Atheism, and secular humanism, do not have a problem of evil. That problem only arises within worldviews that posit an all‑powerful, all‑knowing, perfectly loving being who could eliminate suffering instantly, but does not. Once that assumption is removed, the tension disappears.
From a secular humanist perspective, suffering is easily explained as a function of natural causes, human choices, and how life is. The humanist response is a straightforward one: understand the causes and find ways to reduce the harm. If there are gods, they are not out to help us.
The problem of evil becomes pressing only for classical theism, because it must defend the coherence of a God who is supposedly both willing and able to prevent suffering while allowing the world to remain saturated with it. And when you examine how theistic arguments try to survive this contradiction, the pattern is remarkably predictable. Some redefine “good” so radically that it no longer resembles anything humans would recognize as moral. Others quietly scale back divine attributes, so that God becomes less powerful, less knowledgeable, or less involved than advertised. And when those strategies fail, the final refuge is mystery: “God’s ways are higher than ours”, a phrase that functions less as an explanation and more as a retreat.
None of the standard responses actually preserve classical theism. Redefining “good” removes all moral content. Weakening God’s attributes resolves the contradiction, but only by abandoning the very conception of God that created the problem in the first place. And appealing to mystery is not an explanation.
At some point, the concept of God becomes so compromised, so hedged and qualified, that it collapses under its own weight. This is why many people, myself included, come to the conclusion that the idea of God is unsalvageable.
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