Abstract
We propose a practical zero-knowledge proof system for proving knowledge of short solutions \(\mathbf {s},\mathbf {e}\) to linear relations \(\mathbf {A}\mathbf {s}+\mathbf {e}=\mathbf {u}\pmod q\) which gives the most efficient solution for two naturally-occurring classes of problems. The first is when \(\mathbf {A}\) is very “tall”, which corresponds to a large number of LWE instances that use the same secret \(\mathbf {s}\). In this case, we show that the proof size is independent of the height of the matrix (and thus the length of the error vector \(\mathbf {e}\)) and rather only linearly depends on the length of \(\mathbf {s}\). The second case is when \(\mathbf {A}\) is of the form \(\mathbf {I} \otimes \mathbf {A}'\), which corresponds to proving many LWE instances (with different secrets) that use the same samples \(\mathbf {A}'\). The length of this second proof is square root in the length of \(\mathbf {s}\), which corresponds to a square root of the length of all the secrets. Our constructions combine recent advances in “purely” lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs with the Reed-Solomon proximity testing ideas present in some generic zero-knowledge proof systems – with the main difference that the latter are applied directly to lattice instances without going through intermediate problems.
The full version of this paper is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1449.
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Notes
- 1.
If the coefficients of \(\mathbf {s}\) are unrestricted, as in some applications of LWE, then the proof will be slightly more efficient because we do not have to prove the shortness of \(\mathbf {s}\). If \(\mathbf {s}\) has a size-restricted distribution, but different from \(\mathbf {e}\), then we can apply the transformation of [ACPS09] to convert the instance to one where the distribution of the secret is the same as of the error.
- 2.
We point out that the parameters n and m from this paper do not correspond to those with the same name from [ENS20, Appendix B.1]. The length of the secret \(\mathbf {s}\) in [ENS20] already includes the error vector. So even though the length of the secret is 2048 there, it is actually broken down into a vector of dimension 1024 which gets multiplied by \(\mathbf {A}\), and another 1024 dimensional vector, which is the error. Thus the secret length we are comparing to in this paper is twice as large as in the original [ENS20]. The comparisons to [ENS20] for other dimensions/modulus would be fairly similar.
- 3.
Incorporating a message vector \(\mathbf {m}\) in (1) simply involves rewriting \(\mathbf {e}=\mathbf {e}'+[q/2]\cdot \mathbf {m}\) where \(\mathbf {e}'\) is the LWE error.
- 4.
The secret size in the first line is chosen from 4 elements, rather than 3 as in [ENS20]. Reducing the set to 3 will not give us any noticeable reduction.
- 5.
From a technical perspective, [BKS18, Theorem 4.1] proves that except with small probability, these structured linear combinations have the same distance from the code as the maximum distance of all the codewords in the linear combination. Here, we can tolerate some decrease in the distance in our soundness proof, and prove a weaker result via a simpler method. See the full version of this paper for details.
- 6.
If d is not a divisor of R, we can pad the last equation with zeroes.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their useful feedback. This work was supported by the SNSF ERC Transfer Grant CRETP2-166734 FELICITY.
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A The Hiding Property of Reed-Solomon Codes
A The Hiding Property of Reed-Solomon Codes
We show that when \(\mathbf {r}\) is sampled uniformly at random from \(\mathbb {Z}_q^\tau \), then any \(\tau \) entries of the Reed-Solomon encoding \(\mathsf {Enc}\left( \mathbf {m},\mathbf {r}\right) \) corresponding to the input polynomial \(f = \sum _{i=0}^{m-1} \mathbf {m}_iX^i + X^m \sum _{i=0}^{\tau - 1} \mathbf {r}_iX^i\) follow the uniform distribution over \(\mathbb {Z}_q^\tau \).
Let \(\zeta _1,\ldots ,\zeta _l\) be distinct elements of \(\mathbb {Z}_q^\times \) used as the evaluation points for the Reed-Solomon code. We can write the encoding \(\mathsf {Enc}\left( \mathbf {m},\mathbf {r}\right) \) as a matrix multiplication:
Let I be a subset of [l] with \(|I|=\tau \), and let B(I) be the submatrix of B formed by restricting to the rows in I. Observe B(I) forms a Vandermonde matrix where the i-th row has been multiplied by \(\zeta _i^m\). Since the \(\zeta _i\) are distinct and non-zero, B(I) is invertible. Hence, if \(\mathbf {r}\) is sampled uniformly at random from \(\mathbb {Z}_q^\tau \), then \(B(I)\mathbf {r}\) is uniformly distributed over \(\mathbb {Z}_q^\tau \). This argument shows that any \(\tau \) entries of \(\mathsf {Enc}\left( \mathbf {m},\mathbf {r}\right) \) are uniformly distributed.
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Bootle, J., Lyubashevsky, V., Nguyen, N.K., Seiler, G. (2021). More Efficient Amortization of Exact Zero-Knowledge Proofs for LWE. In: Bertino, E., Shulman, H., Waidner, M. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2021. ESORICS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12973. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_30
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