That thermodynamics has so very many applications is as fascinating as what it so often illuminates. Its tools and methods can be brought to bear on everything from celestial bodies and industrial machines to cellular biology and human endurance. The simple reason is that energy is the fundamental currency of the physical world: no physical process can occur without transferring or transforming it. Thus the laws of thermodynamics provide a near-universal framework to understand the limits and possibilities of any system in motion.
In a study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences on July 6, researchers from Germany and the UK used the principles of thermodynamics to say which route the Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca might have taken through the Alps. Hannibal’s crossing, with an army of 46,000 men, 7,000 horses, and 37 North African elephants, during the Second Punic War is one of the great events of military history. However, the precise route he took has been unclear. From the paper:
Scholars have long debated which route Hannibal followed, weighing each possibility based on historical, logistical, and topographical considerations. In his Histories, Polybius records his own attempt to retrace Hannibal’s route based on a contemporary account by Silenus, now lost. Polybius reports how Hannibal crossed the Rhône river and established a supply line near present-day Orange. From there, Hannibal marched North for about 80 km to Livron-sur-Drôme, from where he headed East into the Alps. After that, Polybius’s record is unclear, leaving it to interpretations to suggest that Hannibal chose between two possible routes across the Alps: One route passes through Grenoble and Aiton, peaks at the Col du Clapier, and reaches the Po Valley via Susa. An alternative route passes through the Col de Grimone and Gap, peaks at the Col de la Traversette, and descends into the Po Valley at Pian del Re.
In their study, the researchers found that the Col de la Traversette route would have been more energy-efficient: taking this route, they estimated the army would have expended 5.42 trillion joules of energy — about as much chemical energy released by blowing up 1,000 tonnes of TNT. On the other hand, the researchers estimated the Col du Clapier would have consumed 6.28 trillion joules. They also evaluated two other routes: Col de Montgenèvre, 6.02 trillion joules; and Col du Mont Cenis, 6.45 trillion joules.

The study also found that the elephants were energy-wise better suited for climbing than humans thanks to their large reserves of fat and what the researchers called “four-wheel-drive” movement. (According to a 2010 study, the labour of an elephant’s limbs aren’t divided the way they are in most other four-legged animals. Rather than the forelimbs acting as brakes and the hindlimbs as motors, all four limbs are capable of braking and propulsion, like a 4WD car. Thus elephants distribute the work of moving their weight evenly. The cost they pay is some energy-efficiency: every now and then their limbs also burn energy to produce opposing forces that cancel out.) On the Col du Clapier route, the elephants were estimated to have lost only 4% of their fat whereas the men may have lost up to 19%.
At the end of the march, which spanned roughly a thousand kilometres from Spain, Hannibal and his army reached Rome and waged war for 14 years. But all but one of the elephants died in the first winter itself: the army couldn’t find food for them in the enemy territory.
Previous attempts to determine Hannibal’s route used historical accounts, archaeology, philology, and even geology. It’s tempting to believe the new study now adds bioenergetics to the mix, as an independent new line of evidence, but let’s pause for a moment and ask two: (i) Was Hannibal aware of the availability of two or four paths? (ii) Did he really optimise for energy alone?
The answers to both questions are discouraging. On the second: Hannibal would have also considered the presence of enemy units on a path, local weather conditions, the availability of water, how easily certain segments of a path could be traversed, the risk of rockfalls, political alliances with local tribes, and — crucially — how easily the moving army could defend itself at various points. On the first question: Hannibal took the help of local guides and incomplete (at the time) maps to find his way to Rome.
Thus the study’s methods could complement historical and archaeological evidence rather in and of themselves be dispositive. That said, if we set aside the intention to use thermodynamics to shed light on which route Hannibal and his army might have taken, we still have usable estimates of the energy cost of each route and an opportunity to inform historical records of the army’s health and potency based on them.
Featured image: An illustration of Hannibal and his army crossing the Alps, by Heinrich Leutemann, 1866. Credit: Public domain.
