South Korean Submarines, 3,000+ ton KSS-III, Nuclear Potential

See detail on possible South Korean nuclear submarine technology in redded KSS-N sub-heading below.

One of South Korea's (international convention of just "Korea" now used) nine Chang Bogo class (KSS-Is). Korea is completing a sale of three to Indonesia.

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One of Korea's four Son Won-Il class (KSS-IIs) in commision - five to go. Larger than the KSS-I and AIP equipped. Looks like a pre-launch ceremony. 

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With the KSS-III being described as a "3,000 tonne submarine" for a decade the above dimensions (very similar to the single hull Collins) may be accurate. The "3,000 t" would be surfaced displacement.

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A larger KSS-III? If its length is really 83.5 m and breadth/beam 7.7 m, then compared with the Collins (77.4 m, 7.8 m) the KSS-III's displacement appears to be around 3,400 tonnes (surfaced) and 3,800 tonnes (submerged). There are many other variables in estimating displacement of course! Other possibilities are that the above is a "4,000 t" nuclear KSS-N? or 83.5 is propaganda to equal the Soryu's 84 m length.

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Another model of what the KSS-III may turn out like. It appears to have 6 VLS hatches but a 6 missile Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) is more likely.
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South Korea (international convention of just "Korea" now used) has a long and competitive ship-building tradition. Korea has the world's largest ship-building industry - with 41% of world market share (in first quarter 2015). This has put Korea in a good position to build German TKMS-HDW designed submarines (from kits?) since 1990. Korea has also has submarine export success and is perhaps well prepared to develop a 3,000-4,000 tonne conventional submarine. It faces threats even greater than Japan does - having a land border with North Korea and in much closer proximity to China. The Korean Navy has publicised its creation of a Submarine Command for reasons difficult to discern but perhaps to suggest an eventual capability of a pre-emptive or second strike nuclear deterrent.

South Korea's KSS-I, KSS-II and KSS-III building program suggest a goal of having a rolling average of at least 18 submarines operational and perhaps 22 to match Japan's medium term goal. The so-called "indigenous" submarine (KSS-III) project may still draw heavily on TKMS-HDW technology but "indigenous" also provides ambiguity if Korea needs to develop KSS-III into a nuclear propelled submarine "KSS-N" possibly nuclear armed. 

South Korea's strategy includes the creation of a pre-emptive strike "kill chain" (of threat detection, decision making-authorisation and (mainly missile) pre-emptive strike) against North Korea. Submarines would be a (or the) principal pre-emptive strike and counter-strike platform. Subsonic cruise missiles are generally too slow for these roles - making supersonic+ cruise and ballistic missiles the logical solution.

Used South Korean has two Dolgorae class mini submarines (above) launched 1990 and 1991, 175 tons, with two small 410mm torpedo tubes. They have crews of 14 and may be used for surveillance and perhaps special forces. They were acquired by South Korea to obtain initial experience with the basics of operating a submarine force and to train surface ASW ships in the detection of subs.

In 2011 South Korea indicated it would be building new mini-subs, known as KSS-500As, weighing 510 tons. They may operate only on Lithium-ion Batteries and diesel engines. 

KSS-Is and KSS-IIs

Korea's navy operates:

- 9 Chang Bogo class (KSS-I), a variant of the TKMS-HDW type 209/1200. In 2011 Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) won a contract to supply Indonesia with two pre-assembled Chang Bogos (to be delivered probably in 2016-2017) with a third Chang Bogo to be assembled in Indonesia (perhaps the beginning of an indigenous Indonesian production line!). The 9 KSS-Is have been regularly upgraded which may extend their service life past the usual 30 years. A major future upgrade may be Lithium-ion batteries fully or partly replacing lead-acid batteries - although such a retrofit may be very difficult. See NTI document for names of specific, commissioned KSS-Is and KSS-IIs up to 2011.

-  4 Son Won-Il class (KSS-II) as at April 2015. Five more are due to be commissioned by 2020. These are variants of the TKMS-HDW Type 214 submarines. Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) built the first three (commissioned 2007-2009). DSME, HHI and STX Offshore & Shipbuilding are alternately building the second batch of six with one of the six commissioned in December 2014 and the final one due to be commissioned in 2018. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs carry some US built Harpoon missiles for anti-ship and possibly land attack. Like the KSS-Is the KSS-IIs are orientated to a surveillance, anti-shipping, anti-submarine and (a short range) land attack capability. 

KSS-III, 3,000-4,000 tonne Design - Conventional and Potentially Nuclear  

There will be eventually 9 (KSS-III) 3,000-4,000 tonne submarines.  See the 3rd and 4th pictues above that contain varying dimentions attributed to the KSS-III (also called "DSX-3000") which indicate its surfaced displacement may be anywhere between 3,000 and 3,400 tonnes. DSME will be the main designer. The lead KSS-III boat began development in November 2014 at DSME's submarine yard at Okpo. It my be a major step forward in utilising Lithium-ion Batteries (LIBs). The second batch of KSS-IIIs (especially if they use new technology LIBs) may take 8 years to build and launch (2024) and then 3 years to commission (about 2027). 

The larger size of the KSS-III will permit it to include some of the latest submarine technologies, including:

- large diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (LDUUVs)
- Seal/diver delivery vehicles (SDVs)
- dry-wet cells for special forces in dinghies/divers/Seals
- VLS or more probably the major advance of Vertical Multi Purpose Lock (VMPL) capable of launching 1,500+ km cruise and Harpoon missiles,, VMPLs are also capable of launching LDUUVs and SDVs. 

As well as retaining fuel cell (or less likely Stirling) AIP, KSS-IIIs could also incorporate features from the TKMS-HDW Dolphin 2 including the large rudder system and reinforced hull bottom which allow such a large SSK to operate in shallow, littoral waters. Also Germany's TKMS-HDW could provide assistance using features from the so-far drawing board only HDW 216 (intended to be a 3,000+ tonne design). 

One additional reason Korea is going the indigenously developed submarine route is that international political pressure on Germany would probably prevent Germany from openly assisting South Korea to develop the KSS-III in the medium-long term into a nuclear propelled KSS-N submarine, possibly armed with nuclear weapons.

The capability to use Tomahawk or indigenous Hyunmoo-3 series cruise missiles of 1,500+ km (far longer than the 140 km range KSS-I/KSS-IIs UGM-84 Harpoons) potentially makes the KSS-III much more effective against such additional threats as China and Russia. The future KSS-IIIs may also be capable of firing ballastic missiles.

The US may have been politically unwilling to supply the Tomahawk to Korea. Instead Korea appears to have incorporated many of Tomahawk's features into the Hyunmoo-3 series. By building an indigenous missile, warhead ambiguity is introduced. Korea is one of those countries (like Japan) that could develop a nuclear weapon in less than a year. Miniaturisation may be a major hurdle but a Hyunmoo-3 (or other cruise missiles) could trade range to achieve a heavier warhead than 500 kg.

KSS-III could best be described as multi-purpose. For a medium sized navy like Korea's KSS-IIIs (or KSS-Ns) could combine some of the capabilities that larger navies cover more comprehensively with distinctly different types, such as SSKs, SSNs, SSGNs and SSBNs. 

KSS-N, a Nuclear Development of the KSS-III? 

Korea appears to have long maintained an option of a KSS-N (also called KSSX-N and SSX) a 4,000+ ton nuclear propelled development of the KSS-III. On past plans see Globalsecurity.com report. However to date any plan has not occurred due to pressure from all of Korea's neighbours, US opposition and the necessity of building an indigenous submarine rather than a submarine that heavily relies on a foreign country (Germany). Also a nuclear propelled Korean submarine would diminish any chance that North Korea would remove/destroy its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Korea might develop the KSS-N submarine if threats against it sufficiently increase and/or US military support diminishes.

Korea has long and extensive experience building nuclear power reactors - mostly large but still useful in any future development of submarine reactors. Interestingly DSME (as at April 2015) appears to be designing a "nuclear propulsion [surface] ship". This would have the legitimate purpose of meeting market demand for nuclear propelled, very large, ice-breaking, oil and LNG tankers. This activity also provides dual-use potential for submerged nuclear propulsion. 

In terms of an actual reactor technology path the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) is also operating and further developing a small 100 MW ("SMART") pressurised water reactor with a output (at least) that may suite a 4,000 ton KSS-N. The SMART reactor's main current weakness is that it uses 5% enriched Uranium (U) 235 providing a poor power to size/weight ratio. 5% means SMART presently needs three year (overly frequent) refueling. Korea probably could legitimately develop the SMART at a higher (ice breaker surface ship) U enrichment percentage to make it much more useful as a submarine reactor. Korea has been seeking IAEA-US permission to develop a greater U enrichment capability but has been blocked. Although at a small amount-laboratory level Korea has a proven Uranium enrichment ability.

So Korea's indigenous submarine (KSS-III) program is well worth watching for its potential.

I'll do an article on North Korea's submarine situation in the future.

More Sources

http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-korea-submarine-capabilities/

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/sea-air-space/2015/04/12/korea-south-north-navy-modernize-coastal-scandal-sub-helicopter-frigate/25512681/

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/kss-n.htm

Pete

Combat System for Australia's Future Submarine?

Some of the components of the Collins US made AN/BYG-1 Combat System. The AN/BYG-1 will very likely be integrated into Australia's Future Submarine.

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Much information and many links have been kindly provided by MHalblaub. 

A combat system is a system of sensors (SONAR, electronic warfare, air-surface detection, navigation systems, communications) databases, for decision making, close-in steering and targeting. The combat system interacts with and includes all of a submarine's weapons.

The combat system Australia has already chosen is the:

- the evolved GENERAL DYNAMICS AN/BYG-1 Tactical Control System (TCS). As well as General Dynamics (another website)  Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are systems integrators for AN/BYG-1 - making the AN/BYG-1 even more of a multi-corporate responsibility proposition than SUBTICS.  

Australia is very accustomed to the AN/BYG-1 and the US and Australia are constantly refining it. The AN/BYG-1 is apparently used on all US SSNs (Seawolf Class with AN/BYG-2 upgrade) and SSGNs as well as SSKs from:

Spain (S-80)
Brazil (Tupi Class (Type 209))
Canada (Victoria Class)

The AN/BYG-1 is closely integrated with the Collins weapons including the American made Mk 48 torpedoes, Harpoon missiles. The Collins is (US Tomahawk SLCM capable. The mines are UK made.

The AN/BYG-1 is designed to work closely with the SeaWeb surveillance system.  For possible positions of the SeaWeb as it covers East Asia see Submarine Matter's How to Trap the Chinese Dragon - SeaWeb's Fixed Undersea Array, September 4, 2015.

SOURCES POINTING AT PREFERENCE FOR US

It is widely believed that (around 2000?) the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and Submarine Capability Team recommended the RAN acquire the ISUS 90 system. However the Australian Cabinet favoured US systems.

See  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/05/a-new-australian-submarine-with-aip.html In October 2009 Australia's then Minister of Defence Material Greg Combet, speaking still current RAN views, indicated  that the US would play a big part in developing Australia's future submarine. The Sydney Morning Herald recorded what Mr Combet said on October 6, 2009. http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/us-to-play-key-role-in-new-aussie-subs-20091006-gky2.html: "US 'to play key role' in new Aussie subs" October 6, 2009...

"Australia wants the assistance of the United States as it looks to replace the Collins class submarines, junior defence minister Greg Combet says.
"...I expect that Australia will look to learn from companies like General Dynamics Electric Boat and Lockheed Martin in designing and developing the Collins class replacement," he said in a statement.
"...US technology is likely to be an important facilitator of this capability," he said.

See http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2012/06/australias-future-submarine-selection-s.html of 20 January 2014 - Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – 2013 Defence White Paper: The Future Submarine Program 3 May 2013 http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/03/prime-minister-minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-2013-defence-white-paper-the-future-submarine-program-2/

"...The Government has also taken the important decision to use the United States AN/BYG-1 combat system as the reference system for future design work.  The early definition of a combat system is a feature of a successful submarine program.  It allows the submarine design to proceed utilising more accurate projections of space, weight and power requirements."

Also see  SEA 1439 PHASE 4A - COLLINS CLASS REPLACEMENT COMBAT SYSTEM http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/msd/sea1439/index.cfm concerning an upgrade process of the AN/BYG-1 combat system conducted jointly by the US and Australia up to 2019 “in conjunction with the Replacement [amounting to upgrades of the US Mk 48] Heavyweight Torpedo (Project SEA 1429)” which points to future integration with US weapons.

- Some 2011 US RAND Corporation studies http://www.rand.org/topics/submarines.html concerning Australian submarine issues needs to be added.

An excellent source on Combat Systems generally and by system-maker is Norman Friedman The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems 5^th edn, 2006, pp. 133-156, text online

Germany's TKMS-HDW also has experience in integrating the AN/BYG-1 with Brazil's Type 209 submarines to take the US Mark 48 torpedo and US Harpoon missile. Therefore HDW should have no problem integrating AN/BYG-1.  German designed submarines are compatible with the US submarine Harpoon missile in several countries (South Korea (in Australia’s region) Greece, Turkey, and Israel). 

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Other Combat Systems not chosen:

Components of the ATLAS ELEKTRONIK's 

 Integrated Sensor Underwater System - ISUS 90 (or the more advanced ISUS 2000) one likely contender for Australia's Future Submarine

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- the ATLAS ELEKTRONIK ISUS 90 (or the more advanced ISUS 2000) with ATLAS is owned by ThyssenKrupp and Airbus DS. ThyssenKrupp owns Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) the world's largest conventional submarine builder. The prospect of the one major company, TKMS, through HDW and Atlas offering the submarine and combat system (respectively) to Australia makes sense. ISUS means Integrated Sensor Underwater System

ATLAS ELEKTRONIK's ISUS 90 sales statement http://www.atlas-elektronik.com/what-we-do/submarine-systems/isus90-combat-system/ includes:

"ATLAS ELEKTRONIK is the undisputed technology and world market leader in command and weapon control systems for non-nuclear submarines. Our “Integrated Sensor Underwater System” (ISUS) is based on many years of experience, is tried and tested, is always at the latest technological level and, thanks to its modular structure and open system architecture, can easily be adapted to suit individual customer requirements and diverse operational scenarios. It enables the submarine crew to fully perceive their surroundings and to analyse the situation in detail, permitting a rapid and reliable response...The quality, reliability and performance of this system is unparalleled worldwide. And this technology lead is highly valued by our clients: ISUS is well-established at more than ten navies around the globe; our sonar systems are in service with over two dozen navies."

The ISUS 90 is on many of HDW's all export Type 209 and 214 submarines

For more ISUS 90 details see http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/43/ISUS-90-Powers-Ahead
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A dramatised (eg. periscope raised) animation of an attack using DCNS SUBTICS Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System.

- SUBTICS or Submarine Tactical Integrated Combat System, offered by DCNS. System developed by Thales Underwater Systems-naval submarine division (Thales owns 25% of DCNS) and UDS Internatonal (all very complex and mixed up French corporate and government share holding-ownership - beyond comprehension). SUBTICS varies according to performances and integration level, in utilising sensors and weapons. It is used on all French Navy SSNs and SSBNs and has been chosen to equip next SSN generation Barracuda. 

On export markets, it is selected to equip every new submarines of Agosta, Scorpene and Andrasta types and to modernize submarines such as the Type 209. 

• Submarines are increasingly faced with various missions including littoral and blue-water operations, stand-alone missions or within a naval force. SUBTICS indicates it can offer:
• Efficient acoustic sensors including low frequency arrays and scalable data processing offering outstanding detection abilities of distant targets at high speed; 
• Efficient non acoustic sensors on the surface and at periscope depth offering a high level of discretion; 
• Communication facilities (from VLF to SHF), noiseless and fully integrated allowing submarine to interact in real time within a force;
• Data synthesis from every sensors (optical, optronic, R-ESM and C-ESM, radar);
• Advanced, automatic and interactive target motion analysis Tracks identification and classification functionality;
• Track fusion and association through an interactive track management tool; 
• Tactical, command and engagement aids with regard to geographical and tactical environment 
• Tactical Data Links operation; and
• Fire and weapon control Torpedoes : F17, SUT 266, TP617, Black Shark, F21 Missiles : SM39 and land-attack capability

SUBTICS provides systems for more than "40" vessels from 9 different Navies (including France).

• Brazil (4 Scorpene being built) 1 SSN (to be built)
• Chile (2 Scorpene, 2 Type 209)
• Ecuador (2 Type 209)
• India, (in the 4 Type 209 “Shishumar” class?)
• Malaysia (2 Scorpene)
• Pakistan (Agosta 90B, Khalid Classes),
• Singapore (4 Challenger, 2 Archer Class) Type 218SG will not be using the French SUBTICS - instead using an Atlas Elektronik and ST Electronics designed system.
• Venezuela (2 unserviceable Type 209)

CONCLUSION

Australia is very accustomed to the US AN/BYG-1 and several conventional submarine companies have experience in integrating the AN/BYG-1 with conventional submarines. Also the US is Australia's most important ally.

The extent that Japan may also draw on US combat system technology is unknown but an indicator  Japan may use something like the US combat sytstem comes from the weapons the Soryu is known to use. The Soryu uses a heavy weight torpedo thought to be very similar to the Mark 48 used by the US and Australia. The Soryu uses the US Harpoon short-medium range cruise missile and Japan is probably in early talks with the US concerning the longer range Tomahawk cruise missile (a missile Australia also wishes to acquire).

Pete

SEA 1000 Continued - Maybe no VLS and no LockMart



So many choices for Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) or broader term Vertical Multi-Purpose Locks (VMPL). Nice to have - adding strategic and tactical flexibility - but very heavy and expensive for a diesel-electric submarine limited to 4,500 tonnes (submerged).

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The following is MHalblaub's comment of "Australian SEA 1000 future submaine - an S-80 development or HDW 216?" of November 30, 2013 at http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/australian-sea-1000-future-submaine-s.html

"Dear Pete,

our view coincide that SEA 1000 is a very ambitious project. Just like the F-35. Ambitious defence projects tend to be delayed and more expensive than expected. In my opinion both projects are far too ambitious.

That any submarine has to use a Lockheed Martin SUBIC combat system will not enhance the development time. The decision to use this combat system is not based on requirements. In my opinion it is only based on cronyism because nobody tried to ask if Australia could get better insight in another system.

A vertical launch system (VLS) is nice to have in case of a real big submarine like the Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock (VMPL) on planed Type 216. You said many missiles could be fired at once from one submarine. My argument is that for one big SEA 1000 submarine at a cost of A$3 billion each Australia could buy 4 small submarines instead with capability to fire even more missiles at once.

For a "piggyback" submarine a VMPL is also unnecessary. A26 or 210mod are planned with a big “torpedo” tube for special purpose. http://www.thyssenkrupp-marinesystems.com/en/hdw-class-210mod.html A smaller submarine can get closer to the shore and the "piggyback" sub doesn’t have to be big.

You have the fear an "interim" sub could become a permanent fix. My fear is that without an interim solution Australia will have no operational submarine in the future. A big submarine even with support by DCNS or HDW and interference by ASC will not be ready before 2030. Navantia is troubled to get the S-80 working. A sole Australian submarine solution might be ready in 2040 (IOC). A small “Off The Shelf” (OTS) solution could be built fast in case no big changes were made to sonar system, command and control system, torpedoes …

I also doubt the claim it would be uneconomic to operate two types of submarines at once. At the moment RAN operates one very uneconomic type of submarine. Does RAN also operate just one type of surface ships because this is more economic? Do you think the F-35 will be the only fighter aircraft for RAAF?

Even with SEA 1000 RAN will operate two types at once for a while. I expect it will be a very unreliable Collins-class with incredible maintenance costs and a troubled SEA 1000 program with many delays.

What about politics? Do you think Australia could use an US built nuclear submarine for any mission without restrictions from Washington? Maybe the best solution would be two or three Virginia-class submarines and a fleet of “cheap” small submarines.

Missile systems:
The seeker system of a Popeye missile was build to hit land targets while the Harpoon was initially built against ships. Therefore I think Israel did use Popeye missiles with a 50 % bigger and better suited warhead.

Regards,
MHalblaub

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Pete's Response 

Hi MHalblaub

Not only is SEA 1000's plans to develop an Australia only SSK ambitious, expensive and highly risky but Australia's planned future purchase of 100 Lockheed Martin F-35s from around 2016 would frustrate and delay any major expenditure on the SEA 1000 project.

The purchase of a Lockheed Martin submarine combat system may indeed add risk to the SEA 1000 project given Lockheed Martin has established a convincing reputation for over-time and over-budget. The extent of Lockheed Martin's political, hence market, power in the US conquers mere considerations of cost and efficiency.

A Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock (VMPL) (of course with VLS capabilities) may indeed be a heavy luxury that may not bring sufficient benefits. Tomahawks fired from 6 standard horizontal tubes could be achieved quickly.

On mini piggy back subs and diver exit I noticed "The Collins class boats are also capable of supporting special forces teams. In 2005, Collins was fitted with various modifications to support special forces, including exterior shelters for inflatable boats. [HMAS] Dechaineux was modified in 2006, and the other submarines will receive the hatches during their full cycle docking." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine#Armament

To avoid what I still see overly problematic options of an interim sub or two SSK designs operating simultaneously the only solution might be to buy a large existing design Off The Shelf. This could be from the most experienced exporters-indigenous build supporters which are DCNS and HDW. In comparison Navantia with its currently troubled S-80 design has comparatively little submarine building experience and no independent sub export or indigenous sub build support experience.

Unfortunately Navantia's problems in themselves might form a sufficient recipe for Navantia's selection by Australia. Our acquisition trend is frequently weighted in favour of choosing under-developed, hence problematic designs like the F-111, then the Collins and now Australia believes itself committed to 100 troubled F-35s.

A DCNS (SSK or SSK transition to SSN) will be considered in following articles as will the Japanese Soryu Class .

Mission restrictions may well be a problem from choosing a US (SSN) or Japanese (SSK) design. But then again the political and strategic advantages of choosing a design from an Asia-Pacific ally like the US and Japan must be factored in.

Regarding Israel's recent use of possible a Harpoon land attack or Popeye missile the issue becomes even more clouded with:

"The Harpoon Block II adds GPS guidance, improved processing that helps it distinguish targets amidst near-shore “clutter,” and land attack features. Harpoon competes with Israel’s own ship-borne Gabriel 3 anti-ship missile ; Israel’s Navy operates both types," http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/israel-requests-642m-in-missiles-fuel-03682/

Regards

Pete

Australian SEA 1000 future submaine - an S-80 development or HDW 216?

 A rough sketch of the Navantia S-80 submarine. This sub is still being built-developed and might be launched in 2015.

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Concerning my article of November 22, 2013, "Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements." http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/ongoing-debate-on-australias-sea-1000.html MHalblaub commented:

"Hi Pete,

do you think the US are unreliable allies? That was my thought reading RAN has to shadow a fast going nuclear powered submarine (SNN) for a week. I doubt that there will be within the next 10 years any technique for a conventional submarine to maintain submerged about 20 knots for more than 24 hours. Therefore the only solution would be a SNN, to wait or to trust the US.

I am well aware that the small HDW 210mod falls short of the SEA 1000 requirements. In my eyes these requirements are the wet dreams of some Admirals.

A greater range would be useful. A bigger weapons load is nice to have. The 8+ VLS are also a nice to have but they could also be tube launched. Btw Popeyes in action: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/

The British Astute-class submarines can also fire Tomahawks without an US combat system.

The problem for Royal Australian Navy will be the gap between Collins-class retirement and entry into service of SEA 1000 submarines. Australia can throw a lot of money after the Collins-class to keep them running until 2030. Today the price for one HDW Type 210 is about the costs Australia needs to maintain Collins-class for one year. The maintenance costs for Collins-class will awfully rise in the future.

My advice would be to order as soon as possible 6 Type 210mod/A 26 to fill this gap. 5 submarines should be built in Australia. That will give Australia time and knowledge to design a proper submarine. This interim solution would also save a lot of money and add capabilities.

Australia should not try to reinvent wheels that already exist in far better quality. E.g. engines, AIP, combat system, … That will lead to a troubled and outdated son of Collins – just like the father.

Regards,
MHalblaub
(I tried two times to log me in …)

AIP: Direct Methanol Fuel Cell: http://www.sfc-defense.com/products

November 22, 2013"

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Pete's Comments

My response is that I think the US are reliable allies that provide Australia with security benefits in peacetime and would be an essential ally if Australia faced an enemy too big for Australia to handle alone.

You are right that no non-nuclear propulsion would allow an Australian submarine to shadow a fast moving SSN for a week. And yes the only options are for an Australian SSN or reliance on US SSNs to do fast moving shadowing.

It is true the SEA 1000 requirements are very ambitious. They would require a unique, new, very large diesel-electric submarine (SSK) or an SSN.

The value of a VLS is its flexibility eg. for: a divers wet-dry chamber; a hatch for a mini "piggyback" sub; and to fire cruise or small ballistic missiles. For missile firing the main value of a VLS is the low indiscretion factor - meaning the sub can fire all (say) 8 missiles very quickly - reducing that chance that the sub will be detected while firing. Using horizontal tubes probably involves "slow time" reloads of missiles or of follow-up torpedos.

Regarding http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2013_07_14/Israel-hits-Syria-to-destroy-Russian-made-Yakhont-anti-ship-missiles-3943/ its quite possible Popeyes were not used. The target was in range of Israel's Harpoon SLCMs. It would therefore have been unnecessary for Israel to use its (perhaps) 1,500 km range Popeye SLCMs and there would have been a risk a malfunctioning Popeye would crash and then its technical secrets might be revealed. If the Popeye SLCMs have a 1,500 km range (see http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/israel-submarine-capabilities/) its more likely they would be used for targets deep inland like Tehran or even Riyadh.

Yes its true the British Astute class SSN is a possibility. However any purchase of a French or UK SSN has the disadvantage that their maintenance-repair bases are around 20,000 km away in Northern Europe or effectively further if the Suez Canal is blocked in wartime. Meanwhile the US provides some SSN maintenance facilities much closer in Diego Garcia, Guam and certainly Pearl Harbour.

The Royal Australian Navy would be very aware that an "interim" sub choice might become permanent. The fixed costs of any sub choice are high - therefore making interim highly uneconomic as would running two different sub types simultaneously.

In any case the HDW 210 is basically the smallest of the HDW range (with the even smaller HDW 206 being phased out). This makes the HDW 210 the least likely HDW Australia might buy. The bigger the better in terms of range and endurance - making a very large version of the HDW 212-214 basically a HDW 800 Dolphin+ the most likely buy from HDW.

An HDW Dolphin+ is on the way to an even larger (but technically and financially high risk)  HDW 216 in response to SEA 1000 requirements. It needs to be remembered though that the US (Lockheed Martin) may well not make its highly developed combat system available to HDW. Against this HDW is probably the world's most experienced and productive builder of conventional diesel-electric subs.

In contrast I understand Lockheed Martin is placing its combat system into the Spanish Navantia S-80. It is significant that Australia might have confidence in dealing with Navantia in submarine development because I believe Australia has a positive relationship with Navantia in the current Canberra LHD and Hobart AWD projects. Against this Navantia has never independently built and then launched an operational submarine. Navantia has also had no independent experience building subs for export or assisting a customer to build a sub

Possibly I'm overrating the importance of the Lockheed Martin SUBICs combat system in the SEA 1000 submarine selection - see http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/193/SEA-1000-COMBAT-SYSTEMS-SELECTION-FOR-SEA-1000 .

While Kockums submarine division's future is in doubt Australia developing an A26 or any other Kockums design is unlikely.

Definitely "Australia should not try to reinvent wheels" and should avoid a repeat of the Collins experience.

I also have had problems logging-in or commenting on some blogger-blogspot sites - probably some technical problem involving blogger-blogspot or even of its Google owner.

Regards

Pete

Ongoing debate on Australia's SEA 1000 future submarine requirements.



The HDW Type 210mod "Ula Class" submarine specifically built for Norwegian conditions, with a submerged displacement of 1,150 tons.



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For the latest on Australia's future submarine issue see June 11, 2014’s Australia's Future Submarine - Swedish vs German Claims http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2014/06/australias-future-submarine-swedish-vs.html . 



For my preceding post "Australian SEA 1000 Future Submarine, shipbuilding-budgeting issues"   http://gentleseas.blogspot.com.au/2013/11/australian-naval-shipbuilding-and.html Anonymous has commented as follows:

"Anonymous said...

So what is the military issue behind a bigger son of Collins-class?

Range of a Collins-class submarine today is reached by even smaller submarines like Type210mod or A26. To gather intelligence a small submarine is better suited and a diesel-electric submarine is even quieter than a large Virginia-class submarine.

What about crew size? A Virginia-class submarine is manned with about 130 men. A modern Type210mod needs just 15 men (21 for 3-watch). Therefore 3 crews of Virginias 26 small submarines could be manned. For price of one Virginia class submarine Australia could get at least 4 Type210. For A$30billion Australia could buy more than 40 Type210mod.

This submarine could be built in Australia. The advantage of building a steady stream of small submarines is to include improvements in the next batch and to keep the knowledge alive how to build them.

Just 3 operational submarines are easier to track and even very fast submarines can’t be everywhere at once. Also a fast submarine is very noisy. A trip around Australia is roughly 7,000 nm. For each submarine 2,300 nm to patrol. With 26 submarines the area is less than 300 nm. With just 3 operational submarines it is very hard to lose one with a crew of over 100 men.

US combat System due to US weapons? What a nonsense! South Korea ChangBogo-class (Type 209) can fire Harpoon missiles. If Raytheon dislikes selling some Tomahawks Australia could just ask Israel about some Popeyes. Israel operates Popeyes on Dolphin-class submarines (Type 209).

Oh, more range. What about submarine tenders? Even the US Navy has a few.

Going big will result in too few submarines. Going to Virginia will add a capability already existing in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. After 6 or 12 small submarines Australia can still switch to a larger submarine type but then with better knowledge.

November 22, 2013

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On this current post I am responding with:

Hi Anonymous

The HDW 210mod and all existing SSKs (including the current sized S-80) fall far short of Australian SEA 1000 (future submarine) requirements.

The SEA 1000 submarine needs range, endurance, speed, multi-mission capabilities and weapons load far above existing SSKs.

If you compare the totality of HDW 209, 210mod ("Ula"), 212 or 214's published capabilities with Collins http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine you'll see the difference.

Note that SEA 1000 needs higher capabilities than even the Collins, especially for the added weapons load of 8+ Tomahawks in a VLS and an AIP capability (achieved by "usual" AIP, advanced batteries or nuclear).

Ideally an SEA 1000 should be operationally autonomous (from US SSNs) and hence capable of shadowing a fast moving SSN for at least a week.

The crew size of 135 for a Virginia being much larger than for SSKs (or the 60 for a future French Barracuda SSN) is indeed an issue.

Tomahawk is a requirement because Harpoon missiles are far too short in range for many land attack scenarios and because Tomahawk is US combat system compatible.

There are too many current uncertainties about the suspected Israeli SLCM Popeye. Popeye may include considerable "off the books" US, French and/or Indian content making it difficult for Israel to export.

Regards

Pete