli-trained operatives broke into an unguarded Tehran warehouse, using plasma cutters to break open safes containing blueprints, data, computer disks, and design books. The material, weighing about 500 kg, was loaded onto two trucks and driven to neighboring Azerbaijan. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented the material at a press conference in Tel Aviv, proving that Iran had lied about its nuclear weapons intentions.
Two years later, Mossad killed one of Iran’s top physicists by using AI-enhanced facial recognition to control a remote-controlled machine gun parked on the side of the road near his weekend home.
Local actors’ role emphasized
In Operation Rising Lion, all strikes inside Iran were carried out solely by local agents and without the entry of Israeli fighters into Iranian territory. This reflects a fundamental shift in Mossad’s approach that began about 15 years ago.
Previously, Mossad operatives—likely Israelis posing as Europeans to install or maintain equipment—wandered around Natanz in double-soled shoes to collect dust and soil samples. Tests eventually revealed that Iranian-made centrifuges were enriching uranium well above the 5 percent level required for a nuclear power plant. (Medical isotopes use 20 percent enriched uranium; bombs use 90 percent.)
Now, the Iranian Mossad agents who broke into safes, planted machine guns, blew up air defenses, and monitored scientists’ apartments were not Israelis. All were either Iranian or third-country nationals.
According to officials interviewed by ProPublica, the growing unpopularity of the Iranian regime has made it much easier to attract agents. In addition, about 40 percent of Iran’s 90 million people are ethnic minorities: Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis, Kurds and others. The motives of Mossad’s local agents were a mix of personal and political. Some wanted revenge against the oppressive, theocratic regime, while others were attracted by money, the promise of medical care for family members or the opportunity to study abroad.
Iran borders Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, and Mossad had connections with smugglers – and often government intelligence services – in all seven countries. Smuggling is a daily occurrence in the region, as thousands of people earn their living by driving donkeys, camels, cars and trucks transporting drugs, fuel and electronics across borders. These locals, in turn, facilitated the delivery of weapons and other materials to Iran, along with the individuals being trained.
My own conclusion is that Mossad’s changed approach – relying on local actors – could also play a major role in the future as Iran continues to implement its nuclear weapons program and Israel prevents its completion. Similarly, if expanded, this approach could play a major role in the potential overthrow of Iran’s current theocratic regime by local actors.
Israel’s small war cabinet met on Sunday evening [13/07/2025] with the aim of preventing the collapse of the Doha hostage and ceasefire talks. The key issue remains Hamas’s demand for Israel to withdraw from southern Gaza, the extent of the withdrawal and, in particular, whether the IDF can maintain the so-called Morag Corridor that bisects Gaza. After Israel has already accepted US Special Envoy Witkoff’s mediation proposal on several occasions, the talks remain stalled due to Hamas’ demands.
The other main topic of the meeting was Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s initiative to build a so-called “humanitarian city” in Rafah, southern Gaza. Katz had asked the Israeli military (IDF) to prepare a plan for the war cabinet meeting based on the initiative.
A tent camp housing displaced Palestinians in Rafah, southern Gaza, last year. Credit:Hatem Ali/Associated Press
A tent camp housing displaced Palestinians in Rafah, southern Gaza, last year. Credit:Hatem Ali/Associated Press
Humanitarian city?
The Israeli government says the “humanitarian city” will initially house 600,000 Palestinians currently living in tents in the overcrowded al-Mawas area on the southern Gaza Strip. Eventually, the entire population of more than two million people in the area will be relocated there.
Israeli media reports say construction could take more than a year and cost up to 15 billion shekels ($4.5 billion). Unnamed military officials said the project “would take three to five months from the start of construction until the humanitarian city is operational.”
Proponents of the “humanitarian city” plan argue that its establishment would be the first opportunity for an entity outside Hamas to take control of the area. Preliminary plans describe the camps as “large” and “voluntary” places where Gazans could “temporarily reside, deradicalize, re-integrate and prepare for relocation if they so wish.”
According to opponents of the plan, a “humanitarian city” would violate international law because civilians would be prevented from returning to their homes in the north, which would be a form of ethnic cleansing.
My analysis
The planned “humanitarian city” in Rafah has been subject to justified criticism – even descriptions of a concentration camp have been used – and there have been demands, among others, from Palestinians and international organizations for the right of Gazans to return to their homes. In my opinion, this criticism completely ignores the real situation and the time frame. Here are a few points of view that clarify this:
Firstly, Gaza is currently largely a war zone and I believe that every effort should be made to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from the combat zones.
Secondly, when the fighting sometimes ends with a ceasefire agreement and/or the withdrawal/elimination of Hamas in Gaza, a contributing factor is that most of Gaza is a ruined and uninhabitable demolition site, meaning that Gazans no longer have homes to return to.
Thirdly, making Gaza habitable requires clearance work, in which booby traps and explosives in the ruins are dismantled, and the tunnel weapons depots and tunnels are generally destroyed. This clearance work is estimated to last at least a year and even longer if bodies are searched for under the rubble. More time and impact will be required if the contaminated soil is replaced, for example to remove asbestos, a popular building material used in Gaza.
Fourthly, after the clearance work, new construction can begin and, if financing is arranged, it is estimated to last at least 10-15 years.
In light of the above situation, the “return home” of the Gazans, the Israeli religious far-right’s dream of a new settlement in Gaza, and Trump’s Riviera tourist destinations are not realistic for a decade or so. Instead, humanitarian aid – regardless of different visions of the future – was needed long ago and is now even more urgent.
I personally have considered the so-called Sinai option to be the best solution, where the Gazans and other Palestinians could establish their future-oriented autonomy/state, but at least so far Egypt has not agreed to provide “wasteland” for this purpose. I think that a “humanitarian city” offers the best emergency solution at this moment until better ones emerge. (About the Sinai option earlier, for example, in my analysis A Day After the Gaza War -Plan by Ariel Rusila )
“Final relief”
Finally, some trivia: Iranian authorities simulated a nuclear attack on Israel in the image they edited below, and most recently, religious scholars threatened destruction on both Israel and the United States during Friday prayers.
It is understandable that Israel takes Iran’s nuclear weapons program seriously with these dream images. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned President Trump during his recent visit to the United States that if Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons, Israel will respond with new military strikes.
This is the English version of an article that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israel in Finnish.
During and after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, which is now in a ceasefire, Iranians have been encouraged to hold demonstrations against the current Iranian regime and in support of Israel not only in various parts of the Western world but also inside Iran – although in Iran they are small and life-threatening. At the same time, citizens in many places have openly opposed members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) when they remarked on women without headscarves. Abroad, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is trying to unite the now fragmented opposition that opposes the current Iranian regime.
The situation now raises hopes of a popular uprising and a change of power, and the opportunity for this is the best in decades. The success of the popular uprising is not at all self-evident, as the theocracy-supporting IRGC has taken major countermeasures, including mass arrests of representatives of Iran’s Jewish minority on charges of supporting Israel.
War as an enabler of the uprising
During the 12-day war, Iran launched nearly 600 missiles and over 1,000 drones at civilian population centers, killing about 30 civilians. For example, the attacks on May 23, 2025, killed more than 700 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), especially in the cities of Tehran and Karaj. This underscores the scale of the Israeli operation and its potentially devastating impact on Iran’s military leadership and infrastructure. Iran’s much-touted regional proxy network—Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis—largely refrained from joining the war. Hezbollah did not fire a single rocket, while the Houthis launched only two missiles in 12 days. Iran’s close backers—Russia and China—provided no assistance to the country. This isolation of Iran greatly strengthened Israel’s international legitimacy to carry out its attacks.
The war was effectively ended by a US bunker buster strike on Iran’s key underground facilities, Iran’s apparent response to it, and a ceasefire brokered by Qatar and the US, among others, between Israel and Iran.
The 12-day war significantly weakened Iran’s theocratic regime; in addition to the planners of the nuclear program, Israel eliminated a significant number of the IRGC’s top military leadership. At the same time, unconfirmed reports have emerged from inside Iran of a possible assassination of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Mojtaba, widely known as a radical hardliner and likely successor to his aging father, was killed at close range in Tehran. If confirmed, this could send shockwaves through the Iranian leadership and deepen the crisis further.
As a small detail, Israel also directly attacked Iran’s Evin prison, a facility for political prisoners, blowing up its entrance.
Israel’s role
The good relations between Israel and Persia go back far into history, to the time of Cyrus the Great (c. 576–529 BCE); he allowed Jews expelled by the Babylonians to return to Israel and even financed the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Iran’s secularization is beneficial to Israel. This is not surprising, since Israel and Iran had excellent relations before the 1978-79 Islamic revolution. The Jewish community in Iran is the oldest continuously existing Jewish community in the world. The community is as significant in the diaspora as it is in Iran. Many now envision the so-called “Cyrus Accords,” i.e. a renewed friendship between Iranians and Israelis, similar to the already partially realized “Abraham Accords,” by which Israel has normalized its relations with several Muslim countries. In this way, Israel would, as it were, repay its debt from the time of Cyrus by freeing Iranians from the shackles of theocracy.
Israel’s unofficial goal has been to overthrow the current Iranian regime. Mossad was very active even before the war and, with the support of the Iranian state, even established a drone factory in Iran; during the war, these drones were used “at close range” to destroy Iran’s air defenses and other military infrastructure. Similarly, cells operating in Iran played a significant role in eliminating nuclear program experts and the military leadership of the Revolutionary Guard. However, Israel’s goals were mainly military and not directly related to overthrowing the current regime.
During the time of Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Israel and Iran had good relations for about 30 years. The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 was essentially a democratic revolution, aiming to expand people’s freedoms and establish a truly democratic state. Although Iran had achieved great material progress under the Shah, the brutality of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, and the lack of political freedom forced the people to rise up to achieve greater freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, as a result of the internal struggle between the various democratic forces and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the leader of the revolution, the mullahs came to control all structures of power.
Supporters and Opponents of the Uprising
News coverage of Iran, as in the past, often focuses on large-scale demonstrations in the country’s largest cities. In doing so, Western media ignores the class composition of the competing demonstrations – the fact that the current Iranian regime received and receives support from a larger section of the population, namely the poor working class, peasants, artisans and public sector workers, while the majority of opposition protesters are upper- and middle-class students, business people and educated professionals.
Most of the coverage has come from English-speaking students active on social media in Tehran, ignoring the provinces, small and medium-sized towns and villages where the current theocratic regime has a broad base of support. The situation for the uprising is weakened by the fact that the educated urban youth and their supporters have social media as their weapon, but they are faced with a fanatical, Koran-educated and, on top of that, well-armed rural population, led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The opposition supporters are usually students who can be easily mobilized for street action, while the Ebemmist group of working youth and domestic workers have expressed their views at the ballot box and have little time or desire to participate in street politics. The current administration has previously enjoyed broad support, for example, in oil and chemical-producing provinces, which may reflect the opposition of energy workers to reformist plans to privatize public companies. A large proportion of the current regime’s supporters probably believe that national security interests, the country’s unity, and the social security system, with all their shortcomings and excesses, could be better defended and improved with the current regime than with upper-class technocrats supported by Western-oriented, privileged youth who value individual lifestyles over community values and solidarity.
The main opponent of the uprising can be considered the IRGC, which consists of a motivated army, navy, and air force (approximately 125,000–190,000 personnel) and the Basij militia (300,000 active soldiers) that can mobilize up to about 600,000 volunteers. The IRGC’s power is built into Iran’s political, economic, and social framework, which gives it the durability and potential to guide the country’s future.
A significant factor in facilitating or resisting the uprising is the Artesh, formed from the pre-revolutionary army, which serves as Iran’s conventional defense force, tasked with protecting the country’s borders, seas, airspace, and territorial integrity. The number of personnel is estimated at 340,000–420,000. Historically, the army has been subordinate to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, receiving a smaller share of funding and modern weapons, and is often seen as less politically reliable.
Factors behind the uprising
According to some opinion polls, only 15% of the population supports the Islamic regime and its Sharia law, and about 70% of the population would like to break away from the current theocratic regime. If the figures are even remotely accurate, the conditions for an uprising would be very good. However, the problem is the fragmentation of the groups that want a change of power.
First of all, exiled political coalitions are pushing for a change of power, such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), led by Maryam Rajavi. It supports the overthrow of the regime and also has an internal network of “Resistance Units” that spread anti-regime communications. The NCRI includes the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK), which the United States previously (until 2012) considered a terrorist group, and it carries out operations both abroad and secretly inside Iran.
Second are monarchist and nationalist groups such as the exiled son of the deposed Shah, Reza Pahlavi, who is pushing for a non-violent regime change. He has limited domestic support, and many inside Iran are skeptical of his close ties to Israel and the West. These groups also include the Constitutional Party of Iran and the House of Representatives of the Kingdom of Iran (Tondar), who want to restore the monarchy. Tondar has historically been reported to have used violent tactics.
Third are ethnic nationalist insurgents such as Khabat (Kurdish) and Jaish ul Adl (Baluchi), who are active in Iran’s border regions, carrying out attacks and pushing for autonomy.
The fourth group is secular and left-wing democratic groups such as the United Republicans of Iran, which promote democratic socialism and secular republicanism, or the “Neighborhood Youth Union” (United Youth of Iran), a grassroots movement that emerged during the “Women, Life, Freedom” protests. It organizes urban youth to challenge the clerical regime and demand human rights reforms.
The fifth group is independent activists and grassroots mobilizers who support democratic reforms and constitutional changes inside Iran, including by distributing leaflets, organizing strikes, and using secret messages to incite opposition.
The fragmentation of those opposing the current regime is evident between the exiled and domestic groups. There is a lack of unity and strategic organization. Domestic activists are wary of large-scale protests due to the regime’s brutal repression and the risks to civilians. Armed minority groups (Kurds, Baloch) escalate local resistance, but their goals often range from regime change to ethnic autonomy or separatism.
Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi as Leader of the Uprising?
In February 2025, various Iranian opposition factions elected Pahlavi as the leader of the opposition and the head of a future transitional government to “form the first national assembly and begin democratic rule through free elections.”
Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the Shah who was overthrown in Iran’s final 1979 Islamic Revolution, released a video message on June 17, 2025, in which he reiterated his call for regime change in Tehran, adding that the Islamic Republic of Iran was collapsing and that the time had come for the Iranian people to “retake Iran.” He said Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had “hid underground” and lost control of the country, describing the moment as “irreversible.” “The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation… Now is the time to rise up. Now all that is needed is a nationwide uprising to end this nightmare (…) I hope I will be with you soon.”
On his website, Pahlavi has said that the Iranian state should become democratic and secular, and that human rights should be respected. He would like to leave it to the Iranian people to decide whether the form of government is a constitutional monarchy or a republic.
The crown prince is hampered by the memory among older citizens of his Shah father, who, on his peacock throne, held power with the help of the SAVAK secret police torture gang, with the support of Britain and the CIA, and who overthrew the democratically elected government of Mohammed Mosaddegh in 1953, who wanted the Iranian people to benefit from Iran’s oil wealth instead of BP and other Western plunderers. This image may lead some Iranians to view the crown prince as a puppet ruler controlled by foreign powers.
Summary
The Iranian opposition is a diverse ecosystem: exiled political fronts, ethnic rebels, secular leftists, monarchists, and underground youth movements. While the current situation offers opportunities, fragmentation, fear of repression, and the lack of a unified internal leadership remain significant obstacles. To achieve meaningful change, grassroots unity—across ethnic, ideological, and strategic lines—is essential.
A group of Iranian businessmen, politicians, military figures, and senior clerics have begun to plan how to run Iran without Khamenei—whether he dies or is ousted. The plan includes a leadership committee that will take over the country and negotiate with the United States to extend the Israeli ceasefire.
From my point of view, a successful uprising requires the defection of every elite from the IRGC or the government, or especially from the military. The uprising also requires armed force, if necessary, from either the military or ethnic groups, because otherwise the fanatical and well-armed supporters of the current regime cannot be dislodged.
In my opinion, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi would be a good and credible unifying force for the scattered groups opposing the current theocratic regime in Iran. After the change of power, he could act as a transitional ruler until free elections are held in Iran and the elected representatives then decide on the future form of government, whether it is a constitutional monarchy or some other secular system.
President Donald Trump on Saturday (June 21, 25) announced a “very successful strike” on three of Iran’s nuclear weapons sites, including Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan. In my article about the Israel-Iran war and how it will end less than a week ago, I presented another scenario
The destruction of the US nuclear weapons program, or to borrow a strategy, its bombers will respond by carrying the heaviest bunker busters from their facilities, such as Fordow, nearly a hundred meters underground.
This scenario now appears to have come true.
Earlier in May 2025, the IAEA estimated that more than 400 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas had already been enriched to 60 percent – a level that is considered highly enriched. This material is under international control and is enough for about 10 nuclear weapons.
Trump has publicly criticized his national intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard and said she was wrong when she claimed that there was no evidence that Iran was building a nuclear weapon. Israel has claimed that Iran is capable of producing a nuclear warhead.
The Iranian foreign minister toured the world last week, meeting with EU leaders, among others, to convince them that Iran may have a nuclear weapons program. It would be sensible for him to convey the message that the program in question will be terminated unconditionally. This would have taken a couple of days for the B2 bombers that left Missouri to refuel, which is why they were not sent without full fuel tanks on board due to the payload (=MOB bunker busters). Well, now the negotiations are continuing because Iran does not (anymore) have a nuclear weapons program.
Two days ago, Trump gave about two weeks to get a result from the negotiations on the war between Israel and Iran. Now Trump seems to be implementing the same negotiation strategy as in the first term by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and thus removing it from the negotiation agenda. Now Iran’s nuclear program has apparently been removed from the agenda, now it is necessary to take care of ending the external war between Israel and Iran and ending Iran’s support for the Houthis. Overly optimistic, negotiations on the human rights of Iran or the rights of Kurdistan will be expected, at least the EU did not have the space to be too careless. Trump said – after the Iranian attack – “now is the time for peace”.
Ariel "Ari" Rusila is a blogger and former development project management expert from Finland with a special interest in the Balkan region. His other interests include geopolitics, conflicts and The Great Middle East. <"Conflicts By Ariel Rusila [aka ex-BalkanBlog] - ISSN 2342-6675 - covers issues of conflicts and regionally the Balkans (esp. Serbia), the Black Sea region and MENA (the greater Middle East and North Africa and esp. Israel) regions as well EurAsia.
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