Terrorism - Where We stand

The past year was relatively quiet on the blow-up-an-American front, but the New Year has already started out with a bit of excitement. Personally, I think that a lot of people got hysterical, although a good deal of that can probably be chalked up to general anti-Obamaism and overall Republican idiocy. Nevertheless, the threat to Americans is quite real, and one would have to be deliberately stupid to think that terrorists, including domestically-originating mad bombers, have ceased to exit.

The debate about the usefulness (not to mention the legality) of CIA operatives and independent orgs like Xe has not even started, but somebody's got to do something, although I would leave the National Guard and the Marines at home. Our military is going to seriously crack if the neo-liberals and neo-conservatives aren't finally shunted aside and out of the Pentagon, not to mention the national security councils.

Regardless, if you don't know where you are, it's hard to pick a way out, so here's an overview of where we stand vis-a-vis the organized terrorist situation, via Stratfor.



Jihadism in 2010: The Threat Continues

By Scott Stewart

For the past several years, STRATFOR has published an annual forecast on al Qaeda and the jihadist movement. Since our first jihadist forecast in January 2006, we have focused heavily on the devolution of jihadism from a phenomenon primarily involving the core al Qaeda group to one based mainly on the wider jihadist movement and the devolving, decentralized threat it poses.

The central theme of last year’s forecast was that al Qaeda was an important force on the ideological battlefield, but that the efforts of the United States and its allies had marginalized the group on the physical battlefield and kept it bottled up in a limited geographic area. Because of this, we forecast that the most significant threat in terms of physical attacks stemmed from regional jihadist franchises and grassroots operatives and not the al Qaeda core. We also wrote that we believed the threat posed by such attacks would remain tactical and not rise to the level of a strategic threat. To reflect this reality, we even dropped al Qaeda from the title of our annual forecast and simply named it Jihadism in 2009: The Trends Continue.

The past year proved to be very busy in terms of attacks and thwarted plots emanating from jihadist actors. But, as forecast, the primary militants involved in carrying out these terrorist plots were almost exclusively from regional jihadist groups and grassroots operatives, and not militants dispatched by the al Qaeda core. We anticipate that this dynamic will continue, and if anything, the trend will be for some regional franchise groups to become even more involved in transnational attacks, thus further usurping the position of al Qaeda prime at the vanguard of jihadism on the physical battlefield.

A Note on ‘Al Qaeda’

As a quick reminder, STRATFOR views what most people refer to as “al Qaeda” as a global jihadist network rather than a monolithic entity. This network consists of three distinct entities. The first is a core vanguard organization, which we frequently refer to as al Qaeda prime or the al Qaeda core. The al Qaeda core is comprised of Osama bin Laden and his small circle of close, trusted associates, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. Due to intense pressure by the U.S. government and its allies, this core group has been reduced in size since 9/11 and remains relatively small because of operational security concerns. This insular group is laying low in Pakistan near the Afghan border and comprises only a small portion of the larger jihadist universe.

The second layer of the network is composed of local or regional terrorist or insurgent groups that have adopted jihadist ideology. Some of these groups have publicly claimed allegiance to bin Laden and the al Qaeda core and become what we refer to as franchise groups, like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Other groups may adopt some or all of al Qaeda’s jihadist ideology and cooperate with the core group, but they will maintain their independence for a variety of reasons. Such groups include the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami (HUJI). Indeed, in the case of some larger organizations such as LeT, some of the group’s factions may actually oppose close cooperation with al Qaeda.

The third and broadest layer of the network is the grassroots jihadist movement, that is, people inspired by the al Qaeda core and the franchise groups but who may have little or no actual connection to these groups.

As we move down this hierarchy, we also move down in operational capability and expertise in what we call terrorist tradecraft — the set of skills required to conduct a terrorist attack. The operatives belonging to the al Qaeda core are generally better trained than their regional counterparts, and both of these layers tend to be far better trained than the grassroots operatives. Indeed, many grassroots operatives travel to places like Pakistan and Yemen in order to seek training from these other groups.

The Internet has long proved to be an important tool for these groups to reach out to potential grassroots operatives. Jihadist chat rooms and Web sites provide indoctrination in jihadist ideology and also serve as a means for aspiring jihadists to make contact with like-minded individuals and even the jihadist groups themselves.

2009 Forecast Review

Overall, our 2009 forecast was fairly accurate. As noted above, we wrote that the United States would continue its operations to decapitate the al Qaeda core and that this would cause the group to be marginalized from the physical jihad, and that has happened.

While we missed forecasting the resurgence of jihadist militant groups in Yemen and Somalia in 2008, in our 2009 forecast we covered these two countries carefully. We wrote that the al Qaeda franchises in Yemen had taken a hit in 2008 but that they could recover in 2009 given the opportunity. Indeed, the groups received a significant boost when they merged into a single group that also incorporated the remnants of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, which had been forced by Saudi security to flee the country. We closely followed this new group, which named itself al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and STRATFOR was the first organization we know of to discuss the threat AQAP posed to civil aviation when we raised this subject on Sept. 2 and elaborated on it Sept. 16, in an analysis titled Convergence: The Challenge of Aviation Security. That threat manifested itself in the attempt to destroy an airliner traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 — an operation that very nearly succeeded.

Regarding Somalia, we have also been closely following al Shabaab and the other jihadist groups there, such as Hizbul Islam. Al Shabaab publicly pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in September 2009 and therefore has formally joined the ranks of al Qaeda’s regional franchise groups. However, as we forecast last January, while the instability present in Somalia provides al Shabaab the opportunity to flourish, the factionalization of the country (including the jihadist groups operating there) has also served to keep al Shabaab from dominating the other actors and assuming control of the country.

We also forecast that, while Iraq had been relatively quiet in 2008, the level of violence there could surge in 2009 due to the Awakening Councils being taken off the U.S. payroll and having their control transferred to the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government, which might not pay them and integrate them into the armed forces. Indeed, since August, we have seen three waves of major coordinated attacks against Iraqi ministry buildings in Baghdad linked to the al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq. Since this violence is tied to the political situation in Iraq, and there is a clear correlation between the funds being cut to the Awakening Councils and these attacks, we anticipate that this violence will continue through the parliamentary elections in March. The attacks could even continue after that, if the Sunni powers in Iraq deem that their interests are not being addressed appropriately.

As in 2008, we paid close attention in 2009 to the situation in Pakistan. This not only was because Pakistan is the home of the al Qaeda core’s leadership but also because of the threat that the TTP and the other jihadist groups in the country posed to the stability of the nuclear-armed state. As we watched Pakistan for signs that it was becoming a failed state, we noted that the government was actually making considerable headway in its fight against its jihadist insurgency. Indeed, by late in the year, the Pakistanis had launched not only a successful offensive in Swat and the adjacent districts but also an offensive into South Waziristan, the heart of the TTP’s territory.

We also forecast that the bulk of the attacks worldwide in 2009 would be conducted by regional jihadist franchise groups and, to a lesser extent, grassroots jihadists, rather than the al Qaeda core, which was correct.

In relation to attacks against the United States, we wrote that we did not see a strategic threat to the United States from the jihadists, but that the threat of simple attacks against soft targets remained in 2009. We said we had been surprised that there were no such attacks in 2008 but that, given the vulnerabilities that existed and the ease with which such attacks could be conducted, we believed they were certainly possible. During 2009, we did see simple attacks by grassroots operatives in Little Rock, Arkansas, and at Fort Hood, Texas, along with several other grassroots plots thwarted by authorities.

Forecast for 2010

In the coming year we believe that, globally, we will see many of the trends continue from last year. We believe that the al Qaeda core will continue to be marginalized on the physical battlefield and struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. The regional jihadist franchise groups will continue to be at the vanguard of the physical battle, and the grassroots operatives will remain a persistent, though lower-level, threat.

One thing we noticed in recent months was that the regional groups were becoming more transnational in their attacks, with AQAP involved in the attack on Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia as well as the trans-Atlantic airliner bombing plot on Christmas Day. Additionally, we saw HUJI planning an attack against the Jyllands-Posten newspaper and cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in Denmark, and on Jan. 1, 2010, a Somali man reportedly associated with al Shabaab broke into Westergaard’s home armed with an axe and knife and allegedly tried to kill him. We believe that in 2010 we will see more examples of regional groups like al Shabaab and AQAP reaching out to become more transnational, perhaps even conducting attacks in the United States and Europe.

We also believe that, due to the open nature of the U.S. and European societies and the ease of conducting attacks against them, we will see more grassroots plots, if not successful attacks, in the United States and Europe in the coming year. The concept behind AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi’s article calling for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets may be gaining popularity among grassroots jihadists. Certainly, the above-mentioned attack in Denmark involving an axe and knife was simple in nature. It could also have been deadly had the cartoonist not had a panic room within his residence. We will be watching for more simple attacks.

As far as targets, we believe that they will remain largely the same for 2010. Soft targets such as hotels will continue to be popular, since most jihadists lack the ability to attack hard targets outside of conflict zones. However, jihadists have demonstrated a continuing fixation on attacking commercial aviation targets, and we can anticipate additional plots and attacks focusing on aircraft.

Regionally, we will be watching for the following:

• Pakistan: Can the United States find and kill the al Qaeda core’s leadership? A Pakistani official told the Chinese Xinhua news agency on Jan. 4 that terrorism will come to an end in Pakistan in 2010, but we are not nearly so optimistic. Even though the military has made good progress in its South Waziristan offensive, most of the militants moved to other areas of Pakistan rather than engage in frontal combat with Pakistan’s army. The area along the border with Pakistan is rugged and has proved hard to pacify for hundreds of years. We don’t think the Pakistanis will be able to bring the area under control in only one year. Clearly, the Pakistanis have made progress, but they are not out of the woods. The TTP has launched a number of attacks in the Punjabi core of Pakistan (including Karachi) and we see no end to this violence in 2010.
• Afghanistan: We will continue to closely monitor jihadist actors in this war-torn country. Our forecast for this conflict is included in our Annual Forecast 2010, published on Jan. 4.
• Yemen: We will be watching closely to see if AQAP will follow the normal jihadist group lifespan of making a big splash, coming to the notice of the world and then being hit heavily by the host government with U.S. support. This pattern was exhibited a few years back by AQAP’s Saudi al Qaeda brethren, and judging by the operations in Yemen over the past month, it looks like 2010 might be a tough year for the group. It is important to note that the strikes against the group on Dec. 17 and Dec. 24 predated the Christmas bombing attempt, and the pressure on them will undoubtedly be ratcheted up considerably in the wake of that attack. Even as the memory of the Christmas Day attack begins to fade in the media and political circles, the focus on Yemen will continue in the counterterrorism community.
• Indonesia: Can Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad find an effective leader to guide it back from the edge of destruction after the death of Noordin Mohammad Top and the deaths or captures of several of his top lieutenants? Or will the Indonesians be able to enjoy further success against the group’s surviving members?
• North Africa: Will AQIM continue to shy away from the al Qaeda core’s targeting philosophy and essentially function as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat with a different name in Algeria? Or will AQIM shift back toward al Qaeda’s philosophy of attacking the far enemy and using suicide bombers and large vehicle bombs? In Mauritania, Niger and Mali, will the AQIM-affiliated cells there be able to progress beyond amateurish attacks and petty banditry to become a credible militant organization?
• Somalia: We believe the factionalism in Somalia and within the jihadist community there will continue to hamper al Shabaab. The questions we will be looking to answer are: Will al Shabaab be able to gain significant control of areas of the country that can be used to harbor and train foreign militants? And, will the group decide to use its contacts within the Somali diaspora to conduct attacks in East Africa, South Africa, Australia, Europe and the United States? We believe that al Shabaab is on its way to becoming a transnational player and that 2010 may well be the year that it breaks out and then draws international attention like AQAP has done in recent months.
• India: We anticipate that Kashmiri jihadist groups will continue to plan attacks against India in an effort to stir-up communal violence in that country and stoke tensions between India and Pakistan — and provide a breather to the jihadist groups being pressured by the government of Pakistan.

As long as the ideology of jihadism survives, the jihadists will be able to recruit new militants and their war against the world will continue. The battle will oscillate between periods of high and low intensity as regional groups rise in power and are taken down. We don’t believe jihadists pose a strategic geopolitical threat on a global, or even regional, scale, but they will certainly continue to launch attacks and kill people in 2010.

This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR





current-events

More on the Puppet Media

In the following article from Consortiumnews.com, Robert Parry, who broke many of the Iran-Contra stories while working for the Associated Press, argues that American news outlets are corrupt and reform is impossible. The recent revelations about the talking-head generals is just the tip of the iceberg; our only chance to get the facts that we need to keep government in check is to find new ways to get the truth out.


U.S. News Media's Latest Disgrace

By
Robert Parry
April 21, 2008
www.consortiumnews.com

The Truth Revealed

After prying loose 8,000 pages of Pentagon documents, the New York Times has proven what should have been obvious years ago: the Bush administration manipulated public opinion on the Iraq War, in part, by funneling propaganda through former senior military officers who served as expert analysts on TV news shows.

In 2002-03, these military analysts were ubiquitous on TV justifying the Iraq invasion, and most have remained supportive of the war in the five years since. The Times investigation showed that the analysts were being briefed by the Pentagon on what to say and had undisclosed conflicts of interest via military contracts.

Retired Green Beret Robert S. Bevelacqua, a former Fox News analyst, said the Pentagon treated the retired military officers as puppets: “It was them saying, ‘we need to stick our hands up your back and move your mouth for you.’” [NYT, April 20, 2008]

None of that, of course, should come as any surprise. Where do people think generals and admirals go to work after they retire from the government?

If they play ball with the Pentagon, they get fat salaries serving on corporate boards of military contractors, or they get rich running consultancies that trade on quick access to high-ranking administration officials. If they’re not team players, they’re shut out.

Yet, what may be more troubling, although perhaps no more surprising, is how willingly the U.S. news media let itself be used as a propaganda conduit for the Bush administration regarding the ill-advised invasion of Iraq.

Fox News may have been the prototype of the flag-waving “news” outlet that fawned over pro-war retired military officers and mocked anti-war citizens.

But the same imbalance could be found at the major networks, like NBC where then-anchor Tom Brokaw spoke in the first person plural as he sat among a panel of retired brass on the night of the Iraq invasion – March 19, 2003 – and said: "In a few days, we're going to own that country."

The blame also goes far beyond the TV networks, to the most prestigious print publications. The New York Times famously promoted fictional stories about Iraqi aluminum tubes for building nuclear weapons, and the Washington Post editorial page remains to this day an ardent cheerleader for the war.

So, the real question is not how widespread the ethical lapses of the U.S. news media were – both in palming off self-interested ex-generals as objective observers and for failing to demonstrate even a modicum of skepticism in publishing false articles that paved the way to war.

Rather, the urgent question is what must be done if the United States is to reclaim its status as a functioning constitutional Republic in which a reasonably honest news media keeps the public adequately informed.

Having spent most of my career on the inside at places such as the Associated Press and Newsweek, it’s been my view for many years that the mainstream U.S. news media can’t be reformed, that it is beyond hope.

Though there are still good journalists working at major news companies – and the better news outlets do produce some useful information, like Sunday’s story in the Times – the central reality is that corporate journalism is rotten at the core and won't stop spreading the rot throughout the U.S. political process.

That’s why for the past dozen-plus years at Consortiumnews.com, we have called for a major public investment in honest journalism, so information can be produced that it is both professional and independent of the kinds of external pressures that have deformed today’s mainstream press.

We must find new ways to tell the news.

The Reagan Era

The scope of the problem dawned on me in the late 1980s, as I watched the widespread criminality of the Iran-Contra and related scandals – ranging from money-laundering, gun-smuggling, drug-trafficking and acts of terrorism – get swept under the rug because they implicated senior U.S. officials.

During those years, I witnessed the Washington press corps – which still basked in the glory of Watergate and the Pentagon Papers – rushing headlong toward becoming little more than a propaganda funnel for the powers-that-be.

Indeed, in 1992, my first book, Fooling America, argued that the Watergate-Vietnam-era press corps was undergoing a historic transformation into a snarky conveyor of ill-considered conventional wisdom.

The book also made the case that this transformation was not accidental, nor was it driven just by corporate greed and journalistic careerism (though there was plenty of both). There also was a powerful ideological component.

Behind the scenes, the Reagan administration had constructed a domestic framework modeled after CIA psychological warfare programs abroad. The main difference this time was that the psy-op took aim at the American people with the goal of managing how they perceived events, what insiders called “perception management.”

From documents that I uncovered during the Iran-Contra scandal, it was clear that the motive behind this extraordinary operation was the bitterness that conservatives felt toward the mass protests against the Vietnam War and toward American journalists whose reporting supposedly had undermined the war effort.

So, Ronald Reagan’s team made it a high priority to rein in troublesome journalists and to reverse the so-called “Vietnam Syndrome,” the American people’s revulsion over any more foreign military adventures.

The documents revealed that the domestic operation took shape in the early 1980s under the guidance of CIA Director William Casey, who even donated one of the CIA’s top propagandists, Walter Raymond Jr., to manage the program from inside President Reagan’s National Security Council staff.

Other factors fed into the success of this propaganda operation, especially the rise of a bright group of political intellectuals known as the neoconservatives. They proved especially adept at using McCarthyistic tactics to marginalize and silence dissent.

The crowning achievement of this decade-long effort came during the first Persian Gulf War of 1990-91. President George H.W. Bush believed that a successful U.S.-led ground offensive could finish the job of bringing the American people back from their post-Vietnam malaise.

However, after months of devastating aerial bombings, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had persuaded Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait with no more killing, and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf and other front-line U.S. commanders favored the deal.
But Bush rebuffed the offer, instead ordering the ground attack that slaughtered tens of thousands of fleeing Iraqi troops during a 100-hour campaign. [For details, see the Colin Powell chapter of Neck Deep.]

When the ground war ended, Bush offered an insight into his central motivation. In his first comments about the U.S. victory, he declared: “By God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all.”

Amid the war euphoria, some American journalists who had thought a less violent solution should have been pursued – including conservative columnist Robert Novak – offered cringing self-criticisms about their mistaken doubts.

The only sustained criticism of President Bush on the war came from the neocons, like Charles
Krauthammer, who complained that Bush should have let the killing go on, that he stopped the ground war too soon, that he should have conquered Baghdad and occupied Iraq.

In my book, Fooling America, I told the story of this decline and fall of the U.S. news media, from its glory days of Watergate to its groveling days of the early 1990s. But 16 years ago, few people wanted to hear the story – or believe it.

The common view at the time was that the Washington press corps was still the aggressive watchdog of Watergate fame and, if anything, was too “liberal.” Though I had a major publisher in Morrow, the book got little circulation and was trashed by key book reviewers, including one from the Washington Post.

The thought that the heroic Washington press corps was changing into something cowardly and reckless was an idea whose time had not yet come.
[Fooling America has long been out of print, but some of the material can be found in Robert Parry’s later books, Lost History, Secrecy & Privilege and Neck Deep.]
Repeating History

In the investigation of how the Pentagon used TV military analysts to sell the Iraq War – thus allowing George W. Bush to “complete the job” left unfinished by his dad – the New York Times also traced the administration’s P.R. theories back to the Vietnam War and to the early days of the Reagan era.

“Many [TV military analysts] also shared with Mr. Bush’s national security team a belief that pessimistic war coverage broke the nation’s will to win in Vietnam, and there was a mutual resolve not to let that happen with this war,” the Times reported in the article by David Barstow.

“This was a major theme, for example, with Paul E. Vallely, a Fox News analyst from 2001 to 2007. A retired Army general who had specialized in psychological warfare, Mr. Vallely co-authored a paper in 1980 that accused American news organizations of failing to defend the nation from ‘enemy’ propaganda during Vietnam.

'We lost the war – not because we were outfought, but because we were out Psyoped,' he wrote. He urged a radically new approach to psychological operations in future wars – taking aim not just at foreign adversaries but at domestic audiences, too.

“He called his approach ‘MindWar’ – using network TV and radio to ‘strengthen our national will to victory.’”

But the danger of “MindWar,” aimed by the U.S. government at the American people, is that it turns inside-out the concept of a democratic Republic in which a well-informed people exercise meaningful control over their government.

Instead, you end up with a duplicitous government using propaganda, fear and intimidation to whip the people into line. Rather than the government being the servant of the people, the people become the servant of the government.

Then, as undemocratic regimes have shown throughout history – with the voice of the people silenced – insiders get a free hand to carry out foolhardy policies and to line the pockets of their friends.

With the U.S. taxpayers now looking at an open-ended Iraq War with the total cost possibly reaching $3 trillion, it shouldn’t be too hard to figure out who the “winners” were in this “MindWar.”

Often they were the same TV military analysts and news media pundits who were advocating for the invasion more than five years ago. Almost everyone of them has made out like bandits, many with fat stock portfolios and posh vacation homes, not to mention appreciative CEOs back at corporate central.

The “losers” should be equally apparent. Besides the fleeced American taxpayers, there have been more than 4,000 U.S. soldiers dead, another 30,000 wounded, and hundreds of thousands of dead and maimed Iraqis.

This bloody march of folly began some three decades ago when the U.S. news media began surrendering its responsibility to keep the people informed and instead opted for the easier and more lucrative role of acting as propagandists for the powerful.

The New York Times article is just further proof of that sorry reality.


Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book, Neck Deep: The Disastrous Presidency of George W. Bush, was written with two of his sons, Sam and Nat, and can be ordered at neckdeepbook.com. His two previous books,Secrecy & Privilege: The Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq and Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth' are also available there. Or go to Amazon.com.

A big Tip o'the Hat to VetSpeak.org

Some related articles you might find interesting:

"Stupid Dirty Tricks," Washington Post
"Operation Northwoods," whatreallyhappened.com
"The CIA and Journalists", article at SourceWatch.org
Alex Constantine website (Warning: this author [me] assumes no responsibility for anything you might find on this intriguing website. Just go and poke around.)


current-events

The Man Who Brainwashed America

Doggerel by Fido

Now that the New York Times seems to have found its cojones, it's probably time to drag out some old news which will go a long way to explaining why the American people have seemed to be shellshocked, and so reluctant to embrace the simple fact that they have been had.

There is an advertising agency in Washington, D.C. which holds a Top Secret clearance. The boss of that ad agency is a lifelong Democrat and has been deeply involved in politics on the national level for some time. He probably considers himself a patriot, inasmuch as receives millions of dollars in billing, principally from the CIA. Yeah, that CIA. And what does his crackerjack agency do for its daily bread?

Glad you asked. What they do is lie to the American people and the world about stuff like Ahmad Chalabi and WMD, feed lies to an uncritical Judith Miller, assist in regime change in places like Panama (remember Noriega, the drug king?) and basically engage in brainwashing on behalf of their client, the United States government.

The following transcript has been floating around the Internet since 2005, and it's about time it resurfaced, preferably on the front page of every newspaper and on every nightly news show in the country, but that ain't gonna happen by itself, so we'll start the ball rolling.

The Rendon agency that will be discussed was the goto outfit for the buildup to the Iraq war (as well as previous CIA shenanigans). I wrote about them at the time (2005), but had forgotten about them, as the distractions came so thick and fast for so long. James Bamford is the man who wrote the book on the NSA, The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America's Most Secret Intelligence Organization

From 2005, Amy Goodman's Democracy Now interview with James Bamford: The Man Who Sold the War

So how did the Bush administration sell the war to the American public? Well, a new article in Rolling Stone magazine (December 1, 2005) examines just that. In it, investigative journalist James Bamford looks at the role of one of the most powerful public relations firms in Washington D.C in setting the stage for the Iraq war. The firm is the Rendon Group and it's founder and CEO is John Rendon – the former Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee.

AMY GOODMAN: James Bamford joins us in our Firehouse studio here in New York, the author of several books including the first one ever written about the National Security Agency called The Puzzle Palace: Inside America’s Most Secret Intelligence Organization. His latest book is A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies. We welcome you to Democracy Now!

JAMES BAMFORD: Thanks, Amy. I appreciate it.

AMY GOODMAN: It’s great to have you with us. Well, this piece in Rolling Stone is quite a read. Why don’t you start off by talking about a man in the Gulf of Thailand who was taking a lie detector test?

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, this took place in December of 2001. This was really the sort of opening shot of the propaganda war to get the United States into war. And the person being polygraphed was an Iraqi defector by the name of al-Haideri, and the Iraqi National Congress, the I.N.C., had brought him out of Iraq and brought him to Thailand primarily to expose him to the media and to try to get his story told. And what his story was was that Saddam Hussein had not only chemical and biological weapons but even nuclear weapons and precursors to nuclear weapons hidden in Iraq in various places. Some of the biological weapons were supposedly hidden under the main hospital in Baghdad, for example. So it was an amazing story.

And this was the—up until this time there was a lot of speculation in the press and in Congress and other places about what Saddam may have, what might have been left over from the Gulf War and so forth. But this was going to be the very first time that somebody could actually point to information as proof, having seen where these things were buried and so forth. So, the I.N.C., the Iraqi National Congress, which was led by Ahmed Chalabi, decided to call in two journalists to broadcast this information to the world.

AMY GOODMAN: Wait. First, the lie detector proved what?

JAMES BAMFORD: Exactly. Before he actually called these people in to broadcast this information, obviously the C.I.A. had a big interest in this and the Pentagon had a big interest in this, so the C.I.A. flew a polygraph operator with his machine all the way over to Thailand, Pattaya, Thailand, which is south of Bangkok, and they went into a hotel room, they strapped up al-Haideri, and they asked him all these questions. And they went over and over for hours his allegations regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and they came away with charts that indicated he was deceptive, that he was lying, that this was not true. And they flew back to Washington and, presumably, assuming this was going to be the end of it. But that was information that was never made public. They didn’t broadcast that information. So what happened was the I.N.C. and Chalabi decided to take that bogus information that al-Haideri was giving and broadcast it around the world. So, they called in two journalists. One of the journalists was Judy Miller, who was given the worldwide print exclusive rights to the story.

AMY GOODMAN: And who called her in?

JAMES BAMFORD: Chalabi called her in. Chalabi asked her if she wanted to do the story, and she flew from Washington all the way over to Bangkok to interview al-Haideri.

AMY GOODMAN: Chalabi on the payroll of the C.I.A.?

JAMES BAMFORD: At this time, Chalabi was—he had been getting money from the C.I.A. up until the mid-1990s, and then he started getting money from the Pentagon after the C.I.A. failed to trust him any more. So, the other journalist that they called in was Paul Moran, who was a journalist working for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. And what makes this very interesting was how this came about. The people setting this up were members of the I.N.C. whose main goal all along from the very beginning was overthrowing Saddam Hussein anyway possible. And ironically, one of the people they called in, Paul Moran, had formerly worked for the I.N.C., and he had also worked for another company called the Rendon Group.

AMY GOODMAN: Hold it there. We have to break. When we come back, we’ll take a look at the Rendon Group. We are talking to investigative reporter James Bamford, author of A Pretext for War, has just written a piece in Rolling Stone called “The Man Who Sold the War.”

[break]

AMY GOODMAN: Our guest is James Bamford. He’s written the piece in Rolling Stone magazine, “The Man Who Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush’s General in the Propaganda War.” So, the Rendon Group and John Rendon.

JAMES BAMFORD: That’s right. The Rendon Group plays an important part in this, because it was the Rendon Group, who few people have heard about, that actually set up the I.N.C., the Iraqi National Congress, in the first place. In a very unusual move, the Bush administration, the first Bush administration, outsourced the propaganda for the war in Iraq basically to a private company.

AMY GOODMAN: Why?

JAMES BAMFORD: The reason they did it was because they specialize in this. The Rendon Group for years have been able to take information that the C.I.A. was trying to get across to the public and broadcast it. For example, they went back to Panama. Just before the U.S. action in Iraq in 1990, the Bush administration invaded Panama and ousted Manuel Noriega. Well, all along, the C.I.A. had a person they wanted to put in there to take Noriega’s place, a person by the name of Endara. And the C.I.A. outsourced to the Rendon Group the propaganda campaign to put Endara in there. So they took this person who was basically a lawyer, a businessman, and Rendon built him up into a presidential candidate, took him around Europe, introduced him to the Pope, and when his group was attacked, one of his vice presidents was attacked, a very bloody attack, it made the front page of newspapers all over the world, including Time magazine.

AMY GOODMAN: With the Rendon Group’s help getting that image out?

JAMES BAMFORD: Exactly, the Rendon Group is the public relations group that pushed all of that information out there.

AMY GOODMAN: John Rendon flying in a few minutes before the actual invasion took place, of Panama.

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, as the invasion took place, before the planes actually started attacking, John Rendon was in a plane about to land in Panama. So he was there right at the beginning, and he was there, too, right about the same time that his candidate, Endara, was sworn in as president. So he did such a good job in Panama in terms of regime change, getting the C.I.A.’s man into office, the Bush administration decided—the first Bush administration decided to use him to help do regime change in Iraq. And after the first Gulf War, the whole idea was to oust Saddam Hussein and put in Ahmed Chalabi as the leader. So, John Rendon, his company the Rendon Group, created an umbrella group known as the Iraqi National Congress.

AMY GOODMAN: He came up with the name?

JAMES BAMFORD: John Rendon came up with the name. He formed an organizational meeting in Vienna. He helped install Chalabi as the head of the group, and then the money was originally funneled from the C.I.A. through the Rendon Group, about $350,000 a month, to Chalabi.

AMY GOODMAN: Was this also for deniability, so it wouldn’t be the C.I.A. directly giving the money?

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, definitely. That’s one of the key reasons that they wanted to use a private company like the Rendon Group as a cutout. And they did that in Panama also. So it was a very convenient organization to turn to in order to help regime change. The C.I.A. could help in terms of the combat, overthrowing a foreign leader like Saddam Hussein, but in terms of building up the world propaganda, number one, hating Saddam Hussein, number two, loving Ahmed Chalabi, that was something that they had to outsource, and the Rendon Group had become specialists in that type of propaganda.

AMY GOODMAN: We are talking with investigative reporter, Jim Bamford, author of A Pretext for War. That’s his book. “The Man Who Sold the War” is the name of his article in Mother Jones. So let’s go back—

JAMES BAMFORD: In Rolling Stone.

AMY GOODMAN: I mean, in Rolling Stone magazine. Let’s go back to Judith Miller and Paul Moran. One is a radio reporter who worked for the Rendon Group, and you could talk about that; and the other, Judith Miller, worked for The New York Times.

JAMES BAMFORD: That’s right. And how this comes full circle is that the Rendon Group created the I.N.C., put in Chalabi in there, and then now we have December of 2001, right after the September 11 attacks, and while the administration is gearing up to sort of get the public behind the administration in going into war in Iraq. So up until this time it had been all speculation about what had been going on in terms of Saddam’s use of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and now the I.N.C., the Iraqi National Congress, comes up with this defector who is telling this huge lie about where all of these weapons are being hidden.

AMY GOODMAN: And they know it’s a lie?

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, I don’t know when they knew it, but they certainly should have known it at some point, that the C.I.A. person who walked out of the room wasn’t smiling about all of the happy news he was hearing—

AMY GOODMAN: And the guy who did the lie detector test said, “He is not telling the truth.”

JAMES BAMFORD: That’s right, exactly, and it didn’t seem to make much difference, because they called in the press, and the two people that they called in, ironically one of them was Paul Moran who had formerly worked, not only for the I.N.C., but also for the Rendon Group. So you have a journalist who has the worldwide broadcast exclusive for this interview with this defector who is telling a lot of lies, who actually had formerly worked for the group putting this show on the road, and then they called in Judy Miller, who was going to be granted the worldwide print exclusives. And Judy Miller, in her own words in a memo she wrote to her bureau chief in Baghdad at one point, mentioned that for a decade Chalabi had been one of her key sources and that he was responsible for many of the front page stories on W.M.D. in The New York Times.

So, they called in these two very sympathetic journalists to broadcast this story, and it made huge news. It came out, I think it was December 20, 2001, and again it made a great impact, because this was the first time that an actual eyewitness was able to say that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. So, this was a major milestone in the road to the war. And from then on, the I.N.C. began coming up with other defectors, and The New York Times and other organizations started promoting the war. But a lot of it had its origins with this first defector, al-Haideri.

AMY GOODMAN: James Bamford, Paul Moran died in Iraq.

JAMES BAMFORD: One of the biggest and most tragic ironies of the entire war was the fact that this journalist, Paul Moran, who had formerly worked for both the I.N.C. and the Rendon Group and then broadcast—had the worldwide broadcast rights for this story about al-Haideri, which helped push the U.S. into war with Iraq—into invading Iraq; Paul Moran actually became the very first journalist killed in the war. He was in northern Iraq, and a car bomb exploded very close to him, and he was killed instantly. I think it was within two or three days of the beginning of the war. So, it was a very tragic irony that Paul Moran, who helped generate some of the early publicity for the war ended up being one of the first people killed in the war.

AMY GOODMAN: John Rendon went to his funeral in Australia?

JAMES BAMFORD: Yes, the Rendon Group really went to a lot of trouble and expense to really create a lot of memorials for Paul Moran. John Rendon flew to the funeral in Australia. They had a memorial service for him in Washington. They had another larger memorial service for him in London, where Rendon and Paul Moran first began working around 1990. So, it was a very big tragedy, and it was a tragedy for the Rendon Group, who had relied on Paul Moran for many, many years.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the I.O.T.F., what it stands for and the Information War Room?

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, the Information Operation Task Force was set up by the Pentagon, because, if you read some of the Pentagon documents that are coming out in the last few years, they wanted to turn information into a major weapon to use during a war. They realized with the internet and with the explosion of information technology around the world that getting a message out is extremely important. It’s especially important in a case like this where we weren’t attacked by Iraq. This wasn’t a case of the United States defending itself against an attack. So, we had to—the United States had to go on a propaganda war in order to convince the world that this preemptive invasion had legitimacy. So, in order to do that the Pentagon created a number of organizations to help promote this information around the world, and the Information Operation Task Force was one of those, and the Rendon Group played an extremely important role in that. And one of the key objectives of the Rendon Group in this aspect was to analyze media all over the world. John Rendon, in my interview with him, and it was the first interview I think he’s ever granted, or at least within probably twenty years—

AMY GOODMAN: And why did he grant it to you?

JAMES BAMFORD: You’re going to have to ask him. I don’t ask questions. I just am very happy when somebody does agree to be interviewed. So he—and one of the ironic aspects of John Rendon is you have somebody here who started out as basically an anti-war activist. He went to work for the George McGovern campaign, actually ran the Maine operation, the operation up in Maine, for George McGovern. So you have a person who started out as an anti-war activist and a lifelong Democrat, head of the Democratic National Committee, Executive Director of the D.N.C., and here he is the chief of propaganda for the Bush administration in their war with Iraq. So it was a very interesting progression, and when I interviewed him, he said he’s still never voted for a Republican, he still votes Democratic, and he donated money to the Democratic Party not long ago.

So now what his role is, is as chief of propaganda and as that, the Pentagon has been using him a great deal to analyze information around the world. Rendon told me that they analyze something like 143 newspapers and a lot of broadcast media around the world and that he prides himself on being able to get to policy makers information on what news organizations all over the world are going to do six hours before they actually do it. And that way, the Pentagon can prepare a response or some kind of rebuttal to whatever may be coming on a news organization hours in advance.

AMY GOODMAN: You write, James Bamford, “A key weapon, according to the documents, was Rendon’s proprietary state-of-the-art news-wire collection system called ‘Livewire,’ which takes real-time news-wire services as they’re filed, before they’re on the internet, before CNN can read them on the air, and 24 hours before they appear in the morning papers, and sorts them by key word. The system provides the most current real time access to news and information available to private or public organizations. The top target that the Pentagon assigned to Rendon was the Al-Jazeera television network. The contract called for the Rendon Group to undertake a massive media mapping campaign against the news organization.” Why, what did they do?

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, it’s a very interesting area, this media mapping. And basically, what it is, is they were directed to take a close look at the actual reporters who were reporting the news and analyze them. What is their slant? What is their bias? What is the background for these people? What makes that very worrisome is that there was another group that was set up by the Pentagon, Office of Strategic Influence, and that was eventually closed down, but one of the things—

AMY GOODMAN: Forced to because it became public?

JAMES BAMFORD: That’s right, when it became knowledge, and one of the aspects was that they were going to plant phony stories in news organizations around the world, and when you plant a phony story in a news organization anywhere in the world today, I mean, it’s immediately accessible to people in the United States. So, it would have had a very bad blowback effect.

AMY GOODMAN: Now, I remember when Rumsfeld closed it. He said, ‘Yeah, we may change the name, but it doesn’t mean we have to stop doing what we are doing.’

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current-events

"They hate us for our freedoms"

President Bush is fond of repeating the inane statement that, “They hate us for our freedoms.”(sic) The National Intelligence Estimate said, “No, they hate the US government for its Middle East policy.” In Michael Moore’s new flick, “Sicko,” an American resident in Paris says that in France the government is afraid of the people, whereas in America, the people are afraid of the government.

Which is probably an odd collection of quotes to kick off the July 4th weekend, but something to chew on as our Republic descends into anarchy and lawlessness.

To wit: Cheney claims that the vice presidency is not part of the executive / White House refuses congressional subpoenas / Air Force Academy cadets are ordered to join fundamentalist congregation / Like it or not, we are building permanent military bases in Iraq / Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was a bagman for the CIA’s rigging of Italian elections / CIA releases “family jewels”: tales of murder, coups, torture, and the American promotion of dictators everywhere /

Have an interesting Fourth of July, Gentle Readers.




current-events