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Reject newline character (U+000A) in URLs in urllib.parse #74898
Description
| BPO | 30713 |
|---|---|
| Nosy | @gpshead, @vstinner, @vadmium, @postmasters, @serhiy-storchaka |
| PRs |
Note: these values reflect the state of the issue at the time it was migrated and might not reflect the current state.
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GitHub fields:
assignee = None
closed_at = <Date 2017-07-26.02:43:37.898>
created_at = <Date 2017-06-20.15:20:33.115>
labels = ['type-security', '3.7']
title = 'Reject newline character (U+000A) in URLs in urllib.parse'
updated_at = <Date 2021-04-23.19:36:58.331>
user = 'https://github.com/vstinner'bugs.python.org fields:
activity = <Date 2021-04-23.19:36:58.331>
actor = 'gregory.p.smith'
assignee = 'none'
closed = True
closed_date = <Date 2017-07-26.02:43:37.898>
closer = 'vstinner'
components = []
creation = <Date 2017-06-20.15:20:33.115>
creator = 'vstinner'
dependencies = []
files = []
hgrepos = []
issue_num = 30713
keywords = []
message_count = 10.0
messages = ['296453', '296454', '296457', '296459', '296467', '296472', '297154', '297512', '298856', '299186']
nosy_count = 6.0
nosy_names = ['gregory.p.smith', 'vstinner', 'martin.panter', 'Nam.Nguyen', 'serhiy.storchaka', 'ecbftw']
pr_nums = ['2301', '2303']
priority = 'normal'
resolution = 'rejected'
stage = 'resolved'
status = 'closed'
superseder = None
type = 'security'
url = 'https://bugs.python.org/issue30713'
versions = ['Python 3.7']
Activity
vstinner commentedon Jun 20, 2017
Spin-off of the bpo-30500: modify the urllib.parse module to reject the newline character (U+000A) in URLS. Modify 3 functions:
vstinner commentedon Jun 20, 2017
I chose to not change how the \r newline character (U+000D) is handled: it is still accepted, even if it is used in SMTP and HTTP as newline separator.
serhiy-storchaka commentedon Jun 20, 2017
See also bpo-29606. I think that fixing the modules implementing Internet protocols is more appropriate way than fixing just a parsing utility.
vstinner commentedon Jun 20, 2017
IMHO we can/should fix ftplib (ftplib, httplib, etc.) *and* urllib.
vstinner commentedon Jun 20, 2017
I tried to be more strict, and I was bitten by tests: test_urllib fails on splittype("data:...") where (...) contains newlines characters. One example:
======================================================================
ERROR: test_read_text_base64 (test.test_urllib.urlopen_DataTests)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
File "/home/travis/build/python/cpython/Lib/test/test_urllib.py", line 511, in setUp
File "/home/travis/build/python/cpython/Lib/urllib/request.py", line 222, in urlopen
File "/home/travis/build/python/cpython/Lib/urllib/request.py", line 510, in open
File "/home/travis/build/python/cpython/Lib/urllib/request.py", line 328, in __init__
File "/home/travis/build/python/cpython/Lib/urllib/request.py", line 354, in full_url
File "/home/travis/build/python/cpython/Lib/urllib/request.py", line 383, in _parse
ValueError: unknown url type: '\nQOjdAAAAAXNSR0IArs4c6QAAAA9JREFUCNdj%0AYGBg%2BP//PwAGAQL%2BCm8 vHgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg%3D%3D%0A%20'
I modified splittype() to reject newlines before the type, but accept them after the type.
postmasters commentedon Jun 20, 2017
Just being nosy here that we should not continue down the path with regex. A proper grammar parser according to spec would be much more appropriate and eliminate these whack-a-mole issues.
serhiy-storchaka commentedon Jun 28, 2017
First, I think urllib.parse is not the best place for doing such checks. Even if add some checks in urllib.parse, they should be added also at lower level in urllib.request or concrete protocol implementations.
Second, PR 2303 actually doesn't reject arguments with '\n'. splithost('example.org\n') will return a tuple ('example.org\n', None), etc.
vadmium commentedon Jul 2, 2017
It might help if you explained why you want to make these changes. Otherwise I have to guess. Is a compromise between strictly rejecting all non-URL characters (not just control characters), versus leaving it up to user applications to validate their URLs?
I guess it could partially prevent some newline injection problems like bpo-29606 (FTP) and bpo-30458 (HTTP). But how do we know it closes more security holes than it opens?
I don’t understand the focus on these three functions. They are undocumented and more-or-less deprecated (bpo-27485). Why not focus on the “urlsplit” and “urlparse” functions first?
Some of the changes seem to go too far, e.g. in the splithost("//hostname/u\nrl") test case, the hostname is fine, but it is not recognized. This would partially conflict the patch in bpo-13359, with proposes to percent-encode newlines after passing through “splithost”. And it would make the URL look like a relative URL, which is a potential security hole and reminds me of the open redirect bug report (bpo-23505).
ecbftw commentedon Jul 22, 2017
I'm the guy that did the original security research on this issue. I've been a pentester for over 12 years, where I am regularly helping developers understand how to best correct their injection flaws. Please carefully consider what I'm trying to tell you. I've been trying to get this message through to Python for nearly 2 years now. =(
Serhiy has the right idea. His email here shows a firm understanding of the issue and the correct remediation approach:
https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-dev/2017-July/148715.html
It seems every developer initially assumes input validation is the way you deal with injection flaws. But this creates a false sense of a "trade off" between security and usability. Rejecting evil-looking things up front just creates more problems for you. Also, you can't be sure every code path leading from user input to the injection point is addressed. (What other ways can new lines reach the FTP library?)
Instead, the problem needs to be dealt with in the lines of code just before the injection occurs. Ideally, any special character should be encoded/escaped, in which case you get the best of both worlds: security and full usability. However, when you're dealing with a syntax that was poorly designed and doesn't have a standard way to escape special characters, then you are forced to reject them. Still, it is better to do this rejection right before the commands are dropped onto the TCP stream. That way, if you later decide that there's an acceptable way to encode new lines for *specific* commands, then you can perform that encoding right there and relax the restrictions in specific cases.
I like Serhiy's idea of optionally supporting escaping via the syntax defined in RFC 2640. This should be disabled by default, and a short-term security patch shouldn't try to tackle it. But in a new Python release, a switch could be added that causes new lines to be escaped for specific commands, such as the CWD and GET commands. It is likely that this escaping is only going to be useful in specific commands, based on what FTP servers actually support. Of course none of this is possible if you use a heavy-handed approach of blocking %0a in URLs up front.
vstinner commentedon Jul 26, 2017
https://bugs.python.org/issue29606 was fixed in ftplib. urllib is not the right place to reject invalid inputs.