Amnesty in Zimbabwe

The New York Times is reporting that top officials of Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF party in Zimbabwe, fearing what will happen now that the opposition party is in the government, are kidnapping and torturing members of the opposition party in an effort to extract promises of amnesty from them. According to the Times:

Didymus Mutasa, who served as Mr. Mugabe’s minister for national security until the power-sharing deal went into effect, acknowledged that some senior officials in his party might be worried about prosecution.

Had the party floated the idea of an amnesty? he was asked. “Perhaps,” he said.

Were abductions used to gain leverage for amnesty? “There could have been something like that,” he said, “but how am I to know?”

The crimes that have been committed under Mugabe's government are unquestionably horrible, and the victims most certainly deserve justice. The Times provides a short accounting:

The crimes committed to entrench Mr. Mugabe’s rule date back to the 1980s, when thousands of civilians from Zimbabwe’s Ndebele minority in Matabeleland were killed by the notorious North Korean-trained Fifth Army brigade, according to historians.

Among the Ndebele, the tears of the living must be shed to release the souls of the dead. But the Fifth Brigade insisted that there be no mourning for those they killed, and in some cases shot family members because they wept, according to “Breaking the Silence,” a 1997 investigation based on the testimonies of more than 1,000 witnesses.

Other political crimes include widespread attacks on the opposition in 2000, 2002 and 2005, and most gruesomely last year. Beyond that, a vast 2005 slum clearance effort known as Operation Murambatsvina, or Get Rid of the Filth, drove 700,000 people in opposition bastions from their homes.

Last year, close to 200 people were killed, mostly before the June presidential runoff between Mr. Mugabe and the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, and thousands were tortured in state-sponsored attacks, but so far no one has been prosecuted, according to a State Department human rights report released in February.

Mr. Mugabe’s party fears that even more damning evidence will be unearthed.

This doesn't even include the horrors that Mugabe has unleashed on his people through his misrule: driving the country into bankruptcy, destroying Zimbabwe's agricultural capacity, collapsing the state's educational and health care systems, and so on.

So, justice is clearly due. But what kind of justice? Setting aside the coercion, should Mugabe and his cronies be given amnesty for their actions? Is getting the ZANU-PF out of power more important than punishing its leaders and members for their actions?

That decision rests, as it shoud, with the peopel of Zimbabwe. Different countries have transitioned through their difficult pasts in different ways. South Africa effectively granted amnesty through its Truth and Reconciliation Committee; Peru just recently tried and convicted its former president for crimes committed during its struggle against Marxist rebels. There are powerful arguments supporting each path.

Still, I would hope to see Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change do what is best for the country, which would be to get Mugabe and the ZANU-PF out of power. Hopefully, the MDC can resist the campaign of coercion being unleashed against it. In its place, the MDC should offer a broad amnesty, up to and including Robert Mugabe himself, in exchange for a full transfer of power to the MDC, which in all likelihood is the rightful ruling party. The amnesty should ensure that no one guilty of the crimes in question can hold political office in Zimbabwe again and that, as in South Africa, a full accounting of crimes is necessary to be granted amnesty. If such a deal can be reached, it should be taken. Anything less would be a true travesty of justice.

An Impending Disaster in Darfur

Things are about to get worse in Darfur. A whole lot worse.

In the wake of his indictment by the International Criminal Court, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir has set about demonstrating to the international community that he will not be cowed by its action. First, Sudan ordered the 13 largest aid and relief organizations -- including Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children, CARE, and the International Rescue Committee -- working in Sudan out of the country. Bashir has also expressed his desire to have all international aid groups out of Darfur within a year. Then, Bashir openly flaunted the ICC warrant by traveling to Eritrea and Egypt. The visits are intended to make it clear that the ICC has no power to arrest Bashir unless states choose to do so themselves; the Arab League has rejected the ICC's call to arrest Bashir, opening the way for Bashir to attend the summit of the League in Qatar.

The ejection of the aid workers is, in the short term, of the gravest concern, as these groups provided 35% of Darfur's food distribution capability. In a piece in today's Washington Post, Michael Gerson recounts an interview with Mohammed Ahmed Abdallah, a physician and human rights advocate in Darfur, in which Abdallah warns that "People are likely to die very soon." In the absence of the aid groups, only 9% of the population of Darfur will have access to clean water, and a cholera or (perhaps and) a meningitis outbreak seems likely. With disease increasing and food supplies decreasing, the desperate Darfuris are likely to begin migrating to eastern Chad. Doing so, however, requires them to leave the relative safety of their refugee camps in order to cross more than 300 miles of desert, exposing themselves to attacks by janjaweed militia groups, dehydration, and starvation.

So, what is to be done? There are several options, none of which is particularly palatable. First, the international community could, for all intents and purposes, back down by blocking or suspending the ICC arrest warrant in hopes that Sudan would allow the aid groups back in. Second, pressure could be put on the member states of the Arab League to enforce the warrant, effectively blocking Bashir's ability to travel. Third, massive pressure could be put on Sudan (and by proxy, China) to allow the aid groups back in. Fourth, the international community could intervene, sending soldiers into the Darfur region to provide security, food, and aid. Finally, as is always an option, the international community can do nothing.

It's pretty clear that the international community has little stomach or will for an intervention. So that leaves a choice between where, how, and whether to apply pressure to reverse Bashir's decision and get the aid groups back in. Backing down in an entirely unacceptible option at this point. While many people, including myself, warned about issuing an arrest warrant, now that it has been issued, backing down would completely destroy any credibility that either the ICC or the international community has; it would also make it clear that international law can easily be hijacked by threatening one own people.

Doing nothing is the most likely option. Protestations and hand-wringing aside, the international community, and the US and the EU in particular, has never shown much interest in incurring any costs to help Darfur, or other African peoples being subjected to genocide. It will certainly be easy for President Obama to maintain the moral rhetoric of "never again" as all his predecssors have done while doing nothing. But that would be shameful, and ultimately counterproductive for American interests. The US does have an interest in stopping genocide, and that interest is the ideals that have made this country what it is: liberalism, human rights, natural law. That a state can be free to slaughter and uproot its own people in an age of American hegemony is an affront to all of these ideals and challenges American interests in a fundamental way. While the fate of the Fur may not threaten the US in as direct manner as a North Korean weapons program or international terrorism, the willingness of the US to abdicate its moral leadership on genocide and human rights undermines US power in a very real way.

So, then, where should the pressue be placed? Sudan has proven nearly impervious to international pressure, largely due to its protector on the Security Council, China, which has been willing to shield Sudan in exchange for access to Sudanese energy exports. It may be more fruitful to pressure China, which has in the past shown its willingess to help the US. But, given the situation in North Korea right now, the US may prefer to save its political capital with China for that.

That leaves pressuring the states of the Arab League. And here the US has a lot of possibilities. Many of these states, such as Egypt, are, essentially, US clients. Many others, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are highly dependent on the US for protection and economic support. The US should use whatever carrots it has to get the Arab League to apply pressure to Sudan.

But for what end? The pressure could be for one of two ends: To get the Arab League to promise to enforce the ICC warrant and arrest Bashir, or to get the League to lean on Sudan to readmit the aid groups. The first would ensure Sudan's isolation, but would also make it all but impossible for the aid groups to return. While the isolation might, eventually, force Sudan to comply with international demands on Darfur, that is a long-term option. The second option might solve the impending humanitarian crisis, but wouldn't increase the likelihood of a long-term solution.

While it might be desirable to pursue the first option, I'm skeptical about any future sustained international effort to help Darfur. Rather, the immediate priority should be to avert the coming disaster. The US, EU, and UN shoud begin exerting whatever pressure they can on the Arab League to, in turn, pressure Sudan to readmit the aid NGOs. Unless that happens, the world will once again sit back and watch the destruction of a people.

Update on Zimbabwe

The chorus is getting louder in its calls for the ouster of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that "it's time for Mugabe to leave," while South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu said if Mugabe does not step down from power voluntarily he should be removed by force and prosecuted for war crimes.

However, South Africa still seems to be dragging its feet. A government spokesman noted that it was "encouraging" that Zimbabwe has asked for international assistance in dealing with the cholera outbreak.

So long as Mugabe has support from other African states, he is likely to cling to power as long as possible. The UN, the EU, and the US must put immediate and painful sanctions on South Africa to force it to back away from Mugabe. So long as he remains in power, the people of Zimbabwe will continue to suffer under his megalomania.

Zimbabwe On The Brink

(Let me apologize again for the dearth of posts lately. But the manuscript is out the door to the publisher, and the grading is done [for the time being...], so I hope to be back to regular blogging)

Things are getting bad in Zimbabwe. Really bad. As if the collapse of the economy or the rigging of the elections by Mugabe wasn't bad enough, now the one-time breadbasket of Africa is being stricken with an outbreak of cholera. 565 people have died so far, and the government is reporting 12,500 infected; clean water is unavailable in the capital city of Harare and the government does not have the chemicals necessary for purification. The deteriorating health conditions, along with the general mess that is the economy -- the inflation rate currently stands at 231 MILLION %!!! -- led more than 100 health care workers to march on the capital, demanding better pay and working conditions. The march was broken up by police wielding batons; several protesters were beaten, at least 15 were arrested. Perhaps even more troubling are reports that Zimbabwean troops are beginning to join the protests:

To add to the chaos, soldiers, angered at the meagerness of their deflated pay, on Monday rampaged through central Harare, breaking windows, looting stores and robbing the money changers who deal in foreign currency. Armed police had to disperse the marauding troops with tear gas.

So far, despite how bad conditions have been inside of Zimbabwe, the government has been able to maintain order. But it looks as if even that may be at an end. A government relies on a mix of force and legitimacy to maintain order. For a democracy, legitimacy is more an important; for an authoritarian regime, it's force that matters more. But all governments need both. When legitimacy collapses, it becomes necessary to use increasing levels of force to hold on to power and maintain order. But as levels of force rise, it becomes even harder to maintain legitimacy, even with the police and soldiers being used to exert force. At some point, the soldiers become unwilling to use force against their fellow citizens and families. For different regimes, this point comes at different times. China was willing to use large levels of force to hold on to power during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, while the governments of Eastern Europe collapsed without so much as a whimper of protest.

If the civil order essentially breaks down as cholera spreads and people are unable to get money for food or basic health care, the army, the police, and the government will have to decide how much force they are willing to use to hold on to a crumbling state. I certainly don't know how far Mugabe will go to hold on to power. Or to put it more precisely, how much will police and army will be willing to do. But, reports such as these indicate that the end of Mugabe's reign may be near. And while the collapse may be ugly, it can't come too soon.

It's not clear what will happen if the regime does, in fact, collapse in the near future. Even if opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai is able to take power, what can be done at the point? It's time for the international community -- most likely the UN working in conjunction with the Southern African Development Community or the African Union -- to place Zimbabwe into some kind of receivership. It will be messy, lots of people will likely die in the regime's death throes, and between the collapsed economy, the political turmoil, and the disease, there's not much on which to build. But there's not much choice. Zimbabwe's collapse will mean disaster for southern Africa. Immigrants, disease, ethnic violence...all are likely if swift action isn't taken. The UN should be readying a peacekeeping force now for immediate deployment to Zimbabwe to take control of the situation if and when the government collapses.

Now They've Got Tanks?

Piracy has long been a problem off of the Horn of Africa. More than 50 ships have been hijacked this year already, and million dollar ransoms are being paid out. Currently, about a dozen ships and more than 200 crew members are being held, and the International Maritime Bureau has issued warnings that the level of piracy now threatens global commerce.

But events took a drastic turn for the worse today. Somali pirates have captured a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 T-72 tanks that were on their way to Kenya. Not only were tanks seized, but the pirates also got away with grenade launchers and ammunition.

It's not entirely clear what a rag-tag bunch of pirates who operate on the high seas are going to do with tanks. Perhaps they'll try to sell them to interested parties in Africa, a development would could easily worsen many of the on-going civil wars raging across Africa.

Piracy is one of the clearest examples of jus cogens, a preemptory norm that creates a crime for which there is no possible justification and for which there is universal jurisdiction. Thus, anyone who wishes to act against the pirates is legally allowed to do so. However, that creates a problem -- in the absence of a specific jurisdiction, no one has the responsibility or strong incentive to act (why should one state bear the cost of enforcement when the cost of piracy falls on many?).

Interestingly, Russia has announced that it is dispatching a warship to the Horn of Africa to deal with piracy. This is a smart move by Russia, which has recently been looking for ways to burnish its image and to build ties to Africa. The US and/or NATO should do the same. Not only is there a fair amount of soft power to be gained by acting against pirates, but the US needs international shipping lines to remain open and unmolested. In days past, the British navy would have moved to deal with the pirates; today, that task should be taken up by the US.

Peace and Justice in Darfur

In the wake of the announcement back in July by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court that he intended to seek indictments against the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, I have blogged my general inclination that such a move would be counter-productive. I am on record in several different places that, when there is a tension between the two, I tend to favor efforts to achieve peace than those aimed at creating justice. Today, the chair of the African Union, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, seems to agree with me, "Justice has to be done. Justice must be seen to be done. What the AU is simply saying is that what is critical, what is the priority, is peace. That is priority number one now...We should do the first thing first. On this basis, the AU supports deferral of the indictment." While I agree with Mr. Kikwete's final assessment, I am not encouraged by his support.

Sadly, the African Union hasn't demonstrated either the willingness or the ability to stand up for what is right. If I honestly believed that the AU was going to be involved in creating peace in Darfur, it would be appropriate for the AU to discuss easing off the pressure on Sudan. But given the AU's record (or lack of record) in standing up to Mugabe in Zimbabwe, not to mention its dismal performace in Darfur, one cannot have any faith in the AU to advance anything but its own weakness and blind support of any African dictator. It's one thing to contemplate giving up on justice in order to achieve peace; it's another thing entirely to give up on justice because one is too weak or scared to challenge the miscreant. Sudan's efforts to destroy the Fur people must be stopped, and if the price of that is letting al-Bashir walk free of international charges, so be it. But if peace is not to be achieved, then let justice be done.

Can Mercenaries Save Darfur?

An interesting possibility has emerged in the conundrum over what to do about Darfur, and other humanitarian crises that seem to demand international peacemaking. Sadly, politics being what it is, states are unwilling to commit their own soldiers into situations that might costs lives for issues that are not directly seen as being part of the national interest. Thus, states tend to look the other way and pass the buck to international organizations, as happened in Rwanda and is happening in Darfur. When states go ahead and get involved anyway, they tend to do so in a half-assed manner, as the US did in Somalia. Even when IOs, like the UN or the African Union, deploy peacekeepers, they are often ineffective, underfunded, undermanned, and underequipped, hampered by restrictive Rules of Engagement necessary to reach political consensus and soothe states fearful of having their soldiers killed, and are beholden to the whims of sovereign states (for example, despite approving a 26,000 strong peacekeeping force, Sudan's insistence that the force be made up predominantly of African troops has prevented the UN from deploying a sufficiently strong enough presence in Darfur). In short, while the UN may be good at peacekeeping, the (perhaps) more important task of peacemaking is beyond its abilities, and outside of the political will and interest of states that do have the necessary capabilities.

Which brings us to a meeting of bizarre bedfellows last month: the actress and Darfur activist Mia Farrow and Erik Prince, founder and CEO of the government contractor, Blackwater Worldwide. According to an ABC News report:

Farrow told ABC News that Blackwater, despite its controversial history and allegations of murdering civilians in Iraq, might be able to help the "hopelessly under-equipped" African Union forces deployed in Darfur with logistics and training.

"Blackwater has a much better idea of what an effective peace-keeping mission would look like than western governments," Farrow told ABC News from a refugee camp in near the Darfur border. Farrow said those governments have been unsuccessful in standing up to the Sudanese government and bringing peace to the region.

...

Prince, meanwhile, has reportedly said that with about 250 professionals, Blackwater could transform roughly one thousand of the African Union soldiers into an elite and highly mobile force.

"I'm so sick of hearing that nothing can be done," Prince told the Wall Street Journal last month, calling the Janjaweed, a militia force backed by the Sudanese government, an "unfettered bully."

"No one has stood up to them," he told the Journal. "If they were met by a mobile quick reaction force of African Union soldiers, the Janjaweed would quickly learn their habits were not sustainable."

Prince also told the Associated Press in July that the military "can't be all things to all people" all the time. "There are always going to be some pieces that the private sector can help in."

The possibility of involving a private contractor like Blackwater in a crisis like Darfur has, unsurprisingly, ruffled many feathers. J. Steven Morrison, a Sudan expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued that "It's preposterous to think there is some magic silver bullet that takes the form of Blackwater or any other private military contractor to solve the problems in Darfur." Furthermore, Blackwater's troubled record in Iraq has led other to question the wisdom of involving this specific company:

Blackwater employees have been involved in two deadly incidents in Iraq that proved to be public relations disasters for the company.

The first was the slaying and mutilation of four Blackwater contractors in 2004 in Fallujah that led to congressional hearings about the protection Blackwater provided its employees.

The second, a September 2007 shooting at a crowded Baghdad intersection that killed 17 Iraqis, triggered congressional hearings and investigations from more than a dozen federal agencies.

Federal prosecutors have sent target letters to six of the security guards involved in the September shooting, indicating a high likelihood the Justice Department will seek to indict at least some of the men, according to reports by the Washington Post on Sunday.

An Iraqi government investigation concluded that the security contractors fired without provocation. Blackwater has said its personnel acted in self-defense.

The question Blackwater in particular is not really one which I am equipped to engage. But the general antipathy to the use of private military trainers and personnel -- mercenaries, if you will -- is, I believe, misplaced. Morrison's worry is one of standard political paralysis: There's no guarantee that a new idea will work, so better to stick with the old idea, even if it's not working. And clearly, international peacemaking efforts aren't working. While the UN dithers and tries to raise enough soldiers and equipment, the janjaweed continue their reign of terror against the people of Darfur. And it's not like the UN has a much better track record than Blackwater: numerous allegations of rape, prostitution, child pornography, and other sexual abuses have dogged UN peacekeepers for years. And, even when UN peacekeepers have been on the ground, events like Srebrenica and Rwanda indicate the limits of their willingness to fight to protect their charges. And waiting for states to get involved hasn't been much better.

So, why not turn to private firms? Note that what Blackwater is discussing here isn't putting its own people into the situation, but rather training the African Union peacekeepers to be competent at their jobs. A private company will not be hampered by a lack of political will or fears of alienating public constituencies. While the world may not yet be ready to use mercenaries for the job itself, using a firm like Blackwater to train those who are willing to go into situations like Darfur should certainly be seriously considered.

Dark Days for Darfur

Things are getting much, more worse for Darfur lately. Last week, a convoy of UN peacekeepers was ambushed by 200 gunmen on horseback and in SUVs. Seven peacekeepers were killed, and 22 wounded in the attack, which reinforces the argument that peacekeeping forces are inappropriate and ill-suited for a conflict which has not been resolved. Peacekeeping forces normally are introduced into conflict situations that have ended by agreement of all warring parties but who do not trust one another to keep the peace. Thus, a neutral third party interposes itself between the sides, guaranteeing that each side will adhere to its commitments. But Darfur is not a settled conflict. The central government in Khartoum is still conducting its raids, the janjaweed continue to raid refugee camps, and the Darfuri rebels are still fighting back, even having attacked peacekeepers in the past.

As if the situation isn't bad enough, it's like to get much worse in the near future. Today, the International Criminal Court announced that its prosecutor has requested an arrest warrant for Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir on three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. While it will be months before the ICC to rule on the application, but if the warrant is issued, President al-Bashir will "effectively turn al-Bashir into a prisoner in his own country. In the past, Interpol has issued so-called Red Notices for fugitives wanted by the court, meaning they should be arrested any time they attempt to cross an international border."

But even if the warrant isn't issued, the damage is already done. The UN, which backs the ICC, also maintains the current peacekeeping force in Darfur, and it seems unlikely that Sudan will allow the peacekeepers to remain if their political leaders face indictment and arrest. The removal of the peacekeeping force, as ineffectual as it has been, would likely herald the resumption of a massive cleansing campaign by the Sudanese government in an effort to "solve" the Darfur problem before international intervention occurs again (if it ever does). Furthermore, the BBC reported on Sunday that China was breaking the UN-imposed arms embargo on Sudan, "roviding military equipment and training pilots to fly Chinese jets." While this development is all that surprising, given the diversion of international pressure on China from Darfur to Tibet, it is a troubling one, as it signals, perhaps, the end of Chinese cooperation on Sudan.

Given the precarious nature of the international community's involvement in Darfur, the indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC was definitely ill-timed and most likely ill-advised. I've blogged several times before about the problems inherent in international justice and law, and this is no different. Given that al-Bashir is unlikely to ever stand trial, maintaining the peacekeeping presence was more important than making a point through law.

The international community needs to prepare itself for more attacks on the peacekeepers, if not their expulsion from Sudan. And if (and when) that happens, given China's backsliding, it is all but impossible for the UN to put together a stronger intervention. So, the burden and responsibility will likely fall on the United States and its NATO allies. Sudan must not be allowed to continue its murderous campaign against Darfur, and China must not be allowed to shield Sudan. President Bush and the heads of states and government of the western countries should immediately threaten to boycott the Olympics, not over Tibet (which is a lost cause) but over Chinese violations of the arms embargo and protection of Sudan. China must be leveraged away from Sudan.

However, while China may be willing to support increased sanctions on Sudan, it will not, nor will Russia, support an intervention without the permission of the Sudanese government. Thus, NATO needs to be ready, if it cares at all about saving the Darfuri people, to deploy a force to Sudan immediately. Anything less will likely condemn the people of Darfur to their doom.

A Chance for the UN to Show Its Quality

Things are looking pretty bleak in Zimbabwe. In the wake of the March elections in which opposition parties won more votes than the ruling ZANU-PF party, President Robert Mugabe has sunk to new, depraved lows in his efforts to hold on to power. Opposition parties have been arrested and charged with treason, rallies have been attacked, supporters have been killed, and there are accusations that the ZANU-PF has set up "torture camps" to systematically terrorize any who dare oppose it. This week, just days before the run-off election forced on the country by Mugabe, opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai has taken refuge in the Dutch Embassy and, on Sunday, withdrew from the race, claiming he would not subject his supporters to violence and even death when their votes would not matter. The UN has disparaged the election, which ZANU-PF has announced will take place this Friday regardless of Tsvangirai's withdrawal, international accusations of electoral fraud and intimidation, and the mounting violence, saying that they will lack legitimacy.

However, though, ultimately, it doesn't look like there's much hope. As the Washington Post editorialized yesterday, "Only concerted and aggressive intervention by the United Nations and Zimbabwe's neighbors can now prevent this crime, brazenly carried out in front of the world, from going forward" and that doesn't seem likely to happen. As the Post notes: "While the United States and Britain have repeatedly condemned Mr. Mugabe's terror and have tried to inspire action by the UN Security Council or the Southern African Development Community, they have been blocked by Mr. Mugabe's allies -- foremost among them Thabo Mbeki , South Africa's lame-duck president."

This blog has already called for the US and the Europeans to sanction South Africa if it refuses to play a responsible role in forcing Mugabe to accept the results of a free election. But that doesn't seem likely to happen either. The situation calls for stronger measures.

I hereby call upon the UN to expel, or suspend, Zimbabwe from the General Assembly and the community of nations. A state whose leader openly says that he would go to war before accepting defeat at the polls cannot be considered a legitimate state. Zimbabwe's legal international sovereignty should be immediately suspended, and Zimbabwe's membership in every international organization should end. Until Mugabe and the ZANU-PF end the campaign of organized electoral intimidation and publicly pledge to accept the results of the election, until the election can be monitored by independent third-party observers, and until the people of Zimbabwe are given the opportunity to have their voices counted, Zimbabwe does not deserve to be a member of the community of nations.

There is little chance that the UN will take such a principled stance, wedded as it is to sovereign equality. But this is a real opportunity for the UN to move beyond its stultifying addiction to treating every state equally. Until the UN is ready to make judgments about countries, to criticize them for openly subverting the will of their peoples, there is no hope for the people of Zimbabwe, let alone those in Darfur or anywhere else people are tormented by their authoritarian rulers.

Progress in Uganda?

The New York Times is reporting that Uganda is very close to signing a peace agreement between the government and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army. However, an agreement has seemed to be at hand before, only to collapse or be delayed. The problem this time?

[I]nternational war crimes indictments against [Joseph] Kony and three top commanders. Mr. Kony’s aides have indicated that he will sign the treaty to show he is serious about peace, but the Lord’s Resistance Army will not fully disband until the indictments, issued in 2005 by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, are dropped.

Despite the fact that "many Ugandans have said that they are more eager for lasting peace than international tribunals, and they have been urging the court to cancel the indictments against Mr. Kony," the ICC has, so far, not relented. According to Maria Mabinty Kamara, a public relations officer of the ICC, “The I.C.C.’s position has been over and over again that the indictments stand and they are valid.”

However, there are indications that the ICC may be willing to back away from its position. The Times reports that "judges in The Hague are reviewing the case and recently sent a letter to the Ugandan government asking for more information about the country’s court systems and its capacity to try Mr. Kony." As I discussed when I last wrote about this, the ICC relies on the principle of complementarity, meaning that if the ICC believes, or can convince itself, that Uganda is willing and able to dispense justice, the ICC will step back.

The question is whether the ICC will consider a plan to minimally punish Kony in order to move towards reconciliation to be "adequate justice." Ugandan officials have demonstrated a willingness to come with some kind of arrangement that will allow Kony to escape criminal punishment. According to the Times:

Ruhakana Rugunda, Uganda’s internal affairs minister, said the key to ending the conflict was balancing accountability with reconciliation.

“Our legal system and the traditional system will provide an adequate framework for dealing with impunity and justice and reconciliation,” he said.

While the Times reports that "many Ugandans have said that they are more eager for lasting peace than international tribunals," no numbers or national polling data are presented. Nevertheless, if the Ugandan government can demonstrate that an agreement will lead to a real and lasting peace, the ICC's insistence on criminal punishment should not be an obstacle to ending one of the longest and most brutal wars in the world.

Bad Signs in Zimbabwe

In the wake of reports today that the opposition party in Zimbabwe had defeated the majority party of Robert Mugabe, now, breaking reports out of Zimbabwe indicate that Mugabe may be trying to hang on to power. The Associated Press is reporting that:

Security agents and paramilitary police in riot gear are surrounding a Harare hotel housing foreign journalists.

A man answering the phone at the hotel says they are taking away some reporters.

The man refused to give his name but said about 30 police entered the hotel Thursday and were preparing to take away four or five journalists.

Furthermore, the New York Times is reporting that:

Despite losing control of Parliament, President Robert G. Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his party were increasingly explicit on Thursday about their willingness to continue fighting for the presidency.

After days of public reticence about the party’s intentions in the wake of Saturday’s elections, Bright Matonga, a deputy information minister for Mr. Mugabe, indicated that the president was not prepared to step aside and would compete in a second round of voting if results showed that neither candidate had won a majority in the first round.

While the Times article focuses on the likelihood that Mugabe and his party would try to force a run-off or even a second vote, the AP report gives a more ominous spin to events there. The US and the international community need to move quickly to put pressure on Mugabe and his African allies alike to ensure that Mugabe knows that a seizure of power will not be tolerated in Zimbabwe, in Africa, and in the greater international community.

UPDATE: The Associated Press is now reporting that:

Police raided offices of the main opposition party and detained foreign journalists Thursday in an ominous sign that President Robert Mugabe might turn to intimidation and violence in trying to stave off an electoral threat to his 28-year rule.

...

MDC [the opposition party] secretary-general Tendai Biti said hotel rooms used as offices by the opposition at one of Harare's main hotels were ransacked by police during the raids.

"Mugabe has started a crackdown," Biti told The Associated Press. "It is quite clear he has unleashed a war."

This doesn't look good.

Zimbabwe On the Precipice

It appears as if the long, nightmarish rule of Robert Mugabe over Zimbabwe is finally at an end. Since assuming power 28 years ago, Mugabe has ruined a country once held up as a model of what post-colonial Africa might be. A country that once was referred to as the "breadbasket of Africa" is now a food importer. The economy has contracted by 40-50% since 2000. Inflation is at an incomprehensible 2,000%, if not higher. Over 3 million people are "missing". An "urban reclamation" program has made thousands of urban poor homeless, removing them from the cities and evicting them into the countryside. Entire towns have been destroyed. The list of misery goes on and on.

But, if the results from the election are as anticipated, Mugabe's reign of destruction may be over. But now is an all-important moment. Will he step down? Will Mugabe and his party accept the results and accept exile into the political minority? If he refuses, or tries to sabotage the election results or the process, violence could easily erupt. Already, there are ominous rumblings from Mugabe's party:

[Mugabe's] government immediately rejected the MDC victory claim as "mischievous."

Deputy Information Minister Bright Matonga told Sky television: "President Mugabe is going nowhere. We are not going to be pressurized into anything."

The government has warned that victory claims before an official result would be regarded as a coup d'etat.

Matonga said in a telephone interview with Sky: "No-one is panicking around President Mugabe. The army is very solidly behind our president, the police force as well."

He added: "We are not going to be rushed by anybody. They can make statements left right and centre, but they are merely wasting their time."

Certainly, the international community needs to move quickly to inform Mugabe that it will not tolerate any subversion of the democratic process. But Zimbabwe and Mugabe have proven remarkably immune to international pressure in the past.

More importantly, the West, and in particular the UK and the rest of the British Commonwealth, needs to put pressure on those actors that do seem to have some influence over Zimbabwe: other African states. In the past, African states have been reluctant to sanction, condemn, censure, or even criticize Mugabe, largely due to his Mandela-like stature as a leading figure in the decolonization and independent movement. Now, however, the stakes are different. Allowing Mugabe to subvert and destroy the democratic process can simply not be allowed if Africa is to have any hope. The West must immediately tell Zimbabwe's African allies, especially South Africa and the African Union, that if there is any hint of interference or obstruction from Mugabe or his party they will be expected to intervene to ensure the peaceful transition of power. The AU should know that the funding and supplies it receives from Western states will be stopped, and South Africa should be told that its economic and political ties will be severely damaged unless they are willing to take a meaningful stand and action.

If the results are as predicted, Robert Mugabe must not be permitted to remain in power one second longer than is necessary. And while the West may not be able to ensure that he steps down, other states in Africa can. And they must.

What is Justice in Uganda?

The dispute between Uganda and the International Criminal Court over the status of the indictments of Joseph Kony and other leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army has reached a crucial point. Yoweri Musevni, the president of Uganda, has announced that Uganda will refuse to hand Kony and the others under indictment over to the ICC so that a peace deal, including an agreement for Kony and others to face local, Ugandan courts, can be struck. The ICC issued the indictments when Uganda, an ICC signatory, referred the case to the ICC in 2005 and Uganda is now obliged, as a result of its accession to the ICC, to arrest Kony and his lieutenants and remand them to ICC custody. Now, Uganda believes that that obligation is an obstacle to peace, as Kony has little incentive to end his rebellion and sign a peace deal if doing so will result in his arrest and trial in international court. Uganda has asserted the right to withdraw its request for ICC involvement, since Uganda requested the ICC's participation, but, according to the Guardian article linked above:

Richard Goldstone, the former chief prosecutor for the Bosnia and Rwanda international tribunals which laid the ground for the ICC, has said that if Museveni gets his way it would be "fatally damaging to the credibility" of the court.

"I just don't accept that Museveni has any right to use the international criminal court like this," he said last year. "If you have a system of international justice you've got to follow through on it. If in some cases that's going to make peace negotiations difficult that may be the price that has to be paid."

Last week, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, refused to meet representatives of the LRA and said the indictments still stand.

The LRA is, unquestionably, deserving of punishment far beyond what a civil court can dish out. The LRA is infamous for abducting children and using drugs and terror to enslave them into their ranks, hacking off people's arms, legs, and even lips and eyelids, forcing children to rape and murder their parents, among other documented and reported atrocities. But should the desire to visit punishment and retribution on these monsters win out over the desire to resolve a long-running conflict that has killed, maimed, and dislocated thousands? Should the desire of the ICC and the international community outweigh the request of the Ugandan government to settle this conflict as it sees fit?

Over at Opinio Juris, Julian Ku and Kevin Jon Heller have been going back and forth on this issue. Julian sees the ICC as "an obstacle to peace," where Kevin argues that "it is difficult to argue that the ICC should simply step aside and leave the Ugandan government and the LRA to their own devices." According to Kevin:

There is obviously no guarantee that the two sides, once freed from ICC oversight, will negotiate a peace that is genuinely acceptable to ordinary Ugandans. Indeed, the evidence to date indicates otherwise. And, of course, the Court will suffer significant and potentially irreparable harm if it rewards the combined Uganda/LRA temper tantrum: as John Boonstra noted today (also at UN Dispatch), "[i]f the ICC is seen as capitulating to the demands of its host government — or worse, to those of an indicted war criminal — a dangerous precedent will be set for the court's work elsewhere."

What, then, is the right answer? It seems to me that the answer lies in the ICC's principle of complementarity. Given that ordinary Ugandans favor traditional justice for low-level perpetrators and criminal prosecution for high-level perpetrators, the Court should insist on two things: (1) that the Ugandan government and the LRA revert back to their original plan to try Kony and the other LRA leaders in Uganda's High Court; and (2) that the Ugandan government revamp its criminal justice system to satisfy the principle of complementarity. At that point — and only at that point — should the ICC step aside.

The principle of complementarity to which Kevin refers above is:

The International Criminal Court will complement national courts so that they retain jurisdiction to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

If a case is being considered by a country with jurisdiction over it, then the ICC cannot act unless the country is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute.

A country may be determined to be "unwilling" if it is clearly shielding someone from responsibility for ICC crimes. A country may be "unable" when its legal system has collapsed.

I think Kevin has set the bar a bit too high here, but his general point is a good one. Uganda has acceded to the Treaty of Rome, creating a clear jurisdiction for the ICC. The ICC should be more deferential to the needs of its members, particular in cases where indictments may be barring the road to settling a conflict (or convincing a leader to step down). And while it's right for the ICC to insist on some level of serious prosecution, the presumption should favor Uganda. A desire to lightly punish, or even perhaps pardon, Kony in order to end the conflict should not be seen as unwilling, so long as the settlement is real. If that's the price of ending the conflict, and if Uganda is willing to pay that price, the ICC should not stand in the way. If, however, Uganda was to pardon Kony and his underlings without a real end to the conflict, then the ICC would be right to maintain its insistence on carrying out the arrest warrants.

This is a difficult test case for the ICC and the expansion of international law more generally. As the example of Uganda shows, politics is often too complicated for generalized international law to deal with simply. And while law must not be ignored, it also must not be allowed to stand in the way of ending one of the more brutal rebellions on the planet.

The New York Times Hates the Darfuris

OK, so that's probably not true. But yesterday's editorial in the New York Times certainly isn't going to do anything to help end the suffering, deaths, and dislocation in Darfur either. In the editorial, the Times accurately points out that "The new United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur is not off to an encouraging start." The problem is that, unsurprisingly, the Sudanese government in Khartoum has done nearly everything possible to undermine the mission and prevent it from being able to do its job.

The 20,000 man joint UN-AU force was supposed to supplement from the badly under-equipped, under-sized (7,000) and poorly trained AU force that had been "patrolling" Darfur. So far, however, only one-tenth of the additional forces have been deployed (meaning that 9,000 of the 26,000 troops are in Darfur), largely because Khartoum has refused to allow non-African peace keepers. Much of the equipment necessary for the mission has not been provided, including helicopters which are essential for patrolling an land area the size of France. To date, none of the 24 helicopters so far requested has been deployed. One of the leaders of the genocidal janjaweed was named to be a special adviser to Sudanese President Omar El Bashir. And just 2 weeks ago, a UN convoy came under fire from Sudanese government forces, in an attack that Sudan denies was intentional, but UN officials claim should have been avoided as Sudanese forces were informed of the presence and route of the convoy.

It should be of no surprise that the UN mission in Darfur is failing. The UN is notoriously bad at these kinds of missions, which in reality should be called "peace making" rather than "peace keeping." In peace keeping, two sides which have been warring decide that they wish to end the conflict, but do not trust each other enough to warrant laying down their arms. A neutral third party is needed to interpose itself between the two sides and guarantee the peace will be observed. The UN, as a neutral and trusted third part is very good at these kinds of missions.

But that doesn't really describe the situation in Darfur, which looks more like peace making, in which an outside party uses military force (or the threat of military force) to impose a peace on a situation, particular when one weaker group is being threatened by a larger group. The NATO intervention in Kosovo is a classic example of peace making. Darfur looks much more like this kind of operation that it resembles peace keeping.

However, as good as the UN is at peace keeping, it is notoriously bad at peace making, largely because it lacks the political will to take sides and impose its will on the aggressor (which is exactly why it was NATO and not the UN that intervened in Kosovo, and why the UN was so disastrous in Bosnia [see Srebrenica]). The UN has neither the appetite nor the ability to bully Sudan, to deploy sufficient numbers of well-equipped troops, or to do what is really necessary to protect the people of Darfur.

So, why does the New York Times hate, or so I jest, the Darfuri? Because in the editorial in which the Times notes many of the problems I list above, the Times concludes that "There is no hope at all until a credible and credibly armed peacekeeping force is deployed" and that "What is needed is troops, equipment and a lot more diplomatic pressure on Sudan. The word of the United Nations is on the line, and so are the lives of Darfur’s people."

Has the Times learned nothing? Wasn't the word of the UN on the line when the Serb forces demanded access to slaughter the Muslims of Srebrenica? Wasn't the word of the UN on the line when UN forces on the ground in Rwanda stood back and watched 800,000 people hacked to death? Wasn't the word on the UN on the line when Albanians in Kosovo were driven from the homes and subjected to ethnic cleansing?

The UN will not be able to help the people of Darfur. It is simply not a mission for which the UN is well suited. And continuing to hope that the UN will come through is to condemn more Darfuris to explusion from their homes or death. If the Times really wanted to see the suffering in Darfur end, it would set aside calls for the UN, and instead ask President Bush and the leaders of NATO to take matters into their own hands as they did in Kosovo. That is the only chance that Darfur has.

Crisis In Kenya

My friend who works for the microfinance company Unitus sent me a message today about how the political strife in Kenya is affecting development on the ground. I thought I'd print the message here, and see if any readers want to help:

Crisis in Kenya: Contribute to the Jamii Bora Emergency Fund

January 7th, 2008

Violence in Kenya following recent presidential elections—you can help!

> DONATE HERE

As has been widely reported, presidential elections in Kenya and the subsequent electoral returns December 30th have been followed by tremendous civil unrest and outright violence. Concern over potential electoral fraud following President Mwai Kabiki’s re-election has sparked a spate of violence that continues long after election day. News coverage of the election process and the post-election violence can be found at a variety of news sources; a few select articles are linked here:

• New York Times:
  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/03/world/africa/03kenya.html
• Reuters:
  http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL03725926
• Time:
  http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1699867,00.html
• International Herald Tribune:
  http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/03/africa/kenya.php

Impact on Jamii Bora Trust and Its Members
As many Unitus supporters know, Jamii Bora Trust is a microfinance institution in Nairobi, Kenya that Unitus has partnered with since 2004. We have recently learned that many of Jamii Bora’s members have been deeply impacted by this violence and are in desperate need of assistance. We have been in touch with Ingrid Munro, Managing Trustee of Jamii Bora Trust, in order to further extend Unitus’s support and understand more fully the conditions and circumstances facing the citizens of Nairobi, and more specifically, the fate of Jamii Bora’s members. Here, in Ingrid’s own words (dated January 1) is what we’ve heard:

Dear friends,

We have been able to be in touch with most of our branch staff in various parts of the country. The situation is very serious in many parts of the country. The target for most mob actions are the Kikuyu, the country’s largest tribe. But even families of other ethnic background are victims when the looting goes out of hand and nobody has time to check who is a Kikuyu and who is not.

Jamii Bora members are particularly badly hit, first because they are in the poorest areas that are most badly affected, second because in these areas they are often the most successful business people after many years of climbing with Jamii Bora, third because many are Kikuyus in the central urban areas, fourth because the police protection is not so strong in the poorest sections of the cities and town. The areas of the rich are much better protected and hardly attacked at all.

Terrible things are happening. People are killed and injured. Rape is on the rise. A church where many families with children had sought refuge was burnt down by an angry mob in Eldoret and many people including at least 34 children were killed. Poor people’s businesses are destroyed, burnt and/or looted. Homes and even churches are burnt down. The fruits of their hard work to climb out of poverty has been destroyed and burnt to the ground.

Tense calm has returned to a few places but most of the badly hit areas are still experiencing problems. Many families are running away in panic and have lost everything they have worked so hard for.

Some of the worst hit areas are the large slums in Nairobi especially Kibera, Mathare, Huruma- Korogocho, Kangemi and Kawangware. Other towns that have been exposed to serious destruction are Eldoret, Kisumu, Kericho and Mombasa. Many other parts of the country are experiencing serious problems in poorer sections of the towns. Several of our branches have also been looted and our computers and POS machines stolen. People can not run their businesses for risk of looting, thus even those who have not been looted or burnt down are affected. No buses are available since the owners fear that they may be stoned or vandalized. People are starving because they cannot access food, they are homeless and seek refuge at police stations and churches. Thus everyone is affected.

Jamii Bora estimates that almost 50% of the members are affected in at least one of the above mentioned ways. Our own disaster fund will not last long in this situation and we urgently need help.

Anything you can do to assist and contribute in a big or a small way will be highly appreciated.

Warm regards

Ingrid

How You Can Help
Please consider a donation to Unitus to support the Jamii Bora Emergency Fund. Members throughout the Nairobi slums—specifically Mathare and Kibera—have been affected, as well as members throughout greater Kenya where Jamii Bora has branches. Lives and futures have been devastated, and your generous support can help Unitus and Jamii Bora Trust lend a hand to those impacted by this violence. Funds donated to Unitus will go directly to Jamii Bora Trust to rebuild looted offices and to help members re-establish their businesses and homes.

Please make your contribution here.

Thank you!

- Your friends at Unitus & Jamii Bora Trust

www.unitus.com
www.jamiibora.org

I'll be donating...I hope that you will as well.

Who's The Problem In Darfur?

Yesterday, hundreds of Darfur rebels poured out of the desert and assaulted a camp of peacekeeping troops from the African Union. When the attack was over, 10 peacekeepers were dead, dozens more were missing, possibly kidnapped, and lots of supplies, including heavy weapons, had been stolen. According to the New York Times:

Relief officials said that as those groups splintered, their new factions needed matériel, and that the attack on the peacekeepers might have been intended to seize quality weapons. “It’s indicative of the complete insecurity,” said Alun McDonald, a spokesman for the Oxfam aid organization in Sudan. “These groups are attacking anybody and everybody with total impunity.”

He added that armed groups were “increasingly targeting aid workers to steal their vehicles, radios and logistical stuff.” He said the attack on the peacekeepers “sounds quite similar to that, just on a much larger scale.”

Mr. McDonald's explanation is, however, unsatisfactory. Attacking the peacekeepers is very likely to result in the withdrawal of the AU force, and perhaps even a delay or cancellation of the UN-AU hybrid force that has been authorized to replace the existing AU force. Already Senegal, one of the largest contributors to the AU force, has announced that it is considering withdrawing its troops from the force. So, unless the rebels wanted the peacekeepers out of Darfur, attacking them doesn't make sense.

But it's altogether likely that the rebels do, in fact, want the peacekeepers out. The rebels are those Darfuri who have decided to take up arms against the Sudanese government in hopes of achieving greater political autonomy and protection, if not independence, for Darfur. The presence of peacekeepers, while perhaps sufficing to minimize or prevent the attacks against civilians that has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions more, will not serve to advance the larger political goal. If anything, the peacekeepers will serve to entrench the status quo by freezing the battlelines and political demands in place. They certainly will make it more difficult for the rebels to attain their larger political goals.

Of course, if the UN was capable of disregarding concerns for sovereign equality and actually taking sides in ethnic conflicts like this, the rebels might have a little more faith that their concerns would be addressed by the international community. But history has likely given them little confidence that the presence of UN peacekeepers will do anything but perpetuate the existing situation, and might, in a worst case, prevent the Darfuri from defending themselves against Sudanese predation.

This attack will likely go a long way to convincing states that sending soldiers to Darfur is not realyl in their national interest. And while that might benefit the rebels, it will do little to ease the suffering of the average Darfuri. Whatever forces end up on the ground in Darfur must be capable of defending themselves against government or rebel forces, and must not be unwilling to use force to enforce the peace.

Dallaire On Darfur

Romeo Dallaire, now a senator in the Canadian parliament, was the commander of the UN peacekeeping force on the ground at the onset of the Rwandan genocide. He has been haunted by his inability to do anything about the slaughter, and has written extensively about his failure, the failure of the UN, and of the international community.

Yesterday, Dallaire published an open letter to General Martin Agwai, the commander-designate of the UN force that will, someday, be deployed into Darfur. The letter is worth reading in its entirety:

An open letter from the former force commander of the ill-fated Unamir mission to Rwanda, to General Martin Agwai, the newly appointed force commander designate for the UN mission in Darfur.

Dear General Agwai

Congratulations on your recent appointment as Joint United Nations/African Union force commander for the hybrid UN/AU Mission in Darfur, formalised by resolution 1769 as Unamid. After over four years of massive killing and displacement in Darfur, a conflict that has not only destabilised Sudan but the entire Eastern Sahel region, Unamid under the leadership of Mr Adada, joint special representative for Darfur, and the force under your command will have the historic opportunity to end slaughter, bring peace, [and] allow humanitarian aid. In the longer term, Unamid has the potential to facilitate the return of Darfur's people to their homes, enhance Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity and stabilise the region.

This is a daunting mandate, and you enter into this mission facing long odds. The intentions of the regime in Khartoum toward an effective, impartial implementation of the Unamid mandate are deeply uncertain. The Sudanese government has blocked and whittled international efforts, through the AU and UN, to end the killing and facilitate a durable peace through fair and transparent internal negotiations. Even since the enactment of Resolution 1769, we have seen ample indications that the Sudanese government will at every turn seek to impose a minimalist reading of the Unamid mandate. The government has already signalled that it will try to restrict the non-African role in the mission as much as it can and prolong the internal divisions and growing chaos which undermine efforts to end the fighting and provide humanitarian aid to all in need.

The challenges you will face in dealing with the rebel movements will also be substantial. In the absence of a viable political settlement process, and exacerbated by the Abuja settlement which many saw as imposed and unbalanced, the groups have fragmented and many elements have degenerated into criminal activity and focus on fighting each other. The same holds true of many "Arab" elements, some of which previously fought alongside government troops. The recent efforts of special envoys Salim and Eliasson have given some hope that this deterioration can be reversed with support from rebel movement leaders and field commanders themselves. But as you know, not all leaders are cooperating and conflict has certainly not diminished on the ground since the recent Arusha meeting. The threat to sustaining humanitarian operations as well as to nurturing the AU/UN-sponsored political talks is obvious and severe.

Finally, assembling, sustaining and directing such a large force in this most remote and inhospitable area will tax you, as it will test the will and capacity of both sponsoring organisations. The Unamid hybrid is conceptually novel, with many practical and legal issues that will impact your work yet to be discovered, let alone resolved. Funding, command and control, reporting and provisioning are all areas where both the location and force size will be taxing, and where the novel character of Unamid will add a difficult layer of challenge for you and the SRSG.

In wishing you well, as a fellow force commander, in your important mission, I would like to take the opportunity to offer a few broad thoughts that I hope may assist you in your preparation and implementation of the mission in the field.

First: I urge you to insist both to New York and to Addis Ababa that they clarify, in the most practical terms and as fast as possible, the chain of command and reporting for the mission. Resolution 1769 is vague on command and control. It did not precisely resolve the well-known disagreement between Khartoum, which insists on essentially AU command, and many other member states, that demand UN command and control as the only guarantor of effectiveness.

For my part, I would press hard for New York to be the headquarters you look to for ongoing guidance and authority to implement the mandate. In practical terms, DPKO has the mechanisms to give you guidance and respond to your urgent requirements at any time, whereas the AU headquarters does not, and DPKO also has long and hard-won experience in supporting missions in the field. At the same time, you will want to ensure that Unamid and DPKO itself integrate the AU secretariat into that process, so that its views and interests are dynamically engaged in your support. Above all, you and SRSG Adada will need to demand from both the UN and AU that they reject undue Sudanese government interference in the implementation of Resolution 1769 regarding command and control, and indeed in your operations.

Second: To succeed in the task given you, it is evident that you must exercise, and insist on, the broadest reading of the mandate given in resolution 1769 (especially operative paragraph 15) concerning your chapter VII authority. We are already seeing efforts by the Sudanese government and its friends to argue that the chapter VII authority extends only to force protection situations and support for the execution of the Darfur peace agreement. But the plain text of the resolution and the intent of the security council clearly are that Unamid should play an active role not only in maintaining peace, but also in protecting the vulnerable civilian population.

The security council's intent flows from those aspects of the Darfur conflict which have set it apart as an international concern of special priority - notably, the massive, purposeful death and displacement at the hands of government forces and their janjaweed militia creation. Those attacks burdened the African Union Mission (Amis) and cast in stark relief its lack of mandate and practical inability to intervene against even the most egregious and predictable attacks on civilians. The Sudanese government has indicated that it does not want Unamid to exercise its chapter VII authority to protect civilians. That cannot be accepted. It would render Unamid a nullity regarding the most fundamental reason for its creation.

Third: All are agreed that Unamid will benefit from having "a predominantly African character," but you must insist that member states with sophisticated capacities provide quickly, and with no political obstruction from Khartoum, what you need to make your force mobile and capable of extending its reach throughout Darfur. So far, a number of African countries have made significant and encouraging commitments. It is beyond dispute, however, that African states themselves simply cannot provide nearly 20,000 qualified troops (nor enough police). Unamid needs attack helicopters, engineers, big cargo lorries, communications and other capabilities that African states also cannot provide.

So far, the UN member states that can provide such capabilities have been slow to do so. I therefore encourage you to reject assertions that the AU has already committed, or could provide, all the needed military forces. Equally, you should bring great pressure, working with the senior UN and AU leadership, to pressure more resource-rich member states to provide the specialised capacities you need. And if Khartoum seeks to discourage meaningful non-African contributions, I urge you to take active exception in the interest of succeeding in your difficult task.

Fourth: Press for progressive deployment of the force, as elements are recruited and prepared. Resolution 1769 sets ambitious target dates for establishing Unamid's operations headquarters, for taking command of the support packages and support for Amis, and for assumption of command authority from Amis. Ranged against those targets are the real challenges of rapid mobilisation and deployment of national troop contributions to Unamid.

The thrust of the resolution is correct in practical as well as policy terms, but the period from now until full Unamid deployment will be a testing one and in many ways the determining period for the mission's success or failure. Previous Amis commanders have made clear their assessment that getting more troops on the ground will shift the balance of authority toward the peacekeepers and away from the spoilers. With a progressive deployment, Unamid can foster a gradual shift in the balance of power in Darfur, which will enhance the longer-term prospects for its effectiveness. In this regard, you will want to maintain pressure on both the UN and AU headquarters to build your needed camp and other logistical facilities as fast as possible, and to monitor Sudanese government interaction with Unamid and the camp construction contractors to ensure that any delaying manoeuvres are quickly identified, reported to New York and Addis Ababa and made a priority for diplomatic intervention.

Fifth: Be vigorous and frank, both in your official reporting to New York and Addis Ababa, and in your public commentary, concerning your achievements and the challenges and obstacles you encounter. It is important that your official reporting, in describing progress on mandate implementation, should highlight obstacles you face that require action by the two headquarters, or by member states. You can anticipate being let down by everyone on whom you depend for support, be that troops, funding, logistics or political engagement. Only by shining a spotlight on those failures in every possible way can you mobilise the attention necessary to get the action you need. Bear in mind that whoever fails you will, in the end, be the most active in blaming you for whatever goes wrong.

Permit me to conclude, general, by wishing you every success in this most challenging and important assignment.

Sincerely,

Senator/Lt General Roméo Dallaire

An excellent letter. Unfortunately, if I was a betting man, I would wager that Dallaire's advice will not be followed, and that the situation in Darfur is far from improving.

Don't Count Your Peacekeepers Before They're Deployed

Sudan has finally agreed to allow a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force of nearly 20,000 soldiers into Darfur to monitor the situation and prevent any further genocide. Sort of.

While the announcement by Sudan is being hailed as a "breakthrough moment" by the African Union, it's not so clear that it's time to breath a sigh of relief for Darfur. Apparently, Sudan is insisting that the force be made up almost entirely of Africans, a demand that makes the deployment all but impossible. According to John Prendergast, a Sudan expert who helps lead Enough Project, “the gulf between the rhetoric of acceptance and the reality of deployment is huge,” and the continued haggling over force makeup “is putting a condition on the deployment which ensures its failure.” Similarly, US Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad stated that "if [the acceptance] is conditional, as we hear, that there will be only African troops involved and no non-Africans, that is putting a condition on the acceptance, and that would be unacceptable.”

The UN will examine the plan today. Hopefully, if Sudan is still trying to stall and block the deployment by such insistences, the UN will finally decide to act and punish the genocidal regime. While this is welcome news, I'm certainly not holding my breath.

US Troops In Darfur?

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) has called for the deployment of US troops into Sudan to stop the on-going genocide in Darfur. Biden, who was attending a multinational meeting at the UN on the Darfur crisis, stated that he would impose a no-fly zone and send American soldiers into the region immediately, and also said that President Bush is considering implementing a large sanctions regime against Sudan if the Sudanese government continues to refuse to admit a larger peacekeeping force.

It's nice to see Biden go out a limb like this; the rest of the congressional delegation (Sen. Bob Corker [R-TN] and Sen. Benjamin Cardin [D-MD]) weren't willing to go as far as Biden and call for an intervention. However, despite the designation of the crisis as a genocide by President Bush, an armed intervention is unlikely to happen. The UN is far too gutless and hamstrung by its bureaucratic procedures to pass a Security Council resolution, the US military is strained by the deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and there is very likely little will -- political or public -- in the US right now for such an intervention.

But, even if Bush decided to send troops, how would such a move be greeted by those who have opposed the use of force in Iraq? An intervention in Darfur is almost guaranteed to be "illegal" in that it will not have the sanction of the UN Security Council, just as the invasion of Iraq did not. Does that mean the US shouldn't intervene? The US public has shown a willingness to tolerate the casualties sustained in Iraq...but will that continue in Darfur? Or will it be a repeat of Somalia where, unconvinced of the national interest at stake, a few US casualties undermined the whole operation?

If such an intervention is to occur, President Bush, along with Senator Biden and the rest of Congress, need to prepare the US public. Specifically, they need to make the case of why the US should expend its treasure, and more importantly, why US soldiers should risk their lives and even die to protect the Darfuris. As I have said before, this is not a hard case to make. But it needs to be made, or else an intervention in Darfur, or anywhere else the US intervenes for humanitarian purposes, will follow the same road as Somalia.

Why The UN Sucks

I apologize for the not-so-academic language in the title of this post, but I'm just so flabbergasted by what the UN has done...as if there weren't already so many reasons to hate the UN.

Over the weekend, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development elected a new chair...Zimbabwe.

Yes, that Zimbabwe.

This is so ridiculous, monstrous, and pathetic on so many fronts it's hard to know where to start excoriating the UN for this truly idiotic decision.

Asking Zimbabwe to chair a commission on sustainable development is like asking Pol Pot to chair a panel on overpopulation. What aspect of Zimbabwe's development is sustainable or could serve as a model to other countries? The fact that the country doesn't have enough power for its capital city, or its farms? The 50% contraction of its economy since 2000? The 2,200% inflation? An unemployment rate believed to be around 80%? A life expectancy that has dropped from 55 to 35 in 27 years? The destruction of entire villages in the name of urban beautification? I guess those who believe that sustainable development means reversing economic development would be OK with the last one...and let's not forget the brutal political repression that has been going on.

This is the country that the UN has chosen to lead the world on the issue of sustainable development. I have written many times about the implications of the UN's preference for sovereign equality over values, law, norms, or basic human decency. How can this body be expected to advance human rights, prevent genocide, or serve as even a shadow of a world government if it can't punish one of the worst regimes operating today?

Madeline Albright and Archbishop Desmond Tutu had an op-ed in the Washington Post this past March arguing that:

The crisis in Zimbabwe raises familiar questions about the responsibilities of the international community. Some argue that the world has no business interfering with, or even commenting on, the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This principle is exceptionally convenient for dictators and for people who do not wish to be bothered about the well-being of others. It is a principle that paved the way for the rise of Hitler and Stalin and for the murders ordered by Idi Amin. It is a principle that, if consistently observed, would have shielded the apartheid government in South Africa from external criticism and from the economic sanctions and political pressure that forced it to change. It is a principle that would have prevented racist Rhodesia from becoming Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe from ever coming to power.

However, they go on to assert that they "are not suggesting that the world should intervene to impose political change in Zimbabwe. We are suggesting that global and regional organizations and individual governments should make known their support for human rights and democratic practices in that country, as elsewhere." Which global organizations? The UN? As is evidenced by this, the UN cannot and will not act against its members until it's almost too late, not necessarily then, as Sudan and Rwanda readily demonstrate.

What regional organizations? The African Union? Not likely. The AU has been hesitant, to say the least, to take on Zimbabwe and its anti-colonial hero-president Mugabe.

So, if anything is going to happen, it will likely fall to the US, the EU, NATO, and/or other western organizations to do something. Of course, any such actions will violate the international law of sovereignty, they will violate the will of the international community as expressed by the UN, and they will no doubt resemble cultural imperialism. So be it. That is what it is going to take to end the suffering in Zimbabwe. In Darfur. In North Korea. And everywhere else that the UN has turned a blind eye.