-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2.8k
Final test fixes #3
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
Conversation
|
Cool! Any reason not to merge right away? |
|
@dscho |
|
Here you are... I commented a bit ;-) Thanks for doing this, and let me know if you need me to work on one or more issues myself. |
All CRLF vs LF errors are introduced by the tr tool. Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <[email protected]>
Our current version of bash 3.1.17(5) can not parse the following snippet
correctly
p=abcd
abspath=/$p
subdir="x$(echo "$p" | tail -c $((253 - ${#abspath})))"
as it returns
tail: cannot open `253' for reading: No such file or directory
This is fixed in bash 3.1.20(4), I did not check earlier versions.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <[email protected]>
As non reliable tests are nasty. Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <[email protected]>
A string of the form "@/abcd" is considered a file path
by the msys layer and therefore translated to a windows path.
Here the trick is to double the slashes.
The msys patch translation can be studied with the following
test program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
unsigned int i;
for(i=1; i < argc; i++)
printf("argv[%d]=%s\n",i, argv[i]);
exit(0);
}
Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <[email protected]>
… cat on MSYS This reverts commit 57a35fd. test_cmp_text is not defined anymore and as of 4d715ac (Windows: a test_cmp that is agnostic to random LF <> CRLF conversions) this workaround is also not required anymore. Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <[email protected]>
This reverts commit 9264b1f. test_cmp_text is not defined anymore and as of 4d715ac (Windows: a test_cmp that is agnostic to random LF <> CRLF conversions) this workaround is also not required anymore. Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <[email protected]>
4848dd1 to
8b9bc73
Compare
|
@dscho Incorporated all proposed changes. |
|
Fun fact of the day: t-b@a84833f is obsolete with the new bash available in msysgit ;) |
|
Thank you so much! |
Heh... should we take it out of this PR, then? |
I would keep it in. Once we have a newer bash we can always revert it with fixup. |
|
Okay! Thanks so much! |
Use write_script. The resulting patch makes it a lot easier to understand what the written script is doing. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
The collect_parents() function now is responsible for
1. parsing the commits given on the command line into a list of
commits to be merged;
2. filtering these parents into independent ones; and
3. optionally calling fmt_merge_msg() via prepare_merge_message()
to prepare an auto-generated merge log message, using fake
contents that FETCH_HEAD would have had if these commits were
fetched from the current repository with "git pull . $args..."
Make "git merge FETCH_HEAD" to be the same as the traditional
git merge "$(git fmt-merge-msg <.git/FETCH_HEAD)" $commits
invocation of the command in "git pull", where $commits are the ones
that appear in FETCH_HEAD that are not marked as not-for-merge, by
making it do a bit more, specifically:
- noticing "FETCH_HEAD" is the only "commit" on the command line
and picking the commits that are not marked as not-for-merge as
the list of commits to be merged (substitute for step #1 above);
- letting the resulting list fed to step #2 above;
- doing the step #3 above, using the contents of the FETCH_HEAD
instead of fake contents crafted from the list of commits parsed
in the step #1 above.
Note that this changes the semantics. "git merge FETCH_HEAD" has
always behaved as if the first commit in the FETCH_HEAD file were
directly specified on the command line, creating a two-way merge
whose auto-generated merge log said "merge commit xyz". With this
change, if the previous fetch was to grab multiple branches (e.g.
"git fetch $there topic-a topic-b"), the new world order is to
create an octopus, behaving as if "git pull $there topic-a topic-b"
were run. This is a deliberate change to make that happen, and
can be seen in the changes to t3033 tests.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
A "rebase" replays changes of the local branch on top of something else, as such they are placed in stage #3 and referred to as "theirs", while the changes in the new base, typically a foreign work, are placed in stage #2 and referred to as "ours". Clarify the "checkout --ours/--theirs". * se/doc-checkout-ours-theirs: checkout: document subtlety around --ours/--theirs
A "rebase" replays changes of the local branch on top of something else, as such they are placed in stage #3 and referred to as "theirs", while the changes in the new base, typically a foreign work, are placed in stage #2 and referred to as "ours". Clarify the "checkout --ours/--theirs". * se/doc-checkout-ours-theirs: checkout: document subtlety around --ours/--theirs
When ac49f5c (rerere "remaining", 2011-02-16) split out a new helper function check_one_conflict() out of find_conflict() function, so that the latter will use the returned value from the new helper to update the loop control variable that is an index into active_cache[], the new variable incremented the index by one too many when it found a path with only stage #1 entry at the very end of active_cache[]. This "strange" return value does not have any effect on the loop control of two callers of this function, as they all notice that active_nr+2 is larger than active_nr just like active_nr+1 is, but nevertheless it puzzles the readers when they are trying to figure out what the function is trying to do. In fact, there is no need to do an early return. The code that follows after skipping the stage #1 entry is fully prepared to handle a case where the entry is at the very end of active_cache[]. Help future readers from unnecessary confusion by dropping an early return. We skip the stage #1 entry, and if there are stage #2 and stage git-for-windows#3 entries for the same path, we diagnose the path as THREE_STAGED (otherwise we say PUNTED), and then we skip all entries for the same path. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the
reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not
properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads.
Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the
stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been
rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up
discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator.
The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory,
which of course segfaults.
One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance
jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack
traces like the following one:
+ git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp
0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0)
==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29
#1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170
#2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194
#3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398
#4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240
#5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355
#6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339
#7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69
#8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123
#9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172
#10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175
#11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464
#12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13
#13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452
#14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623
#15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659
#16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133
#17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432
#18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484
#19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741
#20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805
#21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000
#22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64
#23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
#24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
#25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27)
While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive
tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should
work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't.
The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context
is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table
from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when
calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close
them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore.
Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted.
Reported-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
The incremental MIDX bitmap work was done prior to 9d4855e (midx-write: fix leaking buffer, 2024-09-30), and causes test failures in t5334 in a post-9d4855eef3 world. The leak looks like: Direct leak of 264 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f6bcd87eaca in calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:90 #1 0x55ad1428e8a4 in xcalloc wrapper.c:151 #2 0x55ad14199e16 in prepare_midx_bitmap_git pack-bitmap.c:742 #3 0x55ad14199447 in open_midx_bitmap_1 pack-bitmap.c:507 #4 0x55ad14199cca in open_midx_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:704 #5 0x55ad14199d44 in open_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:717 #6 0x55ad14199dc2 in prepare_bitmap_git pack-bitmap.c:733 #7 0x55ad1419e496 in test_bitmap_walk pack-bitmap.c:2698 #8 0x55ad14047b0b in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:629 #9 0x55ad13f71cd6 in run_builtin git.c:487 #10 0x55ad13f72132 in handle_builtin git.c:756 #11 0x55ad13f72380 in run_argv git.c:826 #12 0x55ad13f728f4 in cmd_main git.c:961 #13 0x55ad1407d3ae in main common-main.c:64 #14 0x7f6bcd5f0c89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #15 0x7f6bcd5f0d44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #16 0x55ad13f6ff90 in _start (git+0x1ef90) (BuildId: 3e63cdd415f1d185b21da3035cb48332510dddce) , and is a result of us not freeing the resources corresponding to the bitmap's base layer, if one was present. Rectify that leak by calling the newly-introduced free_bitmap_index() function on the base layer to ensure that its resources are also freed. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that
exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We
execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check
for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the
following leak:
Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8
#2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2
#3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2
#4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2
#5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3
#6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3
#7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11
#8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9
#9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11
#10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13
#11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4
#12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19
#13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d)
#15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208)
#16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064)
This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at
all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because
we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea
why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially.
In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a
bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying
after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like
this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the
reported leak go away.
It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>
This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that
exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We
execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check
for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the
following leak:
Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8
#2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2
#3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2
#4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2
#5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3
#6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3
#7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11
#8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9
#9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11
#10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13
#11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4
#12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19
#13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d)
#15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208)
#16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064)
This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at
all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because
we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea
why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially.
In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a
bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying
after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like
this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the
reported leak go away.
It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <[email protected]>
This one is a little bit more curious. In t6112, we have a test that
exercises the `git rev-list --filter` option with invalid filters. We
execute git-rev-list(1) via `test_must_fail`, which means that we check
for leaks even though Git exits with an error code. This causes the
following leak:
Direct leak of 27 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555e6946 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x5555558fb4b6 in xrealloc wrapper.c:137:8
#2 0x5555558b6e06 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:112:2
#3 0x5555558b7550 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:311:2
#4 0x5555557c1a88 in strbuf_addstr strbuf.h:310:2
#5 0x5555557c1d4c in parse_list_objects_filter list-objects-filter-options.c:261:3
#6 0x555555885ead in handle_revision_pseudo_opt revision.c:2899:3
#7 0x555555884e20 in setup_revisions revision.c:3014:11
#8 0x5555556c4b42 in cmd_rev_list builtin/rev-list.c:588:9
#9 0x5555555ec5e3 in run_builtin git.c:483:11
#10 0x5555555eb1e4 in handle_builtin git.c:749:13
#11 0x5555555ec001 in run_argv git.c:819:4
#12 0x5555555eaf94 in cmd_main git.c:954:19
#13 0x5555556fd569 in main common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff7ca714d in __libc_start_call_main (.../lib/libc.so.6+0x2a14d)
#15 0x7ffff7ca7208 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (.../libc.so.6+0x2a208)
#16 0x5555555ad064 in _start (git+0x59064)
This leak is valid, as we call `die()` and do not clean up the memory at
all. But what's curious is that this is the only leak reported, because
we don't clean up any other allocated memory, either, and I have no idea
why the leak sanitizer treats this buffer specially.
In any case, we can work around the leak by shuffling things around a
bit. Instead of calling `gently_parse_list_objects_filter()` and dying
after we have modified the filter spec, we simply do so beforehand. Like
this we don't allocate the buffer in the error case, which makes the
reported leak go away.
It's not pretty, but it manages to make t6112 leak free.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
When running t5601 with the leak checker enabled we can see a hang in
our CI systems. This hang seems to be system-specific, as I cannot
reproduce it on my own machine.
As it turns out, the issue is in those testcases that exercise cloning
of `~repo`-style paths. All of the testcases that hang eventually end up
interpreting "repo" as the username and will call getpwnam(3p) with that
username. That should of course be fine, and getpwnam(3p) should just
return an error. But instead, the leak sanitizer seems to be recursing
while handling a call to `free()` in the NSS modules:
#0 0x00007ffff7fd98d5 in _dl_update_slotinfo (req_modid=1, new_gen=2) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:720
#1 0x00007ffff7fd9ac4 in update_get_addr (ti=0x7ffff7a91d80, gen=<optimized out>) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:916
#2 0x00007ffff7fdc85c in __tls_get_addr () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/tls_get_addr.S:55
#3 0x00007ffff7a27e04 in __lsan::GetAllocatorCache () at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_linux.cpp:27
#4 0x00007ffff7a2b33a in __lsan::Deallocate (p=0x0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:127
#5 __lsan::lsan_free (p=0x0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:220
...
#261505 0x00007ffff7fd99f2 in free (ptr=<optimized out>) at ../include/rtld-malloc.h:50
#261506 _dl_update_slotinfo (req_modid=1, new_gen=2) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:822
#261507 0x00007ffff7fd9ac4 in update_get_addr (ti=0x7ffff7a91d80, gen=<optimized out>) at ../elf/dl-tls.c:916
#261508 0x00007ffff7fdc85c in __tls_get_addr () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/tls_get_addr.S:55
#261509 0x00007ffff7a27e04 in __lsan::GetAllocatorCache () at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_linux.cpp:27
#261510 0x00007ffff7a2b33a in __lsan::Deallocate (p=0x5020000001e0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:127
#261511 __lsan::lsan_free (p=0x5020000001e0) at ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_allocator.cpp:220
#261512 0x00007ffff793da25 in module_load (module=0x515000000280) at ./nss/nss_module.c:188
#261513 0x00007ffff793dee5 in __nss_module_load (module=0x515000000280) at ./nss/nss_module.c:302
#261514 __nss_module_get_function (module=0x515000000280, name=name@entry=0x7ffff79b9128 "getpwnam_r") at ./nss/nss_module.c:328
#261515 0x00007ffff793e741 in __GI___nss_lookup_function (fct_name=<optimized out>, ni=<optimized out>) at ./nss/nsswitch.c:137
#261516 __GI___nss_next2 (ni=ni@entry=0x7fffffffa458, fct_name=fct_name@entry=0x7ffff79b9128 "getpwnam_r", fct2_name=fct2_name@entry=0x0, fctp=fctp@entry=0x7fffffffa460,
status=status@entry=0, all_values=all_values@entry=0) at ./nss/nsswitch.c:120
#261517 0x00007ffff794c6a7 in __getpwnam_r (name=name@entry=0x501000000060 "repo", resbuf=resbuf@entry=0x7ffff79fb320 <resbuf>, buffer=<optimized out>,
buflen=buflen@entry=1024, result=result@entry=0x7fffffffa4b0) at ../nss/getXXbyYY_r.c:343
#261518 0x00007ffff794c4d8 in getpwnam (name=0x501000000060 "repo") at ../nss/getXXbyYY.c:140
#261519 0x00005555557e37ff in getpw_str (username=0x5020000001a1 "repo", len=4) at path.c:613
#261520 0x00005555557e3937 in interpolate_path (path=0x5020000001a0 "~repo", real_home=0) at path.c:654
#261521 0x00005555557e3aea in enter_repo (path=0x501000000040 "~repo", strict=0) at path.c:718
#261522 0x000055555568f0ba in cmd_upload_pack (argc=1, argv=0x502000000100, prefix=0x0, repo=0x0) at builtin/upload-pack.c:57
#261523 0x0000555555575ba8 in run_builtin (p=0x555555a20c98 <commands+3192>, argc=2, argv=0x502000000100, repo=0x555555a53b20 <the_repo>) at git.c:481
#261524 0x0000555555576067 in handle_builtin (args=0x7fffffffaab0) at git.c:742
#261525 0x000055555557678d in cmd_main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffac58) at git.c:912
#261526 0x00005555556963cd in main (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffac58) at common-main.c:64
Note that this stack is more than 260000 function calls deep. Run under
the debugger this will eventually segfault, but in our CI systems it
seems like this just hangs forever.
I assume that this is a bug either in the leak sanitizer or in glibc, as
I cannot reproduce it on my machine. In any case, let's work around the
bug for now by marking those tests with the "!SANITIZE_LEAK" prereq.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
There's a race with LSan when spawning threads and one of the threads
calls die(). We worked around one such problem with index-pack in the
previous commit, but it exists in git-grep, too. You can see it with:
make SANITIZE=leak THREAD_BARRIER_PTHREAD=YesOnLinux
cd t
./t0003-attributes.sh --stress
which fails pretty quickly with:
==git==4096424==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f906de14556 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
#1 0x7f906dc9d2c1 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
#2 0x7f906de2500d in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
#3 0x7f906de25187 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:614
#4 0x7f906de17d18 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:53
#5 0x7f906de143a9 in ThreadStartFunc<false> ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:431
#6 0x7f906dc9bf51 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:447
#7 0x7f906dd1a677 in __clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:78
As with the previous commit, we can fix this by inserting a barrier that
makes sure all threads have finished their setup before continuing. But
there's one twist in this case: the thread which calls die() is not one
of the worker threads, but the main thread itself!
So we need the main thread to wait in the barrier, too, until all
threads have gotten to it. And thus we initialize the barrier for
num_threads+1, to account for all of the worker threads plus the main
one.
If we then test as above, t0003 should run indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
In 1b9e9be (csum-file.c: use unsafe SHA-1 implementation when available, 2024-09-26) we have converted our `struct hashfile` to use the unsafe SHA1 backend, which results in a significant speedup. One needs to be careful with how to use that structure now though because callers need to consistently use either the safe or unsafe variants of SHA1, as otherwise one can easily trigger corruption. As it turns out, we have one inconsistent usage in our tree because we directly initialize `struct hashfile_checkpoint::ctx` with the safe variant of SHA1, but end up writing to that context with the unsafe ones. This went unnoticed so far because our CI systems do not exercise different hash functions for these two backends, and consequently safe and unsafe variants are equivalent. But when using SHA1DC as safe and OpenSSL as unsafe backend this leads to a crash an t1050: ++ git -c core.compression=0 add large1 AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1367==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x507000000db0 sp 0x7fffffff5690 T0) ==1367==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1367==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) #1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2 #2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2 #3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2 #4 0x555555b9905d in deflate_blob_to_pack ../bulk-checkin.c:286:4 #5 0x555555b98ae9 in index_blob_bulk_checkin ../bulk-checkin.c:362:15 #6 0x555555ddab62 in index_blob_stream ../object-file.c:2756:9 #7 0x555555dda420 in index_fd ../object-file.c:2778:9 #8 0x555555ddad76 in index_path ../object-file.c:2796:7 #9 0x555555e947f3 in add_to_index ../read-cache.c:771:7 #10 0x555555e954a4 in add_file_to_index ../read-cache.c:804:9 #11 0x5555558b5c39 in add_files ../builtin/add.c:355:7 #12 0x5555558b412e in cmd_add ../builtin/add.c:578:18 #13 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11 #14 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9 #15 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4 #16 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19 #17 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11 #18 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #19 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4) #20 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84) ==1367==Register values: rax = 0x0000511000001080 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000 rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x0000507000000db0 rbp = 0x0000507000000db0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5690 r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30 r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b38 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex ==1367==ABORTING ./test-lib.sh: line 1023: 1367 Aborted git $config add large1 error: last command exited with $?=134 not ok 4 - add with -c core.compression=0 Fix the issue by using the unsafe variant instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
Same as with the preceding commit, git-fast-import(1) is using the safe
variant to initialize a hashfile checkpoint. This leads to a segfault
when passing the checkpoint into the hashfile subsystem because it would
use the unsafe variants instead:
++ git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==577126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000040 (pc 0x7ffff7a01a99 bp 0x5070000009c0 sp 0x7fffffff5b30 T0)
==577126==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==577126==Hint: address points to the zero page.
#0 0x7ffff7a01a99 in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4)
#1 0x555555ddde56 in openssl_SHA1_Clone ../sha1/openssl.h:40:2
#2 0x555555dce2fc in git_hash_sha1_clone_unsafe ../object-file.c:123:2
#3 0x555555c2d5f8 in hashfile_checkpoint ../csum-file.c:211:2
#4 0x5555559647d1 in stream_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:1110:2
#5 0x55555596247b in parse_and_store_blob ../builtin/fast-import.c:2031:3
#6 0x555555967f91 in file_change_m ../builtin/fast-import.c:2408:5
#7 0x55555595d8a2 in parse_new_commit ../builtin/fast-import.c:2768:4
#8 0x55555595bb7a in cmd_fast_import ../builtin/fast-import.c:3614:4
#9 0x555555b1f493 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
#10 0x555555b1bfef in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
#11 0x555555b1e6f4 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
#12 0x555555b1b87a in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
#13 0x5555561649e6 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff742a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
#15 0x7ffff742a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/65h17wjrrlsj2rj540igylrx7fqcd6vq-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: bf320110569c8ec2425e9a0c5e4eb7e97f1fb6e4)
#16 0x555555772c84 in _start (git+0x21ec84)
==577126==Register values:
rax = 0x0000511000000cc0 rbx = 0x0000000000000000 rcx = 0x000000000000000c rdx = 0x0000000000000000
rdi = 0x0000000000000000 rsi = 0x00005070000009c0 rbp = 0x00005070000009c0 rsp = 0x00007fffffff5b30
r8 = 0x0000000000000000 r9 = 0x0000000000000000 r10 = 0x0000000000000000 r11 = 0x00007ffff7a01a30
r12 = 0x0000000000000000 r13 = 0x00007fffffff6b60 r14 = 0x00007ffff7ffd000 r15 = 0x00005555563b9910
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/nix/store/h1ydpxkw9qhjdxjpic1pdc2nirggyy6f-openssl-3.3.2/lib/libcrypto.so.3+0x201a99) (BuildId: 41746a580d39075fc85e8c8065b6c07fb34e97d4) in EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
==577126==ABORTING
./test-lib.sh: line 1039: 577126 Aborted git --git-dir=R/.git fast-import --big-file-threshold=1 < input
error: last command exited with $?=134
not ok 167 - R: blob bigger than threshold
The segfault is only exposed in case the unsafe and safe backends are
different from one another.
Fix the issue by initializing the context with the unsafe SHA1 variant.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
Our CI jobs sometimes see false positive leaks like this:
=================================================================
==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
#1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
#2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
#3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598
#4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51
#5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440
#6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444
#7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81
This is not a leak in our code, but appears to be a race between one
thread calling exit() while another one is in LSan's stack setup code.
You can reproduce it easily by running t0003 or t5309 with --stress
(these trigger it because of the threading in git-grep and index-pack
respectively).
This may be a bug in LSan, but regardless of whether it is eventually
fixed, it is useful to work around it so that we stop seeing these false
positives.
We can recognize it by the mention of the sanitizer functions in the
DEDUP_TOKEN line. With this patch, the scripts mentioned above should
run with --stress indefinitely.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 git-for-windows#1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 git-for-windows#2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 git-for-windows#3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 git-for-windows#4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 git-for-windows#5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 git-for-windows#6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 git-for-windows#7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 git-for-windows#10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 git-for-windows#11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 git-for-windows#12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 git-for-windows#13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 git-for-windows#14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 git-for-windows#15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 git-for-windows#16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 git-for-windows#17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 git-for-windows#18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 git-for-windows#19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 git-for-windows#20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
When trying to create a Unix socket in a path that exceeds the maximum
socket name length we try to first change the directory into the parent
folder before creating the socket to reduce the length of the name. When
this fails we error out of `unix_sockaddr_init()` with an error code,
which indicates to the caller that the context has not been initialized.
Consequently, they don't release that context.
This leads to a memory leak: when we have already populated the context
with the original directory that we need to chdir(3p) back into, but
then the chdir(3p) into the socket's parent directory fails, then we
won't release the original directory's path. The leak is exposed by
t0301, but only via Meson with `meson setup -Dsanitize=leak`:
Direct leak of 129 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555e85c6 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x55555590e3d6 in xrealloc ../wrapper.c:140:8
#2 0x5555558c8fc6 in strbuf_grow ../strbuf.c:114:2
#3 0x5555558cacab in strbuf_getcwd ../strbuf.c:605:3
#4 0x555555923ff6 in unix_sockaddr_init ../unix-socket.c:65:7
#5 0x555555923e42 in unix_stream_connect ../unix-socket.c:84:6
#6 0x55555562a984 in send_request ../builtin/credential-cache.c:46:11
#7 0x55555562a89e in do_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:108:6
#8 0x55555562a655 in cmd_credential_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:178:3
#9 0x555555700547 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
#10 0x5555556ff0e0 in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
#11 0x5555556ffee8 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
#12 0x5555556fee6b in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
#13 0x55555593f689 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#15 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#16 0x5555555ad1d4 in _start (git+0x591d4)
DEDUP_TOKEN: ___interceptor_realloc.part.0--xrealloc--strbuf_grow--strbuf_getcwd--unix_sockaddr_init--unix_stream_connect--send_request--do_cache--cmd_credential_cache--run_builtin--handle_builtin--run_argv--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start
SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 129 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Fix this leak.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
We don't free the result of `remote_default_branch()`, leading to a
memory leak. This leak is exposed by t9211, but only when run with Meson
via `meson setup -Dsanitize=leak`:
Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555cfb93 in malloc (scalar+0x7bb93)
#1 0x5555556b05c2 in do_xmalloc ../wrapper.c:55:8
#2 0x5555556b06c4 in do_xmallocz ../wrapper.c:89:8
#3 0x5555556b0656 in xmallocz ../wrapper.c:97:9
#4 0x5555556b0728 in xmemdupz ../wrapper.c:113:16
#5 0x5555556b07a7 in xstrndup ../wrapper.c:119:9
#6 0x5555555d3a4b in remote_default_branch ../scalar.c:338:14
#7 0x5555555d20e6 in cmd_clone ../scalar.c:493:28
#8 0x5555555d196b in cmd_main ../scalar.c:992:14
#9 0x5555557c4059 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
#10 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#11 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#12 0x555555592054 in _start (scalar+0x3e054)
DEDUP_TOKEN: __interceptor_malloc--do_xmalloc--do_xmallocz--xmallocz--xmemdupz--xstrndup--remote_default_branch--cmd_clone--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start
SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 5 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
As the `branch` variable may contain a string constant obtained from
parsing command line arguments we cannot free the leaking variable
directly. Instead, introduce a new `branch_to_free` variable that only
ever gets assigned the allocated string and free that one to plug the
leak.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
When trying to create a Unix socket in a path that exceeds the maximum
socket name length we try to first change the directory into the parent
folder before creating the socket to reduce the length of the name. When
this fails we error out of `unix_sockaddr_init()` with an error code,
which indicates to the caller that the context has not been initialized.
Consequently, they don't release that context.
This leads to a memory leak: when we have already populated the context
with the original directory that we need to chdir(3p) back into, but
then the chdir(3p) into the socket's parent directory fails, then we
won't release the original directory's path. The leak is exposed by
t0301, but only when running tests in a directory hierarchy whose path
is long enough to make the socket name length exceed the maximum socket
name length:
Direct leak of 129 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555e85c6 in realloc.part.0 lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x55555590e3d6 in xrealloc ../wrapper.c:140:8
#2 0x5555558c8fc6 in strbuf_grow ../strbuf.c:114:2
#3 0x5555558cacab in strbuf_getcwd ../strbuf.c:605:3
#4 0x555555923ff6 in unix_sockaddr_init ../unix-socket.c:65:7
#5 0x555555923e42 in unix_stream_connect ../unix-socket.c:84:6
#6 0x55555562a984 in send_request ../builtin/credential-cache.c:46:11
#7 0x55555562a89e in do_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:108:6
#8 0x55555562a655 in cmd_credential_cache ../builtin/credential-cache.c:178:3
#9 0x555555700547 in run_builtin ../git.c:480:11
#10 0x5555556ff0e0 in handle_builtin ../git.c:740:9
#11 0x5555556ffee8 in run_argv ../git.c:807:4
#12 0x5555556fee6b in cmd_main ../git.c:947:19
#13 0x55555593f689 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
#14 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#15 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#16 0x5555555ad1d4 in _start (git+0x591d4)
DEDUP_TOKEN: ___interceptor_realloc.part.0--xrealloc--strbuf_grow--strbuf_getcwd--unix_sockaddr_init--unix_stream_connect--send_request--do_cache--cmd_credential_cache--run_builtin--handle_builtin--run_argv--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start
SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 129 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
Fix this leak.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
We don't free the result of `remote_default_branch()`, leading to a
memory leak. This leak is exposed by t9211, but only when run with Meson
with the `-Db_sanitize=leak` option:
Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5555555cfb93 in malloc (scalar+0x7bb93)
#1 0x5555556b05c2 in do_xmalloc ../wrapper.c:55:8
#2 0x5555556b06c4 in do_xmallocz ../wrapper.c:89:8
#3 0x5555556b0656 in xmallocz ../wrapper.c:97:9
#4 0x5555556b0728 in xmemdupz ../wrapper.c:113:16
#5 0x5555556b07a7 in xstrndup ../wrapper.c:119:9
#6 0x5555555d3a4b in remote_default_branch ../scalar.c:338:14
#7 0x5555555d20e6 in cmd_clone ../scalar.c:493:28
#8 0x5555555d196b in cmd_main ../scalar.c:992:14
#9 0x5555557c4059 in main ../common-main.c:64:11
#10 0x7ffff7a2a1fb in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a1fb) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#11 0x7ffff7a2a2b8 in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/h7zcxabfxa7v5xdna45y2hplj31ncf8a-glibc-2.40-36/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a2b8) (BuildId: 0a855678aa0cb573cecbb2bcc73ab8239ec472d0)
#12 0x555555592054 in _start (scalar+0x3e054)
DEDUP_TOKEN: __interceptor_malloc--do_xmalloc--do_xmallocz--xmallocz--xmemdupz--xstrndup--remote_default_branch--cmd_clone--cmd_main--main--__libc_start_call_main--__libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5--_start
SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 5 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
As the `branch` variable may contain a string constant obtained from
parsing command line arguments we cannot free the leaking variable
directly. Instead, introduce a new `branch_to_free` variable that only
ever gets assigned the allocated string and free that one to plug the
leak.
It is unclear why the leak isn't flagged when running the test via our
Makefile.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 git-for-windows#1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 git-for-windows#2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 git-for-windows#3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 git-for-windows#4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 git-for-windows#5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 git-for-windows#6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 git-for-windows#7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 git-for-windows#10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 git-for-windows#11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 git-for-windows#12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 git-for-windows#13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 git-for-windows#14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 git-for-windows#15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 git-for-windows#16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 git-for-windows#17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 git-for-windows#18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 git-for-windows#19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 git-for-windows#20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 git-for-windows#1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 git-for-windows#2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 git-for-windows#3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 git-for-windows#4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 git-for-windows#5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 git-for-windows#6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 git-for-windows#7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 git-for-windows#10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 git-for-windows#11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 git-for-windows#12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 git-for-windows#13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 git-for-windows#14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 git-for-windows#15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 git-for-windows#16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 git-for-windows#17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 git-for-windows#18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 git-for-windows#19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 git-for-windows#20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 git-for-windows#1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 git-for-windows#2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 git-for-windows#3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 git-for-windows#4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 git-for-windows#5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 git-for-windows#6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 git-for-windows#7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 git-for-windows#9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 git-for-windows#10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 git-for-windows#11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 git-for-windows#12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 git-for-windows#13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 git-for-windows#14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 git-for-windows#15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 git-for-windows#16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 git-for-windows#17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 git-for-windows#18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 git-for-windows#19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 git-for-windows#20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
The GitHub's CI workflow uses 'actions/checkout@v4' to checkout the repository. This action defaults to using the GitHub REST API to obtain the repository if the `git` executable isn't available. The step to build Git in the GitHub workflow can be summarized as: ... - uses: actions/checkout@v4 #1 - run: ci/install-dependencies.sh #2 ... - run: sudo --preserve-env --set-home --user=builder ci/run-build-and-tests.sh #3 ... Step #1, clones the repository, since the `git` executable isn't present at this step, it uses GitHub's REST API to obtain a tar of the repository. Step #2, installs all dependencies, which includes the `git` executable. Step #3, sets up the build, which includes setting up meson in the meson job. At this point the `git` executable is present. This means while the `git` executable is present, the repository doesn't contain the '.git' folder. To keep both the CI's (GitLab and GitHub) behavior consistent and to ensure that the build is performed on a real-world scenario, install `git` before the repository is checked out. This ensures that 'actions/checkout@v4' will clone the repository instead of using a tarball. We also update the package cache while installing `git`, this is because some distros will fail to locate the package without updating the cache. Helped-by: Phillip Wood <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Karthik Nayak <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
find_cfg_ent() allocates a struct reflog_expire_entry_option via
FLEX_ALLOC_MEM and inserts it into a linked list in the
reflog_expire_options structure. The entries in this list are never
freed, resulting in a leak in cmd_reflog_expire and the gc reflog expire
maintenance task:
Direct leak of 39 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7ff975ee6883 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe6883)
#1 0x0000010edada in xcalloc ../wrapper.c:154
#2 0x000000df0898 in find_cfg_ent ../reflog.c:28
#3 0x000000df0898 in reflog_expire_config ../reflog.c:70
#4 0x00000095c451 in configset_iter ../config.c:2116
#5 0x0000006d29e7 in git_config ../config.h:724
#6 0x0000006d29e7 in cmd_reflog_expire ../builtin/reflog.c:205
#7 0x0000006d504c in cmd_reflog ../builtin/reflog.c:419
#8 0x0000007e4054 in run_builtin ../git.c:480
#9 0x0000007e4054 in handle_builtin ../git.c:746
#10 0x0000007e8a35 in run_argv ../git.c:813
#11 0x0000007e8a35 in cmd_main ../git.c:953
#12 0x000000441e8f in main ../common-main.c:9
#13 0x7ff9754115f4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35f4)
#14 0x7ff9754116a7 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x36a7)
#15 0x000000444184 in _start (/home/jekeller/libexec/git-core/git+0x444184)
Close this leak by adding a reflog_clear_expire_config() function which
iterates the linked list and frees its elements. Call it upon exit of
cmd_reflog_expire() and reflog_expire_condition().
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
find_cfg_ent() allocates a struct reflog_expire_entry_option via
FLEX_ALLOC_MEM and inserts it into a linked list in the
reflog_expire_options structure. The entries in this list are never
freed, resulting in a leak in cmd_reflog_expire and the gc reflog expire
maintenance task:
Direct leak of 39 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7ff975ee6883 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xe6883)
#1 0x0000010edada in xcalloc ../wrapper.c:154
#2 0x000000df0898 in find_cfg_ent ../reflog.c:28
#3 0x000000df0898 in reflog_expire_config ../reflog.c:70
#4 0x00000095c451 in configset_iter ../config.c:2116
#5 0x0000006d29e7 in git_config ../config.h:724
#6 0x0000006d29e7 in cmd_reflog_expire ../builtin/reflog.c:205
#7 0x0000006d504c in cmd_reflog ../builtin/reflog.c:419
#8 0x0000007e4054 in run_builtin ../git.c:480
#9 0x0000007e4054 in handle_builtin ../git.c:746
#10 0x0000007e8a35 in run_argv ../git.c:813
#11 0x0000007e8a35 in cmd_main ../git.c:953
#12 0x000000441e8f in main ../common-main.c:9
#13 0x7ff9754115f4 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x35f4)
#14 0x7ff9754116a7 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x36a7)
#15 0x000000444184 in _start (/home/jekeller/libexec/git-core/git+0x444184)
Close this leak by adding a reflog_clear_expire_config() function which
iterates the linked list and frees its elements. Call it upon exit of
cmd_reflog_expire() and reflog_expire_condition().
Add a basic test which covers this leak. While at it, cover the
functionality from commit commit 3cb22b8 (Per-ref reflog expiry
configuration, 2008-06-15). We've had this support for years, but lacked
any tests.
Co-developed-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
The fill_packs_from_midx() method was refactored in fcb2205 (midx: implement support for writing incremental MIDX chains, 2024-08-06) to allow for preferred packfiles and incremental multi-pack-indexes. However, this led to some conditions that can cause improperly initialized memory in the context's list of packfiles. The conditions caring about the preferred pack name or the incremental flag are currently necessary to load a packfile. But the context is still being populated with pack_info structs based on the packfile array for the existing multi-pack-index even if prepare_midx_pack() isn't called. Add a new test that breaks under --stress when compiled with SANITIZE=address. The chosen number of 100 packfiles was selected to get the --stress output to fail about 50% of the time, while 50 packfiles could not get a failure in most --stress runs. The test case is marked as EXPENSIVE not only because of the number of packfiles it creates, but because some CI environments were reporting errors during the test that I could not reproduce, specifically around being unable to open the packfiles or their pack-indexes. When it fails under SANITIZE=address, it provides the following error: AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3263517==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000027 ==3263517==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3263517==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x562d5d82d1fb in close_pack_windows packfile.c:299 #1 0x562d5d82d3ab in close_pack packfile.c:354 #2 0x562d5d7bfdb4 in write_midx_internal midx-write.c:1490 #3 0x562d5d7c7aec in midx_repack midx-write.c:1795 #4 0x562d5d46fff6 in cmd_multi_pack_index builtin/multi-pack-index.c:305 ... This failure stack trace is disconnected from the real fix because the bad pointers are accessed later when closing the packfiles from the context. There are a few different aspects to this fix that are worth noting: 1. We return to the previous behavior of fill_packs_from_midx to not rely on the incremental flag or existence of a preferred pack. 2. The behavior to scan all layers of an incremental midx is kept, so this is not a full revert of the change. 3. We skip allocating more room in the pack_info array if the pack fails prepare_midx_pack(). 4. The method has always returned 0 for success and 1 for failure, but the condition checking for error added a check for a negative result for failure, so that is now updated. 5. The call to open_pack_index() is removed, but this is needed later in the case of a preferred pack. That call is moved to immediately before its result is needed (checking for the object count). Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
The fill_packs_from_midx() method was refactored in fcb2205 (midx: implement support for writing incremental MIDX chains, 2024-08-06) to allow for preferred packfiles and incremental multi-pack-indexes. However, this led to some conditions that can cause improperly initialized memory in the context's list of packfiles. The conditions caring about the preferred pack name or the incremental flag are currently necessary to load a packfile. But the context is still being populated with pack_info structs based on the packfile array for the existing multi-pack-index even if prepare_midx_pack() isn't called. Add a new test that breaks under --stress when compiled with SANITIZE=address. The chosen number of 100 packfiles was selected to get the --stress output to fail about 50% of the time, while 50 packfiles could not get a failure in most --stress runs. The test case is marked as EXPENSIVE not only because of the number of packfiles it creates, but because some CI environments were reporting errors during the test that I could not reproduce, specifically around being unable to open the packfiles or their pack-indexes. When it fails under SANITIZE=address, it provides the following error: AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3263517==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000027 ==3263517==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==3263517==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x562d5d82d1fb in close_pack_windows packfile.c:299 #1 0x562d5d82d3ab in close_pack packfile.c:354 #2 0x562d5d7bfdb4 in write_midx_internal midx-write.c:1490 #3 0x562d5d7c7aec in midx_repack midx-write.c:1795 #4 0x562d5d46fff6 in cmd_multi_pack_index builtin/multi-pack-index.c:305 ... This failure stack trace is disconnected from the real fix because the bad pointers are accessed later when closing the packfiles from the context. There are a few different aspects to this fix that are worth noting: 1. We return to the previous behavior of fill_packs_from_midx to not rely on the incremental flag or existence of a preferred pack. 2. The behavior to scan all layers of an incremental midx is kept, so this is not a full revert of the change. 3. We skip allocating more room in the pack_info array if the pack fails prepare_midx_pack(). 4. The method has always returned 0 for success and 1 for failure, but the condition checking for error added a check for a negative result for failure, so that is now updated. 5. The call to open_pack_index() is removed, but this is needed later in the case of a preferred pack. That call is moved to immediately before its result is needed (checking for the object count). Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
When performing auto-maintenance we check whether commit graphs need to
be generated by counting the number of commits that are reachable by any
reference, but not covered by a commit graph. This search is performed
by iterating through all references and then doing a depth-first search
until we have found enough commits that are not present in the commit
graph.
This logic has a memory leak though:
Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x55555562e433 in malloc (git+0xda433)
#1 0x555555964322 in do_xmalloc ../wrapper.c:55:8
#2 0x5555559642e6 in xmalloc ../wrapper.c:76:9
#3 0x55555579bf29 in commit_list_append ../commit.c:1872:35
#4 0x55555569f160 in dfs_on_ref ../builtin/gc.c:1165:4
#5 0x5555558c33fd in do_for_each_ref_iterator ../refs/iterator.c:431:12
#6 0x5555558af520 in do_for_each_ref ../refs.c:1828:9
#7 0x5555558ac317 in refs_for_each_ref ../refs.c:1833:9
#8 0x55555569e207 in should_write_commit_graph ../builtin/gc.c:1188:11
#9 0x55555569c915 in maintenance_is_needed ../builtin/gc.c:3492:8
#10 0x55555569b76a in cmd_maintenance ../builtin/gc.c:3542:9
#11 0x55555575166a in run_builtin ../git.c:506:11
#12 0x5555557502f0 in handle_builtin ../git.c:779:9
#13 0x555555751127 in run_argv ../git.c:862:4
#14 0x55555575007b in cmd_main ../git.c:984:19
#15 0x5555557523aa in main ../common-main.c:9:11
#16 0x7ffff7a2a4d7 in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a4d7) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
#17 0x7ffff7a2a59a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a59a) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
#18 0x5555555f0934 in _start (git+0x9c934)
The root cause of this memory leak is our use of `commit_list_append()`.
This function expects as parameters the item to append and the _tail_ of
the list to append. This tail will then be overwritten with the new tail
of the list so that it can be used in subsequent calls. But we call it
with `commit_list_append(parent->item, &stack)`, so we end up losing
everything but the new item.
This issue only surfaces when counting merge commits. Next to being a
memory leak, it also shows that we're in fact miscounting as we only
respect children of the last parent. All previous parents are discarded,
so their children will be disregarded unless they are hit via another
reference.
While crafting a test case for the issue I was puzzled that I couldn't
establish the proper border at which the auto-condition would be
fulfilled. As it turns out, there's another bug: if an object is at the
tip of any reference we don't mark it as seen. Consequently, if it is
reachable via any other reference, we'd count that object twice.
Fix both of these bugs so that we properly count objects without leaking
any memory.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
In the next commit we are about to move the packfile store into the ODB
source so that we have one store per source. This will lead to a memory
leak in the following commit when reading data from a submodule via
git-grep(1):
Direct leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x55555562e726 in calloc (git+0xda726)
#1 0x555555964734 in xcalloc ../wrapper.c:154:8
#2 0x555555835136 in load_multi_pack_index_one ../midx.c:135:2
#3 0x555555834fd6 in load_multi_pack_index ../midx.c:382:6
#4 0x5555558365b6 in prepare_multi_pack_index_one ../midx.c:716:17
#5 0x55555586c605 in packfile_store_prepare ../packfile.c:1103:3
#6 0x55555586c90c in packfile_store_reprepare ../packfile.c:1118:2
#7 0x5555558546b3 in odb_reprepare ../odb.c:1106:2
#8 0x5555558539e4 in do_oid_object_info_extended ../odb.c:715:4
#9 0x5555558533d1 in odb_read_object_info_extended ../odb.c:862:8
#10 0x5555558540bd in odb_read_object ../odb.c:920:6
#11 0x55555580a330 in grep_source_load_oid ../grep.c:1934:12
#12 0x55555580a13a in grep_source_load ../grep.c:1986:10
#13 0x555555809103 in grep_source_is_binary ../grep.c:2014:7
#14 0x555555807574 in grep_source_1 ../grep.c:1625:8
#15 0x555555807322 in grep_source ../grep.c:1837:10
#16 0x5555556a5c58 in run ../builtin/grep.c:208:10
#17 0x55555562bb42 in void* ThreadStartFunc<false>(void*) lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#18 0x7ffff7a9a979 in start_thread (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x9a979) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
#19 0x7ffff7b22d2b in __GI___clone3 (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x122d2b) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
The root caues of this leak is the way we set up and release the
submodule:
1. We use `repo_submodule_init()` to initialize a new repository. This
repository is stored in `repos_to_free`.
2. We now read data from the submodule repository.
3. We then call `repo_clear()` on the submodule repositories.
4. `repo_clear()` calls `odb_free()`.
5. `odb_free()` calls `odb_free_sources()` followed by `odb_close()`.
The issue here is the 5th step: we call `odb_free_sources()` _before_ we
call `odb_close()`. But `odb_free_sources()` already frees all sources,
so the logic that closes them in `odb_close()` now becomes a no-op. As a
consequence, we never explicitly close sources at all.
Fix the leak by closing the store before we free the sources.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
When pushing to a set of remotes using a nickname for the group, the
client initializes the connection to each remote, talks to the
remote and reads and parses capabilities line, and holds the
capabilities in a file-scope static variable server_capabilities_v1.
There are a few other such file-scope static variables, and these
connections cannot be parallelized until they are refactored to a
structure that keeps track of active connections.
Which is *not* the theme of this patch ;-)
For a single connection, the server_capabilities_v1 variable is
initialized to NULL (at the program initialization), populated when
we talk to the other side, used to look up capabilities of the other
sdie possible multiple times, and the memory is held by the variable
until program exit, without leaking. When talking to multiple remotes,
however, the server capabilities from the second connection overwrites
without freeing the one from the first connection, which leaks.
==1080970==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 421 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5615305f849e in strdup (/home/gitster/g/git-jch/bin/bin/git+0x2b349e) (BuildId: 54d149994c9e85374831958f694bd0aa3b8b1e26)
#1 0x561530e76cc4 in xstrdup /home/gitster/w/build/wrapper.c:43:14
#2 0x5615309cd7fa in process_capabilities /home/gitster/w/build/connect.c:243:27
#3 0x5615309cd502 in get_remote_heads /home/gitster/w/build/connect.c:366:4
#4 0x561530e2cb0b in handshake /home/gitster/w/build/transport.c:372:3
#5 0x561530e29ed7 in get_refs_via_connect /home/gitster/w/build/transport.c:398:9
#6 0x561530e26464 in transport_push /home/gitster/w/build/transport.c:1421:16
#7 0x561530800bec in push_with_options /home/gitster/w/build/builtin/push.c:387:8
#8 0x5615307ffb99 in do_push /home/gitster/w/build/builtin/push.c:442:7
#9 0x5615307fe926 in cmd_push /home/gitster/w/build/builtin/push.c:664:7
#10 0x56153065673f in run_builtin /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:506:11
#11 0x56153065342f in handle_builtin /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:779:9
#12 0x561530655b89 in run_argv /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:862:4
#13 0x561530652cba in cmd_main /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:984:19
#14 0x5615308dda0a in main /home/gitster/w/build/common-main.c:9:11
#15 0x7f051651bca7 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 421 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
Free the capablities data for the previous server before overwriting
it with the next server to plug this leak.
The added test fails without the freeing with SANITIZE=leak; I
somehow couldn't get it fail reliably with SANITIZE=leak,address
though.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
When pushing to a set of remotes using a nickname for the group, the
client initializes the connection to each remote, talks to the
remote and reads and parses capabilities line, and holds the
capabilities in a file-scope static variable server_capabilities_v1.
There are a few other such file-scope static variables, and these
connections cannot be parallelized until they are refactored to a
structure that keeps track of active connections.
Which is *not* the theme of this patch ;-)
For a single connection, the server_capabilities_v1 variable is
initialized to NULL (at the program initialization), populated when
we talk to the other side, used to look up capabilities of the other
side possibly multiple times, and the memory is held by the variable
until program exit, without leaking. When talking to multiple remotes,
however, the server capabilities from the second connection overwrites
without freeing the one from the first connection, which leaks.
==1080970==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks
Direct leak of 421 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5615305f849e in strdup (/home/gitster/g/git-jch/bin/bin/git+0x2b349e) (BuildId: 54d149994c9e85374831958f694bd0aa3b8b1e26)
#1 0x561530e76cc4 in xstrdup /home/gitster/w/build/wrapper.c:43:14
#2 0x5615309cd7fa in process_capabilities /home/gitster/w/build/connect.c:243:27
#3 0x5615309cd502 in get_remote_heads /home/gitster/w/build/connect.c:366:4
#4 0x561530e2cb0b in handshake /home/gitster/w/build/transport.c:372:3
#5 0x561530e29ed7 in get_refs_via_connect /home/gitster/w/build/transport.c:398:9
#6 0x561530e26464 in transport_push /home/gitster/w/build/transport.c:1421:16
#7 0x561530800bec in push_with_options /home/gitster/w/build/builtin/push.c:387:8
#8 0x5615307ffb99 in do_push /home/gitster/w/build/builtin/push.c:442:7
#9 0x5615307fe926 in cmd_push /home/gitster/w/build/builtin/push.c:664:7
#10 0x56153065673f in run_builtin /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:506:11
#11 0x56153065342f in handle_builtin /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:779:9
#12 0x561530655b89 in run_argv /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:862:4
#13 0x561530652cba in cmd_main /home/gitster/w/build/git.c:984:19
#14 0x5615308dda0a in main /home/gitster/w/build/common-main.c:9:11
#15 0x7f051651bca7 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 421 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
Free the capablities data for the previous server before overwriting
it with the next server to plug this leak.
The added test fails without the freeing with SANITIZE=leak; I
somehow couldn't get it fail reliably with SANITIZE=leak,address
though.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
When performing auto-maintenance we check whether commit graphs need to
be generated by counting the number of commits that are reachable by any
reference, but not covered by a commit graph. This search is performed
by iterating through all references and then doing a depth-first search
until we have found enough commits that are not present in the commit
graph.
This logic has a memory leak though:
Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x55555562e433 in malloc (git+0xda433)
#1 0x555555964322 in do_xmalloc ../wrapper.c:55:8
#2 0x5555559642e6 in xmalloc ../wrapper.c:76:9
#3 0x55555579bf29 in commit_list_append ../commit.c:1872:35
#4 0x55555569f160 in dfs_on_ref ../builtin/gc.c:1165:4
#5 0x5555558c33fd in do_for_each_ref_iterator ../refs/iterator.c:431:12
#6 0x5555558af520 in do_for_each_ref ../refs.c:1828:9
#7 0x5555558ac317 in refs_for_each_ref ../refs.c:1833:9
#8 0x55555569e207 in should_write_commit_graph ../builtin/gc.c:1188:11
#9 0x55555569c915 in maintenance_is_needed ../builtin/gc.c:3492:8
#10 0x55555569b76a in cmd_maintenance ../builtin/gc.c:3542:9
#11 0x55555575166a in run_builtin ../git.c:506:11
#12 0x5555557502f0 in handle_builtin ../git.c:779:9
#13 0x555555751127 in run_argv ../git.c:862:4
#14 0x55555575007b in cmd_main ../git.c:984:19
#15 0x5555557523aa in main ../common-main.c:9:11
#16 0x7ffff7a2a4d7 in __libc_start_call_main (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a4d7) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
#17 0x7ffff7a2a59a in __libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x2a59a) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
#18 0x5555555f0934 in _start (git+0x9c934)
The root cause of this memory leak is our use of `commit_list_append()`.
This function expects as parameters the item to append and the _tail_ of
the list to append. This tail will then be overwritten with the new tail
of the list so that it can be used in subsequent calls. But we call it
with `commit_list_append(parent->item, &stack)`, so we end up losing
everything but the new item.
This issue only surfaces when counting merge commits. Next to being a
memory leak, it also shows that we're in fact miscounting as we only
respect children of the last parent. All previous parents are discarded,
so their children will be disregarded unless they are hit via another
reference.
While crafting a test case for the issue I was puzzled that I couldn't
establish the proper border at which the auto-condition would be
fulfilled. As it turns out, there's another bug: if an object is at the
tip of any reference we don't mark it as seen. Consequently, if it is
reachable via any other reference, we'd count that object twice.
Fix both of these bugs so that we properly count objects without leaking
any memory.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
It is possible to hit a memory leak when reading data from a submodule
via git-grep(1):
Direct leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x55555562e726 in calloc (git+0xda726)
#1 0x555555964734 in xcalloc ../wrapper.c:154:8
#2 0x555555835136 in load_multi_pack_index_one ../midx.c:135:2
#3 0x555555834fd6 in load_multi_pack_index ../midx.c:382:6
#4 0x5555558365b6 in prepare_multi_pack_index_one ../midx.c:716:17
#5 0x55555586c605 in packfile_store_prepare ../packfile.c:1103:3
#6 0x55555586c90c in packfile_store_reprepare ../packfile.c:1118:2
#7 0x5555558546b3 in odb_reprepare ../odb.c:1106:2
#8 0x5555558539e4 in do_oid_object_info_extended ../odb.c:715:4
#9 0x5555558533d1 in odb_read_object_info_extended ../odb.c:862:8
#10 0x5555558540bd in odb_read_object ../odb.c:920:6
#11 0x55555580a330 in grep_source_load_oid ../grep.c:1934:12
#12 0x55555580a13a in grep_source_load ../grep.c:1986:10
#13 0x555555809103 in grep_source_is_binary ../grep.c:2014:7
#14 0x555555807574 in grep_source_1 ../grep.c:1625:8
#15 0x555555807322 in grep_source ../grep.c:1837:10
#16 0x5555556a5c58 in run ../builtin/grep.c:208:10
#17 0x55555562bb42 in void* ThreadStartFunc<false>(void*) lsan_interceptors.cpp.o
#18 0x7ffff7a9a979 in start_thread (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x9a979) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
#19 0x7ffff7b22d2b in __GI___clone3 (/nix/store/xx7cm72qy2c0643cm1ipngd87aqwkcdp-glibc-2.40-66/lib/libc.so.6+0x122d2b) (BuildId: cddea92d6cba8333be952b5a02fd47d61054c5ab)
The root caues of this leak is the way we set up and release the
submodule:
1. We use `repo_submodule_init()` to initialize a new repository. This
repository is stored in `repos_to_free`.
2. We now read data from the submodule repository.
3. We then call `repo_clear()` on the submodule repositories.
4. `repo_clear()` calls `odb_free()`.
5. `odb_free()` calls `odb_free_sources()` followed by `odb_close()`.
The issue here is the 5th step: we call `odb_free_sources()` _before_ we
call `odb_close()`. But `odb_free_sources()` already frees all sources,
so the logic that closes them in `odb_close()` now becomes a no-op. As a
consequence, we never explicitly close sources at all.
Fix the leak by closing the store before we free the sources.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
So with these fixes all tests pass here.
I still have occasionally a few "vanished known breakages" but these are not reproducible and seems to be triggered by high level of test parallelism.