TL;DR: Armed with new powers to rein in the worst excesses of mobile's duopolists, antitrust bodies around the world are struggling to find their footing, and an incurious tech press is letting it pass with nary a nod. Browsers are app stores, but that perspective is almost entirely absent from the antitrust conversation.

Instead of prioritising the one, narrow intervention that can safely unlock maximal competition, regulators are gripped by alt store fever dreams; driving down cul-de-sacs that will leave the duopolists' power intact even if new native app stores materialise. Worse, enforcers of new regulations are choking in the face of blatant non-compliance. Laws designed to kickstart competition and unchain web apps are being flouted, but regulators seem unfazed.

The web as an engine of interoperability; this was understood by the drafters of these laws, but enforcers have not internalised the lesson, with the UK's CMA being only the latest to pose capitulation as success. Instead of unlocking growth and dynamism, overcautious regulators are ratifying non-compliance through inaction. Timidity today reduces room for manoeuvre tomorrow while hampering home-grown competitors to Big Tech.

As it did twenty-five years ago, the web can unlock maximum change with the lowest risk, but regulators are falling down on the job, and tech reporters are not informing readers of the options or the stakes. It's time we spoke plainly about these overlapping institutional failures.

It's a day that ends in "y", which means The Verge is at it again: covering the regulatory tussle over mobile ecosystems without mentioning browsers, the web, or PWAs.

This long-established pattern is as frustrating as it is predictable. Silicon Valley's journalists fail readers by neglecting to connect the dots between the forces that kept desktop OSes open and the suppressive tactics the mobile duopolists¹ deploy to prevent similar outcomes. And this despite connections handed to them on a platter by OWA and others. In 2026, the choice to cover app store regulation exclusively through the lens of steering and native app alt stores is a yawning blind spot.

Capable browsers, and the PWAs they support, hold the power to grow an ecosystem of applications that no gatekeeper can own or tax, based on standardised APIs that resist enclosure. Apple goes to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of browser engine choice to obstruct the app store's most credible disruptor. But few outlets are connecting these dots for readers.

Cupertino is terrified of the web's potential, but you'll never read about it on the pages of Wired, MIT Tech Review, The Verge, or 404. Loyal readers remain uninformed, never clocking how regulators have acquiesced to the gatekeepers' stalling and misdirection. Only The Register and TNS understand what time it is, covering the essential points regularly:

• Apple is succeeding in delaying real browser choice through underhanded and unlawful tactics
• Regulators are not enforcing the laws effectively in these areas
• Users and local businesses lose as a result

These regulatory and journalistic failures are not victimless, circumscribing what technology can be for us all, both positive and negative.

Open Societies Necessitate Interoperability

In 2026, it should go without saying that billionaires at the helm of Big Tech firms cannot be trusted to do anything but cower and pirouette for Mad King Trump. The "good ones" have been proven feckless when presented with opportunities to defend democracy and decency. The rest are either actively fascist, fascism-curious, fascist-enabling, or so engrossed in tax dodging they haven't clocked the rule of law succumbing to attacks by their peers. Not that there's much hope they'd stand up for it; they've got theirs, Jack.

These are the masters of the universe demanding control over what happens on our most personal computers.

In an era when they still claimed to be changing the world for the better, the lies told to justify an invasive, unsafe ecosystem of native apps went down more easily. The duopolists provided shockingly deep hooks into our lives for native app developers while shielding them from adversarial interoperability. In exchange, they demanded control over distribution and taxed the pants off the gambli... — sorry, "casual games" — and privacy degrading social media apps that powered the growth of the native app ecosystem.

Accomplishing this feat required defeating threats from open technologies, because open systems allow users to assert their interests in the face of abusive and predatory software. If users had a vote where useful software could be acquired, or could use browsers for more of their needs, it wouldn't be possible to tax developers at such a high rate. The anti-privacy, anti-user agenda that Apple and Google draw excess profits from cannot survive serious challenges by open technology, which is why the duopolists have worked to hobble them. This is reason enough for democracies to demand portable, standards-based software.

Democratic societies also have wider interests, and we see clearly that trusting Apple and Google with as much market power as they demand is a threat to those goals. The shocking ethical derelictions of the app stores provide yet more reasons to demand regulators legalise open technology.

Software and digital services benefit from network effects, creating acute winner-take-all dynamics in markets where countervailing forces are suppressed. Traditionally, those crosswinds for would-be monopolists have included over-the-top applications, Open Source software, adversarial interoperability, and end-user modulation within open ecosystems (e.g., ad-blocking extensions). Over time, these disciplining factors can break the hold of short-term monopolists, returning power to users and forcing abusive proprietors of services to do better by society or risk losing market share as moats dry up from the pressure.

The iOS and Android duopoly have rendered these recourses illegal and impractical, minting a small number of durable winners. The CEOs and founders of these colossuses are the new tech oligarchs, and their actions in recent years provide compelling arguments against both money in politics and the idea that there can be such a thing as a "good" billionaire.

The broligarchs have shown no compunction towards subverting the state for illegitimate private ends. Having corrupted American politics with torrid rivers of cash, news of their support for anti-democratic, authoritarian regimes around the world no longer surprises. Shocking evidence of this corruption is on display almost daily. Not content to curdle American governance, the broligarchs now demand others desist in enforcing their laws lest governance dampen their accelerating profits.

This corrosive effect is only possible thanks to the intense concentrations of wealth enabled by perverted market structures. These twisted markets are themselves the result of decades of neo-liberal anti-antitrust groupthink. Contra Bork, the social contributions of robust antitrust enforcement aren't limited to lower prices. Reducing the power of private actors promotes stable institutions and honest dealing across a wide swath of society. Samuel Bagg frames the opportunities for antitrust enforcement similarly:

...many practices of constitutionalism are justified on similar grounds: i.e., that first-order constraints on the abuse of power can only be sustained through second-order limits on the concentration of power more generally. Where modern constitutionalism aims primarily to limit the concentration of public power, however, the anti-monopoly tradition follows earlier materialist forms of constitutionalism in viewing the concentration of private power as equally dangerous (Andrias 2015; Fishkin and Forbath 2014; Khan 2018). After all, problems of capture arise not from the existence of public power as such, but from its relationship to private interests.

— Samuel Ely Bagg,
"The Dispersion of Power, Chapter 6.1"

Tim Wu charts this history of antitrust thinking, noting that:

Back in the 1950s and 1960s, the anti-monopoly enforcers were of a different and much tougher mindset. They were closer in disposition to Theodore Roosevelt and tended to see the stakes of anti-monopoly as transcending mere economics and spilling into questions of democracy and political destiny. Influenced by the recent experience of the Second World War, American officials believed that fascism and corporate monopoly were linked. They feared that excessive corporate power would bleed into fascism or contribute to a communist uprising. Famed antitrust enforcer Thurman Arnold blamed German monopolies for helping Hitler rise to power.

— Tim Wu,
"The Age of Extraction, Chapter 2: Platformization"

Like Wu and other Brandeisian thinkers, Bagg finds counterweights to these corrosive forces useful, both structurally and specifically:

Countervailing power is the natural complement to anti-monopoly. Both demands are set in motion by the insight that capture is most often perpetrated by certain hegemonic actors and groups — i.e., those with the most concentrated private power and organizational capacity — and that protecting the public interest thus entails special attention to those specific forces. Where anti-monopoly entails targeting their resources and organizational capacity directly, however, practices of countervailing power aim to support their opponents.

— Samuel Ely Bagg,
"The Dispersion of Power, Chapter 6.2"

The web is such a countervailing power, bringing with it a large ecosystem of developers and publishers that can jump-start mobile contestability. Real browsers and web apps present a potent, two-sided ecosystem competitor. Because browsers feature low switching-costs compared with replacing phones, and provide a standards-based, interoperable app platform, they carry maximum potential to disrupt the market-concentrating effects of app stores whose software catalogues are welded to specific OSes. These properties pose a credible threat to the smartphone duopoly's extractive, anti-competitive status quo. Indeed, we can expect real browser competition to finally make Apple and Google competitors. This can return economic surpluses to users and businesses, rather than the duopolist's shareholders.

A web liberated to compete has already demonstrated the power to align forces that erode gatekeepers' influence through competition between browsers and their engines. Interoperability and a grounding in royalty-free standards pairs with this competitive engine to expand the penumbra of capabilities that enable new entrants without simultaneously convincing all developers to build for a new OS.

Because browsers commoditise OS features, the competition between them — both internal to, and across the existing Android and iOS deployed base — grows a corpus of essential apps that any new entrant needs (the Bridge Strategy). Instead of forcing a new smartphone OS to convince every software house to build new apps for their new APIs (simultaneously), or to brave legal and technical threats as they implement Apple and Google's APIs wholesale, browsers and PWAs shrink the missing software gap tremendously. Should browsers make hay on iOS and Android the way the DMA's drafters hoped, new market entrants only need to port competent browsers (a much smaller lift) and fill in a greatly reduced app gap.

But even if a new competitor doesn't emerge thanks to the web, browsers discipline incumbents in-place by providing competition with their proprietary software ecosystem. When mobile OSes feature sustained browser competition, incumbents help expand the web's carrying capacity or risk marginalisation.

This dynamic played out in the 2000s and 2010s as Internet Explorer lost share to competitors thanks to Microsoft's under-funding. Firefox, Chrome, and Safari worked to expand the power of the web, pushing IE's once 90+% dominance to the curb while dramatically growing the list of tasks users turn to the web for. Eventually, Microsoft capitulated, switching to Chromium to regain compatibility with a dynamic, growing web that threatened to pass it by.

Proprietary incumbents prioritise user needs over their own extractive agendas when competition from open ecosystems is enabled by low switching costs.² This paves the way for competitors, expanding the power and relevance of low-cost, interoperable technology with each competitive iteration. We have seen the web's wedge work against API enclosure on the desktop, with a large majority of all new desktop software being written first as web applications and only later (and optionally) wrapped in WebViews to deliver needs from a shrinking set of "last mile" capabilities that the web doesn't provide out of the box.

Such is the power of interoperability made manifest; it's far past time for the tech press and regulators to speak clearly about the anti-web game the duopolists are playing to prevent the web from breaking out.

Shared Premises

Several points are plain to anyone engaged in mobile ecosystems. There are many sub-points to quibble about, and various parties talk their own books, but the broad strokes are accepted by all sides:³

• The web provides a portable and (potentially) capable way to deliver software.
• Every contemporary phone with a touch screen has more than enough computing power to run full-fledged browsers that can support capable web apps.
• Yet the smartphones almost every wealthy person carries support only less-capable, lower-quality browsers.
• This suppresses the web's relevance through compounding wealth and quality effects.

A publicly contested (but privately conceded) corollary is that the web is not dominating mobile the way it does desktop because it has not been allowed to compete. From Apple explicitly suppressing competing browsers and breaking critical features OS-wide on the regular, to Google's history of discouraging internal teams from writing mobile web apps and denying competing browsers access to critical PWA features, the fix has been in for 15 years.

Apple and Google's anti-competitive policies keep web apps from threatening the foundations of their App Store revenues by forcing developers to build to the APIs that the incumbents control. This grounding in Apple and Google's proprietary APIs is the root of the duopolist's power. They use it in combination with threats and promotional inducements from their stores to enlist developers in promoting features of the hardware and services they monetise.

Open, interoperable, safe-by-default runtimes with standardised APIs threaten the foundations of this structure by breaking the duopolist's chokehold over software distribution. Browsers, and their core function of abstracting away the proprietary APIs of OS vendors, create a tax-free zone outside the grasp of the OS incumbents' mafioso App Store tactics. To ensure the web cannot threaten the API enclosure today's mobile ecosystems are founded on, browser competition must be suppressed and browsers themselves incapacitated.

That Apple has managed to pull this off is a scandal. But our tech press and commentariat do not cover the web as a true threat to App Stores. Instead, they fixate on alt stores as a mechanism to supplant gatekeeper control. This is a gift-in-kind to the duopolists. By failing to acknowledge the power of the web to disrupt entrenched OSes (as demonstrated by the past 20 years of desktop computing), the press are failing to communicate the stakes of regulatory failure to enable browser competition. This, in turn, excuses woolly regulators as they squander the ripest opportunity for reform in living memory.

Alt Stores, PWAs, and the App Store Endgame

The dream of the alt store is a mirage, or at least a distraction. Windows is able to sustain several successful native app distribution systems in addition to Microsoft's own (e.g., Steam and The Epic Games Store), but these systems are tied to specific verticals and the APIs desktop developers target are de facto open and stable. The incumbent's app stores have significantly larger scope and tie together a host of services that require critical mass to disrupt.

The web presents one of the only ecosystems with enough existing use and investment to plausibly re-create a substantial fraction of this ecosystem value without the cold-start problem. Other challengers face a daunting choice: focus on a less expansive vision by diverting into narrow app categories, or depend heavily on OS services and APIs. Either option reduces contestability and detracts from the potential for a successful, interoperable mobile software ecosystem.

Browsers provide an alternative. Because they synchronise payment instruments, identity, and user preferences over the top of the OS, users experience reduced friction when transferring to the web versus a competing native ecosystem. And because most folks already invest a significant fraction of their digital lives with their browser, apps that run on the web are a more credible threat to the status quo than alt stores filled with native apps that must choose between rebuilding all of this from scratch or buttressing the lock-in of OS vendors.

Regulators facing choices about where to invest scarce resources should foreground browser engine choice and web apps because they create mass behind their agenda and bring a powerful, pre-existing ecosystem to bear. The alternative is playing whack-a-mole with gatekeepers over easily divide-and-conquered alt stores.⁴ Once browser-based apps can address the bulk of the market, the lift required to institute fair distribution terms in other verticals will be substantially reduced.

Instead of promulgating proprietary APIs, the web provides an answer to regulators' central problem: how to bootstrap an ecosystem of interoperable software?

Capable browsers are the proven answer. Unleashed by aggressive policy intervention a quarter century ago, the web has become the most abundant app store of all time. As the D.C. Circuit Court predicted in finding against Microsoft in 2001:

...were middleware to succeed, it would erode the applications barrier to entry. Because applications written for multiple operating systems could run on any operating system on which the middleware product was present with little, if any, porting, the operating system market would become competitive. Id. p p 29, 72.

But as the District Court found, middleware will not expose a sufficient number of APIs to erode the applications barrier to entry in the foreseeable future.

— US D.C. Circuit Court, Per Curiam,
"U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)"

What the court failed to understand in 2001 was that Microsoft had already made the browser a complete platform. Even after Redmond disbanded the IE team after the 6.0 release, it would go on to midwife applications like Google Maps, GMail, and Google Docs; in its zeal to see off Netscape, Microsoft sowed the seeds of Win32's irrelevance. Firefox, Chrome, and (yes) Safari built on the momentum, unlocking adjacent possibilities that brought new categories into the web at a rapid clip. Today, design, CAD, software development, and scientific computing regularly happen in-browser and more than 70% of desktop "jobs to be done" are now handled on the web.

PWAs complete the story for the mobile era, unlocking participation in the tap-and-swipe ecosystem today's duopolists are working enclose through app stores. Just like a quarter century ago, the web is already the answer; we just need to clock it as such and legalise powerful browsers.

So-called alt stores are a less compelling solution because they hold less power to create competition with low switching costs. Instead of providing developers with standardised APIs, they continue to weave the duopolist's proprietary technologies and services into each app. This reduces app portability, increases developer costs, and implicitly helps to build a moat against new OS entrants. A hat-trick of lock-in.

Instead of settling for a world in which alternatively distributed apps must attempt to re-create the technical foundations of interoperability for themselves, regulators can win both interoperability and momentum for their efforts by unblocking real browser choice and PWAs enabled by it. Browser engine projects feature large teams whose entire job is to intermediate between OS-specific APIs and web apps, enabling developers to write to a single interoperable platform out of the box.

The opportunity to harness both a large ecosystem of developers used to building for an interoperable platform, and teams of C++/Rust engineers accustomed to competing to provide improvements to that interoperable platform should have rocketed the web to the forefront of every regulator's thinking. The new powers that the EU's DMA, the UK's DMCCA, and Japan's MSCA provide in theory need concrete enforcement actions to bring the duopolists to heel, and the web's advantages in efficiency of regulatory intervention, reduction in security risk, and pre-existing cross-OS interoperability are unparalleled.

Regulators Are Missing The Ripest Opportunity

It pains me deeply to acknowledge that the institutions handed new powers by the DMA, the DMCCA, and the MSCA are universally failing to prioritise the transformative power of browsers as they work to enforce the provisions of these laws. Instead of focusing fire on the lowest-risk, highest leverage intervention, regulators are being side-tracked and talked down from pursuing aggressive browser choice enforcement.

Consider Apple's opening offer to the EU. The DMA only allows gatekeepers to impose necessary and proportional security restrictions on competing browsers and their engines.

Regardless, Cupertino larded up its package of DMA deliverables with terms for building browsers that include clearly unlawful contractual obligations (pdf) having nothing to do with security. These restrictions levy costly and unworkable demands on the architecture of competitors' products. Alternative browser engines have long featured better security, performance, extensibility, and even privacy than Safari. Should they not be superior, the DMA provides a straightforward solution: competition, rather than legal arm-twisting.

In case procedural hurdles weren't enough disincentive, Apple also hobbled its browser SDK, omitting support for obviously in-scope features including the ability to handle in-app links, support web apps on the home screen, and disambiguate push notifications. It has built and shipped all of this for Safari, in some cases relatively recently, so it wasn't a case of forgetfulness. Brushed back from attempting to murder web apps on the eve of DMA enforcement, Apple simply chose to duck complying with the law by dressing up violation in umbrage and legalese.

Cupertino's design carefully omits the capabilities that would unlock direct competition with the app store, safe in the knowledge that so long as Safari is the only browser with access, it can keep the web hobbled and broken. This is a blatant affront to the DMA's plain meaning and legislative intent, and dovetails with extralegal attempts to apply maximum pressure on the EC to accept less than half a loaf.

Recall that Apple initially argued that it didn't have time to comply given a mere two-year run-up. It was enough time for all of Apple's competitors, but somehow not for the self-proclaimed titans of software from Cupertino.

That was two years ago.

Has the offer improved regarding these strategic omissions? Not one iota.

Indeed, Apple is now lying to our faces; from its latest DMA compliance report (emphasis added):

(45) For the purposes of allowing alternative web browser engines to interoperate with iOS and iPadOS, Apple makes a suite of functionalities available so that browser apps and apps providing in-app browsing using alternative browser engines can be installed and run on iOS and iPadOS in the EU. Apple provides authorized developers access to technologies within the system that enable critical functionality and help developers leverage high-performance modern browser engines. These technologies include Just-in-Time compilation (which provides performance benefits by helping browsers to quickly and efficiently render JavaScript content), multiprocess support, and more. Third-party browser apps using third-party web browser engines can support and run web apps.

— Apple, March 7, 2026 (pdf),
"DMA Compliance Report Summary, Page 201, Section V."

This misleading text suggests that Apple has provided APIs to competitors to support these core use-cases through their own engines; it manifestly has not.

Cupertino is Running Circles Around Brussels, Tokyo, and London

Faced with such strategic flouting of these the law, one might assume regulators with a sense of their own prerogatives and legislative intent might respond with overwhelming force.

Instead, the DMA team at the EU have moved haltingly as Apple plays for time through processes the EC forced Cupertino to create after previous bouts of transparent gamesmanship (pdf). Clear, unambiguously in-scope requests from competitors languish while the Commission settles for tweaks that cannot change the balance of power. Far from fulfilling the law's legislative intent, contemporary DMA enforcement appears unable to prioritize action that will unleash the tools of revolution from action on necessary-but-insufficient nips and tucks.

Rather than treating Apple's belligerent, maximalist strategy as a joined-up attack aimed to deny oxygen to the most effective competing ecosystem, the DMA's enforcement group has ratified Apple's redrawn boundaries through studious inaction. Like Sykes and Picot with a ruler, Apple has drawn lines that favour its interests above all else, and authorities that could countermand its declarations are notable only by their absence. The perspective from Brussels seems to be that these questions are now simply competing claims by equally mucky mud wrestlers, rather than galling non-compliance and an affront to the point of the DMA.

Rather than bearing down on structural issues, regulators appear immersed in dense debates with the scofflaw's counsel over inconsequential details. Even in the areas that it is levying fines, the EC is not challenging the structure of Apple's power. This is tantamount to settling for minor tweaks on the status quo. If the DMA was designed to redress the problems it enumerates, this is failure by the EC's own yardstick. We're entering year three of DMA enforcement, and meaningful change is not obviously closer. Why not?

To hear the regulator's apologists tell it, they're concerned with litigation. Litigation! As though Apple wouldn't sue regardless.

No amount of punch-pulling or case-buttressing will prevent Cupertino from rolling out its shockingly large army of lawyers. Apple already spends more on lawyers every year than the fines the EU is proposing!

This is the same company that used lawyerly nonsense to hold up the UK CMA's investigation for nine months, implausibly arguing the regulator hadn't brought the boom down fast enough on its own bad behaviour, and therefore couldn't do so later. It was never a serious argument, but when dressed up in enough £1000/hr legalese, Apple's calculated attempt to create delay paid massive dividends. Nine months of regulatory delay is worth many billions to Cupertino.

Apple is conducting a maximalist campaign against the very concept of the rule of law when its profits are at risk, and having paid off a deeply corrupt US administration, the intensity and reach of that campaign is only increasing. All of this should create a deep, abiding suspicion of Cupertino's motives, removing the benefit of the doubt wherever it claims contestability is a reality on iOS. No self-respecting regulator can take anything Apple's lawyers say at face value in 2026. But there's only a price for duplicity when those with authority recognise the pattern and apply suspicion, rather than deference.

Regulators (not to mention the press) are well within their rights to take on board Apple's misrepresentations, astro-turfing, and serial non-compliance when calculating how aggressively to act. Instead, the EU's DMA team, the UK's CMA, and Japan's regulators are falling for the same shenanigans over and over; treating each encounter as a blank slate, happy to pretend a disquieting history of belligerent non-compliance is immaterial to arguments offered today.

This is both a tactical error and a strategic blunder.

At a tactical level, extending deference to each new pile of misdirections allows Cupertino to play for time; when you're the incumbent, delay is winning, and regulators that do not demand prompt changes weaken their own future hand. Strategically, failure to demand changes right bloody now in the face of material non-compliance denies the regulator the benefit of even a weak fleet in being effect. And declining to demand immediate change in areas most likely to create the deepest, most generative effects grants Apple ongoing regulatory relief in the form of reduced structural competition.

Of course it harms EU businesses that they cannot target a platform across mobile OSes, and that EU businesses instead have to bear high ongoing development and servicing costs to participate in proprietary app stores. It is obviously negligence on the part of newly empowered regulators to allow Apple's gerrymandering attempts. Cupertino has worked to draw constrictive borders around browsers for the last several years; demarcations that just happen to exclude capabilities that would make mobile computing truly contestable.

Browsers Are App Stores

Since regulators and the tech press are not connecting the dots from first principles, desktop computing analogues, legal precedent, or the lengths Cupertino has gone to prevent the web from breaking out, it must be repeated:

Browsers are app stores.

If we want effective alternatives to the gatekeeper's app shops, nothing will be more effective than unleashing real competition from the web. Browsers are stores filled with a priori interoperable software and with low friction installation thanks to PWAs! And they feature incredible security! Protections so strong that you don't even have to hang a "beware of dog" sign out front.

Should we collectively accept this premise and expand our understanding of software contestation to include the web as a viable alternative in the app store story, what would that mean? The duopolists are working overtime to silo the discussion to their preferred proprietary technologies, why? Is that worthy of investigation and discussion?

For regulators, this perspective is a treasure map. Enabling true browser competition unlocks both internal and cross-OS competitive forces, unleashing firms with an interest in interoperability on both sides of the browser market. But for regulators to get credit for converting on this incredible opportunity, their constituents will need to hear about it. And on that front, we've got a lot of work to do.

Our Tech Press is Missing the Story, Too

We get plenty of TopGear-but-for-phones and "CEO said a thing" coverage, but very little coverage of the way access to APIs shapes our digital lives. Most outlets still treat access like it's a real beat, depriving them of the distance necessary to contextualise the duopolists' actions in a frame their PR staff dislike. The closer a publication gets to the mainstream, the worse the distortion seems to get.

Few tech outlets, including irreverent youtubers, seem to recognise that the web is the single biggest threat to mobile app stores, opting instead to cover minor news of alt stores tremors like The Big One. This misleads readers about the stakes and distorts the incentives of regulators.

Reporting that borrows the narrative frame the duopolists prefer enlists otherwise excellent outlets as allies of the billionaire class. Too many reporters uncritically accept that app stores are how we must think about mobile software, regurgitating this narrative through stories filed in a browser on their laptops. Apple, Google, and the handful of "winners" the app stores bless profit massively from centralisation. Reporters and editors further the goals of the broligarchs by failing to reframe mobile competition in a more historically grounded light.

Perhaps regulators will find their way without the help of a thoughtful, tenacious tech press; stranger things have happened. But judging by The Verge, Wired, and the FT, they're going to need all the luck in the world.

FOOTNOTES

Elon Musk’s Grok and the Mass Undressing Scandal

As I draft this, a week later, it appears pressure from civil society, investigations by regulators, and outright bans on multiple continents have forced Musk to back down to an uncertain degree.

As this scandal roiled, Twitter's apps have been continuously available in Google's Play and Apple's App Store, marking new lows in moral cowardice and non-enforcement of the duopolist's own policies.

Now we sit on tenterhooks, wondering if the worst has actually passed. What outrage the will the valley's billionaire man-children unleash next? Meanwhile, we brace for this episode to embolden censorious authoritarians keen to suppress a free press and legitimate speech they dislike.

This is the backdrop to Elizabeth Lopatto's must-read denunciation in The Verge:

It is genuinely unbelievable to me that I wasted hours of my actual life on a court case where Apple explained it needed total control of its App Store to protect its users. Total control of the App Store was Apple’s main argument against antitrust enforcement: The company insisted that its monopolistic control of what users could install on their phones was essential to create a walled garden where it could protect children from unsafe content.

Ha! Ha ha ha!!

— Elizabeth Lopatto,
"Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai are cowards, The Verge"

Failure to react to the “everything app” going all-in on abuse of women and girls for weeks reveals the illegitimacy of their mobile monopolies¹; anyone pretending otherwise is a fool or a dupe.

We don't need to guess why they sat on their hands.

Acting against Musk's abusive apps might put Apple and Google out of favour with an erratic, power-tripping administration which in turn could impact short-term business prospects. Their stated principles are incompatible with maximizing shareholder value under competitive authoritarianism.

Recall that both firms lent their monopolies on software distribution to ICE, citing the implausible claim that federal agents are a “vulnerable group.” The undressing scandal is the same choice in relief.

Facilitating the unthinkable at the behest of administration allies pays homage to power through obscenity. If they offend Musk…who knows what could happen? So maybe let it play out; let others take the heat. Surely somebody will do something. The internal monologue of the quisling scarcely needs exposition.

And so abuse at scale was amplified through their channels, against their own policies, for weeks.

Vertigo

The duopolist's justifications for monarchical app stores have always been bullshit, top to bottom, stem to stern.

App stores are not sui generis; they're just programs that install other programs, and "apps" are whatever the OS says they are.

As Cory Doctorow observed:

Apps interact with law in precisely the way that web-pages don't. “An app is just a web-page wrapped in enough IP to make it a crime to defend yourself against corporate predation”

It sure looks like Apple and Google failed to protect women and girls in order to preserve the rents they extract from the ecosystems these IP wrappers give them control over.

Gatekeepers like to point out that the wrapper comes with treats — business-critical capabilities and services that OS vendors lock behind proprietary APIs — but this is misdirection.

Web apps could provide safe, privacy-enhancing versions of every capability they currently reserve to native apps, and the duopolists know it. In an earlier era, open platforms chewed up proprietary features and spat out interoperable standards to cover the most useful 80% of that ground safely. Along the way, they published under open licences, dropping the price of commodity features to near-zero. This reduced lock-in for both developers and users which, in turn, forced incumbents to innovate.

Today's gatekeepers are desperate to keep that from happening again. It would upset the entire rentier model.

That's why Apple has worked furiously to keep APIs away from browsers through legal wrangling and subversion of standards. Cryptography and lawyers have also been enlisted to keep other programs-that-install-programs out and a safe, powerful open web at bay. Without those shields, we'd see the deeper failures clearly.

Consider the justifications Apple and its merry band of astroturfers trot out like clockwork to delay browser choice. Cupertino argues it must exclusively control browsers and software distribution to:

• Ensure device security
• Prevent frauds and scams
• Provide a bulwark for privacy
• Simplify software acquisition and distribution
• Keep a lid on the most objectionable content

Now we see clearly that protection on the last point comes not from the stores, but from civil society and governments. This provides a template: each justification is an admission; misdirection to cover culpability.

Let's take it from the top.

The Security Argument

Stores don't ensure security, runtimes do.

Operating systems and browsers — the platforms that sandbox code and mediate permissions — protect users to the extent they're designed to; app stores are just overwrought “beware of dog“ signs meant to scare off easily intimidated ne'er-do-wells. It's no surprise that whenever app stores are trusted with the role, a trail of harrowing failure follows.

This unearths the lie behind the obfuscation: iOS and Android didn't create stores to deliver unheard of security — iOS 1.0 did that by forbidding unsafe native code, replacing it with a better web² — the gatekeepers built app stores because their OSes were and are insecure platforms for native apps. When mobile apps were web apps, the presumption of safety reigned. Alas.

Retreating from safety dovetailed with retreats from safe, open, interoperable computing in other ways. It's no coincidence that Apple backed away from adding capabilities to the web at the same moment it realised it could tax native apps extortionately.

App stores are Marketing's answer to a brand-promise problem: what to do about a hole below the water line that Product and Engineering aren't just failing to patch, but are enthusiastically expanding instead?

The whole facade of the duopolist's power hinges on the false claim that stores create security. Without the need to paper over the disaster of carelessly dispensed power tools, none of the rest of the services the stores provide could be justified; certainly not at the ruinous prices they demand.

More recent, chest-thumping pronouncements need to be evaluated in the same light. These aren't heroic explorers of new frontiers, they're embarrassed students bluffing book reports for tomes they didn't read.

Instead of protecting us, app stores reward platform vendors for security failure and foster centralising, anti-Open Source ecosystems. Open societies cannot abide closed platforms that assert ownership of this much of our lives, particularly not when claims of security are based on misrepresentations.

Frauds and Scams

In the narrow conception, the app stores are feckless. Taking a wider view, they're complicit. Enabling, even.

Under a strict definition of “fraud," the track record of app stores is abysmal. Take just one recent example: while loudly proclaiming to protect users from scams, Apple simultaneously facilitated wide-scale app impersonation at the launch of Sora. This failure isn't a one-off, either. Bald-faced imposters are a long-running problem for stores that pretend to both users and developers that they protect from exactly these sorts of scams.

For its part, Google routinely facilitates shocking amounts of ad fraud via Play. Stores also failed to catch clearly fraudulent fronts for sanctioned Russian banks. This is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg.

If we widen the aperture to let in adjacent classes of user abuse, the situation looks immeasurably worse.

Apple's policies purport to disallow use of the ultra-low-friction IAP systems for gambling:

5.3.3 Apps may not use in-app purchase to purchase credit or currency for use in conjunction with real money gaming of any kind.

This text is lawyered to sound like a curb on gambling addiction's worst effects. In reality, it's designed to facilitate the predatory “gambling lite” systems Apple and Google gleefully promote.

For most of the mobile duopoly's existence, the primary revenue driver has been the problematic, gambling-adjacent behaviour of “digital whales” in so-called “casual games.”

And don't imagine the wilfully predatory behaviour is limited to adults. By allowing “bait apps” — even after previous FTC settlements that should have forbidden them — the app stores have shown us the duopolist's true colours. Serial disregard for the financial health of users is literally baked into their model.

This is the rotten core of mobile app stores. Understood in POSIWID terms, they exist to tax casinos that exploit gambling addictions of vulnerable users.

Privacy

App stores safeguard privacy the way packs of wolves safeguard flocks of sheep.

The only appropriate response to the two-faced, duplicitous claims by Apple and Google towards privacy in recent years is incandescent rage.

I've covered before how Apple's posturing against Facebook is nothing but kayfabe and how Cupertino's privacy arguments regarding alternative browsers are steaming piles of illogical nonsense.

In reality, our privacy problems have been multiplied by Apple and Google.

It was the duopolists that created APIs for persistent background access to your contacts, calendar, location, radios, battery levels, and much else besides. It was the duopolists that then turned around and claimed credit for incrementally curbing the worst abuses of the APIs they themselves handed out like candy. Remember, they added these easily-tracked features knowing full well they would be abused.

How do we know they knew better? Both exposed shocking amounts of information about users to all comers after building browsers that protected from these very risks. Both had past form building web APIs that expanded platform power more thoughtfully. Caution was thrown to the wind by the very folks that now demand credit for remediating tiny patches of the superfund sites they created.

It was the duopolists who handed those APIs to native apps from shady publishers like Facebook with less-than-thoughtful controls. And it was these very companies that failed to police even their mildest policies.

And these same trillion-dollar market-cap firms simultaneously declined to do the one thing that had a chance to dramatically improve privacy: using their incredible lobbying capacity to forcefully call for privacy regulations worth a damn. Instead, they prefer a market structure where they can posture against each other over problems they jointly exacerbate.

And they have got away with it. Their press and product shops are keenly aware reporters don't understand privacy deeply enough to call their bluff, and that so-called privacy experts will clap as loudly for symbolic gestures as for fundamental change.

Humiliatingly for the fourth estate, Cupertino and Mountain View's self-issued privacy participation prizes were never questioned. Indeed, credulous journalists continue to shower them with praise for steps away from the very worst excesses best measured in angstroms.

Recently, Apple have been allowed to take credit for foisting responsibility onto users while Google has faced no sustained questioning for just giving up, having never launched anything at all to structurally curb Android abuses.

Cynics might be inclined to think this was very much the point.

These monopolies on apps-that-install-apps exist to squash competition, not to preserve privacy. Apple's not working furiously to deny iOS users alternative browsers because they might track users, they're misleading anyone who will listen because the web might provide an alternative that doesn't.

Software acquisition and distribution

You know what the easiest way to get an app is? Clicking a link.

Apple literally pioneered this model with iOS 1.0, only to walk away from it a year later when it chose to carelessly expose overpowered, unsafe-by-default APIs with the hurried introduction of native apps. Throwing away privacy and security made software harder to build and distribute, too, but deposited power over developers with OS gatekeepers. Over time, the power to tax those developers became addictive.

A more secure and privacy preserving model is still possible but the duopolists continue to suppress it. I can't speak out of school about all the ways Android and Play mirrored Apple's underhanded tactics to suppress PWAs, but suffice to say it was a lot.

Industrial-scale suppression of safe, privacy-respecting platforms has been packaged up in florid terms as an advantage for developers. Except developers hate mobile app stores. But you don't have to take my word for it.

Given the choice, developers would do exactly what the gatekeepers do when constructing billing, distribution, and marketing systems: shop around in an open market, based on standards-oriented technologies, and select the best fit for their needs.

This is exactly the model that gave rise to the web and to web search. Discovery for web apps isn't impossible without omnipotent app stores; it isn't even hard. If we can build search engines for web pages, we can also highlight sites that are installable. None of this is magic, and none of it requires a 30% take from the developer's budget.

Content Moderation

For the sake of completeness, we should stipulate that an end to app stores would not meaningfully change the content moderation landscape.

We now have a powerful example of this counterfactual thanks to the Twitter/Grok episode. There is no safety to be lost when we replace the gatekeeper's stores with a powerful, open, interoperable web. Mobile app store proprietors stand for nothing but profit and can be counted on only to defend their take. Good riddance.

The Rot of “Who Should Rule?”

Before the 2024 US elections, tech titans were well-enough advised to know which way the winds were blowing. But that did not stir them to defend truth, the rule-of-law, or even the employees that enabled their success. Instead, they hurried to capitulate. Today they sponsor coup-excusers, pay vigs, grovel to people they surely loathe, and fund the literal destruction of America's institutions.

This month's failure to stand up for basic decency is just another link in that chain.

Having narrowed the running to two choices, mobile's masters always ask us to consider governing our phones through the authoritarian frame of "who should rule?"

But these aren't our only choices. As Popper retorts, the better question is "How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?"

This isn't purely a political question, but applies to all of society's power structures. The callous indifference of the app store's billionaire managers (1, 2) when faced with an even moderately difficult call tells us that they cannot be trusted; this was the test, and the mobile overlords failed by their own terms.³

What's left for the rest of us to take on is how we dismantle the mechanisms our misplaced trust helped them build. This will not be easy, and an insightful commenter at The Verge restates the core problem:

This is true and fantastic reporting and why we need to pay for The Verge.

But, it begs the question, what do we do?

Do we opt out of the tech of the modern world to protest? Commitment to values isn’t what we talk about, it’s what we are willing to give up. A key problem is that we don’t have any real competition vs Apple or Google as platforms if we want to exist in the modern world or even have this conversation.

You can’t (easily) read this or participate from a Kobo or Lightphone. Anyone have any suggestions?

I dropped off Twitter and Meta, but I’m running out of options.

— Anonymous commenter,
"Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai are cowards, The Verge, Comments"

We aren't going to get anywhere by throwing our iPhones and Androids into the sea.

Credible, incremental steps that remove power from the gatekeepers are now demanded, and as I have previewed throughout this piece, the open web is that next step. It has all the properties we need to attenuate misgiven power: no single vendor control, based in standards, multiple OSS implementations, and most of all, portability.

The web is an abstraction that holds the power to liberate our computing in-situ, removing superfluous gatekeepers from the loop an increasing fraction of the time. As use of the web grows, so do the prospects for alternatives OSes and hardware ecosystems. They know this, and that's why they're trying to keep the web from winning.

Moving our computing to browsers and web apps won't protect us from Musk, but neither will Apple or Google.⁴ Now that we know that, we can at least start to claw back at the corrosive power of monopolists in our pockets by building for a future that doesn't depend exclusively on them.

FOOTNOTES

Let's cut to the chase, shall we? Updated network test parameters for 2026 are:

• 9 Mbps downlink
• 3 mbps uplink
• 100 millisecond RTT

Regarding devices, my updated recommendations are the Samsung Galaxy A24 4G (or equivalent) and the HP 14. The goal of these recommendations is to emulate a 75th percentile user experience, meaning a full quarter of devices and networks will perform worse than this baseline.

Plugging these parameters into the updated budget calculator, we can derive critical-path resource thresholds for three and five second page load targets. Per usual, we consider pages built in two styles: JS-light, where only 15% of critical-path bytes are JavaScript, and JS-heavy, comprised of 50% JavaScript:

Note: Budgets account for two TLS connections.

Many sites initiate more early connections, reducing time available to download resources. Using four connections cuts the three-second budget by 350 KiB, to 1.5 MiB / 935 KiB. The five-second budget loses nearly half a megabyte, dropping to 3.2 / 1.9 MiB.

It pays to adopt H/2 or H/3 and consolidate connections.

These budgets are extremely generous. Even the target of three seconds is lavish; most sites should be able to put up interactive content much sooner for nearly all users.

Meanwhile, sites are ballooning. The median mobile page is now 2.6 MiB, blowing past the size of DOOM (2.48 MiB) in April. The 75th percentile site is now larger than two copies of DOOM. P90+ sites are more than 4.5x larger, and sizes at each point have doubled over the past decade. Put another way, the median mobile page is now 70 times larger than the total storage of the computer that landed men on the moon.

An outsized contributor to this bloat comes from growth in JavaScript. Mobile JavaScript payloads have more than doubled since 2015, reaching 680 KiB and 1.3 MiB at P50 and P75 (respectively). This compositional shift exacerbates latent inequality and hurts businesses trying to grow.

When JavaScript grows as a proportion of critical-path resources, the impact of higher CPU cost per byte reduces budgets. This coffin corner effect explains why image and CSS-heavy experiences perform better byte-for-byte than sites built with the failed tools of frontend's lost decade.

Indeed, the latest CrUX data shows not even half of origins have passing Core Web Vitals scores for mobile users. More than 40% of sites still perform poorly for desktop users, and progress in both cohorts is plateauing:

This is a technical and business challenge, but also an ethical crisis. Anyone who cares to look can see the tragic consequences for those who most need the help technology can offer. Meanwhile, the lies, half-truths, and excuses made by frontend's influencer class are in defence of these approaches are, if anything, getting worse.

Through no action of their own, frontend developers have been blessed with more compute and bandwidth every year. Instead of converting that bounty into delightful experiences and positive business results, the dominant culture of frontend has leant into self-aggrandising narratives that venerate failure as success. The result is a web that increasingly punishes the poor for their bad luck while paying developers huge salaries to deliver business-undermining results.

Nobody comes to work wanting to do a bad job, but low-quality results are now the norm. This is a classic case of under-priced externalities created by induced demand from developers and PMs living in a privilege bubble.

Embedded in this year's estimates is hopeful news about the trajectory of devices and networks. Compared with early 2024's estimates, we're seeing budget growth of 600+KiB for three seconds, and a full megabyte of extra headroom at five seconds.¹

While this is not enough to overcome continued growth in payloads, budgets are now an order of magnitude more generous than those first sketched in 2017. It has never been easier to deliver pages quickly, but we are not collectively hitting the mark.

To get back to a healthy, competitive web, developers will need to apply considerably more restraint. If past is prologue, moderation is unlikely to arise organically. It's also unhelpful to conceive of ecosystem-level failures as personal failings. Yes, today's frontend culture is broken, but we should not expect better while incentives remain misaligned.

Browsers, search engines, and developer tools will need to provide stronger nudges, steering users away from bloated sites where possible, and communicating the problem to decision-makers. This will be unpopular, but it is necessary for the web to thrive.

Recommended Test Devices and Settings

This series has continually stressed that today's P75 device is yesterday's mid-market Android, and that trend continues.

The explosive smartphone market growth of the mid 2010s is squarely in the rear-view mirror, and so historical Average Selling Prices (ASPs) and replacement dynamics now dominate any discussion of fleet performance.

Hardware upgrade timelines are elongating. Previous estimates of 18 months for replacement on average is now too rosy, with the median smartphone now living longer than two years. P75 devices may be nearly 3 years old, and TechInsights estimates a 23.7% annual replacement rate.

With all of this in mind, we update our target test device to the Samsung Galaxy A24 4G, a mid-2023 release featuring an SoC fabbed on a 6 nm process; a notable improvement over previous benchmark devices.

The A24 sold for less than the global Average Selling Price for smartphones at launch ($250 vs. $353). Because that specific model may be hard to acquire for testing, anything based on the MediaTek Helio G99 or Samsung Exynos 1330 will do; e.g.:

• Samsung Galaxy A16 4G

• Samsung Galaxy A07 4G

• Xiaomi Redmi Note 13 Pro 4G

Teams that are serious about performance should track the low-end cohort instead, sticking with previously acquired Samsung Galaxy A51's, or any late-model device from the Moto E range.²

For link-accurate network throttling, I recommend spending $3 for Throttly for Android. It supports custom network profiles, allowing you to straightforwardly emulate a 9/3/100 network. DevTools throttling will always be inaccurate, and this is the best low-effort way to correctly condition links on your primary test device.

Desktops are not currently the limiting factor in the ecosystem, but it's still helpful to have physical test devices. Do not spend more than $250 (new) on a low-end test laptop. It should have a Celeron processor, eMMC storage, and run Windows. The last point is not an effort to sell more licences, but rather to represent the nasty effects of defender, NTFS, and parasitic background services on system performance. Something like the HP 14 dq3500nr.

Desktop network throttling remains fraught, and the best solutions are still those from Pat Meenan's 2016 article announcing winShaper.

The Big Story Is Still Low-End Android

What we see in our recommended test setups is an echo of the greatest influence of the past decade on smartphone performance: the spread of slow, ever-cheaper Androids with ageing chipsets, riding the cost curve downward, year-on-year.

The explosive growth of this segment drove nearly all market growth between 2011 and 2017. Now that smartphones have reached global saturation, flat sales volumes mirror the long-term trends in desktop device ownership:

At no point in the past dozen years has iOS accounted for more than 20% of new-device shipments. Quarterly fluctuations have pushed that number as high as 25% when new models are released, but the effect never lasts.

Most phones — indeed, most computers — are 24+ month old Androids. This is the result of a price segmented market: a preponderance of smartphones sold for more than $600USD (new, unlocked) are iPhones, and the overwhelming majority of devices sold for less than that are slow Androids.

The “i” in “iPhone” stands for “inequality.”

Global ASPs show the low-end isn't just alive-and-well, it's many multiples of high-end device volume. To maintain a global ASP near $370, an outsized number of cheaper Androids must be sold for every $1K (average) iOS device.

The Landscape

To understand how the payload budget estimate is derived, we need to peer deeper into the device and network situation. Despite huge, unpredictable shocks in the market (positive: Reliance Jio; negative: a pandemic), the market trends this series tracks have allowed us to forecast accurately.

75th+ percentile users are almost always on older devices, meaning we don't need to divine what will happen, just remember the recent past.

Mobile

The properties of today's mobile devices define how our sites run in practice. From the continued prevalence of 4G radios, to the shocking gaps in CPU performance, the reality of the modern web is best experienced through real devices. The next best way to understand it is through data.

Per usual, single and multicore CPU performance charts track four market segments:

• Fastest iOS device
• Fastest Android
• Mid-range Android ($300-350)
• Low-end Android ($100-150)

The last two cohorts account for more than 2/3 of new device sales:

The performance of JavaScript-based web experiences is heavily correlated with single-core speed, meaning that the P75 device places a hard cap on the amount of JavaScript that is reasonable for any website to rely on.

Depressingly, budget device CPUs have not meaningfully improved since 2022. But the nearly-identical SoCs in each year's device are getting cheaper. Reduced bill-of-materials costs mean declining retail prices for low-spec phones.

Meanwhile, the high end continues to pull away. As previewed in prior instalments of this series, top-end Androids are beginning to close the massive performance lead that Apple's A-series chips have opened up over the past decade. This is largely thanks to Qualcomm and MediaTek finally starting to address the cache-gap I have harped on since 2016:

Some cache sizings are estimates, particularly in the Android ecosystem, where vendor documentation is lacking. Android SoC vendors have a habit of implementing the smallest values ARM allows for a licensed core design.

The latest iPhone chip (A19 Pro) features truly astonishing amounts of cache. For a sense of scale, the roughly 50 MiB of L1, L2, and L3 cache in an iPhone 17 Pro provides 8.3 MiB of cache per core. This is more than double the per core cache of Intel's latest high-end desktop part, the 285K, which provides a comparatively skimpy 3.3 MiB combined cache per core.

The gobsmacking caches of A-series parts allow Apple to keep the beast fed, leading to fewer stalls and more efficient use of CPU time. This advantage redounds to better battery life because well-fed CPUs can retire work faster, returning to lower-power states sooner.

That it has taken this long for even the top end of the Android ecosystem to begin to respond is a scandal.

If there's good news for buyers of low-end devices, it's that performance per dollar continues to improve across the board.

Frustratingly, though, low-end single core performance is still 9x slower than contemporary iPhones, and mid-tier devices remain more than 3.5x slower:

Multicore performance tells a similar tale. As a reminder, this metric is less correlated with web application performance than single-core throughput:

Performance per dollar looks compelling for the lower tier parts, but recall that they are 1/3 to 1/5 the performance:

Market Trends

What makes iPhones so bloody fast, while Androids have languished? Several related factors in Apple's chip design and development strategy provided a commanding lead over the past decade:

• In-house tuning of all ARM-designed cores, thanks to a long-ago negotiated Architecture licence, leading to aggressive cache sizings.

• Concentration in fewer SoC SKUs enabled focused yield optimisation.

• Large, early orders with TSMC secured exclusive access to the latest fabrication nodes.

Android vendors, meanwhile, have spread their SoC development budgets in penny-wise, pound-foolish fashion. Even Google and Samsung's in-house efforts have failed to replicate the virtuous effects of Apple's disciplined CPU designs.

Feature sizes are a fudge below 10 nanometres, but marketing names usually reflect real increases in transistor density and frequencies, along with reductions in power use. High-end Android and iOS parts have generally been produced on comparable nodes, with Apple's lead lasting less than a year. But that's less than half the story. Android SoC vendors have avoided adding competitively sized caches, dedicating the same mm^2 on die to higher core counts and on-die radios. From a performance perspective, this has been catastrophic:

Core counts are a headline fixture of device marketing, but even the cheapest phones have featured eight (slow, memory-starved) cores since 2019. Speed comes from other properties; namely appropriate cache sizing, memory latency, frequency scaling, and chip architecture. Apple's core-count restraint and focus on other aspects should have been a lesson to the entire industry long before 2024.

Smaller transistors also allow for higher peak frequencies, giving Apple a perennial advantage thanks to early access to TSMC's latest, smallest, power-sipping processes:

These trade-offs have allowed Apple to charge a premium for devices which no other vendor can justify:

Global ASPs are conservative estimates; some research groups estimate values 10-15% higher, but the trends are consistent. The premium end continues to pull away in both price and performance, dragging ASPs slightly upward. Meanwhile, high-end devices continue to be outsold more than 3:1 by low-end phones that aren't getting faster. Those slow devices are, however, getting increasingly inexpensive, dropping below $100 in the last two years. That's 1/10th the price of the cheapest iPhone with Apple's fastest chip.

Rise of the Refurbs

Thanks to market trends, the recent-spec iPhones many web developers carry don't even represent the experience of most iOS users.

It may seem incongruous that the ASP of iOS devices is bumping up against the $1K mark while most developed countries experience bouts of slow growth post-pandemic, along with well-documented cost-of-living crises among middle-class buyers.

One possible solution to this riddle is that Android sales remain strong, as Apple is cordoned into the segment of the market it can justify to shareholders with a 30% net margin. Another is growth in the resale market, particularly for iOS devices. Thanks to premium components and better-than-Android software support lifetimes, the longevity of iPhones has created a vibrant and growing market below the $400 price point.

This also helps to explain the flat-to-slightly-declining market for new smartphones, as refurbished devices accelerate past $40BN/yr in sales.

What does this mean? We should expect, and see, higher-than-first-sale volumes of iOS use in various aggregate statistics. Wealth effects have historically explained much of this, but the scale is growing. Refurbishment and resale are now likely to be driving growing discontinuity in the data:

Not only is an iPhone 17 Pro not real life in the overall market, it isn't even real life in the iOS market any more.

Desktop

The situation on desktop is one of overwhelming stasis, modulo the Windows 11 upgrade cycle resulting from Windows 10's EOL at the end of 2025. That has driven an unusually strong one-off cycle of upgrades that will reverberate through the data in coming years.

This impetus to upgrade is cross-pressured by pricing headwinds. Economic uncertainty, tariffs, scrambled component pricing from AI demand for silicon of all sorts, and ever-longer device replacement cycles all mean that new PCs may not provide more than incremental performance gains. As a result, an increase in recent worldwide PC Average Selling Prices from ~$650 in our previous estimate to ~$750 in 2025 (per IDC) may not indicate premiumisation. In a globally connected economy, inflation comes for us all.

Overall, the composition and trajectory of the desktop market remains stable. Despite 2025's device replacement boomlet, IDC predicts stasis in “personal computing device” volumes, with growth bumping along at ±1-2% a year for the next 5 years, and landing just about where things are today. The now-stable baseline of ~410MM devices per year is predicted to be entirely flat into 2030.

Top-line things to remember about desktops are:

• 80% of “desktop” devices are laptops, tablets, and other battery-powered form-factors. The performance impact of thermal and power envelopes for these devices is drastic; many cores are spun down to low power states most of the time; symmetric multiprocessing is now a datacentre curio.

• Flaky Wi-Fi, rather than wired Ethernet, is now the last mile to most desktops.

• Desktops (including laptops) are only 15-18% of web-capable device sales; a pattern that has been stable for a decade.

Put another way: if you spend a majority of your time in front of a computer looking at a screen that's larger than 10", you live in a privilege bubble.

Evidence From the Edge User Base

Per previous instalments, we can use Edge's population-level data to understand the evolution of the ecosystem. As of late 2025, the rough breakdown looks like:

Compared with the data from early 2024, we see some important shifts:

• Low-end devices have fallen from ~45% to ~30% of the fleet.

• Most growth is in the middle tier, growing from 48% to 60%.

• The high-end is growing slowly.

Because the user base is also growing, it's worth mentioning that the apparent drop in the low-end is a relative change. In absolute terms, the ecosystem is seeing a slower absolute removal of low-spec machines. This matches what we should intuitively expect from incremental growth of the Edge user base, which is heavily skewed to Windows 11.

Older and slower devices likely constitute an even larger fraction of the total market, but may be invisible to us. Indeed, computers with spinning rust HDDs, <= 4GB of RAM, and <= 2 cores still represent millions of active devices in our data. Alarmingly, they have dropped by less than 20% in absolute terms over the past six months. And remember, this isn't even the low end of the low end, as our stats don't include Chromebooks.

Building to the limits of ”feels fine on my MacBook Pro” has never been realistic, but in 2025 it's active malpractice.

Networks

The TL;DR for networks for 2026 is that the P75 connection provides 9Mbps of downlink bandwidth, 3Mbps upload, with 100ms of RTT latency.

This 9Mbps down, 3Mbps up configuration represents sizeable uplift from the 2024/2025 guidance of 7.2Mbps down, 1.4Mbps up, with 94ms RTT, but also a correction. 2024's estimate for latency was probably off by ~15%, and should have been set closer to 110ms.

Global or ambitious firms should target networks even slower than 9/3/100 in their design parameters; the previous 5/1/28 “cable” network configuration is still worth building for, but with an upward adjustment to latency (think 5/1/100). Uneven service has the power to negatively define brands, and the way to remain in user's good graces digitally is to build for the P95+ user. Smaller, faster sites that serve this cohort well will stand out as being exceptional, even on the fastest networks and devices.

Looking forward into 2026 and 2027, the hard reality is that networks remain slower than developers expect and will not improve quickly.

Upload speeds, in particular, remain frustratingly slow, as wider upload channels correlate with faster early-session downloads. Only users on the fastest 10% of networks see downlink:uplink bandwidth rising above 2.5:1 ratios, even under ideal conditions.³

Owing to physics, device replacement rates, CAPEX budgets of mobile carriers, inherent variability in mobile networks (vs. fixed-line broadband), and worldwide regulatory divergence, we should expect experiences to be heavily bottlenecked by networks for the foreseeable future.

Previous posts in this series have documented improvements, but as we have been saying since 2021, 4G is a miracle, and 5G is a mirage.

This will remain true for at least another three years, with bandwidth and latency improving only incrementally. Sites that want to reach their full potential, if only to beat the competition, must build to budgets that are inclusive for folks on the margins. When it comes to web performance, doing well is the same as doing good.

Bandwidth

Bandwidth numbers are derived from Cloudflare's incredible Radar dataset.⁴ Looking at (downlink) bandwidth trends over the past year, we see stasis:

So where does the improvement in our estimate come from? Looking back to 2024, we see (predicted) gains emerge, but note their small absolute size:

The gap between P25 and P75 downlinks was 15 Mbps at the start of 2024 and has grown to 21 Mbps at the end of 2025; an increase of 40%. Meanwhile, bottom quartile are only 28% faster, improving from ~7 to 9 Mbps. In absolute terms, wealthier users saw 3x as much absolute gain.

The performance inequality gap is growing at the network layer too.

Latency

Latency across networks (RTTs) is improving somewhat, with a nearly 10% decrease at P75 over the past year, from ~110ms to ~100ms. Small improvements on faster links (P50, P25) look to be in the 5% range:

Given the variability at higher percentiles, we'll stick with a 100ms target for the 2026 calendar year, although we should expect slight gains.

Underlying these improvements are datacentre build outs in traditionally underserved regions, undersea cable completions, and cellular backhaul improvements from the 5G build out. Faster client CPUs and radios will also contribute meaningfully and predictably.⁵

All of these factors will continue to incrementally improve, and we predict another ~5% improvement (to 95ms) at P75 for 2027.

Looking Forward

Gains will be modest for both bandwidth and latency over the next few years. The lion's share of web traffic is now carried across mobile networks, meaning that high percentiles represent users feeling the confounding effects of cellular radios, uneven backhaul, coverage gaps, and interference from the built environment. Those factors are hardest and slowest to change, involving the largest number of potential long tent poles.

As discussed in previous instalments, the world's densest emerging markets reached the smartphone tipping point by 2020, displacing feature phones for most adults. More recently, we have approached saturation; the moment at which smartphone sales are dominated by replacements, rather than first-time sales in those markets. Affordability and literacy remain large challenges to get the residually unconnected online. The 2025 GSMA State of Mobile Internet Connectivity report has a full chapter on these challenges (PDF), complete with rich survey data.

What we see in now-stable smartphone shipment volumes primes the pump for improvements in device performance. First-time smartphone users invest less in their devices (relative to income) as the value may be unclear; users shopping for a second phone have clearer expectations and hopes. Having lived the frustration of slow sites and apps, an incrementally larger set of folks will be willing to pay a bit more to add 5G modems to their next phone.

This effect is working its way down the price curve from the ultra-high-end in 2020 to the mid-tier in 2024, but it has yet to reach the low end. Our latest low-end specimen — 2025's Moto E15 — still features a 4G radio. Because of the additional compute requirements that 5G places on SoCs, we will expect to see process node and CPU performance increases as 5G costs fall far enough to impact the low-price band.

Today, devices with otherwise similar specs and a 5G radio still command a considerable premium. The Galaxy A16 5G was introduced at a 20% premium over the 4G version, mirroring the mid-market dynamic from 2022 and 2023 where devices were offered in “regular” and (pricier) 5G versions. It will take a transition down the fab node scale like we saw for mid-market SoCs in 2022 and 2024 to make 5G a low-end table-stakes feature. I'm not holding my breath.

Given the current market for chips of all types, we may be seeing low-spec SoCs produced at 12 nanometres for several more years, reprising the long-term haunting of Android by huge volumes of A53 cores produced at 28 nm from 2012 to 2019.

Content Trends

The budget estimates generated in this series may seem less relevant now that tools like Core Web Vitals provide nuanced, audience-specific metrics that allow us to characterise important UX attributes. But this assumption is flawed thanks to the effects of deadweight losses and the biases inherent in those metrics.

Case-in-point: last year CWV deprecated FID and replaced it with the (better calibrated) INP metric. This predictably dropped the CWV pass rates of sites built on desktop-era JavaScript frameworks like React, Angular, and Ember:

RUM data, in isolation, undercounts the opportunity costs of slow and bloated experiences. Users have choices, and lost users do not show up in usage-based statistics.

A team I worked with this year saw these effects play out directly in their CrUX data:

This high-profile, fast-growing site added nearly 100 KiB of critical-path JavaScript per month from January to June. The result? A growing share of visits from desktop devices, and proportionally fewer mobile users every month. Once we began to fumigate for dead code and overeager preloading, mobile users returned.

These effects can easily overcome other factors, particularly in the current era of JavaScript bundle hyper-growth:

Are SPAs Working?

Perhaps the most important insight I spotted while re-immersing myself in the data for this post were the implications of these charts from the RUM Archive:

The top-line takeaway is chilling: sites that are explicitly designed as SPAs, and which have intentionally opted in to metrics measurement around soft-navigations are seeing one (1) soft-navigation for every full page load on average.

The rinky-dink model we discussed last year for the appropriateness of investing in SPA-based stacks is a harsh master, defining average session performance as the sum of interaction latencies, including initial navigation, divided by the total number of interactions (excluding scrolling):

If the RUM Archive's data is directionally correct, at an ecosystem level, $N=~2$ for both mobile and desktop. Sessions this shallow make a mockery of the idea that we can justify more up-front JavaScript to deliver SPA technology, even on sites with reason to believe it would help.

In private correspondence, Michal Mocny shared an early analysis from data collected via the Soft Navigations API Origin Trial. Unlike the Akamai mPulse data that feeds the RUM Archive, Chromium's data tracks interactions from all sites, not only those that have explicitly opted-in to track soft navigations, providing a much wider aperture. On top-10K origins, Chrome is currently observing values for $N$ between 1.6 and 2.2, depending on how the analysis is run, or 0.8-1.1 additional soft navigations per initial page load.

It's difficult to convey the earth-shattering magnitude of these congruent findings. Under these conditions, the amount of JavaScript a developer can justify up-front to support follow-on in-page navigations is de minimis.⁶

This should shake our industry to the bone, driving rapid reductions in emitted JavaScript. And yet:

Analysis and Conclusions

This series has three main goals:

1. Provide a concrete set of page-weight targets for working web developers.

2. Arm teams with an understanding of how the client-side computing landscape is evolving.

3. Show how budgets are constructed, giving teams tools to construct their own estimates from their own RUM and market data.

This is not altruism. I want the web to win. I began to raise the alarm about the problems created by a lack of adaptation to mobile's constraints in 2016, and they have played out on the same trend-line I feared. The web is now decisively losing the battle for relevance.

To reverse this trend, I believe several (currently unmet) conditions must be fulfilled:

• Reaching users via the web must be cost-competitive with other digital channels, meaning that re-engagement features like being on the home screen and in the notification tray must work correctly.

• The web must deliver the 80/20 set of critical capabilities for most of the important JTBDs in modern computing, but in a webby (safe, privacy-respecting by default) way.

• Web experiences, on average, have to feel responsive enough that the idea of tapping a link doesn't inspire dread.

But the web is not winning mobile. Apple, Google, and Facebook nearly extinguished the web's potential to disrupt their cosy arrangement. Preventing the web from breaking out — from meaningfully delivering app-like experiences outside an app store — is essential to maintaining dominance. But some are fighting back, and against the odds, it's working.

What's left, then, is the subject of this series. Even if browser competition comes to iOS and competitors deliver the features needed to make the web a plausible contender, the structure of today's sites is an impediment to a future in which users prefer the web.

Most of the world's computing happens on devices that are older and slower than anything on a developer's desk, and connected via networks that contemporary “full-stack” developers don't emulate. Web developers almost never personally experience these constraints, and over frontend's Lost Decade, this has created an out-of-touch privilege bubble that poisons the products of the teams that follow the herd, as well as the broader ecosystem.

That's bleak, but the reason I devote weeks to this research each year isn't to scold. The hope is that actionable targets can help shape choices, and that by continuing to stay engaged with the evolution of the landscape, we can see green shoots sprout.

If we can hold down the rate of increase in critical-path resource growth it will give hardware progress time to overtake our excesses. If we make enough progress in that direction, we might even get back to a place where the web is a contender in the minds of users.

And that's a future worth working for.

FOOTNOTES

And now we see it clear, like a Cupertino sunrise bathing Mt. Bielawski in amber: Apple will censor its App Store at the behest of the Trump administration without putting up a fight.

It will twist words into their antipodes to serve the powerful at the expense of the weak.

To better serve autocrats, it will talk out both sides of its mouth in ways it had previously reserved for dissembling arguments against threats to profits, like right-to-repair and browser choice.

They are, of course, linked.

Apple bent the knee for months, leaving many commentators to ask why. But the reasons are not mysterious: Apple wants things that only the government can provide, things that will defend and extend its power to extract rents, rather than innovate. Namely, selective exemption from tariffs and an end to the spectre of pro-competition regulation that might bring about real browser choice.

Over the past few weeks, Tim Apple got a lot what he paid for,¹ with the full weight of the US foreign and industrial policy apparatus threatening the EU over DMA enforcement. This has been part of a full-court press from Cupertino. Apple simultaneously threatened the EU while rolling out fresh astroturf for pliant regulators to recline on. This is loud, coordinated, and calculated. But calculated to achieve what? Why is the DMA such a threat to Apple?

Interoperability.

The DMA holds the power to unlock true, safe, interoperability via the web. Its core terms require that Apple facilitate real browser engine choice, and Apple is all but refusing, playing games to prevent powerful and safe iOS browsers and the powerful web applications they facilitate. Web applications that can challenge the App Store.

Unlike tariffs, which present a threat to short-term profits through higher costs and suppression of upgrades in the near term, interoperability is a larger and more insidious boogeyman for Apple. It could change everything.

Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Web?

Apple's profits are less and less attributable to innovation as “services” revenue swells Cupertino's coffers out of all proportion to iPhone sales volume. “Services” is code for rent extraction from captive users and developers. If they could acquire and make safe apps outside the App Store, Apple wouldn't be able to take 30% from an outlandishly large fraction of the digital ecosystem's wealthiest players.

Apple understands browser choice is a threat to its rentier model. The DMA holds the potential for developers to finally access the safe, open, and interoperable web technologies that power most desktop computing today. This is a particular threat to Apple, because its class-leading hardware is perfectly suited to running web applications. All that's missing are browsers that aren't intentionally hobbled. This helps to explain why Apple simultaneously demands control over all browser technology on iOS while delaying important APIs, breaking foundational capabilities, and gaslighting developers about Apple's unwillingness to solve pressing problems.

Keeping capable, stable, high-quality browsers away from iOS is necessary to maintain the App Store's monopoly on the features every app needs. Keeping other software distribution mechanisms from offering those features at a lower price is a hard requirement for Cupertino's extractive business model. The web (in particular, PWAs) present a worst-case scenario.

Unlike alternative app stores that let developers decouple distribution of proprietary apps from Apple's App Store, PWAs further free developers from building for each OS separately, allowing them to deliver apps though a zero-cost platform that builds on standards. And that platform doesn't feature a single choke point. For small developers, this is transformative, and it's why late-stage Apple cannot abide laws that create commercial fairness and enable safe, secure, pro-user alternatives.

Dots Unconnected

This is what Apple is mortgaging its brand (or, if you prefer, soul) to prevent: a world where users have a real choice in browsers.

Horrors.

Apple is loaning its monopoly on iOS software to yet another authoritarian regime without a fight, painting a stark contrast: when profits are on the line, Cupertino will gaslight democratic regulators and defy pro-competition laws with all the $1600/hr lawyers Harvard can graduate. And when it needs a transactional authoritarian's help to protect those same profits, temporarily² lending its godlike power over iOS to censor clearly protected speech isn't too high a price to ask. Struggle for thee, but not for me.

The kicker is that the only alternative for affected users and developers is Apple's decrepit implementation of web apps; the same platform Cupertino serially knee-caps to deflect competition with its proprietary APIs.

It is no exaggeration to say the tech press is letting democracy down by failing to connect the dots. Why is Apple capitulating? Because Apple wants things from the government. What are those things? We should be deep into that debate, but our reportage and editorial classes cannot grasp that A precedes B. The obvious answers are also the right ones: selective protection from tariffs, defanged prosecution by the DOJ, and an umbrella from the EU's democratic, pro-competition regulation.

The Verge tiptoed ever so close to getting it, quoting letters that former Apple executives sent the company:³

I used to believe that Apple were unequivocally ‘the good guys,’” Hodges writes. “I passionately advocated for people to understand Apple as being on the side of its users above all else. I now feel like I must question that.”

— Wiley Hodges,
"The Verge"

This is a clue; a lead that a more thoughtful press and tech commentariat could use to evaluate the frames the parties deploy to their own benefit.

"Who should rule?"

The tech press is failing to grasp the moral stakes of API access. Again and again they flunk at connecting boring questions of who can write and distribute programs for phones to urgent issues of power over publication and control of devices. By declining to join these threads, they allow the unearned and increasingly indefensible power app stores to proliferate. The urgent question is how that power can be attenuated in the political economy of mobile OSes, or as Popper put it:

We must ask whether…we should not prepare for the worst leaders, and hope for the best. But this leads to a new approach to the problem of politics, for it forces us to replace the question: "Who should rule?" by the new question: "How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?"

— Karl Popper,
"The Open Society and Its Enemies"

But the tech press does not ask these questions.

Instead of questioning why Apple's OS is so fundamentally insecure that an App Store is necessary, they accept the ever-false idea that iOS has been relatively secure because of the App Store.

Rather than confronting Apple with the reality that it used the App Store to hand out privacy-invading APIs in undisciplined ways to unscrupulous actors, it congratulates Cupertino on the next kayfabe performance. Links between Apple's monopoly over APIs and the growth of monopolies in adjacent sectors are rarely, if ever, questioned. Far too often, the tech press accepts the narrative structure of Apple's marketing, satisfying pangs of journalistic conscience with ineffectual critique of surface features, rather analyses of latent power imbalances.

Nowhere, e.g., in The Verge's coverage of these letters is there a discussion about alternatives to the App Store. Only a few outlets ever press Apple on its suppression of web apps, including failure to add PWA install banners and essential capabilities. It's not an Apple vs. Google horse-race story, and so discussion of power distribution doesn't get coverage.

Settling for occasionally embarrassing Apple into partially reversing its most visibly egregious actions is ethically and morally stunted. Accepting the frame of "who should rule?" that Cupertino reflexively deploys is toxic to any hope of worthwhile technology because it creates and celebrates the idea of kings, leaving us supine relative to the mega-corps in our phones.

This is, in a word, childish.

Adults understand that things are complicated, that even the best intentioned folks get things wrong, or can go astray in larger ways. We build institutions and technologies to protect ourselves and those we love from the worst impacts of those events, and those institutions always model struggles over power and authority. If we are lucky and skilled enough to build them well, the results are balanced systems that attenuate attempts at imposing overt authoritarianism.

In other words, the exact opposite of Apple's infantilising and totalitarian world view.

Instead of debating which wealthy vassals might be more virtuous than the current rulers, we should instead focus on attenuating the power of these monarchical, centralising actors. The DMA is doing this, creating the conditions for interoperability, and through interoperability, competition. Apple know it, and that's why they're willing to pawn their own dignity, along with the rights of fellow Americans, to snuff out the threat.

These are not minor points. Apple has power, and that power comes from its effective monopoly on the APIs that make applications possible on the most important computing platform of our adult lives.

Protecting this power has become an end unto itself, curdling the pro-social narratives Apple takes pains to identify itself with. Any reporter that bothers to do what a scrappy band of web developers have done — to actually read the self-contradictory tosh Apple flings at regulators and legislators around the world — would have been able to pattern match; to see that twisting words to defend the indefensible isn't somehow alien to Apple. It's not even unusual.

But The Verge, 404, and even Wired are declining to connect the dots. If our luminaries can't or won't dig in, what hope do less thoughtful publications with wider audiences have?

Apple's power and profits have made it an enemy of democracy and civic rights at home and abroad. A mealy-mouthed tech press that cannot see or say the obvious is worse than useless; it is an ally in Apple's attempts to obfuscate.

The most important story about smartphones for at least the past decade has been Cupertino's suppression of the web, because that is a true threat to the App Store, and Apple's power flows from the monopolies it braids together. As Cory Doctorow observed:

Apple's story – the story of all centralized, authoritarian technology – is that you have to trade freedom for security. If you want technology that Just Works(TM), you need to give up on the idea of being able to override the manufacturer's decisions. It's always prix-fixe, never a la carte.

This is a kind of vulgar Thatcherism, a high-tech version of her maxim that "there is no alternative." Decomposing the iPhone into its constituent parts – thoughtful, well-tested technology; total control by a single vendor – is posed as a logical impossibility, like a demand for water that's not wet

— Cory Doctorow,
"Plenty of room at the bottom (of the tech stack)"

The Price of High Modernism is Dignity

Doctorow's piece on these outrages is a must-read, as it does what so many in the tech press fail to attempt: connecting patterns of behaviour over time and geography to make sense of Apple's capitulation. It also burrows into the rot at the heart of the App Store: the claim that anybody should have as much power as Apple has arrogated to itself.

We can see clearly now that this micro-authoritarian structure is easily swayed by macro-authoritarians, and bends easily to those demands. As James C. Scott wrote:

I believe that many of the most tragic episodes of state development in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries originate in a particularly pernicious combination of three elements. The first is the aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society, an aspiration that we have already seen at work in scientific forestry, but one raised to a far more comprehensive and ambitious level. “High modernism” seems an appropriate term for this aspiration. As a faith, it was shared by many across a wide spectrum of political ideologies. Its main carriers and exponents were the avant-garde among engineers, planners, technocrats, high-level administrators, architects, scientists, and visionaries.

If one were to imagine a pantheon or Hall of Fame of high-modernist figures, it would almost certainly include such names as Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, Le Corbusier, Walther Rathenau, Robert McNamara, Robert Moses, Jean Monnet, the Shah of Iran, David Lilienthal, Vladimir I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Julius Nyerere. They envisioned a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition.

— James C. Scott,
"Seeing Like A State"

This is also Apple's vision for the iPhone; an unshakeable belief in its own rightness and transformative power for good. Never mind all the folks that get hurt along the way, it is good because Apple does it. There is no claim more central to the mythos of Apple's marketing wing, and no deception more empowering to abusers of power.⁴

Apple claims to stand for open societies, but POSIWID shows that to be a lie. It is not just corrupted, but itself has become corrupting; a corrosive influence on the day-to-day exercise of rights necessary for democracy and the rule-of-law to thrive.⁵

Apple's Le Corbusierian addiction to control has not pushed it into an alliance with those resisting oppression, but into open revolt against efforts that would make the iPhone an asset for citizens exercising their legitimate rights to aid the powerless. It scuttles and undermines open technologies that would aid dissidents. It bends the knee to tyranny because unchecked power helps Cupertino stave off competition, preserving (it thinks) a space for its own messianic vision of technology to lift others out of perdition.

If the consequences were not so dire, it would be tragically funny.

Let's hope our tech press find their nerve, and a copy of “The Open Society and Its Enemies," before we lose the ability to laugh.

Endnote: Let's Talk About Google

I spent a dozen and change years at Google, and my greatest disappointment in leadership over those years was the way the founders coddled the Android team's similarly authoritarian vision.

For the price of a prominent search box on every phone,⁶ senior leadership (including Sundar) were willing to sow the seeds of the web's obsolescence, handing untold power to Andy Rubin's team of Java zealots. It was no secret that they sought to displace the web as the primary way for users to experience computing, substituting proprietary APIs for open platforms along the way.

With the growth of Android, Play grew in influence, in part as cover for Android's original sins.⁷ This led to a series of subtler, but no less effective, anti-web tactics that dovetailed with Apple's suppression of web apps on iOS. The back doors and exotic hoops developers must jump through to gain distribution for interoperable apps remains a scandal.

But more than talking about Google and what it has done, we should talk about how we talk about Google. In specific, how the lofty goals of its Search origins were undercut by those anti-social, anti-user failures in Android and Play.

It's no surprise that Google is playing disingenuous games around providing access to competitors regarding web apps on Android, while simultaneously pushing to expand its control over app distribution. The Play team covet what Apple have, and far from exhibiting any self-awareness of their own culpability, are content to squander whatever brand reputation Google may have left in order to expand its power over software distribution.

And nobody can claim that power is being used for good.

Google is not creating moral distance between itself and Apple, or seeking to help developers build PWAs to steer around the easily-censored channels it markets, and totally coincidentally, taxes.⁸ Google is Apple's collaborator in capitulation. A moral void, trotting out the same, tired tactic of hiding behind Apple's skirt whenever questions about the centralising and authoritarian tendencies of App Store monopolies crop up. For 15 years, Android has been content to pen 1-pagers for knock-off versions of whatever Apple shipped last year, including authoritarian-friendly acquiescence.

Play is now the primary software acquisition channel for most users around the world, and that should cause our tech press to intensify scrutiny of these actions, but that's not how Silicon Valley's wealth-pilled technorati think, talk, or write. The Bay Area's moral universe extends to the wall of the privilege bubble, and no further. We don't talk about the consequences of enshittified, trickle-down tech, or even bother to look hard at it. That would require using Android and…like…eww.

Far from brave truth-telling, the tech press we have today treats the tech the other half (80%) use as a curio; a destination to gawp at on safari, rather than a geography whose residents are just as worthy of dignity and respect as any other. And that's how Google is getting away with shocking acts of despicable cowardice to defend a parallel proprietary ecosystem of gambling, scams, and shocking privacy invasion, but with a fraction of the negative coverage.

And that's a scandal, too.

FOOTNOTES

Page-Specific Resources via Shortcodes and the 11ty Bundler

You know how it gets once you've got a mature 11ty setup: shortcodes proliferate, and some generate output that might depend on JS or CSS.

If your setup is anything like mine, you might also feel conflicted about including some of those resources globally. It's important to have them available for the posts that need them, but it's not great to bring a charting library, e.g., into every page when only 1 in 20 will need it.

This blog has grown many such shortcodes that generate expansions for features like:

• Web Components for YouTube and Vimeo embeds

• WebPageTest.org test embeds

• plot.js based charts

Here, for instance, is how a Vimeo embed looks in the markdown of a page, using Nunjucks for Markdown pre-processing:

{% vimeo "VIDEOID", "TITLE" %}

This expands to:

<lite-vimeo 
  videoid="VIDEOID" 
  videotitle="TITLE">
  <a href="http://vimeo.com/VIDEOID">TITLE</a>
</lite-vimeo>

But this also requires script; e.g.:

<script type="module" async
    src="/assets/js/lite-vimeo/lite-vimeo.js">
</script>

And the list keeps growing. To avoid having the weight of these components clogging up every page, a system for selectively pulling in their code would be helpful.

It'd also be grand if we could make sure scripts appear just once, even if shortcodes are invoked multiple times per page. Included code should preferably also be located towards the top of the document.

The 11ty Bundle plugin to the rescue!

Sort of.

At first glance, the 11ty Bundle plugin looks ideal for this, but we need to solve two problems the documentation doesn't cover:

1. Shortcodes should auto-include the scripts they need, but not over-include them. How can we use Bundle plugin provided shortcodes from within other shortcodes? This is important to avoid having every page needing to remember to include scripts.

2. How to make this work with templates that use pagination?

The first problem turns out to be very simple because 11ty shortcodes are themselves callable functions. Somewhere in my .eleventy.js configuration, there's now a function like:

function addToBundle(scope, bundle, code) {
  eleventyConfig.getPairedShortcode(bundle)
                .call(scope, code);
}

This works because 11ty's internals are dogmatic about not binding this, allowing tools like shortcodes to be regular 'ole functions that can be invoked from dynamic scopes via call() and apply(). This is awesome!

The Vimeo shortcode then calls addToBundle to make sure that the JS it depends on will get loaded:

eleventyConfig.addShortcode("vimeo",
                            function(id, title="") {
  addToBundle(this, "js", `
    <script type="module" async
        src="/assets/js/lite-vimeo/lite-vimeo.js">
    </script>
  `);

  let titleAttr = title ? ` videotitle="${title}" ` : "";
  return `
    <lite-vimeo videoid="${id}" ${titleAttr}>
      <a href="http://vimeo.com/${id}">${title}</a>
    </lite-vimeo>
  `;
});

The real code is a tad more complex to handle things like proper escaping, script file versioning, stripping whitespace to avoid markdown issues, etc…but not much. Page templates then include the usual:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <!-- ... -->

    {% getBundle "js" %}

    <!-- ... -->
  </head>
  <!-- ... -->

And this should be it!

Mo Pagination, Mo Problems

Except it didn't work on my homepage.

Why not? Mostly because the 11ty Bundle plugin was built for sane sites; projects where a single output page's content doesn't need to hoist bundle inputs from across multiple entries. But I'm using pagination, like a mug.

I've got a patch out that addresses this, hackily, and for now I'm using package.json overrides to target that branch. It seems to be working well enough here:

{
  "name": "infrequently.org",
  // ...
  "devDependencies": {
    "@11ty/eleventy": "3.1.2",
    "@11ty/eleventy-plugin-rss": "^2.0.4",
    "@11ty/eleventy-plugin-syntaxhighlight": "^5.0.2",
    // ...
  },
  "overrides": {
    "@11ty/eleventy-plugin-bundle": 
      "https://github.com/slightlyoff/eleventy-plugin-bundle-pagination.git#pagination-aware"
  },
  // ...
}

Now I can build shortcodes that use other shortcodes to bundle code only for the pages that need it, trimming the default JS payload while leaving me free to build and use richer components as necessary.

Build Time Impact

The one downside of this approach has been an increase in build times.

I've worked to keep full re-builds under five seconds, and incremental builds under a second on my main writing device (a recent Chromebook). The Bundle plugin adds a post-processing phase (via @11ty/eleventy/html-transformer) to builds which tack on two seconds to both scenarios. This blog generates ~1,500 pages in a build, so the per page hit isn't bad, but it's enough to be noticeable.

I will likely spend time getting this trimmed back down in the near future. If you've got a smaller site, I can recommend the bundler-with-generative-shortcodes approach. If your site is much larger, it may be worth adopting if you're already paying the price of a post-processing step. Otherwise, and as ever, it's worth measuring.

Scroll-Position Based Delayed Code Loading

Loading code only on the pages that need it is great, but you know what's even better? Only loading code when it's going to actually be needed.

For a lot of pages, it makes sense to load specific widgets only when users scroll down far enough to encounter their content. Normally this is the sort of thing folks lean on big frameworks to handle, but that's not how this blog rolls. Instead, we'll use an IntersectionObserver and a MutationObserver to:

• Locate scripts that want deferred loading.

• Use attributes on those elements to identify which elements they should be invoked for.

• Watch the page scrolling and trigger the code loading when target elements get close enough to the viewport.

Taken together, this reduces code loaded up front that might otherwise contend with above-the-fold resources without sacrificing interactive features further down the page.

Here, for instance, was how some code from a recent blog post that needed charts looked before:

{% js %}
<script type="module" 
    src="/assets/js/d3.min.js"></script>
<script type="module" 
    src="/assets/js/plot.min.js"></script> 

<script type="module">
  // ...
  genFeatureTypePlot("leading", true, {
    caption: "Chromium launches ... ahead of other engines."
  });
  // ...
</script>
{% endjs %}

#### Leading Launches by Year

<div id="leading"></div>

The Bundle plugin makes it simple to write code near the elements that will target it and not worry about duplicates. That's helpful, and the bundle plugin provides many tools for choosing where to output the gathered-up bits, but what I really want is to delay the fetching of those scripts until the user might plausibly benefit from them.

Here's what the revised code looks like:

{% js %}
<script type="io+module" data-for="leading" 
    src="/assets/js/d3.min.js"></script>
<script type="io+module" data-for="leading" 
    src="/assets/js/plot.min.js"></script> 

<script type="io+module" data-for="leading">
  // ...
  genFeatureTypePlot("leading", true, {
    caption: "Chromium launches ... ahead of other engines."
  });
  // ...
</script>
{% endjs %}

#### Leading Launches by Year

<div id="leading"></div>

These scripts will still be hoisted into the <head>, but they won't execute because they are using a type attribute the browser doesn't recognise. The data-for attribute provides an ID of the element to trigger loading of the script. These are enough to build a scroll-based loader with.

Our loader uses a bit of inline'd script at the top of the page to set up an IntersectionObserver to watch scrolling, and a collaborating MutationObserver to identify elements matching this description as the parser creates them.

Here's the meat of that snippet, loaded early in the document as a <script type="module">. Pardon the pidgin JavaScript style; the last thing I want is a JS transpiler as part of builds, so bytes matter:

// Utilities to delay code until the next task
let rAF = requestAnimationFrame;
let doubleRaf = (func) => {
  rAF(()=> { rAF(()=> { func(); }) });
};

// Bookkeeping
let ioScripts = new Set();
let ioScriptsFor = new Map();
let triggerIDs = new Set();

// Record which scripts should wait on elements
let processScript = (s) => {
  if(ioScripts.has(s)) { return; }
  ioScripts.add(s);
  let idFor = s.getAttribute("data-for");
  let isf = ioScriptsFor.get(idFor);
  if(!isf) {
    isf = [];
    ioScriptsFor.set(idFor, isf);
    triggerIDs.add(idFor);
  }
  isf.push(s);
};

// Handle existing scripts before setting up 
// the Mutation Observer
document.querySelectorAll(`script[type="io+module"]`)
    .forEach(processScript);

// Preload element tempalate;
let plt = document.createElement("link");
plt.setAttribute("rel", "modulepreload");

// For a given element, begin loading scripts 
// that were waiting on it.
let triggerScripts = async (id) => {
  let scripts = ioScriptsFor.get(id);
  let head = document.head;
  for(let s of scripts) {
    if(!s.src) { continue; }
    // Get a preload request started
    let pl = plt.cloneNode(true);
    pl.setAttribute("href", s.src);
    head.append(pl);
  }

  for(let s of scripts) {
    // Clone because setting type alone does not 
    // trigger evaluation.
    let sc = s.cloneNode(true); 
    // Set type to an executable value
    sc.setAttribute("type", "module");
    if(sc.src) { // External scripts
      let lp = new Promise((res) => {
        sc.onload = res; 
      });
      head.append(sc);
      await lp; // Serialisation handled above
    } else { // Inline modules
      head.append(sc);
    }
  }
};

let forObs = new IntersectionObserver(
  (entries) => {
    entries.forEach((e) => {
      if(e.intersectionRatio > 0) {
        forObs.unobserve(e.target);
        doubleRaf(() => {
          triggerScripts(e.target.id);
        });
      }
    });
  }, 
  {
    // If we boot far down the page, e.g. via back 
    // button scroll restoration, load eagerly. 
    // Else, watch two screens ahead:
    rootMargin: "1000% 0px 200% 0px",
  }
);

// When new elements are added, watch for scripts 
// with the right type and elements that scripts are 
// waiting on.
let documentMo = new MutationObserver((records) => {
  for(let r of records) {
    if(!r.addedNodes) { continue; }
    for(let n of r.addedNodes) {
      if(n.nodeType === 1) { // Elements only
        if((n.tagName === "SCRIPT") &&
           (n.type === "io+module")) {
          processScript(n);
        }
        // If we find elements in the watch list, 
        // observe their scrolling relative to 
        // the viewport
        if(n.id && triggerIDs.has(n.id)) {
          forObs.observe(n);
        }
      }
    }
  }
});

documentMo.observe(document.documentElement, { 
  childList: true, 
  subtree: true,
});

That's the whole job done in just 110 lines of modern platform code, including utility functions and 20 lines of comments.

A few small tricks of note:

• <link rel="modulepreload" href="..."> allows us to get network requests started without waiting on previous scripts to download, parse, and evaluate.

• Limiting support to modules enables us to get async, but ordered, execution semantics.

• The early querySelectorAll() ensures hoisted script blocks that occur before the inline'd script are handled correctly.

As this was enough for the moment, I haven't implemented a few obvious improvements:

• This technique could be combined with shortcodes-calling-the-bundler to create shortcodes that dynamically load their code based on scroll position and only on pages that need them.

• The id-based system is a bit fugly and can easily be upgraded to use any simple CSS selector that matches() supports.

Faster CSS Selectors for 11ty Syntax Highlighting

It's a small thing, but I do try to optimise the CSS selectors used on this blog, as it's element-heavy and doesn't encapsulate much of the style-recalculation time work with Shadow DOM.

It was something of a surprise, then, to find that use of the @11ty/eleventy-plugin-syntax-highlight module's use of some basic styles cargo-culted many years ago was tanking style recalculation performance. How? Slow attribute rules:

code[class*="language-"],
pre[class*="language-"] {
	color: #f8f8f2;
	background: none;
	text-shadow: 0 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.3);
  /* ... */
}

Thanks to the prevalence of inline <code> blocks in my writing, the Selector Stats panel showed a fair few slow-path misses.

Thankfully, the fix is simple. In the CSS I switched to faster whole-attribute selectors:

code[highlighted],
pre[highlighted] {
	color: #f8f8f2;
	background: none;
	text-shadow: 0 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.3);
  /* ... */
}

Next, I used the configuration options available in the plugin (which I only figured out from reading the source) to specify those attributes be added to the <pre>s and <code>s generated by the syntax highlighter:

import syntaxHighlight from 
    "@11ty/eleventy-plugin-syntaxhighlight";

// ...

eleventyConfig.addPlugin(syntaxHighlight, {
  // For faster CSS selectors
  preAttributes: { highlighted: "highlighted" },
  codeAttributes: { highlighted: "highlighted" },
});

Now the browser doesn't have to attempt a slow substring search every time it encounters one of these elements.

There's more to do in terms of selector optimisation on this site, but this was a nice quick win.

Lean Rada's CSS-only Low-Quality Image Previews

The history is boring, but suffice to note that the <img> helpers this site uses predate the official 11ty Image transform plugin, and are tuned to generate URLs that work with Netlify's Image CDN. This means I've also been responsible for generating my own previews for images that haven't loaded yet, and devising strategies for displaying and animating them.

This has been, by turns, fun and frustrating.

The system relies on (you guessed it) shortcodes which both produce a list of images without previews and consume cached preview data to inline the scaled-down versions. Historically this worked by using sharp to generate low-res WebP (then AVIF) base64-encoded values that got blurred. I played a bit with BlurHash and ThumbHash, but the need for a <canvas> element was unattractive.

A better answer would have relied on CSS custom paint, but between Safari being famously rekt (and representing large fraction of this blog's readership), and the Paint Worklet context missing the ImageData() constructor, it never felt like a workable approach.

But as of this year, there's a new kid in town: Lean Rada's badass CSS-only LQIP approach.

That system is now implemented, which does a lot to shrink the HTML payloads of pages, as well as speeding up raster of the resulting image previews. This is visible in detailed traces, where the layout phase no longer has to wait for a background threads to synchronously decode image literals.

It took a few weekends of playing around to get it going correctly, as the code linked from Lean's blog post is not what he's using now. The colourspace conversion code they're using is also inaccurate, and so attempts to replace it with color-space produced visually incorrect results. Using the exact code they do for RGB-to-Lab conversion is necessary to generate the correct effect, and dialling in those differences was time-consuming.

Happy to make the code I use for this available upon request, but it's not amazing, and you really should go read Lean's blog post for yourself. It's a masterpiece.

Bonus Hack: Global Acronyms for Better Abbreviations

I recently added markdown-it-abbr to my configuration to make some technical writing a bit more accessible. Across a few posts, this ended up with a lot of repetition for terms like “W3C”, “IETF”, etc.

This was both a bit time-consuming and error-prone. What if, I wondered, it were possible to centralise them?

Turns out it's trivial! My setup pre-processes markdown as Nunjucks (via markdownTemplateEngine: "njk"), which makes the full range of directives available, including…include.

This means I can just create a single file with commonly used acronyms and include it from every page; the physical location is _includes/acronyms.md:

{% include "acronyms.md" %}

This doesn't improve performance, but has been hugely helpful for consistency.

Does It Work?

Putting it all together, what do we get?

On a page which previously saw contention between scripts for charts and above-the-fold fonts and initial layout work, the wins have been heartening on a low-spec test bench:

The long tent pole is now Netlify's pokey connection setup and TTFB, and I'm content (if not happy) with that.

Contents

• Lies by Any Other Name
• Great Artists Steal
• Dear Tech Reporters: Access Is Not A Beat

This blog is failing on several levels. First, September 2025 is putting the “frequent” in “infrequently”, much to my chagrin. Second, my professional mission is to make a web that's better for everyone, not to tear Apple down.

But just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in.

Over the past 24 hours, Cupertino has played the hits from its iPhone-era anti-user, anti-business, anti-rule-of-law power trip. To recap:

• Apple sent a demand that the EU give up on DMA enforcement in a petulant and utterly misleading press release that mostly served to catalogue Apple's own failures to comply.

• Cupertino's kept astroturf outfit — ACT | The App Association — penned unhinged misinformation for consumption by US regulatory types (h/t Damien Geradin).

• The EC then called Apple's bluff.

Make no mistake about what's going on: Apple is claiming that the EU is forcing Apple to adopt interpretations of the DMA that no other party has, which the EC itself has not backed, and which are “forcing” Apple to avoid shipping features in the EU.

Or, put another way, Apple wants to launder the consequences of its own anticompetitive, anti-user choices through a credulous tech press. The goal is to frame regulators for Apple's own deeds.

Lies by Any Other Name

If this smells like bullshit, that's because it is.

Apple tried similar ploys last year when it sprung a blatant attempt to kill PWAs on the EU as a price for having the temerity to regulate. The plan, it seemed then, was to adopt an exotic reading of the DMA and frame the EC for killing PWAs.

What Apple's attempting now is even more brazen, particularly after 16+ months of serial non-compliance since the DMA came into force (h/t OWA).

Remember that:

• Apple's browser, and by extension every iOS browser, fails on basic security and privacy controls, putting users at risk constantly. Apple serially misrepresents this situation to anyone who will listen.

• Cupertino has constructed a legal (PDF) and technical thicket that prevents competitors from building better browsers, including:

  • Geofencing choice to the EU.

  • Forcing users to download separate browsers to access better versions (should they appear).

  • Withholding PWA and Push Notification APIs from competitors.

  • Providing a busted SDK that included multiple show-stopping bugs.

  • Making the process of acquiring and using the necessary entitlements for development nearly impossible.

  • Gaslighting the EC and the press at every turn; simultaneously claiming it is complying, while complaining loudly that it has to do work to implement the wholly unnecessary hurdles to compatibility that Apple itself created.

• Apple have used every opportunity to rubbish both the spirit and letter of the law, spreading outlandish claims about user harms. These claims keep getting rejected whenever they're weighed by regulators and independent third parties.

All of this to prevent the web from threatening the App Store, via the DMA.

Add today's shake-down, and we see an assault on the rule of law. Tim's appearance in The Oval bearing gaudy-ass trinkets makes sense as a kickback for services rendered against the idea of laws. Or at least laws that bind those with power the way they constrain everyone else.

This is not a one-off or a fluke.

The name of the game is delay, and Apple is using the same tactics it has practised to maintain profits through outrageous attacks on the right-to-repair and sensible anti-e-waste regulation. When you're the incumbent, delay is winning. Apple has pulled out all the stops to prevent the web from providing a safer, more private alternative to native apps, winning long reprieves thus far. And you should see what they did on the native side. phew.

This is extremely embarrassing for the EU, which has attempted to respond thoughtfully and reasonably to every provocation. But appeasement of Cupertino isn't working.

Great Artists Steal

Apple didn't author the playbook it's using now; it has been developed and honed for 40 years by toxic industries trying feverishly to escape the consequences of their actions. Most famously, the tactics Apple is gleefully employing served Big Oil and Big Tobacco extremely well:

1. Lobbying (legalised corruption).

   This works a shockingly large fraction of the time, and was sufficient to kill effective regulation of the smartphone ecosystem in the US during Biden's term, despite overwhelming evidence from the NTIA's exhaustive report.

   If first-party lobbying hits roadblocks — e.g., being absolutely outclassed by civil society groups that see the real threats and costs of your actions — there are alternatives, including...

2. Astroturf.

   If "ACT" rings a bell, it might be for the role it played in the '90s in the (hollow) defence of Microsoft.

   These days, it's a bought-and-paid-for megaphone for Apple, and it is working to worm its way into EU policy circles too. For a flavour of the Klein bottle arguments it serves up regularly, imagine arguing that more choice than a single App Store would be bad because it would hurt small developers. 🤯

3. Market false comparison points.

   Apple has a point about privacy and security when it comes to Android, e.g., but why is that our comparison point? Why is the App Store's historic failure to safeguard anyone from anything (by comparison to browsers) our collective counterfactual? It's nonsense. Hot tosh. But it's marketed with gusto and zeal in the hopes that nobody will notice. And the tech press, to their everlasting discredit, have more than played along.

   When that doesn't work...

4. Perform petulance.

   If a regulator or government has the stones to stand up for its own democratic polity in a way that attacks your profit potential, go to the matresses. Let everyone know they'll be sorry. Throw as big a hissyfit as you can manage, then make the same false claims over and over.

   To make obvious falsehoods stick, shameless repetition, at volume, is a must.

5. Market your "compliance."

   But under no circumstances, actually comply.

   The trick here is to performatively roll out processes and press briefings telling everyone how seriously you take all of this while actively gumming up the works. Apple have done this on the regular since the DMA's passage, and if that rhymes with various ongoing plots against right-to-repair after public claims to support it...well...

6. Claim law hurts kittens, blame regulators

   Doesn't have to be kittens, obviously. Jobs, privacy, apple pie...anything that seems sympathetic will do. Just make fig-leaf claims to support your side and lean heavily into "won't someone think of the kids?"

   Assuming your bought-and-paid-for astroturfers and docile access-journalism reporters are still on speed dial, GOTO 2, safe in the assumption that regulators won't do much.

Honestly, it's a winning formula, assuming you have more money than Croesus and lawyers willing to make claims they know to be untrue. All they better if they're so well paid that they can't be bothered to check.

It only falls apart if the folks whose job it is to ferret out the truth, and the people whose role is to stand up for citizens against vested interests, do their jobs.

Dear Tech Reporters: Access Is Not A Beat

At the risk of stating the obvious, it does not matter what your relationship to Cupertino is. It's in your head. They threaten to call your boss? Or to stop talking to you? So what? They always do that. To everyone. All the time. Ask anyone. There's no upside, and you can never be on the inside. You were always being managed.

Cupertino's gonna threaten to stop running ads on your site? Print that.

Where are your stones? Why did you get into journalism? Or technology? Or technology journalism? What, would you say, 'ya do here?

The obvious stenography around competition issues is mind-numbing when the theory of the case is so bloody simple. Apple and Google want everyone in their app stores because that's how they maintain power, and through that power, profits. They have arranged things such that being in the App Store is the only way developers get access to critical APIs, and those APIs are the only way to make functional apps.

Apple's fighting real browsers and the DMA because they're a threat to that model. Browsers, and the PWAs they enable, are the open, tax-free alternative to app stores, and the Duopolists are extremely displeased that they exist, even in the degraded form they currently allow.

This is simple. Obvious. Incredibly transparent.

But almost nobody will connect the dots in print. And that's a scandal, too.

Update:
The charts below were inappropriately snapped, compressing the range of values. This has been corrected. Feature availability numbers also changed since drafting and have been updated.

In several recent posts, I've attempted to address how the structure of standards bodies and their adjacent incubation venues accelerates or suppresses the potential of the web as a platform. The pace of progress matters because platforms are competitions, and actors that prevent expansions of basic capabilities risk consigning the web to the dustbin.

Inside that framework, there is much to argue over regarding the relative merits of specific features and evolutionary directions. This is healthy and natural. We should openly discuss features and their risks, try to prevent bad consequences, and work to mend what breaks. This competitive process has made browsers incredibly safe and powerful for 30 years.

Until iOS, that is.

Imagine my surprise upon hearing that Apple isn't attempting to freeze the web in amber, preserving advantages for its proprietary platform, and that it instead offers to redesign proposals it disagrees with.

As I have occasionally documented, this has not been my experience. I have relatively broad exposure to the patterns of Apple's collaboration, having designed, advised on, or led teams that built dozens of features across disparate areas of the platform since the Blink fork.¹

But perhaps this was the wrong slice from which to judge? I've been hearing of Apple's openness to collaboration on challenging APIs so often that either my priors are invalid, or something else is at work. To find out, I needed data.

Background

A specific parry gets deployed whenever WebKit's sluggish feature pace comes up: “controversial” features “lack consensus” or “are not standards” or “have privacy and security problems” (unspecified). The corollary being that Apple engages in good-faith to address these developer needs in other ways, even in areas where they have overtly objected.

Apple's engine has indisputably trailed Blink and Gecko in all manner of features over the past decade. This would not be a major problem, except that Apple prevents other browsers from delivering better and more competitive web engines on iOS.

Normally, consequences for not adopting certain features arrive in the market. Browsers that fail to meet important needs, or drop the ball on quality lose share. This does not hold on iOS because no browser can ship a less-buggy or more capable engine than Apple's WebKit.

Because competitors are reduced to rebadging WebKit, Apple has created new responsibilities and expectations for itself.² Everyone knows iOS is the only way to reach wealthy users, and no browser can afford to be shut out of that slice of the mobile market. Therefore, the quality and features of Apple's implementation matter greatly to the health and competitiveness of the web.

This put's Apple's actions squarely in the spotlight.

Is Apple Engaged In Constructive API Redesign?

It's possible to size up Apple's appetite for problem-solving in several ways. We can look to understand how frequently Apple ships features ahead of, or concurrently with, other engines because near-simultaneous delivery is an indicator of co-design. We can also look for visible indications of willingness to engage on thorny designs, searching for counter-proposals and shipped alternatives along the way.

General Trends

This chart tracks single-engine omissions over the past decade; a count of designs which two engines have implement but which a single holdout prevents from web-wide availability:

Thanks to the same Web Features data set, many views are possible. This data shows that there are currently 178 features in Chromium that are not available in Safari, and 34 features in Safari that are not yet in Chromium. (or 179 and 37 for mobile, respectively). But as I've noted previously, point-in-time evaluations may not tell us very much.

I was curious about delays in addition to omissions. How often do we see evidence of simultaneous shipping, indicating strong collaboration? Is that more or less likely than leading vendors feeling the need to go it alone, either because of a lack of collaborative outreach, or because other vendors do not engage when asked?

To get a sense, I downloaded all the available data (JSON file), removed features with no implementations, removed features introduced before 2015, filtered to Chrome, Safari, and Firefox, then aggregated by year. The resulting data set is here (JSON file).

The data can't determine causality, but can provide directional hints:

Leading Launches by Year

Features Shipped Within One Year of the Leader

Features Shipped Two+ Years After the Leader

Safari rarely leads, but that does not mean other vendor's designs will stand the test of time. But if Apple engages in solving the same problems, we would expect to see Safari leading on alternatives³ or driving up the rates of simultaneously shipping features once consensus emerges. But these aren't markedly increased. Apple can, of course, afford to fund work into substitutes for “problematic” APIs, but it doesn't seem to.

Narratives about collaboration in tricky areas take more hits from Safari's higher incidence of catch-up launches. These indicate Apple shipping the same design that other vendors led with, but on a delay of two years or more from their first introduction. This is not redesign. If there were true objections to these APIs, we wouldn't expect to see them arrive at all, yet Apple has done more catching up over the past several years than it has shipped APIs with other vendors.

This fails to rebut intuitions developed from recent drops of Safari features (1, 2) composed primarily of APIs that Apple's engineers were not primary designers of.

But perhaps this data is misleading, or maybe I analysed it incorrectly. I have heard allusions to engagement regarding APIs that Apple has publicly rejected. Perhaps those are where Cupertino's standards engineers have invested their time?

Hard Cases

Most of the hard cases concern APIs that Apple (and others) have rightly described as having potentially concerning privacy and security implications. Chromium engineers agreed those concerns have merit and worked to address them; we called it “Project Fugu” for a reason. In addition to meticulous design to mitigate risks, part of the care taken included continually requesting engagement from other vendors.

Consider the tricky cases of Web MIDI, Web USB, and Web Bluetooth.

Web MIDI

Apple has supported MIDI in macOS for at least 20 years — likely much longer — and added iOS support for MIDI in 2010. By the time the first Web MIDI proposals broke cover in 2012, MIDI hardware and software were the backbone of digital music and a billion dollar business; Apple's own physical stores were stocking racks of MIDI devices for sale. Today, an overwhelming fraction of MIDI devices explicitly list their compatibility with iOS and macOS.

It was therefore a clear statement of Apple's intent to cap web capabilities when it objected to Web MIDI's development just before the Blink fork. The objections by Apple were by turns harsh, condescendingly ignorant and imbued with self-fulfilling stop-energy; patterns that would repeat post-fork.

After several years of open development (which Cupertino declined to participate in), Web MIDI shipped in Chromium in early 2015. Despite a decade to engage, Apple has not shipped Web MIDI, has not provided a “standards position” for it⁴, and has not proposed an alternative. To the best of my knowledge, it has also not engaged in conversations about the core feature set, despite being a member of the W3C's Audio Working Group which has published many Working Drafts of the API. That group has consistently included publication of Web MIDI as a goal since 2012.

Across 11 charters and re-charters, I can find no public objection within the group's mailing list from anyone with an @apple.com email address.⁵ Indeed, I can find no mentions of MIDI from anyone at Apple on the public list. Obviously, that is not the same thing as agreeing to publication as a Recommendation, but it also not indicative of any attempts at providing an alternative.

But perhaps alternatives emerged elsewhere, e.g., in an Incubation venue?

There's no counter-proposal listed in the WebKit explainers repository, but maybe it was developed in a different venue?

We can look for features available behind flags in Safari Technology Preview and read the Tech Preview release notes. To check them, I used curl to fetch each of the 127 JSON files that are (apparently) the format for Safari's release notes, pretty-printed them with jq, then grepped case-insensitively for mention of “audio” and “midi”. Every mention of “audio” was in relation to the Web Audio API, the Web Speech API, WebRTC, the <audio> element, or general media playback issues. There were zero (0) mentions of MIDI.

I also cannot locate any public feedback on Web MIDI from anyone I know to have an @apple.com email address in the issue tracker for the Web Audio Working Gropup or in WICG except for a single issue requesting that WICG designs look “less official.”

The now-closed Web MIDI Community Group, likewise, had zero (0) involvement by Apple employees on its mailing list or on the successor Audio Community Group mailing list. There were also no (0) proposals covering similar ground that I was able to discern on the Audio CG issue list.

Instead, Apple have issued a missive decrying Web MIDI as a privacy risk. As far as anyone can tell, this was done without substantive analysis or engagement with the evidence from nearly a decade of deploying it in Chromium-based browsers.

If Apple ever offered an alternative, or to collaborate on a redesign, or even an evidence-based case for opposing it,⁶ I cannot find them in the public record.⁷

Web USB

USB is a security sensitive API, and Web USB was designed with those concerns in mind. All browsers that ship Web USB today present “choosers” that force users to affirmatively select each device they provide access to, from which sites, and always show ambient usage indicators that let users revoke access. Further, sensitive device classes that are better covered by more specific APIs (e.g., the Filesystem Access API instead of USB Mass Storage) are restricted.

This is far from the Hacker News caricature of "letting any web page talk to your USB devices," allowing only point connections between individual devices and sites, with explicit controls always visible.

After two years of public development and a series of public Origin Trials lasting seven months (1, 2), the first version of the API shipped in Chrome 61, released September 2017.

I am unable to locate any substantive engagement from Apple about alternatives for the motivating use-cases outlined in the spec.

With many years of shipping experience, we can show that these needs have been successfully addressed by WebUSB; e.g. teaching programming in classrooms. More than a decade after it was first approached about them, it's unclear what Apple's alternative is. Hollowing out school budgets to buy Cupertino's high-end devices to run unsafe, privacy-invading native apps?

Apple have included Web USB on the list of APIs they “decline to implement” and quite belatedly issued a “standards position” opposing the design. But no counter-proposal was developed or linked from those threads, despite being asked directly if there might be more palatable alternatives.

I can locate no appetite from Apple's standards engineers to address these use-cases, know of no enquiries into data about our experiences shipping them, and can find no constructive counterproposals. Which raises the obvious question: if Apple does engage to develop counterproposals in tricky areas, how long are counterparties meant to wait? More than eight years?

Web Bluetooth

Like Web USB, Web Bluetooth was designed from the ground-up with safety in mind and, as a result, has been incredibly safe and deployed at massive scale for eight years. It relies on the same chooser model in Chromium-based browsers.

As with all Project Fugu device APIs, Web Bluetooth was designed to reduce ambient risks — no access to Bluetooth Classic, available only on secure sites, and only in <iframe>s with explicit delegation, etc. — and to give implementers flexibility about the UIs they present to maximise trust and minimise risk. This included intentionally designing flexibility for restricting access based on context; e.g., only from installed PWAs, if a vendor chooses that.

The parallels with Web USB continue on the standards track. I can locate no engagement from any @apple.com or @webkit.org email addresses on the public-web-bluetooth mailing list. In contrast, when design work began in 2014 and every browser vendor was invited to participate, Mozilla engaged. I can find no evidence of similar openness on the part of Apple, nor practical counter-proposals.

Over more than three years of design and gestation in public, including very public Origin Trials, Apple did not provide constructive feedback, develop counter-proposals, or offer to engage in any other way I can find.

This appears to be a pattern.

From a deep read of the “standards position” threads for designs Apple opposes, I cannot find evidence that Cupertino has ever offered a counter-proposal to any API it disfavours.

These threads do demonstrate a history of downplaying clearly phrased developer needs, rather than proactive engagement, and it seems the pattern is that parties must beg Apple to belatedly form an opinion. When there is push-back, often after years of radio silence, requesters (not Apple) also have to invent potential alternatives, which Apple may leave hanging without engagement for years.

Worse, there are performative expressions of disinterest which Apple's standards engineers know are in bad-faith. An implementer withholding engagement from a group, then claiming a lack of implementer engagement in that same venue as a reason not to support a design, is the sort of self-serving, disingenuous circularity worthy of disdain.

Overall Impressions

Perhaps both the general trends and these specific high-profile examples are aberrant. Perhaps Apple's modus operandi isn't to:

• Ignore new incubations, even when explicitly asked to participate.
• Fail to register concerns early and collaboratively, where open design processes could address them.
• Force web developers and other implementers to request “positions” at the end of the design process because Apple's disengagement makes it challenging to understand Cupertino's level of support (or antipathy).

Mayhaps it's not simply the predicable result of paltry re-investments in the web by a firm that takes eye watering sums from it.

If so, I would welcome evidence to that effect. But the burden of proof no longer rests with me.⁸

What's Happening Here?

It's hard to say why some folks are under the impression that Apple are generous co-designers, or believe Apple's evocative statements about hard-case features are grounded in analysis or evidence. We can only guess at motive.

The most generous case I can construct is that Apple's own privacy and security failures in native apps have scared it away, and that spreading FUD is cover for those sins. The more likely reality is that upper management fears PWAs and wants to keep them from threatening the App Store with safe alternatives that don't require paying Apple's vig.

Whatever the cause, the data does not support the idea that Apple visibly engages in constructive critique or counter-proposal in these areas.

Moreover, it shows that many of Apple's objections and delays were unprincipled. It should be every browser's right to control the features it enables, and Cupertino is entirely within those rights to avoid shipping features in Safari. But the huge number of recent “catch-up” features tells a story that aligns more with covering for embarrassing oversights, rather than holding a line on quality, privacy, or security.

On the upside, this suggests that if and when web developers press hard for capabilities that have been safe on other platforms, Cupertino will relent or be regulated into doing so. It scarcely has a choice while simultaneously skimming billions from the web and making arguments like these to regulators (PDF, p35):

The moment iPhone users around the world can install high-quality browsers, the conversational temperature about missing features and reliability will drop considerably. Until then, it remains important that Apple bear responsibility for the problems Apple is causing not only for Apple, but for us all.

FOOTNOTES

Commentary about browsers and the features they support is sometimes pejorative towards pre-standardisation features. Given Apple's constriction of Mozilla's revenue stream and its own strategic under-funding of WebKit, this usually takes the form "Chromium just ships whatever it wants."

This is true, of course, but not in the way commenters intend; and not only because Blink's rigorous launch process frequently prevents unvalidated designs from shipping.

Except for iOS, where Apple attempts to hide its role in undermining the competitive foundation of web standards, every vendor always ships "whatever it wants." That is the point of voluntary standards, and competition is the wind in those sails.

Working Groups don't gate what browsers ship, nor do they define what's useful or worthy. There are no seers; no Delphic oracles that fleetingly glimpse a true logos. Working Groups do not invent the future, nor do they hand down revealed truths like prophets of the House of Iamus.

In practice, they are thoughtful historians of recent design expeditions, critiquing, tweaking, then spreading the good news of proposals that already work through Web Standards ratified years after features first ship, serving to licence designs liberally to increase their spread.

In the end, this is the role of standards and the Working Groups that develop them: to license patents that read on existing designs, reducing risks to implementers who adopt them.

Anyone who tries to convince you otherwise, or invites you to try your hand at invention within a chartered Working Group, does not understand what those groups are designed to do. Sadly, this includes some folks who spend a lot of time in them.

Complaints about certain engines leading reveals a bias to fighting the last-war; fear of a return to the late 90s, when “irrational exuberance” applied not just to internet stocks, but also browser engines.

Unfounded optimism about our ability to deal with externalities of shipping prior to consensus created a great deal of pain. Misreadings of how browsers evolve in practice over-taught lessons that still invoke fear. But we have enough miles on the tires to see that standards aren't what create responsible feature development; thoughtful launch processes are.¹

As we will see, consensus is never a precondition for shipping, nor could it be. If it were, nothing would move forward, for it is the threat (and sometimes reality) of popular features shipping without a priori agreement that brings parties to the table. It's also the only reliable defence against the fifth column problem.

Terminology Traps

Before we get into the role of the charters that define Standards Development Organisation (SDO) Working Groups, we must define some terms:²

Proposal

Any design, in any sort of document (Specification, Explainer, or scrawl on the back of a napkin) offered inside an SDO for standardisation. Proposals are revised through collaborative processes which function best inside SDOs thanks to carve-outs in competition laws allowing competitors to collaborate in writing standards.

Proposals are implemented, and even shipped, well ahead of formal status as Web Standards in order to gain developer feedback, iterate on designs, and build confidence that they meet needs effectively.³

Specification

A document that describes the properties of an implementation, often in technical shorthand (e.g., Web IDL) and with reference to other specifications.

Specifications are by and for implementers, rather than working web developers, and are the documents to which the IPR commitments of Web Standards attach.

Explainer

An overview of a proposal. Explainers are not specifications, but encapsulate the key points of designs in terms of the problems they solve.⁴ The goal is to explain the why along with the what, in terms web developers can weigh.

In well-incubated designs, Explainers evolve in parallel to specifications. This forces API designers to think like web developers. Explainers serve as foci for considering alternatives and as well as “missing manuals” for early designs.

Web Standard

A specification that has been put forward by a chartered Working Group to the full membership, and granted official status after ratification. For example, by receiving the status as a Recommendation of the W3C by a vote of the Advisory Committee, or in the case of ECMA TC39, publication of an International Standard at ISO.

Web standards create clarity around IPR concerns which pre-standards specifications cannot. These commitments license the patents of parties participating in a Working Group under Royalty Free terms.

In practice, this also commits major firms to the defence of potential implementers, reducing risks across the ecosystem.

Standards Track

A specification document is "on the standards track" if its developers have signalled interest in formal, chartered Working Groups taking up their design for publication as a Web Standard, subject to clarification along the way. It is not necessary for any specific Working Group to agree for this description to hold.

Designs in this state often carry IPR grants, but provide less patent clarity ("contribution only") than official Web Standards.

Incubation

Any process outside a chartered Working Group in which web developers, browser vendors, and other interested parties meet to understand problems and design solutions. Drafts of incubated designs are often volatile. Eventually, if a problem is judged important by participants, one or more designs congeal into brief, high-level "Explainers".

Before features launch without flags in stable-channel browsers, developer and implementer feedback can lead to large changes in incubated designs. Designers and participants must actively solicit input and respond to substantive feedback constructively.

Proposals whose specifications receive formal status within SDOs are described as “adopted”, “recommended”, or “ratified”. This process binds the intellectual property of chartered Working Group participants to the licensing regime of the SDO by approval of the membership.

From this we can see that is nonsensical to discuss “proposals” and "standards" in the same breath. They are a binary pair. A specification has either one status or the other; it cannot be both.

No design that becomes a standard can start as anything but a proposal,⁵ and the liminal space of non-standard proposal is not somehow less-than or an aberration. Rather, it is an embryonic stage every design must pass through, and which every de jure Web Standard has taken at some point.

Armed with better language, we can develop an understanding of how features actually come to the web. Through this, we'll see why our optimism for standards has to come from our own powers of collaborative problem-solving, rather than waiting for designs to be handed down from Olympus.

Standardisation != Interoperability

Jake Archibald pointed out that linguistic precision is uncommon, and developers use the phrase “standard” or “web standard” loosely; a shorthand for features they can use without worry. That ground covers both official Web Standards and de facto standards. The example of WebP was raised, and was even more instructive than I recalled.⁶

A brief refresher: WebP was introduced by Google in 2010, shipping in Chromium in 2011. At that point, and for many years thereafter, WebP was not a standard. A high-level specification broke cover in 2012, but was not brought to an SDO. Patent rights and other IP questions were addressed only by Google's waiver and the Open Source licensing of libwebp.

Nearly all Chromium-based browsers adopted WebP by 2012. Microsoft Edge added support in 2018, Firefox joined the party in 2019, and Safari added support in 2020.

It was not until April 2021, a full decade after the format's introduction and after all major engines supported it, that WebP arrived at the IETF for standardisation. It finally earned RFC status in November 2024, four years after Apple unlocked wide compatibility, having been the last hold-out.

WebP gained tremendous adoption despite not being a standard for nearly 15 years. This has led some to suggest it was a Web Standard, as it had many of the properties expected of successful standards. Namely:

• Broad adoption. All major engines gained support before standardisation began in earnest.
• Stability. Despite adding opacity and animation later, every WebP image produced across the life of the format still renders correctly.
• Interoperability. The same WebP images work across implementations.
• IPR clarity. As the primary contributor to the format and reference implementation, Google's substantial legal and patent assets provided adopters with assurances related to the provenance of both the code and the codec fundamentals.

Many assume that Web Standards are the only path to achieving these attributes, but WebP shows us that this is mistaken. Web Standards deliver these properties most effectively and reliably, but WebP shows us that “being a standard” is not a requirement for interoperable implementation at scale, even in browsers.

Interoperability and adoption are, by inspection, independent of official status. Many formal Web Standards have spotty adoption or fail to achieve interoperability. The web also has a long history of de facto behaviours gaining official status long after interoperability and stability manifest in the market. This sits comfortably with the reality that every single web feature is non-standard for some fraction of its lifetime. At the limit, that fraction can be rather large.

Conflation of de facto standards, official Web Standards, wide deployment, and interoperability are likely to persist. However, those of us who work on browsers can and should be more precise, preferring “interoperability”, “widely deployed”, and “standards track” to “Web Standard” when those are more appropriate.

Standardisation != Responsibility

If we admit, as we must, that all features begin as non-standard proposals which proceed through official processes to become Web Standards, quality is never as simple as “standard good, non-standard bad.” A design can pass unaltered through every lifecycle stage without change to its technical shape or merits, and questions of wide implementation and interoperability are clearly extrinsic to the status of a design within an SDO.

We must locate definitions of relative goodness in more directly descriptive properties. I have given a few above, namely adoption, stability, interoperability, and IPR clarity. For a full account, we need to cover design-time attributes, including testability, specification rigour, wide review, and responsiveness to developer feedback . Taken together, they define what it means to solve important problems well on the standards track.

Developers and implementers weigh up these properties when judging APIs. Some designs, like WebP,⁷ can score highly on everything but adoption. WebP was not technically worse in 2015 than in 2019, or 2020, or 2024; only less widely adopted. Working web developers were free to exploit its benefits the whole time. Many did, and because it had been responsibly developed, interoperability followed, even before a proposal had been submitted to an internet standards body.

Likewise, we cannot judge other APIs shipped in a single engine to be low-quality on the basis of SDO status. Nor can we credit statements opposing them on that basis, particularly from parties that have not offered counterproposals. A single implementation may preclude features from becoming standards, but that says nothing about design fitness, or even prospects for eventual adoption.

This understanding draws our focus away from formal SDO status and toward more important properties of features. It also helps us weigh up the processes that gestate them:

• Are they friendly and open to developers, or are they smoke-filled rooms where old-timers hold sway?
• Do they encourage new work at the pace of emerging developer needs, or are they artificially constricted by a proliferation of veto players?
• Do those processes generate good tests and strong specifications, or do a few powerful editors regularly cut corners?
• Are features submitted for wide review to competent and responsive experts, or is Working Group "go fever" allowed to dominate?
• Do processes put evidence of solving end-user and developer problems⁸ ahead of groupthink and reckons?
• Do those processes allow high-quality features to ship ahead of full consensus, based on evidence?
• Do they adequately protect implementers from IPR risks?

These questions do not line up clearly with corporate jerseys. They do not favour one company's designs over another's. Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Mozilla all have fielded designs that easily pass these tests, and others that flunked. That's the thing about quality; metrics don't care about status or affiliation. Quality doesn't have a “team”, it has units of measure.

Quality tests help us evaluate features in the market-based ecosystem of voluntary standards. The presumed working mode of Web SDOs is that many ideas will be tried (responsibly, hopefully) and the best ideas should gain traction. Eventually, better designs sway the market, leading to calls for standardisation.⁹ Competitors who objected, even strenuously, can then adopt liberally-licensed designs, provide alternatives, or lose share. This logic does not designate grandees or smoke-filled rooms as arbiters of quality. Instead, we rely on voluntary adoption, the testable qualities of shipped designs, and developers voting with their feet.

Responsible, quality-oriented feature development processes reject priesthoods, seers, and oracles, putting evidence-based engineering in their place. This focuses us on solving problems we can see, showing our work, inviting critique, and engaging constructively.

There were never curtains from behind which a feature's essential “standardness” could be revealed, and we should not invent them because the messier, egalitarian reality of feature evolution seems disquieting. Like “Best Picture”, formal SDO status isn't a reliable indicator of quality. Each must judge for themselves.

In the end, the wider internet engineering community always decides if problems are relevant and if designs are “correct.”

There are no blinding flashes of insight, only the push and pull of competing proposals to solve user and developer needs. When standards fail to meet needs, developers patch over the gaps at great cost, or route around standards-based platforms altogether. It is no coincidence that the phases of the Blink Launch Process and tools like Origin Trials present practical steps away from Working Group mysticism. Moving, however haltingly, towards egalitarian, pluralistic collaboration has delivered tremendous progress, despite recalcitrant participants.¹⁰

What Working Groups Really Do

Along with other experienced colleagues at Google and Microsoft, I have had the privilege to teach the practice and theory of standards-track feature development to talented engineers working inside Chromium.

The role of chartered Working Groups looms large in those conversations, but it is far from central. This is because the primary job of a Working Group is to accelerate adoption of existing designs that have enough support to move forward and insulate them from IPR-based attacks. This is both their official job (per SDO process documents) and their primary value.

“I” dotting and “t” crossing is expected, and it can slightly alter designs, but chartered Working Groups never work well as venues for effectively canvassing developers for problems to solve. Nor are they good environments for testing ideas. If the goal is to solve new problems or design new solutions, chartered Working Groups are never the best forum for the simple reason that it is not what they are built to do.

Consider the most recent charters from a few lively W3C Working Groups:

• Web Apps (charter)
• Web Payments (charter)
• CSS (charter)
• Web GPU (charter)

Per the formal process governing charters, each group's convening document contains several sections that outline:

• A problem statement, laid out at the group's (re)charter.
• An explicit scope; i.e., technologies the group can consider in addressing that problem.
• An a priori list of documents and deliverables the WG will produce.

Everything in these charters works to provide clarity and precision about what the group will deliver because that is how members (firms, in the W3C's case) weigh up the costs and benefits of joining relative to their patent portfolios.

Yes, it's all about patents. Standards Development Organisations are, practically speaking, IPR clearing houses. From this perspective, all the hoops one must jump through to join a chartered group make sense:

• Q: Why do companies have to officially join each Working Group separately?

  A: Patents.

• Q: Why does each participant need to be approved by a company's main W3C delegate?

  A: Patents.

• Q: Why are there so many checkpoints in the process that appear to do little more than waste time?

  A: Patents.

• Q: Why does the whole membership need to vote to progress a document to a formal standard?

  A: Patents.

Features named in Working Group charters are the only designs a group can standardise, and groups run into trouble with lawyers when they exceed charter scopes, because participating firms may not have done a search in their portfolio (or their competitor's) regarding designs outside the pre-determined scope. When this happens, all progress can halt for an indeterminate amount of time. SDO processes and documents, therefore, work to cabin the risk, moving early design out of Working Groups and into other venues.

Chartered Working Groups Are Not Design Venues

All of this drives to a simple set of obvious conclusions: venues other than chartered Working Groups are necessary in order to do the sort of high-iteration-pace design work that leads to higher-quality designs.

It's a punchline that standards committees are bad at design, but this is by design. They do not have the cycles, mission, or tools needed to explore developer problems, let alone iterate towards compelling solutions. Their job, per the official process documents that convene them, is to ensure that certain quality attributes are tended to (e.g., tests and complete specifications) on the way towards licensing of the intellectual property embodied in specifications.

The Role of Incubation

To this end, internet SDOs have many alternatives that are better suited to design work, and which create glide paths for the fittest proposals into chartered Working Groups to gain eventual status as Web Standards. Here are a few:¹¹

• W3C

  • Interest Groups
  • Business Groups
  • Community Groups, particularly the WICG

• IETF

  • "Bar BOFs"
  • Official BOFs

• TC39

  • Stage 0/1 Drafts

It's always possible for designs to fail to solve important problems, or fail to solve them well, and better designs flow naturally from a higher pace of iteration and feedback. Incubation venues tend to work better for design because they lower some strictures Working Groups erect to create patent clarity. Instead of needing to pre-define their deliverables, these groups can fail fast and iterate. When they work, they can be submitted to Working Groups to get patent and IP issues finalised.

Incubation venues display very different working modes and membership than formal Working Groups. Instead of pre-decided, formal deliverables, groups can form around nebulous problem statements and define the issues long before landing on a single design. There is no stable set of delegates from member firms, largely dominated by implementers. Rather, interest groups may form organically, even from web developers interested in shared problems. Instead of predefined timelines and pre-ordained deliverables, these groups work at the speed of their need and understanding. And instead of design pivots representing potential failure, incubation venues can test multiple alternatives. Discarding entire designs is even healthy while the furious iteration of incubation plays out.

Lower barriers to entry for web developers, along with structures that encourage dynamic problem-solving coalitions, tend to create higher pace and more focused work. This, in turn, allows consideration of more alternatives and helps facilitate the iterations that hone design. Not every Incubation venue succeeds, and not every design they consider wins. But their outsized success vs. design-in-committee approaches has been apparent for more than a decade.

Only those mistakenly wedded to, or cynically selling, mystical notions of Working Groups as diviners of revealed truth try to rubbish the web's incubation venue's outstanding track record of delivery. Given the overwhelming success of incubation, including the demonstrated benefits of fail-fast iteration, we must then ask why there are still proponents of Working Group misuse and process opacity.

No Prophecies, Only Engineering

Splitting the needs of design from the strictures of standardisation isn't against the spirit of standardisation, nor is shipping ahead of a vote by the full membership of an SDO problematic. These approaches are written into the process documents of the internet's most effective bodies. Implementation experience is required for a proposal to become a ratified standard, and Working Groups are enjoined by process from undertaking the explorations incubation venues specialise in. Which is why those same SDOs build and encourage incubation groups.

This is an uncomfortable acknowledgement for some.

Folks I have talked to seem to imagine rooms filled with people who know everything and always make correct decisions. There are no such rooms. We're all just engineers trying to solve problems, from the heights of the TAG and the Internet Architecture Board to the scrappiest W3C Community Group or IETF Bar BOF. And sometimes we get it very wrong. But that should not immobilise us in fear; it should cause us to do what we always do when engineering: adopt processes and guardrails to improve quality and increase the rate of delivery.

Problems only get solved by people of good cheer working hard to spot them,¹² trying out solutions, and working collaboratively to document the ones that work best. There are no oracles in standards work, only engineers. And that's more than enough.

FOOTNOTES

TL;DR: Market competition underlies the enterprise of standards. It creates the only functional test of designs and lets standards-based ecosystems route around single-vendor damage. Without competition, standards bodies have no purpose, and neither they, nor the ecosystems they support, can retain relevance. Apple has poisoned the well through a monopoly on influence, which it has parleyed into suppression of browser choice. This is an existential threat to the web, but also renders web and internet standards moot. Internet standards bodies should recognise the threat and respond.

Internet enthusiasts of the previous century sometimes expressed the power of code by declaring the sovereignty of cyberspace, or that "code is law."

As odd as these claims sound today, they hit a deep truth: end-users, and even governments, lack power to re-litigate choices embodied in software. Software vendors, therefore, have power. Backed by deeply embedded control chokepoints, and without a proportional response from other interests, this control is akin to state power.

Both fear and fervour about these properties developed against a backdrop of libertarian¹ attitudes toward regulation and competition. Attenuating vendor power through interoperability was, among other values, a shared foundation of collaboration for internet pioneers.

The most fervent commitment of this strain was faith in markets to sort out information distribution problems through pricing signals,² and that view became embedded deeply into the internet's governance mechanisms.³ If competition does not function, neither do standards.

The internet's most consequential designs took competitive markets as granted. Many participants believed hardware and software markets would (and should) continue to decouple; that it would be easier for end-users to bring their own software to devices they owned. It is odd from the perspective of 2025 to suggest that swapping browsers, e.g., should come at the cost of replacing hardware. This is why Apple have worked so hard to obscure that this is exactly the situation it has engineered, to the detriment of users, the web, and internet standards.

Internet standards bodies assumed the properties of open operating systems and low-cost software replacement to such an extent that their founding documents scarcely bother to mention them.⁴ Only later did statements of shared values see fit to make the subtext clear.

And it has worked. Internet standards have facilitated interoperability that has blunted lock-in, outsized pricing power, and other monopolistic abuses. This role is the entire point of standards at a societal level, and the primary reason that competition law carves out space for competitors to collaborate in developing them.⁵

But this is not purely an economic project. Standards attenuate the power of firms that might seek to arrogate code's privileges. Functional interoperability enables competition, reallocating power to users. Standardisation is therefore, at least partially a political project; one that aligns with the values of open societies:

We must ask whether ... we should not prepare for the worst leaders, and hope for the best. But this leads to a new approach to the problem of politics, for it forces us to replace the question: "Who should rule?" by the new question: "How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?"

— Karl Popper,
"The Open Society and Its Enemies"

Without a counterweight, network effects allow successful tech firms to concentrate wealth and political influence. This power allows them to degrade potential competitive challenges, enabling rent extraction for services that would otherwise be commodities. This mechanism operates through (often legalised) corruption of judicial, regulatory, and electoral systems. When left to fester, it corrodes democracy itself.⁶

Apple has deftly used a false cloak of security and privacy to move the internet, and the web in particular, toward enclosure and irrelevance. Cupertino acts as a corrupted, and indeed incompetent, autocrat in our digital lives, even for folks who don't carry iPhones. It accomplishes this trick through abuse of a unique monopoly, allowing it to extract rents, including on the last remnants of open ecosystems it tolerates.

Worse, Apple's centralisation through the App Store entrenches the positions of peer big tech firms, harming the prospects of competitors in turn. Apple have been, over the course of many years, poisonous to internet standards and the moral commitments of that grand project.⁷

Despite near continuous horse-race coverage in the tech press, the consequences of this regression in civic/technical affairs is not well socialised.

The Power of Interoperability

Standardisation expands the reach of interoperable technology, pushing firms to innovate, rather than extracting rents on commodities.

Interoperability-in-being gives users choice, forcing competitors to differentiate on quality and not-yet-standard features. Standards expedite interoperability by lowering the costs for implementers and reducing tail risks, e.g. from patent trolls. Over time, a complete enough set of standards can attenuate the power of vendors to extract rents and prevent progress in important domains.

Interoperability is not the only mechanism that can reduce the power of dominant firms, but it is the most powerful. Free and Open Source software (FOSS) can provide a counterweight too, but OSS is not a full solution.⁸

Voluntary Adoption Is Foundational to Internet Standards

Interoperability, and the economic surpluses that flow from it, are underpinned by voluntary adoption. This is enshrined in the "open stand" principles agreed to by no less than ISOC, IETF, IAB, IEEE, and the W3C.:

...

5. Voluntary Adoption

Standards are voluntarily adopted and success is determined by the market.

— The IAB, IEEE, IETF, ISOC, and W3C,
"The OpenStand Principles"

This final principle is the shortest, and many readers will understand it as a dodge; a way for Standards Development Organisations (SDOs) to avoid being seen to pick winners. But it is more than that.

Voluntary adoption is necessary for internet standards to function, and it creates a presumption of fair play.

Several implications bear mentioning.

First, the principle of voluntary adoption is necessary for effective standards development. Without a mechanism for determining which designs are better, we are unable to make consistent progress. That test never comes from within an SDO; it is always customer-defined. Writing a standard is not a test of quality, and without a functional market to test designs in, SDOs are irrelevant.

Second, this principle outlines a live-and-let-live doctrine, both within standards bodies and in the market. Participants may want their design to win, but are enjoined from procedural shenanigans to prevent competing designs from also being standardised.

Lastly, voluntary adoption marks customers (developers) and suppliers (browser vendors, etc.) as peers and creates norms of mutual respect within the walls of SDOs.

For all of these reasons, voluntary adoption must be defended, and actions taken to undermine it met with resistance and eventual sanction.

Apple's Unique Monopoly

Regulators have had no difficulty in building market tests that demonstrate the power Apple holds in the lives of users.

Some of these tests have produced comical contortions as Apple has attempted to weasel out of its responsibilities. Consider the Trinitarian claim that Safari is simultaneously one product, and also three. Or that iPadOS, despite sharing nearly all code with iOS, marketed under that brand for years, supporting identical features, running the same third-party software, releasing on the same cadence, and running exclusively on the same hardware architecture is (somehow) an entirely different product.⁹

But for as clear and effective as regulator's tests have been in piercing these smoke screens, they do not capture the most important aspects of Apple's influence on the market for smartphone software: the monopoly on wealth.

Apple suppresses standards-based platforms and their disruptive potential through a mechanism every software developer understands: wealthy users carry iPhones, and they have all the influence.

Competition law does not explicitly recognise this distortion of the market, but the connection between the influence of the wealthy and the choices available to other end-users is indisputable.

Despite selling fewer than a quarter of smartphones globally for the past decade, Apple has built and anti-competitively maintained a supermonopoly among the wealthiest 10-20% of the world's population who, in turn, control effectively all wealth on the planet. This has handed it control over software distribution due to the social effects of wealth. Apple pairs legitimately superior product attributes (e.g., leading chip design) with anti-user and anticompetitive tactics — e.g., green vs. blue chat bubbles, suppression of browsers — to maintain this position.

Apple has put in place a set of interlocking restrictions to ensure the web cannot disrupt native apps within this user base. Those users, in turn, warp the behaviour of software developers thanks their spending power and positions within the software industry. Developers understand that if they cannot demo their wares to bosses and VCs (all of whom are wealthy) on their own devices, their software might as well not exist.

The long-stable propensity of users who make more than $100K USD/year to carry iPhones combines with Apple's suppression of browsers and PWA capabilities to ensure developers have no choice but to build native applications. These effects were visible in population-level statistics a decade ago and have been stable ever since:

Knowing whether someone owns an iPad in 2016 allows us to guess correctly whether the person is in the top or bottom income quartile 69 percent of the time. Across all years in our data, no individual brand is as predictive of being high-income as owning an Apple iPhone in 2016.

— Marianne Bertrand and Emir Kamenica,
"Coming Apart? Cultural Distances in the United States Over Time"

Developers are forced into the App Store by missing web capabilities, ensuring an advantage for Apple's proprietary ecosystem. This induces wealthy and influential users to default to the App Store for software, further damping the competitiveness of open platforms.

The monopoly on influence explains why Apple is wedded to legalistic, dissembling tactics in order to prevent the spread of web apps. Should the work of internet and web standards bodies ever become relevant, Cupertino understands the market for software will transform in ways it cannot control or tax.

How Apple Uses Its Monopoly to Centralise and Enclose

Developers are forced into the App Store by a lack of functionality in browsers and web apps. By contrast, Apple has liberally meted out fingerprintable system capabilities to privacy-invading native apps. It has also allowed them to suppress pro-privacy interventions when it serves them.¹⁰

Apple professes that "privacy is a human right", but this as an attempt to turn the consequences of Apple's own largesse towards data abusers into a marketing asset. Wide-scale privacy erosion has depended, fundamentally, on Apple's own decisions, and it has not recanted.

It was Apple's choice to introduce less safe, less privacy-preserving native apps into iOS. It was also Apple's choice to deny competing browsers engines the freedom of voluntary feature adoption. This has ensured that important underlying capabilities could only ever be accessed through Apple's proprietary APIs, and only ever by those who are willing to agree to Cupertino's extractive terms.

The result has been API enclosure; appropriation of commodity capabilities that themselves are standards-based — e.g., rich graphics, USB, Bluetooth, NFC, file storage, etc. — by a proprietary ecosystem. Meanwhile, it has delayed and undermined the emergence of safe and privacy-preserving versions of those features on the web.

This, in turn, has created a winner-take-all dynamic inside the app store, harming privacy, security, and competition in the process.

Apple's Transgressions Against Voluntary Adoption

This strategy relies on interlocking policies that harm competitors, and the sabotage of voluntary standards adoption lies at its heart. A Bill of Particulars for crimes against the internet community springs from a small set of undisputed facts.

Apple has:

• Restricted competitors from shipping their own implementations of web and internet standards, depriving them access to influential users.

• Forced all iOS browsers to use Apple's own defective, impoverished implementation.

• Undermined user security and privacy through iOS browser engine monoculture.

• Used contractual terms to dissuade competitors from supporting standards Apple disfavours.

• Objected spuriously within standards bodies to prevent standardisation of features which Apple offered no counter-proposal.¹¹

• Engaged in marketing and product UI that discourages use of web-based alternatives.

• Misled regulators and the public when presented with evidence of the harm from these actions.

Through these and other overt acts, Apple has worked to disempower users, depriving them of choice by preventing open platforms from challenging native apps.¹²

This isn't just a fierce market participant competing aggressively. Apple has done violence to the founding ethos of internet and web standards development. Instead of honourably withdrawing from those groups, Apple has maintained a charade of engagement, and gaslights other participants while actively sabotaging the principle of voluntary adoption that internet standards rely on.

Unilateral Off-Ramps

Apple has never been forced to suppress its competitors, nor to create an anticompetitive landscape. Cupertino's senior management have intellectually consistent options that would allow it to pursue growth of the superior (we are told) native app ecosystem without threatening browser choice or the good functioning of internet standards.

Let's consider two: all safe browsers, and no browsers.

Apple could, of course, simply enable the same sort of level playing field for high-quality browsers that every competing general-purpose OS vendor has for the web's entire history. Apple itself facilitates this sort of ecosystem on macOS.¹³ Any plausible restrictions stemming from available system resources have long been overcome by progress in mobile hardware, particularly within Apple's ecosystem.¹⁴

The only reasonable restrictions on competing browser engines relate to security. As other vendors have generally had a better track records than Apple regarding sandboxing, incident response, patch gaps, and support for older OS versions, this should be no practical obstacle.

Lest Apple's defenders worry about the impact on Safari, recall that under true browser choice, Apple retains considerable market advantages, including (but not limited to) pre-installation, lower structural costs¹⁵, and continued differentiation through integration.¹⁶ Such bulwarks have allowed Safari to retain considerable share on macOS in spite of stiff competition and Safari's poor track record on security and standards conformance.

Alternatively, Apple could withdraw Safari while forbidding web content on iOS. This is a fully consistent position, and has been available to Apple from the moment of the App Store's release. The iPod did not include a browser, and many subsequent Apple OSes lack functional browsers. iOS and visionOS are uniquely deficient in this regard.¹⁷

Either way, the decision to undermine choice and standards rests entirely with Apple. It has always had intellectually honest solutions to the problems it has created. Apple cannot claim the situation is anyone else's fault, or that it has had no alternative.

How Apples Crimes Differ From Prior Episodes

Under voluntary implementation, every vendor is free to ship what they please, including Apple. It may be sad, or even damaging, when features go missing from important products, but that is not a calamity; just an input to be priced by the market — a reason for a specific browser to gain or lose share.

It's not enough to cite a lack of features, bungled implementations, peevish behaviour in working groups — or even rank dishonesty — as reason for censure. These are, to greater or lesser degrees, players playing the game. Certain tactics may be distasteful, but are squarely inside the "awful but lawful" zone. Standards venues should allow them, with sanctions for poor behaviour meted out in the social realm.

But by undercutting voluntary implementation, Apple has committed a more fundamental and more dangerous outrage.¹⁸

Some will see a parallel to the Paradox of Tolerance, and I do not believe this is mistaken. Standards bodies can, and should, admit many positions by their participants, but granting membership in good standing to those who are actively poison the basis for standards is madness. It ensures that standards, and the ecosystems that depend on them, wither and die.

By subverting the voluntary nature of open standards, Apple has defanged them as tools for users against the totalising power of technology firms in their digital lives. This high-modernist approach is antithetical to the foundational commitments of internet standards bodies and, over time, erode them.

Indeed, no other vendor has achieved what Apple has in suppressing the web through anticompetitive means. We must not imagine that Apple would stop at the Application layer given a chance. The same mechanism threatens voluntary feature adoption in networking and every other layer down the stack, too.

Necessary, Proportional Responses

The web and internet communities should understand the threat and clock the cumulative harm done to internet standards and open technology ecosystems. It seems to me that this point has hardly been engaged, let alone won, within the walls of SDOs. But if it were, then what? What can be done?

The founding documents of internet SDOs do not include censure mechanisms for sabotage. The W3C's bylaws, for example, only relate membership in good standing with paying dues. Regardless, it is possible — and I believe urgent — to do more.

First, proposals can be raised to amend bylaws to include mechanisms for censure by votes of the membership for the kinds of outrages alleged here. These are likely to fail, and will surely be rejected at first, but the act of raising these questions has power. Bringing up these issues in plenary meetings can, at a minimum, elicit a response. That, on its own, is valuable to the community.

Next, leadership boards with moral authority can consider the question and issue guidance. The W3C's Advisory Board and Technical Architecture Group and the IETF's Internet Architecture Board have the ear of the membership, even on non-technical topics, should they choose to weigh in on the side of their own continued relevance.

Most importantly, individual delegates to Working Groups can recognise that Apple's forced monoculture is illegitimate and corrosive. They can resolve not to accept "Apple does not comment on future products" in response to questions about implementation timelines.

As long as Cupertino demands a monopoly, we must demand it take responsibility for the consequences.

Today, Apple alone chooses which features ship in WebKit, and which can be used by competing browsers. Even if it does not to enable them in Safari, it can provide more to others. It is simply illegitimate for Apple to claim that it cannot, or should not, allow other vendors to reach feature parity between their iOS browsers and other products that use their own engines.

WebKit purports to be Open Source, but in practice Apple has used it to undermine the "bring your own code" foundation of OSS. It is illogical for Apple to cite a disinterest in a feature in Safari as a reason for Apple not to be expected to implement those features in iOS's WebKit binary, making them available for other embedders to flag on.

The sham of WebKit as an Open Source project is incompatible with preventing other vendors from introducing features they would turn on for their iOS users if allowed. The destruction of voluntary adoption is not a shield against critique. Instead, it must heighten expectations. Apple agues it should be singularly entrusted with control over all web features on iOS, despite Safari and WebKit's trailing record on standards' conformance, security, and even privacy. This is nonsense, but so long as it is the law of the land in code, Apple should bear the costs.

Apple alone must be on the hook to implement any and every web platform feature shipped by any and every other engine. It does not need to enable them in Safari, but must make them available for use by others as they see fit.

So long as competing vendors are forced into the App Store and required to use Apple's engine, Cupertino owes much more when it comes to completeness and quality. So long as Cupertino compels use of WebKit, the demand should be echoed back: parity with browser features on other Operating Systems is the minimum bar.

Fundamentally, the web and internet community must stop accepting the premise that Apple should benefit from the protections and privileges of voluntary feature adoption while denying it to others.¹⁹

Lastly, and perhaps most controversially, delegates and organisations can use their positions to vote against Apple's personnel in elections to leadership positions within internet and web SDOs. It is inconsistent for Apple to hold positions of influence in organisations it works to sabotage, and fellow participants are under no obligation to pretend otherwise. Handing Apple formal or persuasive power within these groups is a mistake, and one that can be corrected without changes to bylaws.

Why Now?

In raising these questions, colleagues have invariably asked "why now? What changed?"

Beyond the threshold point that the damage is cumulative, and therefore it isn't necessary to identify specific instances to discuss the spreading rot, it's fair to ask why anyone should be agitated tomorrow when they might not have been yesterday.

Most of the factors involved have indeed changed very gradually, and humans are famously poor judges of slowly emergent threats. Apple's monopoly on influence, Cupertino's post-2009 WebKit priorities, the suppression of browser competitors, and the never-ending parade of showstopping bugs are all gradually emergent factors. Despite all of this long-running, unrefuted evidence, many continue to think of Apple an ally of the web for helpful acts now more than 15 years old.

But recent events must shake us awake. Apple's petulant attempt to duck regulations, destroy the web as a competitor for good, and frame regulators for the dirty deed was shocking. In recurring misrepresentations to regulators before and since, it has dissembled about its role in suppressing the web, and through its demand for secrecy in quasi-standards processes, has worked tirelessly to cover its tracks.

Taken individually, and in ignorance of iOS's coerced WebKit use by competing browsers, forced monoculture, habitual security failures, and strategic starvation of the Safari team, these shameful acts would simply indicate another monopolist behaving badly. It is only when considered alongside the wider set of facts that the anti-standards strategy and impact become clear.

Do Standards Matter?

Like most who have dedicated the greater proportion of their working lives to the cause of an open and interoperable web, the conclusions offered here shock me as well.

In the end, however, the question "do standards matter any more?" is intrusive, despite my aversion to reconsidering a question whose answer I thought obvious. But in light of the past decade's sidelining of the web, we must grapple with the consequences. To allow Apple to continue to abuse the foundation of standards without acknowledgement would be a failure of honesty towards my own intellectual commitments.

My personal affinity for the many talented and thoughtful people that Apple has sent to standards bodies over the years — including those I think of as friends — has, on reflection, been an emotional blind spot. But here we are. The realisation that they have been an unwitting fifth column against the web is nauseating for me, and I expect many will loudly reject the conclusion. I do not blame them.

For all the harm Apple has done to the web and to competition, I had hoped that it would relent before any of this became necessary. Like most web developers, I harboured hope that, true to Steve Job's promise in '07, Apple would let the web be a "sweet solution" for delivering safe, powerful applications. Piggybacked on that hope was a belief that a relevant mobile web would bolster the relevance of standards. But Cupertino has gone a different way, choosing profit over collaboration and the needs of users.

The web matters too much for the standards-based future it represents to fade without so much as a nod.

FOOTNOTES

Apple vs. Facebook is, and always was, kayfabe. In reality, Apple is Facebook's chauffeur; holding Zuck's coat while Facebook¹ wantonly surveils iPhones owners.²

Facebook and Apple mugged convincingly for the cameras as "App Tracking Transparency" rolled out, talking up the impact to Facebook's business. But San Mateo's profits tell a very different story. Net income dipped between late 2021 and early 2023 thanks to accelerating capital expenditures, not reductions in revenue. Despite strenuous efforts to sell the move, it's hard to discern any impact from ATT whatsoever.

How can we be sure Apple's wise? Because Cupertino continues to allow Facebook's wide-scale abuse of In-App Browsers:

Open Web Advocacy - In-App Browser Primer

Apple has long facilitated and enriched mass surveillance through native apps, both directly from in-app activity, but much more insidiously through the In-App Browsers that lurk behind every link in Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, Threads, TikTok, Pinterest, etc.

I have written about them before, and they still stink to high heavens. Facebook couldn't ask for a better or more willing accomplice than Apple as it glides into the second decade of its browserjacking spree.

In-App Browsers are, for Facebook's purposes, ad-blocker blockers. Cheat codes for the enterprising panopticon proprietor. Much wringing of hands transpires every time one of these knockoff browsers is suspected of injecting script into web pages. The fear is that this will enable a level of tracking by apps that is not otherwise possible.

As scary (and real) as the threat is, it is also a misdirection.

To effect total surveillance, Facebook et al. don't need to inject scripts into the runtime, they only need your browser not to block their "ad tags" that are already embedded in every high-traffic page on the internet. Combined with the ability to watch every URL you navigate to in a WebView, this is more than enough to correlate in-app activity with web browsing without leaving overt fingerprints.

As long as users remain in the web purgatory of native apps, data collected from tracking endpoints remains immeasurably richer. It is, in effect, a loophole that only requires users be denied access to their browser of choice whenever it is convenient for native apps.

Real browsers matter because they are user agents; they represent the interests of users, rather than ad networks (Facebook, Google, ByteDance) and the OS vendors that are desperate to keep apps from decamping to portable, interoperable alternatives like PWAs. Users configure their browsers' privacy and security settings, knowing they will synchronize between devices. They can expand those protections with extensions that further ward against unwanted snooping.

By contrast, IABs from Facebook and ByteDance (etc.) do not feature many privacy-preserving settings or extensions, are fiendishly hard to disable, and do not sync between devices in the same app. They don't even synchronise preferences between multiple apps from the same company on the same device.³

This goat rodeo is wilfully obtuse in a way that only an organisation dedicated through-and-through to A/B testing can accomplish. You might very well think that Facebook is working hard to trick users into a knockoff browser in the hopes they don't notice.

Even without assuming intentional obfuscation, it is shocking how laughably incomplete the privacy and security settings of Facebook's IAB remain, more than a dozen years after it was introduced:

An identical thicket of pain awaits anyone trying to disable the Facebook IAB on iOS. Facebook's UI is screen-for-screen the same across mobile OSes, and iOS users enjoy no advantage in finding the settings to disable FB's IAB.

Chrome and Edge's sync'd settings are vast by comparison, as are the offerings from every other responsible browser vendor:

The difficulty in disabling Facebook's IAB, failure to synchronize opt-out choices, and a crippled privacy features are calculated to enable maximum tracking when tapping links. Even when Apple's vaunted "App Tracking Transparency" is enabled:

Here are the results of the EFF's "Cover Your Tracks" testing tool on (left-to-right) the iOS Facebook IAB, Firefox Focus, and the DuckDuckGo browser, all with default settings under iPadOS 17.7.10:

Users that install browsers, configure them to preserve their privacy, then use Facebook app's after selecting "Ask App Not to Track" are reliably sold up the river by Apple, who seem content to facilitate this end-run around the rules.

Privacy settings? Gone. Extensions? Poof! And because Facebook has code on every top site, the tracking suddenly roars back to life, out of band of the channels that Apple wants you to believe are important (or at least that it has taken heat for in the past).

FB's tracking is so pervasive in modern web pages that it doesn't need to exfiltrate data from the IAB to track you. It just needs to keep you away from your real browser, where it might not be able to join up clicks and taps.

It isn't exactly clear if the IAB is the basis for recent reports of secretive "deterministic matching" efforts, but it's safe to assume that Facebook's bullheaded determination to steal clicks and deny users their choice in browsers isn't simply an oversight.

Apple Knows

None of this is news to Apple. They have read the posts and have made timid interventions to avoid being blamed for the most obviously nasty versions of IAB tracking. But acting against the deep rot? No joy.

Not only has Apple not responded to advocacy on behalf of users from groups like OWA, it has failed to impose either common-sense, pro-privacy restrictions on IABs, or to support action by regulators. As we've seen above, it doesn't even require apps to avoid privacy-degrading IABs when ATT is enabled or provide a global opt-out.

And Apple is absolutely aware of these concerns because they have been raised publicly and in regulatory circles for years. Yet it does not act.

Why?

Facebook's dark patterns are directly facilitated by Apple and Google. It is their SDKs and policies that make this not only possible, but pervasive. So why do they deliver users unto perdition?

Denying users true browser choice helps keep the big app vendors in the store. Those whales understand that native APIs offer increased data collection, which they monetize.

Keeping big fish in the store, in turn, helps Apple and Google corral others into their API enclosure ghettos. If users know that to get their "main" apps, they must go to the store, then the store becomes the place to look for all software. Moreover, for competitors to have any hope of equivalent profits, they must enter the same Store-enabled race to the privacy bottom.

And that race to the bottom helps the duopolists, no matter how much they want you to believe otherwise.

Apple and Google are trying to maintain a distribution model chokehold over mobile software. Their duopoly allows them to tax developers outrageously for access to commodity APIs. Dependence on proprietary versions of bog-stock APIs, in turn, makes it hard for software vendors to consider building for other platforms with their limited engineering budgets.

This, not coincidentally, reduces the size of the (potentially) portable software catalogue, harming the prospects of new entrants that might challenge the duopoly. For users, a lack of apps in open ecosystems make it hard to escape for less predatory alternatives.

The entire point of the multi-layered exercise, in the end, is to subvert interoperability. And to do that, it's necessary to keep the anchor apps happy. Which is why Apple and Google let Facebook spy on you via through the web.

Apple isn't defending your privacy, it's retreating just far enough into the hedge that you won't notice the App Store dangling Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, and TikTok to take the blame for the APIs that Apple itself has recklessly provided. Compared to the web, iOS native apps have facilitated a universe of privacy invasion that was previously unthinkable. Apple did that, and continues to do that, and now it wants credit for forcing developers to "comply" (wink wink) with anti-tracking rules it can't be bothered to enforce.

The answer is blindingly obvious: forbid IABs, particularly under ATT, and/or force native apps to use the system-provided browser-overlay systems — SFSafariViewController and Android Custom Tabs — where user's choice of browser and customisations will be respected.

This isn't hard. In fact, it's one of the simplest interventions possible. And yet neither Apple nor Google are willing to pick a real fight with Facebook and do right by users.

And until they do, you can be certain the privacy preening is all for show.⁴

FOOTNOTES

Anyone who has worked closely with me, or followed on social media [, ], will have seen a post or comment to the effect of:

Names and dates on docs. Every time. Don't forget.

This is most often tacked onto design documents lacking inline attribution, and is phrased provocatively to make it sticky.

Why do I care enough about this to be prescriptive — bordering on pushy — when colleagues accuse me of being Socratic to a fault about everything else? Because not only is unattributed writing a reliable time-waster, the careers of authors hang in the balance.

Having to work to find the best person to discuss a topic with is annoying, but in large organisations, the probability of authors having work appropriated without credit goes up when they fail to claim ownership of their writing. It should go without saying that this is toxic, and that functional engineering cultures look harshly on it. But to ward off bad behaviour, it helps to model what's healthy.

The best reminder to cite work is for authors to name themselves. Doing this increases their stature, unsubtly encourages others to link and cite, and leaves a trail of evidence for authors to reference when building a case for promotion.

The importance of evidence to support claims of design work in technical fields cannot be overstated. Having served on hiring and promotion committees for many years, I can unequivocally say that this collateral is often pivotal. The difference between "[x] promote" and "[x] do not promote" often comes down to the names on documents. Reviewers will pay attention to both the authors list and the propensity of design doc authors to cite others.¹

Weighing Up Inline Attribution

In response to unsubtle nudges, several recurring arguments are offered against explicit authorship notices.

"These blocks detract from readability."

This is fair, but does not outweigh the needs of future readers who may be working to trace a chain of events or ideas. Nor does it outweigh the needs of authors for credit regarding their work at a future date.

"There's already an edit log."

This crutch fails in any number of ways:

• PDFs and printed copies do not include authorship data that is not in body text.
• Some systems (e.g. Google Docs) do not make the history available to non-editors.
• Documents may be copied or re-published in ways that disconnect the content from the original revision tracking system; e.g., in a systems transition as part of an acquisition.

Moreover, design is a complex and collaborative process. Ideas and concepts captured in documents are not always the contribution of the person writing down the conclusions of a whiteboarding session. A clear, consistent way to give credit helps everyone feel included and encourages future collaboration.

"Our team is small.

This is usually offered as a claim of superfluousness. If everyone knows everything and everyone working in a system, why does attribution matter?

Perhaps a team is small now, but will it always be? I am not in a position to tell, and my interlocutors also lack crystal balls. Given the downside risks, attribution is a pittance of an insurance premium.

"Specifying an author elides the contributions of collaborators."

This is easily countered with invitations in comments and drafts for contributors to add themselves to the authorship section. Generous and collaborative folks — the sorts of people we want to promote — reliably add their collaborators to documents proactively and set the expectation that others will do the same. Over time, practice becomes habit, which crystallises into culture.

Minimum Viable Attribution

A final concern I hear is that these blocks require a great deal of upkeep. Long-form revision logs might be onerous, but the minimum viable attribution style only needs three elements: names, emails, and dates. These should be provided on the very first page, ideally just below the title.

The primary date always refers first drafting, even if that is before publication. If deemed necessary, authors can optionally add a "Last Updated" field below the primary date, but this is optional. Documents authored in a single sitting by a lone author should avoid extra visual noise.

Revision logs are generally unnecessary, and my personal view is that they distract from content; if they're a requirement (e.g., in a heavily regulated industry), record them in an Appendix, but do not remove minimum viable attributions.

Here's a screenshot of an explainer I helped draft many years ago showing the basic form²:

If a document is still an early draft, it can be helpful to put some indication in the title — I use a prefix like "[ Draft ] ..." — and invite collaborators to add themselves to the authors list by including an entry there of the form "Your Name <your_email@example.com>". Once a document is circulated widely, remove these inline markers.

FOOTNOTES

Mel Conway's seminal paper "How Do Committees Invent?" (PDF) is commonly paraphrased as Conway's Law:

Organizations which design systems are (broadly) constrained to produce designs which are copies of the communication structures of these organizations.

This is deep organisational insight that engineering leaders ignore at their peril, and everyone who delivers code for a living benefits from a (re)read of "The Mythical Man-Month", available at fine retailers everywhere.

Conway's Law is generally invoked to describe organisations working to solve well-defined problems, in which everyone is working towards a solution. But what if there are defectors? And what if they can prevent forward progress without paying any price? This problem is rarely analysed for the simple reason that such an organisation would be deranged.

But what if that happened regularly?

I was reminded of the possibility while chatting with a colleague joining a new (to them) Working Group at the W3C. The most cursed expressions of Conway's Law regularly occur in Standards Development Organisations (SDOs); specifically, when delegates refuse to communicate their true intentions, either through spurious objection or tactical silence.

This special case is the fifth column problem.

Expressed in Conwayist terms, the fifth column problem describes the way organisations mirror the miscommunication patterns of their participants when they fail to deliver designs of any sort. This pathology presents when the goal of the majority is antithetical to a small minority with a veto.

Reticence of certain SDO participants to consider important problems is endemic, in part, due to open membership. Unlike corporate environments where alignment is at least partially top-down, the ability of any firm to join an SDO practically invites subterfuge. This plays out calamitously when representatives of pivotal firms obfuscate their willingness to implement, or endlessly delay consideration of important designs.

Open membership alone would not lead to crisis, except that certain working groups adopt rules or norms that create an explosion of veto players.

These veto-happy environments combine with bad information to transmute opaque communication into arterial blockage. SDO torpidity, in turn, colours the perception of web developers against standards. And who's to say they're wrong? Bemoaning phlegmatic working groups is only so cathartic.

Eventually, code must ship, and if important features are missing from standards-based platforms, it becomes inevitable that developers will decamp to proprietary solutions.

Instances of the fifth column problem are frequently raised to me by engineers working in these groups. "How," they ask, "can large gatherings of engineers meet regularly, accomplish next-to-nothing, yet continue pat themselves on the back?"

The sad answer is "quite easily."

This dynamic has recurred with surprising regularity over the web's history,¹ and preventing it from clogging the works is critical to the good order of the entire system.

How Does This Happen?

The primary mechanism that produces consequential fifth column episodes is internal competition within tech giants.

Because the web is a platform, and because platforms are competitions, it's natural that companies that make both browsers and proprietary platforms favour their owned-and-operated offerings.

The rent extraction opportunities from controlling OS APIs are much more lucrative than an open ecosystem's direct competition. Decisions about closed platforms also do not have to consider other players as potential collaborators. Strategically speaking, managing a proprietary platform is playing on easy mode. When that isn't possible, the web can provide a powerful bridge to the temporarily embarrassed monopolist, but that is never their preference.

This competition is often hard to see because the decisive battles between proprietary systems and open platforms are fought behind the tallest, most heavily guarded walls of tech giants: budget planning.

Because budgets are secret, news of the web losing status is also a secret. It's a firing offence to leak budget details, or even share internally to those without a need to know, so line engineers may never be explicitly told that their mission has fundamentally changed. They can experience transitions away from the web as "Plan A" to "Plan Z" without their day-to-day changing much. The team just stops growing, and different types of features get priority.

OS vendors that walk away from the web after it has served their businesses can simply freeze browser teams, trimming ambitions around the edges without even telling the team that their status has been lowered. Capping and diverting funding away from new capabilities is easily explained; iteration on existing, non-threatening features is important, after all, and there are always benchmarks to optimise for.

Most fifth columnists are, therefore, unwitting and unknowing accomplices to corporate machinations well above their own pay grades. They cannot acknowledge that a vibrant web is not valuable to their firm because they will have never been told as much, and should they enquire, will hear only that the important work they are doing continues to be valued.

Mayfly Half-Lives

Until recently, the impact of fifth column tactics was obscured in a haze of legacy engines. Web developers take universality seriously, so improvements in capabilities have historically been experienced as the rate at which legacy UAs fall below a nominal relevance threshold.² Thanks to pervasive auto-updates, the historical problem of dead-code-walking has largely been resolved. Major versions of important browsers may have entire cradle-to-grave lifecycles on the order of two or three months, rather than IE 6's half-decade half-life.

This has clarified the impact of (dis)investments by certain vendors and makes fifth columnists easier to spot. Web developers now benefit from, or are held back by, recent decisions by the companies (under)funding browser development. If sites remain unable to use features launched in leading-edge engines, it's only because of deficiencies in recent versions of competing engines. This is a much easier gap to close — in theory, anyway.

The Web Platform's Power Structure

Web standards are voluntary, and the legal structures that create SDO safe-harbours (PDF) create the space in, and rules under, which SDOs must operate. SDOs may find their designs written into legislation after the fact, or as implementation guides, but there is a strong aversion to being told what to design by governments within the web community, particularly among implementers. Some new participants in standards arrive with the expectation that the de jure nature of a formal standard creates a requirement for implementation, but nothing could be further from fact. This sometimes leads to great frustration. Enshrining a design in a ratified standard does not obligate anyone to do anything, and many volumes of pure specifiction have been issued to little effect.

The voluntary nature of web standards is based on the autonomy of browsers, servers, and web developers to implement whatever they please under own brand.

Until Apple's flagrantly anticompetitive iOS policies, this right was inviolable because, when compromised, erosions of feature sovereignty undermine the premise of SDOs.

When products lose the ability to differentiate on features, quality, performance, safety, and standards conformance, the market logic underpinning voluntary standards becomes a dead letter. There's no reason to propose an improvement to the collective body of the web when another party can prevent you from winning share by supporting that feature.

The harms of implementation compellence are proportional to market influence. iOS's monopoly on the pockets of the wealthy (read: influential) has decisively undermined the logic of the open internet and the browser market. Not coincidentally, this has also desolated the prospect of a thriving mobile web.

The Mobile Web: MIA

It's no exaggeration to say that it is anti-web to constrain which standards vendors can implement within their browsers, and implementation coercion is antithetical to the good functioning of SDOs and the broader web ecosystem.³

In a perverse way, Apple's policy predations, strategic under-investment, and abusive incompetence clarify the basic terms of the web's power structure: SDOs are downstream of browser competition, and browser competition depends on open operating systems.

But Why?

Why do vendors spend time and money to work in standards, only to give away their IP in the form of patent licences covering ratified documents?

When vendors enjoy product autonomy, they develop standards to increase interoperability at the behest of customers who dislike lock-in. Standards also lower vendor's legal risk through joint licensing, and increase marketability of their products. Behind this nondescript summary often lies a furious battle for market share between bitter competitors, and standards development is famous for playing a subtle role. Shapiro and Varian's classic paper "The Art of Standards Wars" (PDF) is a quarter-century old now, but its description of these sorts of battles is no less relevant today that it was in '99.

Like this classic, most discussions of standards battles highlight parties with differing visions but similar goals — should margin-sizing or border-sizing be the default? — rather than situations where one vendor has a proprietary agenda and wishes to grow or maintain a capability gap versus standards-based alternatives. Denying features to open ecosystems makes high-tax proprietary platforms more attractive, and gridlock in standards is an effective strategy for accomplishing it. These cases are under-discussed, in part, because they're hard to perceive over short time periods or by observing a single working group.

Parties that maintain a footprint in standards, but are unhappy to see standards-based platforms compete with their proprietary offerings, only need a few pages from the Simple Sabotage manual (PDF).

Often, they will send delegates to important groups and take visible leadership positions. Combined with juuuuuust enough constructive technical engagement, obstreperous parties scarcely have to say anything about their intent. Others will raise their own hopes, and cite (tepid) participation as evidence of good faith. The fifth columnist doesn't need to raise a finger, which is handy, as doing nothing is the goal.⁴

Problem Misstatements

Working group composition also favours delays at the hands of fifth columnists. Encouraged by defectors, they regularly divert focus from important problems, instead spending huge amounts of time on trivialities because few customers (web developers) have the time, money, and energy to represent their own needs in committee. Without those voices, it's hard to keep things on track.

Worse, web developers generally lack an understanding of browser implementation details and don't intone the linguistic airs and shorthands of committeespeak, which vary from venue to venue. This hampers their ability to be taken seriously if they do attend. At the limit, dismissing pressing problems on technicalities can become something of a committee pastime.⁵

There's also a great deal of opportunity for fifth columnists to misrepresent the clearly stated needs of web developers, launching projects to solve adjacent (but unimportant) sub-issues, while failing to address the issues of the day. This is particularly problematic in big, old rooms.

A competent fifth columnist only needs to signal in-group membership to amplify the impact of their own disinterest in topics they would prefer to avoid. Ambiguous "concerns" and scary sounding caveats are raised, and oven-ready designs which do arrive are reframed as naive proposals by outsiders. Process-level critique, in lieu of discussing substance, is the final line of defence.

Deflecting important work is shockingly easy to pull off because organisations that wish to defeat progress can send delegates that can appeal to rooms full of C++/Rust engineers as peers. The tripwires in web API design are not obvious to the uninitiated, so it's easy to move entire areas of design off the agenda through critique of small details.

The most depressing thing about this pattern is that these tactics work because other vendors allow it.

Closed For Business

One problem facing new areas in standards is that chartered Working Groups are just that: chartered. They have to define what they will deliver years in advance, and anything not on the agenda is, by definition, not in scope. The window in many SDO processes for putting something new into the hopper is both short and biased towards small revisions of the existing features. Spinning up new Working Groups is a huge effort that requires political clout.

Technically, this is a feature of SDOs; they jointly licence the IP of members to reduce risks to implementers and customers of adopting standards-based products. Patent trolls have to consider the mutual defences of the whole group's membership and cannot easily pick off smaller prey. Most developers never give a second thought to patent portfolios and do not live in fear of being personally sued for infringement.

This is a sign web standards are a smashing success, but also makes it unlikely that working developers understand that standards processes are designed with bounded IP commitments in mind. Internet SDOs have been so successful at caging the beast that generations of developers have never considered the threat or how it intersects with their interests.

This creates a tension: over the long term, SDOs and the ecosystems can only succeed if they take on new problems that are adjacent to the current set, but the Working Groups they create are primed by their composition and history to avoid taking on substantial expansions of their scope. After all, a good v2 of a spec is one that fixes all the problems of v1 and introduces relatively few new ones.

To work around this restriction, functional SDOs create incubation venues. These take different guises, but the core features are the same. Unlike chartered Working Groups, incubation groups are simple to create; no charter votes or large, up-front IP commitments. They also feature low bars to participation, can be easily shut down, and do not produce documents for formal standardisation, although they can produce "Notes" or other specification documents that Working Groups can take up.

Instead, they tend to have substantial contributor-only grants of IP, ad-hoc meeting and internal debate mechanisms, and attract only those interested in working on solutions in a new problem space. In functioning SDOs, such "fail-fast" groups naturally become feeders for chartered Working Groups, iterating on problems and solutions at a rate which is not possible under the plodding bureaucracy of a chartered Working Groups's minuted and agenda-driven meeting cadence.

And that's why these sorts of groups are a first priority for sabotage by fifth columnists. The usual tactics deployed to subvert incubation include:

• Aspersions of bad faith by those working in incubation venues, either on the grounds that the groups are "amateur", "not standards-track",⁶ or "do not have the right people."
• Avoidance of engagement in incubation groups, robbing them of timely feedback while creating a self-fulfilling "lack of expertise" critique.
• Citing a high fraction failed designs within these groups as an indicator that they are not useful, obscuring the reality that the entire point of incubation is to fail fast and iterate furiously.⁷
• Accuse those who implement incubated proposals of "not following the process", "ignoring standards", or "shipping whatever they want"; twisting the goals of those doing design in the open, in good faith, under the SDO's IP umbrella.
• Demanding formalities akin to chartered Working Groups to slow the pace of design progress in incubation venues that are too successful to ignore.

The fifth columnist also works behind the scenes to reduce the standing and reputation of incubation groups among the SDO's grandees, claiming that they represent a threat to the stability of the overall organisation. Because that constituency is largely divorced from the sausage-making, this sort of treachery works more often than it should, causing those who want to solve problems to burn time defending the existence of venues where real progress is being made.

Survivorship Bias and The Problem of Big, Old Rooms

The picture presented this far is of Working Groups meeting in The Upside Down. After all, it's only web developers who can provide a real test of a design, or even the legitimacy of a problem.

This problem becomes endemic in many groups, and entire SDOs can become captured by the internal dramas and preferences of implementers, effectively locking customers out. Without more dynamic, fail-fast forums that enable coalitions of the willing to design and ship around obstructionists, working groups can lay exclusive claim to important technologies and retreat into irrelevance without paying a reputational cost.

The alternative — hard forking specifications — is a nuclear option. The fallout can easily blow back into the camp of those launching a fork, and the effort involved is stupendous. Given the limited near-term upside and unclear results, few are brave or foolish enough to consider forking to route around a single intransigent party.

This feeds the eclipse of an SDO's relevance because legitimacy deficits become toxic to the host only slowly. Risk of obsolescence can creep unnoticed until it's too late. As long as the ancient forms and traditions are followed, a decade or more can pass before the fecklessness of an important group rises to the notice of anyone with the power to provoke change. All the while, external observers will wonder why they must resort to increasingly tall piles of workarounds and transpilers. Some may even come to view deadening stasis, incompatibility, and waste as the natural state of affairs, declining to invest any further hope for change in the work of SDOs. At this point, the fifth columnist has won.

One of the self-renewing arrows in the fifth column's quiver is the tendency of large and old working groups to indulge in survivorship bias.

Logically, there's no reason why folks whose designs won a lottery in the last round of market jousting⁸ should be gatekeepers regarding the next tranche of features. Proposing winning designs in the past is not, in itself, a reliable credential. And yet, many of these folks become embedded within working groups, sometimes for decades, holding sway by dint of years of service and interpersonal capital. Experience can be helpful, but only when it is directed to constructive engagement, and too many group chairs allow bad behaviour, verging on incivility, at the hands of la vieille garde. This, of course, actively discourages new and important work, and instead clears the ground for yet more navel-gazing.

This sort of in-group/out-group formation is natural in some sense, and even folks who have loathed each other from across a succession of identically drab conference rooms for years can find a sort of camaraderie in it. But the social lives of habitual TPAC and TC39 attendees are no reason to accept unproductive monopolies on progress; particularly when the folks in those rooms become unwitting dupes of fifth columnists, defending the honour of the group against those assailing it for not doing enough.

The dysfunctions of this dynamic mirrors those of lightly moderated email lists: small rooms of people all trying to solve the same problem can be incredibly productive, no matter how open. Large rooms with high alignment of aims can make progress if leadership is evident (e.g., strong moderation). What is reliably toxic are large, open rooms with a mix of "old timers" who are never moderated and "newbies" who have no social standing. Without either a clear destination or any effective means of making decisions, these sorts of venues become vitriolic over even the slightest things. As applied to working groups, without healthy norms and strong chairing, interpersonal dynamics of long-standing groups can make a mockery of the responsibilities documented in a charter. But it's unusual for anyone on the outside to get any the wiser. Who has time to decipher meeting minutes or decode in-group shorthands?

And so it is precisely because fifth columnists can hire old timers⁹ that they are able to pivot groups away from addressing pressing concerns to the majority of the ecosystem, particularly in the absence of functional incubation venues challenging sclerotic groups to move faster.

Marketing Gridlock As Thoughtfulness

One useful lens for discussing the fifth column problem is the now-common Political Science analysis of systems through "veto points" or "veto players" (Tsebelis, '95; PDF):

Policy stability is different from both government stability and regime stability. In fact ... they are inversely related: policy stability causes government or regime instability. This analysis is based on the concept of the veto player in different institutional settings.

If we substitute "capability stability" for "policy stability" and "platform relevance" for "government/regime stability," the situation becomes clear:

Capability stability is different from platform relevance. In fact ... they are inversely related: capability stability causes platform irrelevance.

Any platform that cannot grow to incorporate new capabilities, or change to address pressing problems, eventually suffers irrelevance, then collapse. And the availability of veto points to players entirely hostile to the success of the platform is, therefore, an existential risk¹⁰ — both to the platform and to the SDOs that standardise it, not to mention the careers of developers invested in the platform.

This isn't hard to understand, so how does the enterprising fifth columnist cover their tracks? By claiming that they are not opposed to proposals, but that they "need work," without either offering to do that work, develop counter-proposals, or make any commitment to ship any version of proposals in their own products. This works too often because a pattern of practice must develop before participants can see that blockage is not a one-off rant by a passionate engineer.

Participants are given wide berths, both because of the presumption of voluntarity implementations,¹¹ and the social attitudes of standards-inclined developers. Most SDO participants are community-minded and collaboration-oriented. It's troubling to imagine that someone would show up to such a gathering without an intent to work to solve problems, as that would amount to bad faith. But it has recurred frequently enough that we must accept it does happen. Having accepted its possibility, we must learn to spot the signs, remain on guard, and call it out as evidence accumulates.

The meta-goal is to ensure no action for developers, with delay to the point of irrelevance as a fallback position, so it is essential to the veto wielder that this delay be viewed as desirable in some other dimension. If this sounds similar to "but neighbourhood character!" arguments by NIMBYs offer, that's no accident. Without a valid argument to forestall efforts to solve pressing problems, the fifth column must appeal to latent, second-order values that are generally accepted by the assembled to pre-empt the first-order concern. This works a shocking fraction of the time.

It works all the better in committees with a strong internal identity. It's much easier to claim that external developers demanding solutions "just don't get it" when the group already views their role as self-styled bulwarks against bad ideas.

When Is A "Consensus" Not Consensus?

The final, most pernicious, building block of Working Group decay is the introduction of easy vetoes via consensus decision-making. When vetoes are available to anyone in a large group at many points, the set of proposals that can be offered without a presumption of failure shrinks to a tiny set, in line with the findings of Tsebelis.

This is not a new problem in standards development, but the language gets muddy. I perceive two distinct versions:

• Strong Consensus refers to working modes in which the assent of every participant is affirmatively required to move proposals forward.
• Weak Consensus are modes in which preferences are polled, but "the sense of the room" can carry a proposal forward over even strenuous objections by small minorities.

Every long-term functional SDO operates by some version of Weak Consensus. The IETF bandies this about so often that the phrase "rough consensus and running code" is synonymous with the organisation.

But not every group within these SDOs are chaired by folks willing to overrule objectors. In these situations, groups can revert to de facto strong consensus, which greatly multiplies the number of veto holders. Variations on this theme can be even less disciplined, with only an old guard having effective veto power, whilst newer participants may be more easily overturned.

Strong consensus is the camel's nose for long-term gridlock. Like unmoderated mailing lists, things can spiral without anyone quite knowing where the error was made. Small groups can start under strong consensus out of a sense of mutual respect, only to find it is nearly impossible to revoke a veto power once handed out. A sense of fair play may cause this right to be extended to each new participant, and as groups grow, affiliations change, and interests naturally diverge, it may belatedly dawn on those interested in progress that the very rooms where they once had so much luck driving things forward have become utterly dysfunctional. And under identical rules!

Having found the group no longer functions, delegates who have invested large portions of their careers to these spaces have a choice: they can acknowledge that it is not working and demand change, becoming incredibly unpopular amongst their closest peers in the process. Or they can keep their heads down and hope for the best, defending the honour of the group against attacks by "outsiders". Don't they know whose these people are?

Once it sets in, strong consensus modes are devilish to unpick, often requiring a changing of the guard, both among group chairs and influential veto-wielders. Groups can lose internal cohesion and technical expertise in the process, heaping disincentive to rock even the most unproductive boats.

Defences Against Fifth Columns

The ways that web ecosystem SDOs and their participants can guard against embrittlement and fracture from the leeching effects of fifth columns are straightforward, if difficult to pull off socially:

• Seek out and remove strong consensus processes.

  The timeless wisdom of weak consensus is generally prescribed by process documents governing SDOs, so the usual challenge is enforcement. The difficulty in shaking strong consensus practices is frequently compounded by the status of influential individuals from important working groups who prefer it. Regardless, the consequences of allowing strong consensus to fester in rooms big enough to justify chairing is dire, and it must be eliminated root and branch.

• Aggressively encourage "counterproposal or GTFO" culture.

  Fifth columnists thrive in creating ambiguity for the prospects of meaningful proposals while paying no cost for "just asking questions." This should be actively discouraged, particularly among implementers, within the social compact of web SDOs. The price for imposing delay must be higher than having vague "concerns".

• Require Working Groups to list incubators they accept proposals from. Require they prove it.

  Many groups that fifth columnists exploit demonstrate a relative imperviousness to new ideas through a combination of social norms and studious ignorance. To break this pattern, SDOs should require all re-charters include clear evidence of proposals coming from outside the group itself. Without such collateral, charters should be at risk.

• Defend incubators from process attacks.

  Far from being sideshows, incubation venues are the lifeblood of vibrant SDOs. They must be encouraged, nurtured, and highlighted to the membership as essential to the success of the ecosystem and the organisation.

  In the same vein, process shenanigans to destabilise successful incubators must be fended off; including but not limited to making them harder to join or create, efforts to deny their work products a seat in working group chartering, or tactics that make their internal operations more veto-centric.

It takes a long time, but like the gravitational effects of a wandering planet out in the OORT cloud, the informational content of the fifth columnist's agenda eventually becomes legible by side effect. Because an anti-web agenda is easy to pass off under other cover, it requires a great number of observations to understand that this part of the committee does not want the platform to evolve. From that point forward, it becomes easier to understand the information being communicated as noise, rather than signal.

Once demonstrated, we must route around the damage, raising the cost of efforts to undermine the single most successful standards-based ecosystem of our lifetimes; one that I believe is worth defending from insider threats as well as external attack.

FOOTNOTES

Frances has urged me for years to collect resources for folks getting into performance and platform-oriented web development. The effort has always seemed daunting, but the lack of such a list came up again at work, prompting me to take on the side-quest amidst a different performance yak-shave. If that sounds like procrastination, well, you might very well think that. I couldn't possibly comment.

The result is a new links and resources page page which you can find over in the navigation rail. It's part list-of-things-I-keep-sending-people, part background reading, and part blogroll.

The blogroll section also prompted me to create an OPML export , which you can download or send directly to your feed reader of choice.

The page now contains more than 250 pointers to people and work that I view as important to a culture that is intentional about building a web worth wanting. Hopefully maintenance won't be onerous from here on in. The process of tracking down links to blogs and feeds is a slog, no matter how good the tooling. Very often, this involved heading to people's sites and reading the view-source://

FOMO

Having done this dozens of times on the sites of brilliant and talented web developers in a short period of time, a few things stood out.

First — and I cannot emphasise this enough — holy cow.

The things creative folks can do today with CSS, HTML, and SVG in good browsers is astonishing. If you want to be inspired about what's possible without dragging bloated legacy frameworks along, the work of Ana Tudor, Jhey, Julia Miocene, Bramus, Adam, and so many others can't help but raise your spirits. The CodePen community, in particular, is incredible, and I could (and have) spend hours just clicking through and dissecting clever uses of the platform from the site's "best of" links.

Second, 11ty and Astro have won the hearts of frontend's best minds.

It's not universal, but the overwhelming bulk of personal pages by the most talented frontenders are now built with SSGs that put them in total control. React, Next, and even Nuxt are absent from pages of the folks who really know what they're doing. This ought to be a strong signal to hiring managers looking to cut through the noise.

Next, when did RSS/Atom previews get so dang beautiful?

The art and effort put into XSLT styling like Elly Loel's is gobsmacking. I am verklempt that not only does my feed not look that good, my site doesn't look that polished.

Last, whimsy isn't dead.

Webrings, guestbooks, ASCII art in comments, and every other fun and silly flourish are out there, going strong, just below the surface of the JavaScript-Industrial Complex's thinkfluencer hype recycling.

And it's wonderful.

My overwhelming feeling after composing this collection is gratitude. So many wonderful people are doing great things, based on values that put users first. Sitting with their work gives me hope, and I hope their inspiration can spark something similar for you.

Before saying anything else, I'd like to thank the organisers of JSNation for inviting me to speak in Amsterdam. I particularly appreciate the folks who were brave enough to disagree at the Q&A sessions afterwards. Engaged debate about problems we can see and evidence we can measure makes our work better.

The conference venue was lovely, and speakers were more than well looked after. Many of the JSNation talks were of exactly the sort I'd hope to see as our discipline belatedly confronts a lost decade, particularly Jeremias Menichelli's lighting talk. It masterfully outlined how many of the hacks we have become accustomed to are no longer needed, even in the worst contemporary engines. view-source:// on the demo site he made to see what I mean.

Vinicius Dallacqua's talk on LoAF was on-point, and the full JSNation line-up included knowledgeable and wise folks, including Jo, Charlie, Thomas, Barry, Nico, and Eva. There was also a strong set of accessibility talks from presenters I'm less familiar with, but whose topics were timely and went deeper than the surface. They even let me present a spicier topic than I think they might have been initially comfortable with.

All-in-all, JSNation was a lovely time, in good company, with a strong bent toward doing a great job for users. Recommended.

Day 2¹ — React Summit 2025 — could not have been more different. While I was in a parallel framework authors meeting for much of the morning,² I did attend talks in the afternoon, studied the schedule, and went back through many more after the fact on the stream. Aside from Xuan Huang's talk on Lynx and Luca Mezzalira's talk on architecture, there was little in the program that challenged frameworkist dogma, and much that played to it.

This matters because conferences succeed by foregrounding the hot topics within a community. Agendas are curated to reflect the tides of debate in the zeitgeist, and can be read as a map of the narratives a community's leaders wish to see debated. My day-to-day consulting work, along with high-visibility industry data, shows that the React community is mired in a deep, measurable quality crisis. But attendees of React Summit who didn't already know wouldn't hear about it.

Near as I can tell, the schedule of React Summit mirrors the content of other recent and pending React conferences (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) in that these are not engineering conferences; they are marketing events.

How can we tell the difference? The short answer is also a question: "who are we building for?"

The longer form requires distinguishing between occupations and professions.

Occupational Hazards

In a 1912 commencement address, the great American jurist and antitrust reformer Louis Brandeis hoped that a different occupation — business management — would aspire to service:

The peculiar characteristics of a profession as distinguished from other occupations, I take to be these:

First. A profession is an occupation for which the necessary preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere skill.

Second. It is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely for one's self.

Third. It is an occupation in which the amount of financial return is not the accepted measure of success.

In the same talk, Brandeis named engineering a discipline already worthy of a professional distinction. Most software development can't share the benefit of the nominative doubt, no matter how often "engineer" appears on CVs and business cards. If React Summit and Co. are anything to go by, frontend is mired in the same ethical tar that causes Wharton, Kellogg, and Stanford grads to experience midlife crises.³

It may seem slanderous to compare React conference agendas to MBA curricula, but if anything it's letting the lemon vendors off too easily. Conferences crystallise consensus about which problems matter, and React Summit succeeded in projecting a clear perspective — namely that it's time to party like it's 2013.

A patient waking from a decade-long coma would find the themes instantly legible. In no particular order: React is good because it is popular. There is no other way to evaluate framework choice, and that it's daft to try because "everyone knows React".⁴ Investments in React are simultaneously solid long-term choices, but also fragile machines in need of constant maintenance lest they wash away under the annual tax of breaking changes, toolchain instability, and changing solutions to problems React itself introduces. Form validation is not a solved problem, and in our glorious future, the transpilers compilers will save us.

Above all else, the consensus remains that SPAs are unquestionably a good idea, and that React makes sense because you need complex data and state management abstractions to make transitions between app sections seem fluid in an SPA. And if you're worried about the serially terrible performance of React on mobile, don't worry; for the low, low price of capitulating to App Store gatekeepers, React Native has you covered.⁵

At no point would our theoretical patient risk learning that rephrasing everything in JSX is now optional thanks to React 19 finally unblocking interoperability via Web Components.⁶ Nor would they become aware that new platform APIs like cross-document View Transitions and the Navigation API invalidate foundational premises of the architectures that React itself is justified on. They wouldn't even learn that React hasn't solved the one problem it was pitched to address.

Conspicuously missing from the various "State Of" talks was discussion of the pressing and pervasive UX quality issues that are rampant in the React ecosystem.

We don't need to get distracted looking inside these results. Treating them as black boxes is enough. And at that level we can see that, in aggregate, JS-centric stacks aren't positively correlated with delivering good user-experiences.

This implies that organisations adopting React do not contain the requisite variety needed to manage the new complexity that comes from React ecosystem tools, practices, and community habits. Whatever the source, it is clearly a package deal. The result are systems that are out of control and behave in dynamically unstable ways relative to business goals.

The evidence that React-based stacks frequently fail to deliver good experiences is everywhere. Weren't "fluid user experiences" the point of the JS/SPA/React boondoggle?⁷

We have witnessed high-cost, low-quality JS-stack rewrites of otherwise functional HTML-first sites ambush businesses with reduced revenue and higher costs for a decade. It is no less of a scandal for how pervasive it has become.

But good luck finding solutions to, or even acknowledgement of, that scandal on React conference agendas. The reality is that the more React spreads, the worse the results get despite the eye-watering sums spent on conversions away from functional "legacy" HTML-first approaches. Many at React Summit were happy to make these points to me in private, but not on the main stage. The JS-industrial-complex omertà is intense.

No speaker I heard connected the dots between this crisis and the moves of the React team in response to the emergence of comparative quality metrics. React Fiber (née "Concurrent"), React Server Components, the switch away from Create React App, and the React Compiler were discussed as logical next steps, rather than what they are: attempts to stay one step ahead of the law. Everyone in the room was expected to use their employer's money to adopt all of these technologies, rather than reflect on why all of this has been uniquely necessary in the land of the Over Reactors.⁸

The treadmill is real, but even at this late date, developers are expected to take promises of quality and productivity at face value, even as they wade through another swamp of configuration cruft, bugs, and upgrade toil.

React cannot fail, it can only be failed.

OverExposed

And then there was the privilege bubble. Speaker after speaker stressed development speed, including the ability to ship to mobile and desktop from the same React code. The implications for complexity-management, user-experience, and access were less of a focus.

The most egregious example of the day came from Evan Bacon in his talk about Expo, in which he presented Burger King's website as an example of a brand successfully shipping simultaneously to web and native from the same codebase. Here it is under WebPageTest.org's desktop setup:⁹

As you might expect, putting 75% of the 3.5MB JS payload (15MB unzipped) in the critical path does unpleasant things to the user experience, but none of the dizzying array of tools involved in constructing bk.com steered this team away from failure.¹⁰

The fact that Expo enables Burger King to ship a native app from the same codebase seems not to have prevented the overwhelming majority of users from visiting the site in browsers on their mobile devices, where weaker mobile CPUs struggle mightily:

The CrUX data is damning:

This sort of omnishambles is what folks mean when they say that "JavaScript broke the web and called it progress".

The other poster child for Expo is Bluesky, a site that also serves web and React Native from the same codebase. It's so bewilderingly laden with React-ish excesses that their engineering choices qualify as gifts-in-kind to Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg:

Why is Bluesky so slow? A huge, steaming pile of critical-path JS, same as Burger King:

Again, we don't need to look deeply into the black box to understand that there's something rotten about the compromises involved in choosing React Native + Expo + React Web. This combination clearly prevents teams from effectively managing performance or even adding offline resilience via Service Workers. Pinafore and Elk manage to get both right, providing great PWA experiences while being built on a comparative shoestring. It's possible to build a great social SPA experience, but maybe just not with React:

The unflattering comparisons are everywhere when you start looking. Tanner Linsley's talk on TanStack (not yet online) was, in essence, a victory lap. It promised high quality web software and better time-to-market, leaning on popularity contest results and unverifiable, untested claims about productivity to pitch the assembled. To say that this mode of argument is methodologically unsound is an understatement. Rejecting it is necessary if we're going to do engineering rather that marketing.

The TanStack website cites this social proof as an argument for why their software is great, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating:

The contrast grows stark as we push further outside the privilege bubble. Here are the same sites, using the same network configuration as before, but with the CPU emulation modelling a cheap Android instead:

Yes, these websites target developers on fast machines. So what? The choices they make speak to the values of their creators. And those values shine through the fog of marketing when we use objective quality measures. The same sorts of engineers who care to shave a few bytes of JS for users on fast machines will care about the lived UX quality of their approach all the way down the wealth curve. The opposite also holds.

It is my long experience that cultures that claim "it's fine" to pay for a lot of JS up-front to gain (unquantified) benefits in another dimension almost never check to see if either side of the trade comes up good.

Programming-as-pop-culture is oppositional to the rigour required of engineering. We need to collectively recalibrate when the folks talking loudest about "scale" and "high quality" and "delivery speed" — without metrics or measurement — continually plop out crappy experiences but are given huge megaphones anyway.

There were some bright spots at React Summit, though. A few brave souls tried to sneak perspective in through the side door, and I applaud their efforts:

If frontend aspires to be a profession¹¹ — something we do for others, not just ourselves — then we need a culture that can learn to use statistical methods for measuring quality and reject the sorts of marketing that still dominates the React discourse.

And if that means we have to jettison React along the way, so be it.

FOOTNOTES

• 2023: WebGPU
• 2020: SVG Favicons
• 2023: HDR Images
• 2024: CSS Anchor Positioning
• 2023: CSS text-wrap: pretty
• 2025: CSS progress() function
• 2023: Scroll-driven Animations (finally!!!)
• 2020: Trusted Types
• 2021: URL Pattern API
• early 2025: WebAuthN Signal API
• 2020: WritableStreams for the File System APIs
• late 2023: Scroll Margin for Intersection Observers
• 2025: CSS Logical Overflow (overflow-block and overflow-inline)
• 2024: CSS align-self and justify-self in absolute positioning
• 2025: a subset of Explicit JavaScript Resource Management
• 2021: AudioEncoder & AudioDecoder for WebCodecs
• 2020: RTCEncodedAudioFrame & RTCEncodedVideoFrame serialisation
• 2024: RTCEncodedAudioFrame & RTCEncodedVideoFrame constructors
• 2018: PCM format support in MediaRecorder
• 2017: ImageCapture.grabFrame()
• 2017(?): SVG pointer-events="bounding-box"
• 2015: <link rel=dns-prefetch>

In many cases, these features were available to developers even earlier via the Origin Trials mechanism. WebGPU, e.g., ran trials for a year, allowing developers to try the in-development feature on live sites in Chrome and Edge as early as September 2021.

There are features that Apple appears to be leading on in this release, but it's not clear that they will become available in Safari before Chromium-based browsers launch them, given that the announcement is about a beta:

• Digital Credentials API: currently in Chromium OT.
• CSS contrast-color()
• margin-trim: block inline extends a neat Safari-only feature in useful ways.
• Apple's ALAC format for MediaRecorder.
• Audio Output Devices API. In progress in Chromium, but no launch scheduled.

The announced support for CSS image crossorigin() and referrerpolicy() modifiers has an unclear relationship to other browsers, judging by the wpt.fyi tests.

On balance, this is a lot of catch-up with sparse sprinklings of leadership. This makes sense, because Safari is in usually in last place when it comes to feature completeness:

And that is important because Apple's incredibly shoddy work impacts every single browser on iOS.

You might recall that Apple was required by the EC to enable browser engine choice for EU citizens under the Digital Markets Act. Cupertino, per usual, was extremely chill about it, threatening to end PWAs entirely and offering APIs that are inadequate or broken.

And those are just the technical obstacles that Apple has put up. The proposed contractual terms (pdf) are so obviously onerous that no browser vendor could ever accept them, and are transparently disallowed under the DMA's plain language. But respecting the plain language of the law isn't Apple's bag.

All of this is to say that Apple is not going to allow better browsers on iOS without a fight, and it remains dramatically behind the best engines in performance, security, and features. Meanwhile, we now know that Apple is likely skimming something like $19BN per year in pure profit from it's $20+BN/yr of revenue from its deal with Google. That's a 90+% profit rate, which is only reduced by the paltry amount it re-invests into WebKit and Safari.

So to recap: Apple's Developer Relations folks want you to be grateful to Cupertino for unlocking access to features that Apple has been the singular obstacle to.

And they want to you ignore the fact that for the past decade it has hobbled the web while skimming obscene profits from the ecosystem.

Don't fall for it. Ignore the gaslighting. Apple could 10x the size of the WebKit team without causing the CFO to break a sweat, and there are plenty of great browser engineers on the market today. Suppressing the web is a choice — Apple's choice — and not one that we need to feel gratitude toward.

While I'd like to be spending most of this time working through improvements to web APIs, the majority of time spent with partners goes to remediating performance and accessibility issues caused by “modern” frontend frameworks and the culture surrounding them. Today, these issues are most pronounced in React-based stacks.

This is disquieting because React is legacy technology, but it continues to appear in greenfield applications.

Surprisingly, some continue to insist that React is “modern.” Perhaps we can square the circle if we understand “modern” to apply to React in the way it applies to art. Neither demonstrate contemporary design and construction. They are not built for current needs and do not meet contemporary performance standards, but pose as expensive objets harkening back to an earlier era's antiquated methods.

In the hope of steering the next team away from the rocks, I've found myself penning advocacy pieces and research into the state of play, as well as giving talks to alert managers and developers of the dangers of today's frontend orthodoxy.

In short, nobody should start a new project in the 2020s based on React. Full stop.¹

The Rule Of Least Client-Side Complexity

Code that runs on the server can be fully costed. Performance and availability of server-side systems are under the control of the provisioning organisation, and latency can be actively managed.

Code that runs on the client, by contrast, is running on The Devil's Computer.² Almost nothing about the latency, client resources, or even API availability are under the developer's control.

Client-side web development is perhaps best conceived of as influence-oriented programming. Once code has left the datacentre, all a web developer can do is send thoughts and prayers.

As a direct consequence, an unreasonably effective strategy is to send less code. Declarative forms generate more functional UI per byte sent. In practice, this means favouring HTML and CSS over JavaScript, as they degrade gracefully and feature higher compression ratios. These improvements in resilience and reductions in costs are beneficial in compounding ways over a site's lifetime.

Stacks based on React, Angular, and other legacy-oriented, desktop-focused JavaScript frameworks generally take the opposite bet. These ecosystems pay lip service to the controls necessary for preventing horrific proliferations of unnecessary client-side cruft. The predictable consequence are NPM-amalgamated bundles full of redundancies like core-js, lodash, underscore, polyfills for browsers that no longer exist, userland ECC libraries, moment.js, and a hundred other horrors.

This culture is so out of hand that it seems 2024's React developers are constitutionally unable to build chatbots without including all of these 2010s holdovers, plus at least one chonky MathML or TeX library in the critical path to display an <input>. A tiny fraction of query responses need to display formulas — and yet.

Tech leads and managers need to break this spell. Ownership has to be created over decisions affecting the client. In practice, this means forbidding React in new work.

OK, But What, Then?

This question comes in two flavours that take some work to tease apart:

• The narrow form:

  "Assuming we have a well-qualified need for client-side rendering, what specific technologies would you recommend instead of React?"

• The broad form:

  "Our product stack has bet on React and the various mythologies that the cool kids talk about on React-centric podcasts. You're asking us to rethink the whole thing. Which silver bullet should we adopt instead?"

Teams that have grounded their product decisions appropriately can work through the narrow form by running objective bake offs. Building multiple small PoCs to determine each approach's scaling factors and limits can even be a great deal of fun.³ It's the rewarding side of real engineering; trying out new materials under well-understood constraints to improve outcomes.

Just the prep work to run bake offs tends to generate value.

In most teams, constraints on tech stack decisions have materially shifted since they were last examined. For some, identifying use-cases reveals a reality that's vastly different than managers and tech leads expect. Gathering data on these factors allows for first-pass cuts about stack choices, winnowing quickly to a smaller set of options to run bake offs for.⁴

But the teams we spend the most time with don't have good reasons to stick with client-side rendering in the first place.

Many folks asking "if not React, then what?" think they're asking in the narrow form but are grappling with the broader version. A shocking fraction of decent, well-meaning product managers and engineers haven't thought through the whys and wherefores of their architectures, opting instead to go with what's popular in a responsibility fire brigade.⁵

For some, provocations to abandon React induce an unmoored feeling; a suspicion that they might not understand the world any more.⁶

Teams in this position are working through the epistemology of their values and decisions.⁷ How can they know their technology choices are better than the alternatives? Why should they pick one stack over another?

Many need help deciding which end of the telescope to use when examining frontend challenges because frameworkism has become the dominant creed of our discourse.

Frameworkism insists that all problems will be solved if teams just framework hard enough. This is non-sequitur, if not entirely backwards. In practice, the only thing that makes web experiences good is caring about the user experience — specifically, the experience of folks at the margins. Technologies come and go, but what always makes the difference is giving a toss about the user.

In less vulgar terms, the struggle is to convince managers and tech leads that they need to start with user needs. Or as Public Digital puts it, "design for user needs, not organisational convenience"

The essential component of this mindset shift is replacing hopes based on promises with constraints based on research and evidence. This aligns with what it means to commit wanton acts of engineering, because engineering is the practice of designing solutions for users and society under known constraints.

The opposite of engineering is imagining that constraints do not exist, or do not apply to your product. The shorthand for this is “bullshit.”

Ousting an engrained practice of bullshitting does not come easily. Frameworkism preaches that the way to improve user experiences is to adopt more (or different) tooling from within the framework's ecosystem. This provides adherents with something to do that looks plausibly like engineering, but isn't.

It can even become a totalising commitment; solutions to user problems outside the framework's expanded cinematic universe are unavailable to the frameworkist. Non-idiomatic patterns that unlock wins for users are bugs to be squashed, not insights to be celebrated. Without data or evidence to counterbalance the bullshit artist's assertions, who's to say they're wrong? So frameworkists root out and devalue practices that generate objective criteria in decision-making. Orthodoxy unmoored from measurement predictably spins into absurdity. Eventually, heresy carries heavy sanctions.

And it's all nonsense.

Realists do not wallow in abstraction-induced hallucinations about user experiences; they measure them. Realism requires reckoning with the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. In that way, realism is the opposite of frameworkism.

The most effective tools for breaking the spell are techniques that give managers a user-centred view of system performance. This can take the form of RUM data, such as Core Web Vitals (check yours now!), or lab results from well-configured test-benches (e.g., WPT). Instrumenting critical user journeys and talking through business goals are quick follow-ups that enable teams to seize the momentum and formulate business cases for change.

RUM and bench data sources are essential antidotes to frameworkism because they provide data-driven baselines to argue from, creating a shared observable reality. Instead of accepting the next increment of framework investment on faith, teams armed with data can weigh up the costs of fad chasing versus likely returns.

And Nothing Of Value Was Lost

Prohibiting the spread of React (and other frameworkist totems) by policy is both an incredible cost savings and a helpful way to reorient teams towards delivery for users. However, better results only arrive once frameworkism itself is eliminated from decision-making. It's no good to spend the windfall from avoiding one sort of mistake on errors within the same category.

A general answer to the broad form of the problem has several parts:

• User focus

  Decision-makers must accept that they are directly accountable for the results of their engineering choices. Either systems work well for users,⁸ including those at the margins, or they don't. Systems that do not perform must be replaced. No sacred cows, only problems to be solved with the appropriate application of constraints.

• Evidence

  The essential shared commitment between management and engineering is a dedication to realism. Better evidence must win.

• Guardrails

  Policies must be implemented to ward off hallucinatory frameworkist assertions about how better experiences are delivered. Good examples of this include the UK Government Digital Service's requirement that services be built using progressive enhancement techniques.

  Organisations can tweak guidance as appropriate — e.g., creating an escalation path for exceptions — but the important thing is to set a baseline. Evidence boiled down into policy has power.

• Bake Offs

  No new system should be deployed without a clear list of critical user journeys. Those journeys embody what we users do most frequently, and once those definitions are in hand, teams can do bake offs to test how well various systems deliver given the constraints of the expected marginal user.

All of this casts the product manager's role in stark relief. Instead of suggesting an endless set of experiments to run (poorly), they must define a product thesis and commit to defining success as improving services for users. This will be uncomfortable. It's also the job. Graciously accept the resignations of PMs who decide managing products is not in their wheelhouse.

Vignettes

To see how realism and frameworkism differ in practice, it's helpful to work a few examples. As background, recall that our rubric⁹ for choosing technologies is based on the number of incremental updates to primary data in a session. Some classes of app, like editors, feature long sessions and many incremental updates where a local data model can be helpful in supporting timely application of updates, but this is the exception.

It's only in these exceptional instances that SPA architectures should be considered.

And only when an SPA architecture is required should tools designed to support optimistic updates against a local data model — including "frontend frameworks" and "state management" tools — ever become part of a site's architecture.

The choice isn't between JavaScript frameworks, it's whether SPA-oriented tools should be entertained at all.

For most sites, the answer is clearly "no".

We can examine broad classes of site to understand why this is true:

Informational

Sites built to inform should almost always be built using semantic HTML with optional progressive enhancement as necessary.

Static site generation tools like Hugo, Astro, 11ty, and Jekyll work well for many of these cases. Sites that have content that changes more frequently should look to "classic" CMSes or tools like WordPress to generate HTML and CSS.

Blogs, marketing sites, company home pages, and public information sites should minimise client-side JavaScript to the greatest extent possible. They should never be built using frameworks that are designed to enable SPA architectures.¹⁰

Why Semantic Markup and Optional Progressive Enhancement Are The Right Choice

Informational sites have short sessions and server-owned application data models; that is, the source of truth for what's displayed on the page is always the server's to manage and own. This means that there is no need for a client-side data model abstraction or client-side component definitions that might be updated from such a data model.

Note: many informational sites include productivity components as distinct sub-applications, which can be evaluated independently. For example, CMSes such as Wordpress are comprised of two distinct surfaces; post editors that are low-traffic but high-interactivity, and published pages, which are high-traffic, low-interactivity viewers. Progressive enhancement should be considered for both, but is an absolute must for reader views which do not feature long sessions.^9:1

E-Commerce

E-commerce sites should be built using server-generated semantic HTML and progressive enhancement.

Many tools are available to support this architecture. Teams building e-commerce experiences should prefer stacks that deliver no JavaScript by default, and buttress that with controls on client-side script to prevent regressions in material business metrics.

Why Progressive Enhancement Is The Right Choice

The general form of e-commerce sites has been stable for more than 20 years:

• Landing pages with current offers and a search function for finding products.
• Search results pages which allow for filtering and comparison of products.
• Product-detail pages that host media about products, ratings, reviews, and recommendations for alternatives.
• Cart management, checkout, and account management screens.

Across all of these page types, a pervasive login and cart status widget will be displayed. Sometimes this widget, and the site's logo, are the only consistent elements.

Long experience demonstrates very little shared data across these page types, highly variable session lengths, and a need for fresh content (e.g., prices) from the server. The best way to reduce latency in e-commerce sites is to optimise for lightweight, server-generated pages. Aggressive caching, image optimisation, and page-weight reduction strategies all help.

Media

Media consumption sites vary considerably in session length and data update potential. Most should start as progressively-enhanced markup-based experiences, adding complexity over time as product changes warrant it.

Why Progressive Enhancement and Islands May Be The Right Choice

Many interactive elements on media consumption sites can be modelled as distinct islands of interactivity (e.g., comment threads). Many of these components present independent data models and can therefore be constructed as progressively-enhanced Web Components within a larger (static) page.

When An SPA May Be Appropriate

This model breaks down when media playback must continue across media browsing (think "mini-player" UIs). A fundamental limitation of today's web platform is that it is not possible to preserve some elements from a page across top-level navigations. Sites that must support features like this should consider using SPA technologies while setting strict guardrails for the allowed size of client-side JS per page.

Another reason to consider client-side logic for a media consumption app is offline playback. Managing a local (Service Worker-backed) media cache requires application logic and a way to synchronise information with the server.

Lightweight SPA-oriented frameworks may be appropriate here, along with connection-state resilient data systems such as Zero or Y.js.

Social

Social media apps feature significant variety in session lengths and media capabilities. Many present infinite-scroll interfaces and complex post editing affordances. These are natural dividing lines in a design that align well with session depth and client-vs-server data model locality.

Why Progressive Enhancement May Be The Right Choice

Most social media experiences involve a small, fixed number of actions on top of a server-owned data model ("liking" posts, etc.) as well as distinct update phase for new media arriving at an interval. This model works well with a hybrid approach as is found in Hotwire and many HTMX applications.

When An SPA May Be Appropriate

Islands of deep interactivity may make sense in social media applications, and aggressive client-side caching (e.g., for draft posts) may aid in building engagement. It may be helpful to think of these as unique app sections with distinct needs from the main site's role in displaying content.

Offline support may be another reason to download a snapshot of user data to the client. This should be as part of an approach that builds resilience against flaky networks. Teams in this situation should consider a Service Worker-based, multi-page apps with "stream stitching". This allows sites to stick with HTML, while enabling offline-first logic and synchronisation. Because offline support is so invasive to an architecture, this requirement must be identified up-front.

Note: Many assume that SPA-enabling tools and frameworks are required to build compelling Progressive Web Apps that work well offline. This is not the case. PWAs can be built using stream-stitching architectures that apply the equivalent of server-side templating to data on the client, within a Service Worker.

With the advent of multi-page view transitions, MPA architecture PWAs can present fluid transitions between user states without heavyweight JavaScript bundles clogging up the main thread. It may take several more years for the framework community to digest the implications of these technologies, but they are available today and work exceedingly well, both as foundational architecture pieces and as progressive enhancements.

Productivity

Document-centric productivity apps may be the hardest class to reason about, as collaborative editing, offline support, and lightweight "viewing" modes with full document fidelity are hard product requirements.

Triage-oriented experiences (e.g. email clients) are also prime candidates for the potential benefits of SPA-based technology. But as with all SPAs, the ability to deliver a better experience hinges both on session depth and up-front payload cost. It's easy to lose this race, as this blog has examined in the past.

Editors of all sorts are a natural fit for local data models and SPA-based architectures to support modifications to them. However, the endemic complexity of these systems ensures that performance will remain a constant struggle. As a result, teams building applications in this style should consider strong performance guardrails, identify critical user journeys up-front, and ensure that instrumentation is in place to ward off unpleasant performance surprises.

Why SPAs May Be The Right Choice

Editors frequently feature many updates to the same data (e.g., for every keystroke or mouse drag). Applying updates optimistically and only informing the server asynchronously of edits can deliver a superior experience across long editing sessions.

However, teams should be aware that editors may also perform double duty as viewers and that the weight of up-front bundles may not be reasonable for both cases. Worse, it can be hard to tease viewing sessions apart from heavy editing sessions at page load time.

Teams that succeed in these conditions build extreme discipline about the modularity, phasing, and order of delayed package loading based on user needs (e.g., only loading editor components users need when they require them). Teams that get stuck tend to fail to apply controls over which team members can approve changes to critical-path payloads.

Other Application Classes

Some types of apps are intrinsically interactive, focus on access to local device hardware, or center on manipulating media types that HTML doesn't handle intrinsically. Examples include 3D CAD systems, programming editors, game streaming services, web-based games, media-editing, and music-making systems. These constraints often make client-side JavaScript UIs a natural fit, but each should be evaluated critically:

• What are the critical user journeys?
• How long will average sessions be?
• Do many updates to the same data take place in a session?
• What metrics will we track to ensure that performance remains acceptable?
• How will we place tight controls on critical-path script and other resources?

Success in these app classes is possible on the web, but extreme care is required.

A Word On Enterprise Software: Some of the worst performance disasters I've helped remediate are from a category we can think of, generously, as "enterprise line-of-business apps". Dashboards, worfklow systems, corporate chat apps, that sort of thing.

Teams building these excruciatingly slow apps often assert that "startup performance isn't important because people start our app in the morning and keep it open all day". At the limit, this can be true, but what this attempted deflection obscures is that performance is cultural. Teams that fail to define and measure critical user journeys (include loading) always fail to manage post-load interactivity too.

The old saying "how you do anything is how you do everything" is never more true than in software usability.

One consequence of cultures that fail to put the user first are products whose usability is so poor that attributes which didn't matter at the time of sale (like performance) become reasons to switch.

If you've ever had the distinct displeasure of using Concur or Workday, you'll understand what I mean. Challengers win business from them not by being wonderful, but simply by being usable. These incumbents are powerless to respond because their problems are now rooted deeply in the behaviours they rewarded through hiring and promotion along the way. The resulting management blindspot becomes a self-reinforcing norm that no single leader can shake.

This is why it's caustic to product success and brand value to allow a culture of disrespect towards users in favour of venerating developers (e.g., "DX"). The only antidote is to stamp it out wherever it arises by demanding user-focused realism in decision making.

"But..."

To get unstuck, managers and tech leads that become wedded to frameworkism have to work through a series of easily falsified rationales offered by Over Reactors in service of their chosen ideology. Note, as you read, that none of these protests put the user experience front-and-centre. This admission by omission is a reliable property of the conversations these sketches are drawn from.

"...we need to move fast"

This chestnut should be answered with the question: "for how long?"

The dominant outcome of fling-stuff-together-with-NPM, feels-fine-on-my-$3K-laptop development is to get teams stuck in the mud much sooner than anyone expects.

From major accessibility defects to brand-risk levels of lousy performance, the consequence of this approach has been crossing my desk every week for a decade. The one thing I can tell you that all of these teams and products have in common is that they are not moving faster.

Brands you've heard of and websites you used this week have come in for help, which we've dutifully provided. The general prescription is "spend a few weeks/months unpicking this Gordian knot of JavaScript."

The time spent in remediation does fix the revenue and accessibility problems that JavaScript exuberance cause, but teams are dead in the water while they belatedly add ship gates and bundle size controls and processes to prevent further regression.

This necessary, painful, and expensive remediation generally comes at the worst time and with little support, owing to the JavaScript-industrial-complex's omerta. Managers trapped in these systems experience a sinking realisation that choices made in haste are not so easily revised. Complex, inscrutable tools introduced in the "move fast" phase are now systems that teams must dedicate time to learn, understand deeply, and affirmatively operate. All the while the pace of feature delivery is dramatically reduced.

This isn't what managers think they're signing up for when accepting "but we need to move fast!"

But let's take the assertion at face value and assume a team that won't get stuck in the ditch (🤞): the idea embedded in this statement is, roughly, that there isn't time to do it right (so React?), but there will be time to do it over.

This is in direct opposition to identifying product-market-fit. After all, the way to find who will want your product is to make it as widely available as possible, then to add UX flourishes.

Teams I've worked with are frequently astonished to find that removing barriers to use opens up new markets and leads to growth in parts of a world they had under-valued.

Now, if you're selling Veblen goods, by all means, prioritise anything but accessibility. But in literally every other category, the returns to quality can be best understood as clarity of product thesis. A low-quality experience — which is what is being proposed when React is offered as an expedient — is a drag on the core growth argument for your service. And if the goal is scale, rather than exclusivity, building for legacy desktop browsers that Microsoft won't even sell you at the cost of harming the experience for the majority of the world's users is a strategic error.

"...it works for Facebook"

To a statistical certainty, you aren't making Facebook. Your problems likely look nothing like Facebook's early 2010s problems, and even if they did, following their lead is a terrible idea.

And these tools aren't even working for Facebook (or IG, or Threads). They just happen to be a monopoly in various social categories and can afford to light money on fire. If that doesn't describe your situation, it's best not to over index on narratives premised on Facebook's perceived success.

"...our teams already know React"

React developers are web developers. They have to operate in a world of CSS, HTML, JavaScript, and DOM. It's inescapable. This means that React is the most fungible layer in the stack. Moving between templating systems (which is what JSX is) is what web developers have done fluidly for more than 30 years. Even folks with deep expertise in, say, Rails and ERB, can easily knock out Django or Laravel or WordPress or 11ty sites. There are differences, sure, but every web developer is a polyglot.

React knowledge is also not particularly valuable. Any team familiar with React's...baroque...conventions can easily master Preact, Stencil, Svelte, Lit, FAST, Qwik, or any of a dozen faster, smaller, reactive client-side systems that demand less mental bookkeeping.

"...we need to be able to hire easily"

The tech industry has just seen many of the most talented, empathetic, and user-focused engineers I know laid off for no reason other than their management couldn't figure out that there would be some mean reversion post-pandemic. Which is to say, there's a fire sale on talent right now, and you can ask for whatever skills you damn well please and get good returns.

If you cannot attract folks who know web standards and fundamentals, reach out. I'll help you formulate recs, recruiting materials, hiring rubrics, and promotion guides to value these folks the way you should: unreasonably effective collaborators that will do incredible good for your products at a fraction of the cost of solving the next problem the React community is finally acknowledging that React caused.

Resumes Aren't Murder/Suicide Pacts

But even if you decide you want to run interview loops to filter for React knowledge, that's not a good reason to use it! Anyone who can master the dark thicket of build tools, typescript foibles, and the million little ways that JSX's fork of HTML and JavaScript syntax trips folks up is absolutely good enough to work in a different system.

Heck, they're already working in an ever-shifting maze of faddish churn. The treadmill is real, which means that the question isn't "will these folks be able to hit the ground running?" (answer: no, they'll spend weeks learning your specific setup regardless), it's "what technologies will provide the highest ROI over the life of our team?"

Given the extremely high costs of React and other frameworkist prescriptions, the odds that this calculus will favour the current flavour of the week over the lifetime of even a single project are vanishingly small.

The Bootcamp Thing

It makes me nauseous to hear managers denigrate talented engineers, and there seems to be a rash of it going around. The idea that folks who come out of bootcamps — folks who just paid to learn whatever was on the syllabus — aren't able or willing to pick up some alternative stack is bollocks.

Bootcamp grads might be junior, and they are generally steeped in varying strengths of frameworkism, but they're not stupid. They want to do a good job, and it's management's job to define what that is. Many new grads might know React, but they'll learn a dozen other tools along the way, and React is by far the most (unnecessarily) complex of the bunch. The idea that folks who have mastered the horrors of useMemo and friends can't take on board DOM lifecycle methods or the event loop or modern CSS is insulting. It's unfairly stigmatising and limits the organisation's potential.

In other words, definitionally atrocious management.

"...everyone has fast phones now"

For more than a decade, the core premise of frameworkism has been that client-side resources are cheap (or are getting increasingly inexpensive) and that it is, therefore, reasonable to trade some end-user performance for developer convenience.

This has been an absolute debacle. Since at least 2012, the rise of mobile falsified this contention, and (as this blog has meticulously catalogued) we are only just starting to turn the corner.

Frameworkist assertion that "everyone has fast phones" is many things, but first and foremost it's an admission that the folks offering it don't know what they're talking about — and they hope you don't either.

No business trying to make it on the web can afford what they're selling, and you are under no obligation to offer your product as sacrifice to a false god.

"...React is industry-standard"

This is, at best, a comforting fiction.

At worst, it's a knowing falsity that serves to omit the variability in React-based stacks because, you see, React isn't one thing. It's more of a lifestyle, complete with choices to make about React itself (function components or class components?) languages and compilers (typescript or nah?), package managers and dependency tools (npm? yarn? pnpm? turbo?), bundlers (webpack? esbuild? swc? rollup?), meta-tools (vite? turbopack? nx?), "state management" tools (redux? mobx? apollo? something that actually manages state?) and so on and so forth. And that's before we discuss plugins to support different CSS transpilation, among other optional side-quests frameworkists insist are necessary.

Across more than 100 consulting engagements, I've never seen two identical React setups, save smaller cases where the defaults of Create React App were unchanged. CRA itself changed dramatically over the years before finally being removed from the React docs as the best way to get started.

There's nothing standard about any of this. It's all change, all the time, and anyone who tells you differently is not to be trusted.

The Bare (Assertion) Minimum

Hopefully, if you've made it this far, you'll forgive a digression into how the "React is industry standard" misdirection became so embedded.

Given the overwhelming evidence that this stuff isn't even working on the sites of the titular React poster children, how did we end up with React in so many nooks and crannies of contemporary frontend?

Pushy know-it-alls, that's how. Frameworkists have a way of hijacking every conversation with assertions like "virtual DOM is fast" without ever understanding anything about how browsers work, let alone the GC costs of their (extremely chatty) alternatives. This same ignorance allows them to confidently assert that React is "fine" when cheaper alternatives exist in every dimension.

These are not serious people. You do not have to entertain arguments offered without evidence. But you do have to oppose them and create data-driven structures that put users first. The long-term costs of these errors are enormous, as witnessed by the parade of teams needing our help to achieve minimally decent performance using stacks that were supposed to be "performant" (sic).

"...the ecosystem..."

Which part, exactly? Be extremely specific. Which packages are so valuable, yet wedded entirely to React, that a team should not entertain alternatives? Do they really not work with Preact? How much money is exactly the right amount to burn to use these libraries? Because that's the debate.

Even if you get the benefits of "the ecosystem" at Time 0, why do you think that will continue to pay out at T+1? Or T+N?

Every library presents a separate, stochastic risk of abandonment. Even the most heavily used systems fall out of favour with the JavaScript-industrial-complex's in-crowd. This strands teams in the same position they'd have been in if they accepted ownership of more of the stack up-front, but with less experience and agency. Is that a good trade? Does your boss agree?

And how's that "CSS-in-JS" adventure working out? Still writing class components, or did you have a big forced (and partial) migration that's still creating headaches?

The truth is that every single package that is part of a repo's devDependencies is, or will be, fully owned by the consumer of the package. The only bulwark against uncomfortable surprises is to consider NPM dependencies a high-interest loan collateralized by future engineering capacity.

The best way to prevent these costs spiralling out of control is to fully examine and approve each and every dependency for UI tools and build systems. If your team is not comfortable agreeing to own, patch, and improve every single one of those systems, they should not be part of your stack.

"...Next.js can be fast (enough)"

Do you feel lucky, punk? Do you?

You'll have to be lucky to beat the odds.

Sites built with Next.js perform materially worse than those from HTML-first systems like 11ty, Astro, et al.

It simply does not scale, and the fact that it drags React behind it like a ball and chain is a double demerit. The chonktastic default payload of delay-loaded JS in any Next.js site will compete with ads and other business-critical deferred content for bandwidth, and that's before custom components and routes are added. Even when using React Server Components. Which is to say, Next.js is a fast way to lose a lot of money while getting locked in to a VC-backed startup's proprietary APIs.

Next.js starts bad and only gets worse from a shocking baseline. No wonder the only Next sites that seem to perform well are those that enjoy overwhelmingly wealthy user bases, hand-tuning assistance from Vercel, or both.

So, do you feel lucky?

"...React Native!"

React Native is a good way to make a slow app that requires constant hand-tuning and an excellent way to make a terrible website. It has also been abandoned by it's poster children.

Companies that want to deliver compelling mobile experiences into app stores from the same codebase as their website are better served investigating Trusted Web Activities and PWABuilder. If those don't work, Capacitor and Cordova can deliver similar benefits. These approaches make most native capabilities available, but centralise UI investment on the web side, providing visibility and control via a single execution path. This, in turn, reduces duplicate optimisation and accessibility headaches.

References

These are essential guides for frontend realism. I recommend interested tech leads, engineering managers, and product managers digest them all:

• "Building a robust frontend using progressive enhancement" from the UK's Government Digital Service.
• "JavaScript dos and donts" by Github alumnus Mu-An Chiou.
• "Choosing Your Stack" from Cancer Research UK
• "The Monty Hall Rewrite" by Alex Sexton, which breaks down the essential ways that a failure to run an honest bake off harms decision-making.
• "Things you forgot (or never knew) because of React" by Josh Collinsworth, which enunciates just how baroque and parochial React's culture has become.
• "The Frontend Treadmill" by Marco Rogers explains the costs of frameworkism better than I ever could.
• "Questions for a new technology" by Kellan Elliott-McCrea and Glyph's "Against Innovation Tokens". Together, they set a well-focused lens for thinking about how frameworkism is antithetical to functional engineering culture.

These pieces are from teams and leaders that have succeeded in outrageously effective ways by applying the realist tenants of looking around for themselves and measuring. I wish you the same success.

FOOTNOTES

This post is an edited and expanded version of a now-mangled Mastodon thread.

Some in the JavaScript community imagine that I harbour an irrational dislike of their tools when, in fact, I want nothing more than to stop thinking about them. Live-and-let-live is excellent guidance, and if it weren't for React et. al.'s predictably ruinous outcomes, the public side of my work wouldn't involve educating about the problems JS-first development has caused.

But that's not what strategy demands, and strategy is my job.¹

I've been holding my fire (and the confidences of consulting counterparties) for most of the last decade. Until this year, I only occasionally posted traces documenting the worsening rot. I fear this has only served to make things look better than they are.

Over the past decade, my work helping teams deliver competitive PWAs gave me a front-row seat to a disturbing trend. The rate of failure to deliver usable experiences on phones was increasing over time, despite the eye-watering cost of JS-based stacks teams were reaching for. Worse and costlier is a bad combo, and the opposite of what competing ecosystems did.

Native developers reset hard when moving from desktop to mobile, getting deeply in touch with the new constraints. Sure, developing a codebase multiple times is more expensive than the web's write-once-test-everywhere approach, but at least you got speed for the extra cost.

That's not what web developers did. Contemporary frontend practice pretended that legacy-oriented, desktop-focused tools would perform fine in this new context, without ever checking if they did. When that didn't work, the toxic-positivity crowd blamed the messenger.²

Frontend's tragically timed turn towards JavaScript means the damage isn't limited to the public sector or "bad" developers. Some of the strongest engineers I know find themselves mired in the same quicksand. Today's popular JS-based approaches are simply unsafe at any speed. The rot is now ecosystem-wide, and JS-first culture owns a share of the responsibility.

But why do I care?

Platforms Are Competitions

I want the web to win.

What does that mean? Concretely, folks should be able to accomplish most of their daily tasks on the web. But capability isn't sufficient; for the web to win in practice, users need to turn to the browser for those tasks because it's easier, faster, and more secure.

A reasonable metric of success is time spent as a percentage of time on device.³

But why should we prefer one platform over another when, in theory, they can deliver equivalently good experiences?

As I see it, the web is the only generational software platform that has a reasonable shot at delivering a potent set of benefits to users:

• Fresh
• Frictionless
• Safe by default
• Portable and interoperable
• Gatekeeper-free (no prior restraint on publication)⁴
• Standards-based, and therefore...
• User-mediated (extensions, browser settings, etc.)
• Open Source compatible

No other successful platform provides all of these, and others that could are too small to matter.

Platforms like Android and Flutter deliver subsets of these properties but capitulate to capture by the host OS agenda, allowing their developers to be taxed through app stores and proprietary API lock-in. Most treat user mediation like a bug to be fixed.

The web's inherent properties have created an ecosystem that is unique in the history of software, both in scope and resilience.

...and We're Losing

So why does this result in intermittent antagonism towards today's JS community?

Because the web is losing, and instead of recognising that we're all in it together, then pitching in to right the ship, the Lemon Vendors have decided that predatory delay and "I've got mine, Jack"-ism is the best response.

What do I mean by "losing"?

Going back to the time spent metric, the web is cleaning up on the desktop. The web's JTBD percentage and fraction of time spent both continue to rise as we add new capabilities to the platform, displacing other ways of writing and delivering software, one fraction of a percent every year.⁵

The web is desktop's indispensable ecosystem. Who, a decade ago, thought the web would be such a threat to Adobe's native app business that it would need to respond with a $20BN acquisition attempt and a full-fledged version of Photoshop (real Photoshop) on the web?

Model advantages grind slowly but finely. They create space for new competitors to introduce the intrinsic advantages of their platform in previously stable categories. But only when specific criteria are met.

Win Condition

First and foremost, challengers need a cost-competitive channel. That is, users have to be able to acquire software that runs on this new platform without a lot of extra work. The web drops channel costs to nearly zero, assuming...

80/20 capability. Essential use-cases in the domain have to be (reliably) possible for the vast majority (90+%) of the TAM. Some nice-to-haves might not be there, but the model advantage makes up for it. Lastly...

It has to feel good. Performance can't suck for core tasks.⁶ It's fine for UI consistency with native apps to wander a bit.⁷ It's even fine for there to be a large peak performance delta. But the gap can't be such a gulf that it generally changes the interaction class of common tasks.

So if the web is meeting all these requirements on desktop – even running away with the lead – why am I saying "the web is losing"?

Because more than 75% of new devices that can run full browsers are phones. And the web is getting destroyed on mobile.

Utterly routed.

This is what I started warning about in 2019, and more recently on this blog. The terrifying data I had access to five years ago is now visible from space.

If that graph looks rough-but-survivable, understand that it's only this high in the US (and other Western markets) because the web was already a success in those geographies when mobile exploded.

That history isn't shared in the most vibrant growth markets, meaning the web has fallen from "minuscule" to "nonexistent" as a part of mobile-first daily life globally.

This is the landscape. The web is extremely likely to get cast in amber and will, in less than a technology generation, become a weird legacy curio.

What happens then? The market for web developers will stop expanding, and the safe, open, interoperable, gatekeeper-free future for computing will be entirely foreclosed — or at least the difficulty will go from "slow build" to "cold-start problem"; several orders of magnitude harder (and therefore unlikely).

This failure has many causes, but they're all tractable. This is why I have worked so hard to close the capability gaps with Service Workers, PWAs, Notifications, Project Fugu, and structural solutions to the governance problems that held back progress. All of these projects have been motivated by the logic of platform competition, and the urgency that comes from understanding that that web doesn't have a natural constituency.⁸

If you've read any of my writing over this time, it will be unsurprising that this is why I eventually had to break silence and call out what Apple has done on iOS, and what Facebook and Android have done to more quietly undermine browser choice.

These gatekeepers are kneecapping the web in different, but overlapping and reinforcing ways. There's much more to say here, but I've tried to lay out the landscape over the past few years,. But even if we break open the necessary 80/20 capabilities and restart engine competition, today's web is unlikely to succeed on mobile.

You Do It To Yourself, And That's What Really Hurts

Web developers and browsers have capped the web's mobile potential by ensuring it will feel terrible on the phones most folks have. A web that can win is a web that doesn't feel like sludge. And today it does.

This failure has many fathers. Browsers have not done nearly enough to intercede on users' behalf; hell, we don't even warn users that links they tap on might take them to sites that lock up the main thread for seconds at a time!

Things have gotten so bad that even the extremely weak pushback on developer excess that Google's Core Web Vitals effort provides is a slow-motion earthquake. INP, in particular, is forcing even the worst JS-first lemon vendors to retreat to the server — a tacit acknowledgement that their shit stinks.

So this is the strategic logic of why web performance matters in 2024; for the web to survive, it must start to grow on mobile. For that growth to start, we need the web to be a credible way to deliver these sorts of 80/20 capability-enabled mobile experiences with not-trash performance. That depends both on browsers that don't suck (we see you, Apple) and websites that don't consistently lock up phones and drain batteries.

Toolchains and communities that retreat into the numbing comfort of desktop success are a threat to that potential.

There's (much) more for browsers to do here, but developers that want the web to succeed can start without us. Responsible, web-ecology-friendly development is more than possible today, and the great news is that it tends to make companies more money, too!

The JS-industrial-complex culture that pooh-poohs responsibility is self-limiting and a harm to our collective potential.

Groundhog Day

Nobody has ever hired me to work on performance.

It's (still) on my plate because terrible performance is a limiting factor on the web's potential to heal and grow. Spending nearly half my time diagnosing and remediating easily preventable failure is not fun. The teams I sit with are not having fun either, and goodness knows there are APIs I'd much rather be working on instead.

My work today, and for the past 8 years, has only included performance because until it's fixed the whole web is at risk.

It's actually that dire, and the research I publish indicates that we are not on track to cap our JS emissions or mitigate them with CPUs fast enough to prevent ecosystem collapse.

Contra the framework apologists, pervasive, preventable failure to deliver usable mobile experiences is often because we're dragging around IE 9 compat and long toolchains premised on outdated priors like a ball and chain.⁹

Reboot

Things look bad, and I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge that it could just be too late. Apple and Google and Facebook, with the help of a pliant and credulous JavaScript community, might have succeeded where 90s-era Microsoft failed — we just don't know it yet.

But it seems equally likely that the web's advantages are just dormant. When browser competition is finally unlocked, and when web pages aren't bloated with half a megabyte of JavaScript (on average), we can expect a revolution. But we need to prepare for that day and do everything we can to make it possible.

Failure and collapse aren't pre-ordained. We can do better. We can grow the web again. But to do that, the frontend community has to decide that user experience, the web's health, and their own career prospects are more important than whatever JS-based dogma VC-backed SaaS vendors are shilling this month.

FOOTNOTES

Other posts in the series:

• Reckoning: Part 1 — The Landscape
• Reckoning: Part 2 — Object Lesson
• Reckoning: Part 3 — Caprock

Frontend took ill with a bad case of JavaScript fever at the worst possible moment. The predictable consequence is a web that feels terrible most of the time, resulting in low and falling use of the web on smartphones.¹

If nothing changes, eventually, the web will become a footnote in the history of computing; a curio along side mainframes and minicomputers — never truly gone but lingering with an ashen palour and a necrotic odour.

We don't have to wait to see how this drama plays out to understand the very real consequences of JavaScript excess on users.²

Everyone in a site's production chain has agency to prevent disaster. Procurement leads, in-house IT staff, and the managers, PMs, and engineers working for contractors and subcontractors building the SNAP sites we examined all had voices that were more powerful than the users they under-served. Any of them could have acted to steer the ship away from the rocks.

Unacceptable performance is the consequence of a chain of failures to put the user first. Breaking the chain usually requires just one insistent advocate. Disasters like BenefitsCal are not inevitable.

The same failures play out in the commercial teams I sit with day-to-day. Failure is not a foregone conclusion, yet there's an endless queue of sites stuck in the same ditch, looking for help to pull themselves out. JavaScript overindulgence is always an affirmative decision, no matter how hard industry "thought leaders" gaslight us.

Marketing that casts highly volatile, serially failed frontend frameworks as "standard" or required is horse hockey. Nobody can force an entire industry to flop so often it limits its future prospects.

These are choices.

Teams that succeed resolve to stand for the users first, then explore techniques that build confidence.

So, assuming we want to put users first, what approaches can even the odds? There's no silver bullet,³ but some techniques are unreasonably effective.

Managers

Engineering managers, product managers, and tech leads can make small changes to turn the the larger ship dramatically.

First, institute critical-user-journey analysis.

Force peers and customers to agree about what actions users will take, in order, on the site most often. Document those flows end-to-end, then automate testing for them end-to-end in something like WebPageTest.org's scripting system. Then define key metrics around these journeys. Build dashboards to track performance end-to-end.

Next, reform your frontend hiring processes.

Never, ever hire for JavaScript framework skills. Instead, interview and hire only for fundamentals like web standards, accessibility, modern CSS, semantic HTML, and Web Components. This is doubly important if your system uses a framework.

The push-back to this sort of change comes from many quarters, but I can assure you from deep experience that the folks you want to hire can learn anything, so the framework on top of the platform is the least valuable part of any skills conversation. There's also a glut of folks with those talents on the market, and they're vastly underpriced vs. their effectiveness, so "ability to hire" isn't a legitimate concern. Teams that can't find those candidates aren't trying.

Some teams are in such a sorry state regarding fundamentals that they can't even vet candidates on those grounds. If that's your group, don't hestitate to reach out.

In addition to attracting the most capable folks at bargain-basement prices, delivering better work more reliably, and spending less on JavaScript treadmill taxes, publicising these criteria sends signals that will attract more of the right talent over time. Being the place that "does it right" generates compound value. The best developers want to work in teams that prize their deeper knowledge. Demonstrate that respect in your hiring process.

Next, issue every product and engineering leader cheap phones and laptops.

Senior leaders should set the expectation those devices will be used regularly and for real work, including visibly during team meetings. If we do not live as our customers, blind spots metastasise.

Lastly, climb the Performance Management Maturity ladder, starting with latency budgets for every project, based on the previously agreed critical user journeys. They are foundational in building a culture that does not backslide.

Engineers and Designers

Success or failure is in your hands, literally. Others in the equation may have authority, but you have power.

Begin to use that power to make noise. Refuse to go along with plans to build YAJSD (Yet Another JavaScript Disaster). Engineering leaders look to their senior engineers for trusted guidance about what technologies to adopt. When someone inevitably proposes the React rewrite, do not be silent. Do not let the bullshit arguments and nonsense justifications pass unchallenged. Make it clear to engineering leadership that this stuff is expensive and is absolutely not "standard".

Demand bakeoffs and testing on low-end devices.

The best thing about cheap devices is they're cheap! So inexpensive that you can likely afford a low-end phone out-of-pocket, even if the org doesn't issue one. Alternatively, WebPageTest.org can generate high-quality, low-noise simulations and side-by-side comparisons of the low-end situation.

Write these comparisons into testing plans early.

Advocate for metrics and measurements that represent users at the margins.

Teams that have climbed the Performance Management Maturity ladder intuitively look at the highest percentiles to understand system performance. Get comfortable doing the same, and build that muscle in your engineering practice.

Build the infrastructure you'll need to show, rather than tell. This can be dashboards or app-specific instrumentation. Whatever it is, just build it. Nobody in a high-performing engineering organisation will be ungrateful for additional visibility.

Lastly, take side-by-side traces and wave them like a red shirt.

Remember, none of the other people in this equation are working to undercut users, but they rely on you to guide their decisions. Be a class traitor; do the right thing and speak up for users on the margins who can't be in the room where decisions are made.

Public Sector Agencies

If your organisation is unfamiliar with the UK Government Digital Service's excellent Service Manual, get reading.

Once everyone has put their copy down, institute the UK's progressive enhancement standard and make it an enforceable requirement in procurement.⁴ The cheapest architecture errors to fix are the ones that weren't committed.

Next, build out critical-user-journey maps to help bidders and in-house developers understand system health. Insist on dashboards to monitor those flows.

Use tender processes to send clear signals that proposals which include SPA architectures or heavy JS frameworks (React, Angular, etc.) will face acceptance challenges.

Next, make space in your budget to hire senior technologists and give them oversight power with teeth.

The root cause of many failures is the continuation of too-big-to-fail contracting. The antidote is scrutiny from folks versed in systems, not only requirements. An effective way to build and maintain that skill is to stop writing omnibus contracts in the first place.

Instead, farm out smaller bits of work to smaller shops across shorter timelines. Do the integration work in-house. That will necessitate maintaining enough tech talent to own and operate these systems, building confidence over time.

Reforming procurement is always challenging; old habits run deep. But it's possible to start with the very next RFP.

Values Matter

Today's frontend community is in crisis.

If it doesn't look that way, it's only because the instinct to deny the truth is now fully ingrained. But the crisis is incontrovertable in the data. If the web had grown at the same pace as mobile computing, mobile web browsing would be more than a 1/3 larger than it is today. Many things are holding the web back — Apple springs to mind — but pervasive JavaScript-based performance disasters are doing their fair share.

All of the failures I documented in public sector sites are things I've seen dozens of times in industry. When an e-commerce company loses tens or hundreds of millions of dollars because the new CTO fired the old guard out to make way for a bussload of Reactors, it's just (extremely stupid) business. But the consequences of frontend's accursed turn towards all-JavaScript-all-the-time are not so readily contained. Public sector services that should have known better are falling for the same malarkey.

Frontend's culture has more to answer for than lost profits; we consistently fail users and the companies that pay us to serve them because we've let unscrupulous bastards sell snake oil without consequence.

Consider the alternative.

Canadian engineers graduating college are all given an iron ring. It's a symbol of professional responsibility to society. It also recognises that every discipline must earn its social license to operate. Lastly, it serves as a reminder of the consequences of shoddy work and corner-cutting.

I want to be a part of a frontend culture that accepts and promotes our responsibilities to others, rather than wallowing in self-centred "DX" puffery. In the hierarchy of priorities, users must come first.

What we do in the world matters, particularly our vocations, not because of how it affects us, but because our actions improve or degrade life for others. It's hard to imagine that culture while the JavaScript-industrial-complex has seized the commanding heights, but we should try.

And then we should act, one project at a time, to make that culture a reality.

FOOTNOTES

Other posts in the series:

• Reckoning: Part 1 — The Landscape
• Reckoning: Part 2 — Object Lesson
• Reckoning: Part 4 — The Way Out

Last time, we looked at how JavaScript-based web development compounded serving errors on US public sector service sites, slowing down access to critical services. These defects are not without injury. The pain of accessing SNAP assistance services in California, Massachusetts, Maryland, Tennessee, New Jersey, and Indiana likely isn't dominated by the shocking performance of their frontends, but their glacial delivery isn't helping.

Waits are a price that developers ask users to pay and loading spinners only buy so much time.

Complexity Perplexity

These SNAP application sites create hurdles to access because the departments procuring them made or green-lit inappropriate architecture choices. In fairness, those choices may have seemed reasonable given JavaScript-based development's capture of the industry.

Betting on JavaScript-based, client-side rendered architectures leads to complex and expensive tools. Judging by the code delivered over the wire, neither CalSAWS nor Deloitte understand those technologies well enough to operate them proficiently.

From long experience and a review of the metrics (pdf) the CalSAWS Joint Management Authority reports, it is plain as day that the level of organisational and cultural sophistication required to deploy a complex JavaScript frontend is missing in Sacramento:

Dora Militaru | Performance culture through the looking-glass

It's safe to assume a version of the same story played out in Annapolis, Nashville, Boston, Trenton, and Indianapolis.

JavaScript-based UIs are fundamentally more challenging to own and operate because the limiting factors on their success are outside the data center and not under the control of procuring teams. The slow, flaky networks and low-end devices that users bring to the party define the envelope of success for client-side rendered UI.

This means that any system that puts JavaScript in the critical path starts at a disadvantage. Not only does JavaScript cost 3x more in processing power, byte-for-byte, than HTML and CSS, but it also removes the browser's ability to parallelise page loading. SPA-oriented stacks also preload much of the functionality needed for future interactions by default. Preventing over-inclusion of ancilliary code generally requires extra effort; work that is not signposted up-front or well-understood in industry.

This, in turn, places hard limits on scalability that arrive much sooner than with HTML-first progressive enhancement.

Consider today's 75-percentile mobile phone¹, a device like the Galaxy A50 or the Nokia G100:

This isn't much of a an improvement on the Moto G4 I recommended for testing in 2016, and it's light years from the top-end of the market today.

A device like this presents hard limits on network, RAM, and CPU resources. Because JavaScript is more expensive than HTML and CSS to process, and because SPA architectures frontload script, these devices create a cap on the scalability of SPAs.² Any feature that needs to be added once the site's bundle reaches the cap is in tension with every other feature in the site until exotic route-based code-splitting tech is deployed.

JavaScript bundles tend to grow without constraint in the development phase and can easily tip into territory that creates an unacceptable experience for users on slow devices.

Only bad choices remain once a project has reached this state. I have worked with dozens of teams surprised to have found themselves in this ditch. They all feel slightly ashamed because they've been led to believe they're the first; that the technology is working fine for other folks.³ Except it isn't.

I can almost recite the initial remediation steps in my sleep.⁴

The remaining options are bad for compounding reasons:

• Digging into an experience that has been broken with JS inevitably raises a litany of issues that all need unplanned remediation.
• Every new feature on the backlog would add to, rather than subtract from, bundle size. This creates pressure on management as feature work grinds to a halt.
• Removing code from the bundle involves investigating and investing in new tools and deeply learning parts of the tower of JS complexity everyone assumed was "fine".

These problems don't generally arise in HTML-first, progressively-enhanced experiences because costs are lower at every step in the process:

• HTML and CSS are byte-for-byte cheaper for building an equivalent interface.
• "Routing" is handled directly by the browser and the web platform through forms, links, and REST. This removes the need to load code to rebuild it.
• Component definitions can live primarily on the server side, reducing code sent to the client.
• Many approaches to progressive enhancement (rather than "rehydration") use browser-native Web Components, eliminating both initial and incremental costs of larger, legacy-oriented frameworks.
• Because there isn't an assumption that script is critical to the UX, users succeed more often when it isn't there.

This model reduces the initial pressure level and keeps the temperature down by limiting the complexity of each page to what's needed.

Teams remediating underperforming JavaScript-based sites often make big initial gains, but the difficulty ramps up once egregious issues are fixed. The residual challenges highlight the higher structural costs of SPA architectures, and must be wrestled down the hard (read: "expensive") way.

Initial successes also create cognitive dissonance within the team. Engineers and managers armed with experience and evidence will begin to compare themselves to competitors and, eventually, question the architecture they adopted. Teams that embark on this journey can (slowly) become masters of their own destinies.

From the plateau of enlightenment, it's simple to look back and acknowledge that for most sites, the pain, chaos, churn, and cost associated with SPA technology stacks are entirely unnecessary. From that vantage point, a team can finally, firmly set policy.

Carrying Capacity

Organisations that purchase and operate technology all have a base carrying capacity. The cumulative experience, training, and OpEx budgets of teams set the level.

Traditional web development presents a model that many organisations have learned to manage. The incremental costs of additional HTML-based frontends are well understood, from authorisation to database capacity to the intricacies of web servers

SPA-oriented frameworks? Not so much.

In practice, the complex interplay of bundlers, client-side routing mechanisms, GraphQL API endpoints, and the need to rebuild monitoring and logging infrastructure creates wholly unowned areas of endemic complexity. This complexity is experienced as a shock to the operational side of the house.

Before, developers deploying new UIs would cabin the complexity and cost within the data center, enabling mature tools to provide visibility. SPAs and client-side rendered UIs invalidate all of these assumptions. A common result is that the operational complexity of SPA-based technologies creates new, additive points of poorly monitored system failure — failures like the ones we have explored in this series.

This is an industry-wide scandal. Promoters of these technologies have not levelled with their customers. Instead, they continue to flog each new iteration as "the future" despite the widespread failure of these models outside sophisticated organisations.

The pitch for SPA-oriented frameworks like React and Angular has always been contingent — we might deliver better experiences if long chains of interactions can be handled faster on the client.

It's time to acknowledge this isn't what is happening. For most organisations building JavaScript-first, the next dollar spent after launch day is likely go towards recovering basic functionality rather than adding new features.

That's no way to run a railroad.

Should This Be An SPA?

Public and private sector teams I consult with regularly experience ambush-by-JavaScript.

This is the predictable result of buying into frontend framework orthodoxy. That creed hinges on the idea that toweringly complex and expensive stacks of client-side JavaScript are necessary to deliver better user experiences.

But this has always been a contingent claim, at least among folks introspective enough to avoid suggesting JS frameworks for every site. Indeed, most web experiences should explicitly avoid both client-side rendered SPA UI and the component systems built to support them. Nearly all sites would be better off opting for progressive enhancement instead.

Doing otherwise is to invite the complexity fox into the OpEx henhouse. Before you know it, you're fighting with "SSR" and "islands" and "hybrid rendering" and "ISR" to get back to the sorts of results a bit of PHP or Ruby and some CSS deliver for a tenth the price.

So how can teams evaluate the appropriateness of SPAs and SPA-inspired frameworks? By revisiting the arguments offered by the early proponents of these approaches.

The entirety of SPA orthodoxy springs from the logic of the Ajax revolution. As a witness to, and early participant in, that movement, I can conclusively assert that the buzz around GMail and Google Maps and many other "Ajax web apps" was their ability to reduce latency for subsequent interactions once an up-front cost had been paid.

The logic of this trade depends, then, on the length of sessions. As we have discussed before, it's not clear that even GMail clears the bar in all cases.

The utility of the next quanta of script is intensely dependent on session depth.

Very few sites match the criteria for SPA architectures.

Questions managers can use to sort wheat from chaff:

• Does the average session feature more than 20 updates to, or queries against, the same subset of global data?
• Does this UI require features that naturally create long-lived sessions (e.g., chat, videoconferencing, etc.), and are those the site's primary purpose?
• Is there a reason the experience can't be progressively enhanced (e.g., audio mixing, document editing, photo manipulation, video editing, mapping, hardware interaction, or gaming)?

Answering these questions requires understanding critical user journeys. Flows that are most important to a site or project should be written down, and then re-examined through the lens of the marginal networks and devices of the user base.

The rare use-cases that are natural fits for today's JS-first dogma include:

• Document editors of all sorts
• Chat and videoconferencing apps
• Maps, geospatial, and BI visualisations

Very few sites should lead with JS-based, framework-centric development.

Teams can be led astray when sites include mutliple apps under a single umberella. The canonical example is WordPress; a blog reading experience for millions and a blog editing UI for dozens. Treating these as independent experiences with their own constraints and tech stacks is more helpful than pretending that they're actually a "single app". This is also the insight behind the "islands architecture", and transfers well to other contexts, assuming the base costs of an experience remain low.

The Pits

DevTools product managers use the phrase "pit of success" to describe how they hope teams experience their tools. The alternative is the (more common) "pit of ignorance".

The primary benefit of progressive enhancement over SPAs and SPA-begotten frameworks is that they leave teams with simpler problems, closer to the metal. Those challenges require attention and focus on the lived experience, which can be remediated cheaply once identified.

The alternative is considerably worse. In a previous post I claimed that:

SPAs are "YOLO" for web development.

This is because an over-reliance on JavaScript moves responsibility for everything into the main thread in the most expensive way.

Predictably, teams whose next PR adds to JS weight rather than HTML and CSS payloads will find themselves in the drink faster, and with tougher path out.

What's gobsmacking is that so many folks have seen these bets go sideways, yet continue to participate in the pantomime of JavaScript framework conformism. These tools aren't delivering except in the breach, but nobody will say so.

And if we were only lighting the bonuses of overpaid bosses on fire through under-delivery, that might be fine. But the JavaScript-industrial-complex is now hurting families in my community trying to access the help they're entitled to.

It's not OK.

Aftermath

Frontend is mired in a practical and ethical tar pit.

Not only are teams paying unexpectedly large premiums to keep the lights on, a decade of increasing JavaScript complexity hasn't even delivered the better user experiences we were promised.

We are not getting better UX for the escalating capital and operational costs. Instead, the results are getting worse for folks on the margins. JavaScript-driven frontend complexity hasn't just driven out the CSS and semantic-markup experts that used to deliver usable experiences for everyone, it is now a magnifier of inequality.

As previously noted, engineering is designing under constraint to develop products that serve users and society. The opposite of engineering is bullshitting, substituting fairy tales for inquiry and evidence.

For the frontend to earn and keep its stripes as an engineering discipline, frontenders need to internalise the envelope of what's possible on most devices.

Then we must take responsibility.

Next: The Way Out.

FOOTNOTES