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Here is a patch for Python 3.5 which breaks backward compatibility: urlparse functions now raise a ValueError if the IPv6 address, port or host is invalid.
According to unit tests, Python 3.4 is more tolerant: it only raises an error when the port number is read (obj.port) from an URL with an invalid port. There error is not raised when the whole URL is parsed.
My patch "urlparse.patch" may be modified to fix also bpo-18191 in Python 2.7, 3.3 and 3.4: splitport() should handle IPv6 ("[::1]:80") and auth ("user:passowrd@host") but not raises an exception.
I suspect the proposed patch here would make some of the special error handling for the “port” property redundant, and would compete with my patch for bpo-20059, which raises ValueError in more cases when “port” is accessed, rather than returning None.
There should also be test cases (and maybe documentation or fixes?) to illustrate the behaviour of parsing:
http://[fe80::a%25en1] (RFC 6874-style scoped IPv6 address with zone identifier)
With optimizations in bpo-23563 and weaken IPv6 check the implementation of urlsplit() can be faster.
$ ./python -m timeit -s "from urllib.parse import urlparse, clear_cache" -- "urlparse('http://python.org:80'); clear_cache()"
10000 loops, best of 3: 86.3 usec per loop
$ ./python -m timeit -s "from urllib.parse import urlparse, clear_cache" -- "urlparse('http://[2001:4802:7901:0:e60a:1375:0:5]:80'); clear_cache()"
10000 loops, best of 3: 88.6 usec per loop
demianbrecht commented on Mar 6, 2015
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I think some further consideration around this change is worthwhile:
Currently, urllib.parse.split* methods seem to do inconsistent validation around the data they're splitting. For example:
(None for an invalid port)
>>> parse.splitnport('example.com:foo')
('example.com', None)
Whereas other split* methods do not:
(Auth part should be URL-encoded)
>>> parse.splituser('u@ser:p@ssword@example.com:80')
('u@ser:p@ssword', 'example.com:80')
And others are just plain incorrect:
(:bad should be the port as defined by the ABNF 'authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ]')
>>> parse.splitport('example.com:bad')
('example.com:bad', None)
However, none of these cases (currently) raise exceptions.
Looking at urllib.parse, two large motivations behind it are splitting and parsing. In my mind, splitting should solely be responsible for splitting input based on RFC-defined delimiters. Parsing on the other hand, should be responsible for both splitting as necessary as well as input validation. It may also make sense to add simple validation functions to the module to comply with the "batteries included" philosophy, but that's a topic for another issue.
My concern with the proposed patch is that it adds further inconsistency to split* methods:
>>> parse.urlsplit('http://[::1]spam:80')
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "/Volumes/src/p/cpython/Lib/urllib/parse.py", line 350, in urlsplit
netloc, url = _splitnetloc(url, 2)
File "/Volumes/src/p/cpython/Lib/urllib/parse.py", line 324, in _splitnetloc
raise ValueError('Invalid IPv6 URL')
(While the above examples still yield the same results and don't raise exceptions)
I do think that the validation should be done and I agree that an exception should be raised, but it should be done at the urlparse level, not on split (in this case, due to the change to _splitnecloc).
demianbrecht commented on Mar 6, 2015
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splitport() shouldn't handle auth, it should be called after auth is dropped with splituser().
Why shouldn't splitport() handle auth? Are you suggesting that in the eyes of splitport() that "user:password@host:port" should be invalid?
To me, the only difference between urlsplit() and urlparse() is that urlsplit() does not treat parameters following a semicolon specially. The documentation tends to agree with this view. So whatever exceptions are raised by urlparse() should also be raised by urlsplit() for consistency.
Also, I doubt it is worth worrying about the finer details of splitport() or whatever, because they are meant to be deprecated and not used externally, except for backwards compatibility.
See also bpo-36338 for a possible security issue for host of value "benign.com[attacker.com]" (spam[::1] format) where attacker.com is parsed as the host name assuming presence of [ and ] to be a IPV6 address without validation of the value attacker.com inside [] to be a valid IPV6 address.
As a datapoint input "http://[::1]spam" raises exception in Java, golang and Ruby. Browser's JS console returns invalid URL. I too would like exception being raised but not sure at which level.
If input does not end with U+005D (]), validation error, return failure.
Return the result of IPv6 parsing input with its leading U+005B ([) and trailing U+005D (]) removed.
Most cases from this issue were fixed in gh-103848 and gh-105704. I opened #155220 for the remaining ones: an invalid port and an unbracketed IPv6 address.
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serhiy-storchaka commentedon Jan 15, 2014
'http://[::1]spam:80' is invalid URL, but urllib.parse.urlparse() accepts it and just ignore the spam part.
serhiy-storchaka commentedon Jan 21, 2014
What should be correct behavior? Raise an exception, return '[::1]spam' as hostname, or left all as is?
1st1 commentedon Feb 1, 2014
I think we should start raising an exception in 3.5 (backwards incompatible change to back-port it)
vstinner commentedon Mar 7, 2014
Here is a patch for Python 3.5 which breaks backward compatibility: urlparse functions now raise a ValueError if the IPv6 address, port or host is invalid.
Examples of invalid URLs:
According to unit tests, Python 3.4 is more tolerant: it only raises an error when the port number is read (obj.port) from an URL with an invalid port. There error is not raised when the whole URL is parsed.
Is it ok to break backward compatibility?
vstinner commentedon Mar 7, 2014
Oh, by the way my patch fixes also bpo-18191.
vstinner commentedon Mar 7, 2014
My patch "urlparse.patch" may be modified to fix also bpo-18191 in Python 2.7, 3.3 and 3.4: splitport() should handle IPv6 ("[::1]:80") and auth ("user:passowrd@host") but not raises an exception.
serhiy-storchaka commentedon Mar 1, 2015
splitport() shouldn't handle auth, it should be called after auth is dropped with splituser().
The patch makes URL parsing slower, especially URLs with IPv6 addresses.
vadmium commentedon Mar 2, 2015
I suspect the proposed patch here would make some of the special error handling for the “port” property redundant, and would compete with my patch for bpo-20059, which raises ValueError in more cases when “port” is accessed, rather than returning None.
There should also be test cases (and maybe documentation or fixes?) to illustrate the behaviour of parsing:
serhiy-storchaka commentedon Mar 3, 2015
With optimizations in bpo-23563 and weaken IPv6 check the implementation of urlsplit() can be faster.
demianbrecht commentedon Mar 6, 2015
I think some further consideration around this change is worthwhile:
Currently, urllib.parse.split* methods seem to do inconsistent validation around the data they're splitting. For example:
(None for an invalid port) >>> parse.splitnport('example.com:foo') ('example.com', None)Whereas other split* methods do not:
(Auth part should be URL-encoded) >>> parse.splituser('u@ser:p@ssword@example.com:80') ('u@ser:p@ssword', 'example.com:80')And others are just plain incorrect:
(:bad should be the port as defined by the ABNF 'authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ]') >>> parse.splitport('example.com:bad') ('example.com:bad', None)However, none of these cases (currently) raise exceptions.
Looking at urllib.parse, two large motivations behind it are splitting and parsing. In my mind, splitting should solely be responsible for splitting input based on RFC-defined delimiters. Parsing on the other hand, should be responsible for both splitting as necessary as well as input validation. It may also make sense to add simple validation functions to the module to comply with the "batteries included" philosophy, but that's a topic for another issue.
My concern with the proposed patch is that it adds further inconsistency to split* methods:
Before patch:
>>> parse.urlsplit('http://[::1]spam:80') SplitResult(scheme='http', netloc='[::1]spam:80', path='', query='', fragment='')After patch:
>>> parse.urlsplit('http://[::1]spam:80') Traceback (most recent call last): File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module> File "/Volumes/src/p/cpython/Lib/urllib/parse.py", line 350, in urlsplit netloc, url = _splitnetloc(url, 2) File "/Volumes/src/p/cpython/Lib/urllib/parse.py", line 324, in _splitnetloc raise ValueError('Invalid IPv6 URL')(While the above examples still yield the same results and don't raise exceptions)
I do think that the validation should be done and I agree that an exception should be raised, but it should be done at the urlparse level, not on split (in this case, due to the change to _splitnecloc).
demianbrecht commentedon Mar 6, 2015
Why shouldn't splitport() handle auth? Are you suggesting that in the eyes of splitport() that "user:password@host:port" should be invalid?
>>> parse.splitport('user:password@host:80') ('user:password@host', '80')Seems to be reasonable behaviour to me. Why add the artificial constraint of calling splituser() first?
vadmium commentedon Mar 23, 2015
To me, the only difference between urlsplit() and urlparse() is that urlsplit() does not treat parameters following a semicolon specially. The documentation tends to agree with this view. So whatever exceptions are raised by urlparse() should also be raised by urlsplit() for consistency.
Also, I doubt it is worth worrying about the finer details of splitport() or whatever, because they are meant to be deprecated and not used externally, except for backwards compatibility.
tirkarthi commentedon Mar 27, 2019
See also bpo-36338 for a possible security issue for host of value "benign.com[attacker.com]" (spam[::1] format) where attacker.com is parsed as the host name assuming presence of [ and ] to be a IPV6 address without validation of the value attacker.com inside [] to be a valid IPV6 address.
As a datapoint input "http://[::1]spam" raises exception in Java, golang and Ruby. Browser's JS console returns invalid URL. I too would like exception being raised but not sure at which level.
Ruby seems to use a regex : https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/trunk/lib/uri/rfc3986_parser.rb#L6
Java parseurl : http://hg.openjdk.java.net/jdk/jdk/file/c4c225b49c5f/src/java.base/share/classes/java/net/URLStreamHandler.java#l124
golang : https://github.com/golang/go/blob/50bd1c4d4eb4fac8ddeb5f063c099daccfb71b26/src/net/url/url.go#L587
See also https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#host-parsing
If input starts with U+005B ([), then:
tirkarthi commentedon Oct 24, 2019
With Victor's PR 16780, "http://[::1]spam:80" would raise a ValueError.
ValueError: Invalid network location: '[::1]spam:80'
serhiy-storchaka commentedon Aug 5, 2026
Most cases from this issue were fixed in gh-103848 and gh-105704. I opened #155220 for the remaining ones: an invalid port and an unbracketed IPv6 address.