Abstract
Procedural fairness is an accepted requirement for health decision-making. Fair procedures promote the acceptability and quality of health decisions while simultaneously advancing broader goals of participatory democracy. We conducted a case study of the Sugary Beverage Tax in South Africa known as the Health Promotion Levy (HPL), which was legislated in 2018. The case study examines the process around the adoption of the HPL from the perspective of procedural fairness with the view of identifying local gaps and lessons transferable to other local decision-making processes and other jurisdictions. We conducted a desk review of publically available data relating to the passage and implementation of the HPL, including a review of the policy documents, public submissions during the public participation process, response documents from policymakers, review of national legislative committee minutes, legal instruments and academic literature capturing public awareness, stakeholder views and media content. The data collection is novel in terms of the large scope of data considered, as well as the variety of sources. An analytical framework consisting of key criteria for procedural fairness, informed by a scoping review of the literature, guided the analysis of the decision-making process in South Africa. The process of the adoption and passage of the HPL met the majority of the procedural fairness criteria. However, a shortcoming, which impacted several criteria, was the failure to actively source the participation of community representatives and the larger public. Non-governmental organizations did not adequately fulfil this representative role. Industry interests were also disproportionately considered. The case study highlights the overall importance of viewing general members of the public as interested parties in health policies and the dangers of over-involving policy opponents under a mistaken understanding that this constitutes meaningful public engagement in decision-making procedures.
Keywords: Procedural fairness, health decisions, South Africa, SSB tax, sugar tax
Key messages.
Decision-making through established formal processes, such as processes guided by constitutional law, benefits from clarity, consistent practice and judicial insight.
Representation by non-governmental organizations is desirable but cannot be deemed a substitute for community representation without further investigation into the nature and composition of the organization.
Decision-makers would benefit from training on features of a fair process, particularly the objectives of public participation, and on practical guidance on how to navigate submissions by for-profit bodies.
Introduction
In 2016, the Minister of Finance proposed a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages to tackle the rising incidence of overweight and obesity in South Africa (Minister of Finance, 2016). A formal national legislative process was initiated to pass the tax, which was referred to as the Health Promotion Levy (HPL). This subsequently triggered constitutional rules relating to law-making and public participation procedures and elicited the involvement of the South African Parliament and two national departments (Finance and Health) (Constitution, 1996). The process to pass the tax took over 2 years and led to substantial changes in the original tax structure and rate. The tax was ultimately passed in 2018. It was the first tax of its type in the African region and also significant given strong local industry interests as South Africa is both a sugar-cane growing nation and the regional hub for several large sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) producers (Kruger et al., 2021).
The objective of the case study is 2-fold. First, the study describes the process leading up to the adoption of the tax (the decision), which contains both a description of the formal procedure and a description of how stakeholders engaged with this procedure to attempt to influence the substantive outcome of the process (i.e. change the structure of the tax). This description will consider the entities involved in managing the process (the policymaker), the stakeholders involved in the procedure (interested parties), the rules governing the procedure with a special focus on the rules governing the participation of stakeholders and the oversight over the procedure (formally and informally). Secondly, the study examines the process around the adoption of the HPL from the perspective of procedural fairness with the view of identifying local gaps and lessons transferable to other local decision-making processes (where applicable) and other jurisdictions.
Procedural fairness has been shown to be a key component in fostering acceptability, and subsequent compliance with fiscal policies (Prichard et al., 2019), and in ensuring substantive fairness (Dolan et al., 2007). Procedural fairness inherently explores how stakeholder positions, and more importantly disagreements, are managed and considered by decision-makers, and therefore studies on procedural fairness in policies can help guide future positive policy changes (Beauvais, 2018; World Bank, 2023). Procedural fairness is also a goal unto itself, forming part of democratic values as understood globally, as well as in the South African Constitutional context (Brynard, 2011). The HPL has been discussed through different lenses (Table 1); however, an analysis of the procedural fairness of its passing is novel. Procedural fairness as a component of equity in health policy has received academic attention in South Africa, but without clarity as to the content of such procedural fairness (McIntyre and Gilson, 2002). This study therefore intends to contribute to the bridging of this gap and will have particular value to decision-makers and stakeholders in health decision processes to guide effective processes and to allow for evaluation and meaningful challenge where processes fall short.
Table 1.
Sources considered
| Topic | Source | Description of data collected |
|---|---|---|
| Policy content of the HPL | National Treasury (2016) | Initial policy content discussion document |
| National Treasury (2017a) | Response document to initial public submissions | |
| National Treasury (2017b) | Final response document to public submissions and Parliamentary Committee meeting minutes | |
| Public submissions | Finance Standing Committee (FSC) (2017a) | 31 May 2017 Public Hearing (submissions × 10) |
| Finance Standing Committee (FSC) (2017b) | 6 June 2017 Public Hearing (submissions × 10) | |
| National Council of Provinces Finance Committee (NCOP) (2017a) | 28 November 2017 Public Hearing (submissions × 4) | |
| Abdool Karim et al. (2020) | Review of themes of 23 industry submissions | |
| Fooks et al. (2019) | Detailed review of evidence in three industry submissions | |
| Parliamentary Committee meeting minutes | Finance Standing Committee (FSC) (2017d) | 23 May 2017, Briefing on Bill |
| Finance Standing Committee (FSC) (2017c) | 14 June 2017, National Treasury Response | |
| Finance Standing Committee (FSC) (2017e) | 5 September 2017, FSC discussion | |
| NCOP (2017b) | 29 November 2017, discussion | |
| Perceptions on HPL | Essman et al. (2021) | Qualitative analysis of 193 newspaper entries relating to the HPL |
| Baijnath and Pillay (2020) | Self-reported awareness and perceptions on the HPL from 394 adult participants in KwaZulu-Natal collected through a questionnaire administered in public shopping centres | |
| Bosire et al. (2020) | Focus group discussions with 57 participants in Gauteng in relation to perceptions and attitudes on the HPL | |
| Description of the legislative process | Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) | Details of the national legislative process |
| Case law from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa | Ten cases were reviewed to provide additional guidance on how public participation processes are to be conducted | |
| Comment on the process drivers | Kruger et al. (2021) | Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis of the HPL process, including the review of South African media referencing the HPL between 2016 and 2019 |
| Mialon et al. (2020) | Review of industry activity around the HPL, identification of 107 instances of corporate political activity | |
| Ndinda et al. (2018) | Review of political and ideological drivers of the governing party’s NCD policy using a document review and conducting 44 key informant interviews | |
| Efficacy of taxation | Hofman et al. (2021) | Review of four independent studies on the impact of the HPL and a report by the National Treasury |
For the purpose of this study, procedural fairness denotes a concern with how people should be informed, the extent to which they should be able to participate in decision-making and how their interests should be considered. Considering procedural fairness from these various elements can assist policymakers and policy commentators to identify context-specific shortcomings and strengths for decision-making.
Methods
Study design and data collection
The study is based on a single-case study design (Yin, 2012) approach with a detailed desk-based review of available official documents and published literature relating to various components of the passage of the HPL. We identified the following primary data based on the content of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group summary of the passage of the HPL: policy proposals, public submissions, response documents to public submissions and Parliamentary Committee meeting minutes. To provide more insights into the structure of the legislative process and public participation, we also reviewed the following legal instruments obtained from JutaStat South Africa (a reputable legal resources platform used by South African attorneys): the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and case law from the Constitutional Court identified by searching references to ‘public involvement’ and ‘public participation’, reviewing the relevant editor’s summary and then doing a full-text review.
We then reviewed academic literature commenting on the adoption of the HPL (Table 1). These studies used various input data: policy content of the HPL, public submissions, Parliamentary Committee meeting minutes, perceptions on the HPL, descriptions of the legislative process, comments and review of the process drivers.
Data analysis
This case study applied a procedural fairness framework outlined in the NIPH-World Bank-BCEPS report on “Open and Inclusive: Fair Processes for Financing Universal Health Coverage” (World Bank, 2023). This framework is composed of three domains: information, voice and oversight, capturing seven essential criteria for procedural fairness. The information domain encompasses reason-giving, transparency and accuracy of information. Reason-giving involves decision-makers justifying their decisions to those affected by them and addressing disagreements through the exchange and respectful consideration of reasons, thereby enabling a more comprehensive understanding and evaluation of the choices being made. Transparency means sharing information abut how decisions are made, why they’re made, the reasoning behind them, and what the final decisions are. Accuracy of information entails decisions being informed by a wide range of information sources, encompassing diverse evidence, perspectives and views. The second domain—voice—consists of public participation and inclusiveness. Public participation means providing the public with access to information, giving them the opportunity to express their opinions, and actively involving them in the decision-making process. Inclusiveness involves considering a broad range of views and concerns, with a particular emphasis on involving underrepresented groups and ensuring representation of diverse perspectives, even when direct participation isn’t feasible. The third domain of oversight encompasses revisability and enforcement. Revisability means acknowledging that new evidence and evolving understandings of the issue can gain importance over time; thus requiring mechanisms for challenging decisions and enabling revisions to the original decision. Finally, enforcement has two dimensions: one relates to mechanisms that safeguard procedural fairness criteria in the decision-making process, while the other pertains to ensuring the implementation of outcomes through laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms. The domains organize key criteria of procedural fairness that were identified by a scoping review covering theoretical and empirical literature from political theory and public administration (including deliberative democracy), public finance, environmental management, psychology, and health financing (Dale et al., 2023) and international expert consultations (World Bank, 2023). Data were collated using these criteria and analysed against the descriptions of the criteria. Barriers and facilitators to achieving each criterion were identified. The case study also identified whether the type of health financing decision under review led to certain criteria becoming more relevant or contentious than others. General and context-specific observations for future health policy decision-making are also discussed.
Results
Narrative description of the adoption of the HPL
The introduction of the HPL as an excise tax means its introduction is governed by section 77 of the South African Constitution, which mandates how ‘money bills’ are to be dealt with by the national legislature, also known as the Parliament (Constitution, 1996). South Africa’s bicameral Parliament consists of the National Assembly (NA) (representation is national) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (representation by province). Before the introduction of a Bill in the Parliament, the South African National Treasury publishes a discussion document or draft bill and invites public comments. It is customary to host public workshops with stakeholders to engage with the comments and to (re)draft the Bill. These workshops are often used to brief stakeholders as to the main policy points and to accommodate a related dialogue. These documents are called Green and White (more refined) Papers.
Money Bills are introduced by the Minister of Finance in the NA. Such Bills are then referred to the Portfolio Committee on finance in the NA. The Committee considers the Bill and ensures, among others, a constitutionally mandated process to ‘facilitate public involvement’. The NA then votes on the relevant Bill, and if successful, the Bill is referred to the NCOP. The NCOP repeats the processes, including the public participation procedures. After the NCOP assents, the President signs the Bill, in this case, to enact the tax.
During this legislative process, the Constitution provides for the facilitation of public involvement. The Constitutional Court has developed a set of guidelines that are to be employed on a case-by-case basis for all legislative decisions. These principles cut across the various domains and criteria for procedural fairness. These principles include rules on which persons or bodies are interested parties and the differing degrees of effort necessary to facilitate their involvement (Doctors for Life, 2006; Matatiele, 2006; LAMOSA, 2016) and the mechanisms to ensure access and transparency in those processes. Ultimately, any procedure should allow for meaningful, widespread, informed and transparent public engagement (Doctors for Life, 2006). The relevant legislative body (Parliament legislating nationally) internally oversees the application of these principles. However, any interested party can challenge the legislative process based on non-adherence to these principles before the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of national and provincial legislation.
The discussion and adoption phases of the Bill occurred while the African National Congress (ANC) party held key political positions in the Parliament. The first announcement of the HPL was made by then Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan, a senior member of the ANC with a long-standing record of holding political appointments. The public hearings prior to the introduction of the Bill were managed by the Finance Standing Committee chairpersons, Yunus Carrim and Lindelwa Dunjwa—also senior members of the ANC. The Minister of Finance introducing the Bill to the NA was Malusi Gigaba (ANC). During the debates in the two houses of Parliament, the majority of members affiliated with the ANC supported the tax, while other parties indicated a more neutral stance (Finance Standing Committee (FSC), 2017a,b,e; National Council of Provinces Finance Committee (NCOP), 2017a; NCOP, 2017b; Kruger et al., 2021). Support for the HPL is consistent with the ANC’s previous policy statements and track record of shifting focus to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) prevention. The previous policy focus on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, alongside scientific advances in the treatment and prevention of transmission of HIV/AIDS, led to an increase in the population’s life expectancy accompanied by an increase in the prevalence of NCDs (Ndinda et al., 2018; Kruger et al., 2021).
The origin of the HPL proposal is found in the National Strategy for Prevention and Control of Obesity 2015–2020 (Strategy). The Strategy was created by a task team composed of state officials from the Departments of Health, Sports and Recreation, Transport, Public Service, and Administration, technical experts from various universities and research institutes and advisors from the World Health Organization and led by the Director of the National Department of Health. Evidence for the Strategy was provided by a wide range of South African academics (National Department of Health (NDoH), 2013). The National Treasury also indicated that the HPL proposal is responsive to other SSB taxes being discussed or introduced in other countries representative of various income bands (National Treasury, 2016). The National Treasury indicated that any disagreement on the scientific basis for the tax required ‘engage[ment] with academic journals’ (Finance Standing Committee (FSC), 2017a). The original discussion document relied on South African and foreign evidence, as well as recommendations by the WHO and OECD to formulate its initial tax proposal (National Treasury, 2016). The National Treasury also conducted its own modelling of the possible outcomes of the tax (National Treasury, 2017b).
After adoption of the HPL, the monitoring and evaluation of the procedure to adopt and implement the HPL is undertaken by different bodies. Oversight over the procedure to pass the tax, including managing the public participation process, is vested in the Parliament and, subsequently, in the Constitutional Court if the Parliament’s oversight and effective management of the legislative process is challenged. Procedural shortcomings can lead to a declaration of invalidity of the legislation (the Act in which the HPL is introduced) by the Constitutional Court.
The implementation of the HPL is overseen by the South African Revenue Services which employs a Duty-at-Source model and monitors effective tax administration through a process of licencing and accounting. Producers of goods covered under the HPL have to pay the relevant excise liability within 30 days of the end of the monthly accounting period. The decision to adjust an excise tax lies with the Minister of Finance and is announced when the Minister tables the budget in the Parliament.
Assessment of the HPL process against the criteria on procedural fairness
The results are reported and analysed using the criteria for procedural fairness. Table 2 contains a summary of the findings.
Table 2.
Summary of results
| Domain | Criteria | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Information | Reason-giving | Discussion documents published by the National Treasury provided justification backed by scientific evidence of the design of the HPL. Once the documents received questions and comments from stakeholders, the National Treasury addressed these in a systematic fashion with point-by-point justification for fully or partially accepting or rejecting entirely a given proposal. |
| Accuracy of information | Industry-sponsored research was permitted; however, the Parliament exhibited an understanding of consistent evidence produced by independent parties. | |
| Transparency | Information on policy was published on various forums, reasons were publically provided and stakeholder positions were disclosed. | |
| Voice | Inclusiveness | While various stages of the process invited public comment, lay persons were not well represented. |
| Participation or public involvement | Established, constitutionally protected process; equality of persons requires work. Lay persons were not well informed; industry was given a disproportionate platform. | |
| Oversight | Revisability | Established and functional processes to challenge decisions exist and are constitutionally and statutorily protected. |
| Enforcement | Enforcement of the process is fixed in the Constitution. Some evidence of intended interference with the process by the interest groups. Enforcement of the decision is subject to standard difficulties in tax administration. |
Reason-giving
As stated, before a Bill was drafted to introduce the tax, the National Treasury circulated a discussion document highlighting the components of the proposed tax and detailing the evidence used to determine such elements. During the public hearing in the Portfolio Committee for Finance, the National Treasury provided feedback on the consultations to the Parliament and other stakeholders on the first round of consultations (prior to presenting the draft Bill) and showed changes to the structure of the tax in response to those inputs. The National Treasury also separately presented a detailed response to all public comments received on 21 June 2017 in which it presented a point-by-point breakdown of public comments, its response thereto (‘noted’, ‘partially accepted’, ‘accepted’ and ‘not accepted’) and the reasons for the response. These responses were made to the Portfolio Committee during an open sitting and made available online. It again made a presentation to the relevant Portfolio Committee in the NCOP detailing its response to public comments (Finance Standing Committee (FSC), 2017d). Finally, it presented another response document after all public participation processes were completed and the relevant parliamentary committees deliberated on 17 December 2017 (National Treasury, 2017b). The timelines of the public participation and refinement process both before (Figure 1) and after (Figure 2) the commencement of the formal legislative process is detailed below.
Figure 1.

Public participation and Bill refinement prior to the Parliamentary introduction
Figure 2.

Formal legislative process and corresponding public participation
Accuracy of information
A key discussion was the accuracy and completeness of information provided. Proponents of the tax maintained that there was sufficient and local evidence to adopt the HPL, while opponents claimed that more evidence was required, or they presented purported evidence showing inefficiency of the tax. Subsequent studies support the effectiveness of the tax in line with proponents’ submissions (Hofman et al., 2021). During the Parliamentary debates, the Portfolio Committee members took stock of the consistency of evidence presented by tax proponents (Kruger et al., 2021). Where information on including certain products in the scope of the tax was deemed inconsistent, such products were excluded from the policy proposal (Kruger et al., 2021). Analysis of industry submissions revealed that industry commissioned its own research to support such claims (Abdool Karim et al., 2020). Fooks et al. (2019) analysed a subset of submissions from industry or industry associations (opponents of the tax) and identified several key misuses or misrepresentations of evidence.
Despite the National Treasury defending its initial evidentiary basis for the introduction of the tax to reach a compromise between tax proponents and opponents on concerns raised over employment and economic growth (unproven at that stage or later), the tax rate was reduced, and a threshold amount was introduced. The threshold was also motivated by the Treasury as a mechanism to improve administrative ease (Kruger et al., 2021).
Transparency
The Constitution mandates that any legislative process in the Parliament must be conducted in an open manner and that media access is to be facilitated unless limiting access to the public or the media is reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society (Constitution, 1996). The policy rationale and responses to submissions were publically available on an open-access website. There was some doubt as to whether the stated policy goals (health promotion and revenue-raising) were the true policy goals—with the public and other stakeholders questioning whether the tax is solely a form of revenue-raising (Bosire et al., 2020; Kruger et al., 2021). Members of Parliament reported receiving death threats intended to dissuade support for the HPL; however, these threats were disclosed and no evidence suggests that any persons involved in the decision-making process were acting under duress or impartially.
Inclusiveness
There is evidence that the range of perspectives included in the deliberations around the HPL was limited. Figure 3 shows a breakdown of organizations or individuals disclosed as making submissions during the public participation process (Finance Standing Committee (FSC), 2017a,b,c,d; National Treasury, 2017b) (A detailed breakdown of actors are available in the supplemental data). Individual views, as reported, were dominantly medical professionals making submissions in their personal capacity. Community-based or geographic-specific groups, such as representation of persons from informal settlements, community centres in areas where sugar cane is grown or milled or representation from customary law authorities, were not reported. Not-for-profit groups mainly consisted of organizations with predetermined health mandates, which operate at a national level, with offices in major urban centres.
Figure 3.

Public submissions as disclosed by Treasury/PMG (See supplemental A)
Inputs were, however, received from the National Treasury, the National Department of Health, industry, civil society, academia and other technical specialists at various key stages of the decision-making process: before drafting the Bill, after drafting the Bill before introduction to the Parliament and during Parliamentary hearings. The views of these stakeholders were also represented in the media in nearly equal measure (Essman et al., 2021).
Participation or public involvement
The National Treasury indicated 144 persons/institutions provided written submissions on the discussion document (National Treasury, 2016) (see Figure 3 for a breakdown of disclosed persons or institutions). During the public participation process in the Portfolio Committees in the two houses of Parliament, 48 written public submissions were received, of which roughly half came from impacted industries or representative industry bodies (Abdool Karim et al., 2020). Oral submissions were permitted before the Portfolio Committees. Industry bodies did claim that insufficient public participation or stakeholder consultation occurred (Abdool Karim et al., 2020). The remaining submissions were dominated by civil society and academic institutions.
Public participation occurred at various stages: before publishing a discussion document (in-person meetings and discussions), during the process of preparing the Bill (in-person meetings and written submissions) and in both houses of Parliament (written submissions and oral presentations). After the introduction of the tax, more limited discussions on its existence continued and the possibility of increasing the rate occurred yearly during the medium-term budget policy discussion or in consultation prior to the publication of the national annual budget.
A review of focus group discussions in Gauteng (the most populous province) indicated that members of the general public were not aware that the HPL was announced or passed through the legislative process (Bosire et al., 2020). A second study conducted 1 year later (in a different geographic area) showed that just over half of the participants in the study were aware of the HPL (Baijnath and Pillay, 2020). This is not surprising as the list of stakeholder consultations provided by the Treasury indicates that prior to the introduction of the Bill or during the legislative process, industry associations and certain non-governmental groups were primarily targeted for consultation. It is difficult to measure the degree of support for the HPL among those persons or organizations with awareness of the policy. However, a media analysis of the HPL indicates that public sentiment on the HPL (where reported) was overwhelmingly positive at the start of the policy-making process, but attracted more negative sentiment as industry opposition in the process became apparent (Kruger et al., 2021). The change in sentiment reflects the introduction of anti-tax arguments which was also considered by the Treasury. A close relationship with public discourse and decision-making was therefore present.
The Treasury does not report meeting with any community groups or representatives but did report some open discussions on media outlets with a higher income, predominantly urban audience (Classic FM, Business Day or Health-e) (National Treasury, 2017b). In contrast, the Treasury consulted with Coca-Cola on three occasions and with industry associations to which Coca-Cola belonged on two additional occasions (National Treasury, 2017b).
The primary mechanism for identifying parties for consultation was based on self-selection during the early stages of the policy proposal. In other words, parties who elected to comment on the initial proposal by the Treasury were to be actively invited for further consultations. This process naturally favours resourced parties who monitor government publications for policy proposals. Policy proposals are often not available on popular media, but on departmental websites or in the Government Gazette, which is a technical publication that requires internet access. Another possible factor is that organs of state are not obliged to conduct communications in more than one language, despite South Africa recognizing 11 official languages and mandating the use of at least three for certain governmental activities (Rautenbach, 2018). The initial policy proposal by the Treasury was published in English and used technical language.
Revisability
Given that the HPL was introduced during a formal legislative process, strict revision and appeal procedures are not allowed. However, any law can be challenged based on the law’s unconstitutionality in relation to its content or its procedural rigour. Such challenges can be undertaken in either the High Court of South Africa or the Constitutional Court, depending on the nature of the challenge. The procedures for such challenges are widely known and used. It is also noteworthy that the nature of the tax—an excise tax—means it is subject to yearly revision as part of the formulation of the national budget. This entails a yearly public participation process whereby relevant parties can submit comments to the Minister of Finance on any aspect of the budget, including the scope and rate of any excise tax. South Africa previously incorporated an SSB tax, and it was removed due to industry opposition (National Treasury, 2016).
Enforcement of the process and the decision
The nature of the HPL as an excise tax means its enforcement is largely impacted by the efficiencies (or not) of the general administration of excise taxes. Excise tax administration is enforced by the South African Revenue Service, and failure to accurately pay excise taxes attracts criminal or administrative penalties of high value. A 2018 Commission of Inquiry revealed problems with revenue collection in relation to excise duties (albeit specifically with alcohol and tobacco duty collection) (Nugent Commission Report, 2018). There is no indication that the enforcement of the HPL was impacted by extraordinary factors.
Discussion
South Africa has a well-established framework for ensuring procedural fairness in law-making as outlined in the 1996 Constitution, a document created in response to the history of Apartheid where law-making was inherently exclusionary and non-transparent (Phooko, 2017). The system strengths were observable in a majority of the proposed criteria to assess procedural fairness and can arguably be attributable to the clear legislative process outlined in the Constitution and the in-depth guidance provided by the Judiciary. The case study of the HPL highlights the value of using formal legislative (and arguably regulatory) processes in countries with strong emerging democracies.
However, inclusiveness in public participation and ensuring equality over persons, especially in a society characterized by high rates of inequality and suppression of equal language development—South Africa has 11 official languages—are difficult to achieve (Collins, 2017). The targeting of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the public participation process of a health policy decision procedure has previously been identified as a good practice within the South African context (McIntyre and Gilson, 2002). It is therefore encouraging to see, among others, that NGOs were actively involved in the HPL public participation process as a representative body for a larger group of people. However, consideration should be given to the fact that NGO participation is not equivalent to true, decentralized community involvement and community representation should also be sought. A concern when relying on representative bodies in public participation processes is that vulnerable members of society might not be represented or that a self-selected subset of interested parties might be more readily represented (Rowe and Kewer, 2000). This concern is even more so when elite interests are at play (Rowe and Kewer, 2000).
The lack of broader public awareness of the HPL, even after passage, is an indicator that NGO representation was insufficient. Given the level of big industry vested interests in the issue of the HPL, a focus on true public engagement becomes even more important to negate distortion of the process. The lack of general public awareness has implications on several fairness criteria: it impacts the equality and consistency of persons, reduces the inclusiveness of the procedures and reduces the impact and purpose of the public participation procedure. It also has implications for other criteria. Reason-giving and transparency are only effective if all interested stakeholders are aware and, subsequently, can access the resources explaining the procedures and the reasons for certain components of the decision. Public awareness of policy interventions has been linked to increased support and engagement for certain policy interventions, as well as changes in public behaviour (Robinson and Hort, 2012; Khatibi et al., 2021). It also provides legitimacy and support to coercive interventions (MacCoun, 2005), which would include a mandatory excise tax.
One possible reason for this lack of community-level engagement is that policymakers used a passive approach when facilitating the involvement of communities and individuals. In other words, it allowed that participation but did not seek it out. Industry, health experts, and NGOs were actively involved through invitations to present ideas to the National Treasury. It is therefore not surprising that stakeholders who were actively involved in the policy creation phase also dominated the discussion during the public participation phase of the formal legislative process. One possible mechanism to ensure a more representative sample of participants would be to use local media, preferably in multiple languages, so communities can opt into the public participation procedure, as well as actively contacting community representatives to engage in discussions.
Furthermore, the case study also revealed a disproportionate focus by the policymaker to include industry in the participation process. Abelson warns of this phenomenon of industry interests being entertained around the policy table as ‘public interest’ (Abelson et al., 2007). Stakeholders have a self-interest, usually in terms of power or resources (stake), in a decision, while the public has a broader, diffused set of interests (Abelson et al., 2007). The bodies facilitating public involvement collapse these two concepts, allowing industry actors with a vested profit interest to disproportionately benefit from a process that was designed to primarily protect the interest of the larger South African public. One possible explanation is a mistaken understanding that a meaningful public participation process involves providing equal weight to all possible arguments or attempting to accommodate dissenting views for no greater purpose other than achieving a compromise. This would also explain the concession to industry interests despite the lack of supporting evidence for their position. To ensure that public participation achieves its stated democratic purpose, policymakers should be trained on navigating stakeholder vs public interest narratives and provided tools to better evaluate evidence during public submissions. One mechanism to mitigate the imbalance between industry vs broader public interest is to refrain from actively sourcing industry participation in law-making processes. A second mechanism is to source independent technical expertise to evaluate industry arguments, especially where scientific evidence is advanced.
The HPL in South Africa has previously, like similar taxes in other settings (Carriedo et al., 2021), been studied from a political economy perspective that focuses on the determinants of successful policy adoption and implementation (Kruger et al., 2021). Chiefly, these studies have addressed how framing of the tax influences public perception and appeal, how proponents of the tax strategically build coalitions and networks within the legislature and other sites of power and how arguments against the tax can be countered and suppressed (Carriedo et al., 2021). A key goal of these studies is to generate knowledge about how a desirable policy objective—in this instance the SSB tax—can be strategically pursued. In comparison, the procedural fairness perspective pays greater attention to the legitimate nature of differing values and sentiments shaping views about the SSB tax and how these can be resolved in a way that respects the different positions of stakeholders, including those who disagree with what is a desirable objective from a public health perspective. Procedural fairness emphasizes the need for transparency, reason-giving, accuracy and breadth of information, inclusiveness and public participation, based on the principle of equality (Beauvais, 2018; World Bank, 2023). Both, however, recognize the power dynamics and the difference in the level of influence among different stakeholders (Mansbridge et al., 2011; Bachtiger et al., 2018; Sparkes et al., 2019), revealing how the decision-making process can be distorted or dominated by powerful stakeholders with self-serving interests in the outcome (Carriedo et al., 2021).
This study demonstrates that the proposed criteria for procedural fairness (World Bank, 2023) has the potential to reflect both on the efficacy of the infrastructure to make health financing decisions, including the influence of the prescriptions of the Constitution in law-making on the different criteria, and on the individual variable decisions. Not all criteria are equally friendly to apply. For example, the accuracy of information is difficult to establish due to the technical nature of health financing decisions, the broad range of government and stakeholder statements that need to be considered and the documented phenomenon of misuse of evidence by industry stakeholders (Fooks et al., 2019). Similarly, the role of undue influence, bias and duress on criteria such as transparency is difficult to ascertain due to associated and inherent secrecy. However, the criteria under the voice domain provide useful insight to policymakers on how to structure engagement with health financing decisions and—as in the current case study where engagement was comprehensively documented—allow for reflection on current shortcomings in public engagement processes.
Strengths and limitations
This case study considers the adoption and implementation of the HPL as an excise tax overall and does not consider and discuss the decisions and procedures administered by the South African Revenue Services to levy individual taxes. We did not conduct key informant interviews and relied exclusively on a desk review. The availability of extensive and comprehensive public records relating to the HPL, as well as a significant body of local academic literature available on the process of adopting the HPL, allowed the authors to achieve data saturation. As a strength, this case study is novel in its consideration of a wide range of data sources. Some data, e.g. the citation of case law (court cases that become binding law), have not been previously captured. The use of a desk review also minimized recall bias and circumvented issues of access to stakeholders that arose due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Conclusion
This study detailed and subsequently analysed the process to adopt the South African HPL using the criteria developed to measure procedural fairness in health financing decisions. The study found that the use of legislation (or other legal instruments) within jurisdictions with established law-making and review mechanisms is effective in so far as promoting consistency across decisions, transparency of the decision-making process and offering institutional oversight, as well as processes for external challenges such as court challenges. However, given certain shortcomings in established public participation processes, as well as a policymaker understanding of the purpose of said processes, for-profit actors had disproportionate influence and access to the process. Community and layperson representation was lacking. Policymakers, researchers and advocates need to unlearn problematic understandings of public participation and be trained to understand the democratic underpinnings of these processes.
Supplementary Material
Contributor Information
Petronell Kruger, The SAMRC/Wits Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science (PRICELESS SA), Wits School of Public Health, University of Witwatersrand, Office 233, 2nd floor, Wits Education Campus, 27 St Andrews Road, Parktown, Johannesburg 2197, South Africa.
Susan Goldstein, The SAMRC/Wits Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science (PRICELESS SA), Wits School of Public Health, University of Witwatersrand, Office 233, 2nd floor, Wits Education Campus, 27 St Andrews Road, Parktown, Johannesburg 2197, South Africa.
Karen Hofman, The SAMRC/Wits Centre for Health Economics and Decision Science (PRICELESS SA), Wits School of Public Health, University of Witwatersrand, Office 233, 2nd floor, Wits Education Campus, 27 St Andrews Road, Parktown, Johannesburg 2197, South Africa.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at Health Policy and Planning online.
Data availability
The data underlying this article are available in the article and in its online supplementary material.
Funding
This work was supported with funds from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) provided to the University of Bergen and the Norwegian Institute of Public Health under the programme ‘Decision support for universal health coverage’ (grant number RAF-18/0009). Additional support was provided from the South African Medical Research Council (grant number 23108).
Author contributions
All authors contributed to the conception of the work. P.K. collected the data. P.K. led data analysis and interpretation with inputs from S.G. and K.H. P.K. drafted the article. All authors provided critical revisions of the article and approved the final version of the article.
Reflexivity statement
The authors include three females with multiple levels of seniority within the same institution. The institution is located in South Africa, a middle-income setting. One author is a trained legal practitioner with experience in procedural and administrative law. The other two authors are medical doctors by training, one with expertise in health promotion and the other with experience in evaluation of public health interventions. The authors have previously expressed support for the policy under discussion in this study.
Ethical approval
Ethical approval for this research was waived by the institutional review board of the author institute/s.
Conflict of interest
None declared.
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Associated Data
This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.
Supplementary Materials
Data Availability Statement
The data underlying this article are available in the article and in its online supplementary material.
