Showing posts with label 2010. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2010. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 04, 2011

Annual Blog Round-Up – 2010

If monthly, why not annual blog round-up? These are my top popular "Security Warrior" blog posts for the entire 2010. This list covers the posts most popular in 2010, not necessarily only those written in 2010.

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So, the list:

  1. Simple Log Review Checklist Released!” made BY FAR the biggest splash last year. The checklist, a list of critical things to look for while reviewing  system, network and security logs when responding to a security incident,  now has a dedicated page (securitywarriorconsulting.com/logchecklist/) and you can grab an updated versions there
  2. Checklist has a companion tool list of a popular free open-source log management and log analysis tools, which is also on the top list for 2010. It was posted to my blog (“On Free Log Management Tools”) as well as to a dedicated page (securitywarriorconsulting.com/logtools/)
  3. On Choosing SIEM” is next in my top post chart. It helps to determine “What is the least wrong way [of choosing a SIEM or log management product] which will actually get used in real-life?”  Sadly, people  seems unwilling to use the right way for a set of reasons…
  4. A carryover from last year, the quest for open source SIEM continues! In fact, a few top posts on my blog in 2010 (as well as 2009) resulted from search queries for “open source SIEM” – and now “open source log management.”  They are: “Why No Open Source SIEM, EVER?” , “On Open Source in SIEM and Log Management”  and “Short Observation on Open Source SIEM
  5. Updated With Community Feedback SANS Top 7 Essential Log Reports DRAFT2”, “SANS Top 5 Essential Log Reports Update!” and their predecessor  “Top5 SANS Log Reports Update DRAFT” also show up close to the top. Now that I have a bit more time, I will finally finish the write-up and submit it to SANS for distribution… look the final version in January 2011.
  6. The Myth of SIEM as “An Analyst-in-the-box” or How NOT to Pick a SIEM-II?” with 7 reasons why SIEM is NOT “an analyst in the box” – and never can be. “SOC in the box”? Bua-ha-ha-ha, come on, let’s be reasonable here
  7. My Best PCI DSS Presentation EVER!” covers my keynote experience at  PCI DSS Workshop 2010 by Treasury Institute for Higher Education (the other keynote being Bob Russo, naturally) – the presentation is embedded in the post
  8. How Do I Get The Best SIEM?” is another SIEM selection advice post that made the top chart. It sure seems like 2010 was a year when a lot of organizations were looking for SIEM tools…
  9. “I Want to Buy Correlation” or How NOT to Pick a SIEM?” … guess what it is about? Yup, selecting a SIEM tool.
  10. It is amazing that something posted in November made the “year’s best” list. Still, “Complete PCI DSS Log Review Procedures, Part 1” and the whole series (which would be completed in early 2011) is among the most read posts for the entire 2010.

See you in December 2011 when I will post the next annual blog round-up; see my previous annual “Top Posts” -2007, 2008 and the monthly top posts below.

Possibly related posts / past monthly popular blog round-ups:

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Checking My 2010 Security Predictions

People should be banned from making new industry predictions before checking how their past predictions fared – and possibly embarrassing themselves again and again (see “The Year of Mobile Malware” Smile)
My 2010 predictions were here: http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/12/security-predictions-2010.html
Proceeding to check them below!
#1
Compliance: as many other observers (Joshua at 451 Group comes to mind) noted, many of the security activities in 2010 will be defined by regulatory mandates such as PCI DSS, HIPAA/HITECH and others.  […]
Sadly, this is as true as ever. As security moves downstream/downmarket, compliance plays bigger role. WIN – but an easy one. BTW, some people did predict “the death of compliance”, but this sure isn't happening any time soon…
#2
Bad shit: what we have here is an intersection of two opposite trends: rampant, professional cybercrime and low occurrence of card fraud (as a percentage of card transaction volume). I explain this conundrum by predicting a scary picture of huge criminal opportunity, which still exists unchanged.  […]
Shit is indeed pretty bad. WIN – but an easy one; no fame points getting this right. This will get worse before they get better and we are in the “climb to REALLY bad shit phase”, IMHO.
#3


Intrusion tolerance is another trend (and its continues existence is in fact my prediction for 2010) which helps the “bad guys”: it is highly likely that most organizations have bots on their networks. What are they doing about it? Nothing much that actually helps. It is too hard; and many businesses just aren’t equipped – both skill-wise and technology wise – to combat a well-managed criminal operation which also happens to not be very disruptive to the operation of their own business.  […]
Same thing – predicting this was like taking candy from a baby. WIN, but with no extra credit. Organization will likely stay owned, despite regulations, media attentions, big security budgets, etc.
#4
Cloud security: I predict much more noise and a bit more clarity (due to CSA work) in regards to information security requirements as more and more IT migrates to the cloud. The Holy Grail of “cloud security” – a credible cloud provider assessment guide/checklist – will emerge during 2010.
A WIN here too - more clarity on cloud security is here. CSA work (CSA 2.0 guide,  recent cloud compliance matrix and CloudAudit releases) are helping.  Still, there is a lot of delusional cloud noises from many vendors….
#5

Platform security: just like Vista didn’t in 2007, Windows 7 won’t “make us secure.” The volume of W7 hacking  will increase as the year progresses.  Also, in 2008, I predicted an increase in Mac hacking. I’d like to repeat it as there is still room there :-) […]
And, only the truly lazy won’t predict more web application attacks. Of course! It is a true no-brainer, if there ever were one. Web application hacking is “a remote network service overflow” of the 2000s….
So, a partial WIN here, but then again – predicting “more attacks” is stupidly easy. BTW, Windows 7 is holding pretty well and there is no dramatic rise in public W7 vuln releases. Are people hoarding them (possible) or the vulnerabilities just aren’t there? Or maybe everybody is owning Adobe now (NEWFLASH: Adobe 2 days without a 0-day vulnerability!)


#6

Incidents: just like in 2008, I predict no major utility/SCADA intrusion and thus no true “cyber-terrorism” (not yet). Everybody predicts this one forever (as Rich mentions), but I am guessing we would need to wait at least few years for this one (see my upcoming predictions for 2020!) Sure, it makes for interesting thinking about why it did not happen; surely there is a massive fun factor in sending some sewage towards your enemies.  I'm happy to be correct here and have no such incidents happen, but I was predicting that something major and world changing would NOT happen so Feynman paradox is on my side. […]
WIN – but a reluctant one. I still won’t predict it for 2011 (predictions out soon), but even thinking about this one freaks me out…

UPDATED: in comments, Alex has [likely] correctly called me on this one - what about Stuxnet and Iran's nuclear control gear? Won't this qualify as "major industrial control incident"? OK, maybe - but we don't know what damage they suffered, beyond annoyance. In any case, I am changing this for partial FAIL from WIN.

UPDATED2: this prediction is an official FAIL. It was reported that Stuxnet DID in fact significantly impact Iranian nuclear facilities by accelerating an unknown number of centrifuges to beyond safe limits, and likely causing their breakage. We have proof - sort of - that you can blow up sensitive equipment nicely using malware. So...the future begins...NOW?

A massive data theft to dwarf Heartland will probably be on the books. And it will include not some silly credit card number (really, who cares? :-)), but full identity - SSN and all.
FAIL. No such breach materialized – at least not publicly.

UPDATED3: as pointed out in comments, Wikileaks is just such a breach - big, wide-ranging; it matters even though I thought it would be a PII breach and not a confidential document breach. Changing FAIL to partial WIN.


#7

Malware: sorry guys, but this year won’t be the Year of Mobile Malware either. As I discussed here, mobile malware is "a good idea" (for attackers) provided there is something valuable to steal – but it is just not the case yet in the US. There will be more PoC malware for iPhone, BlackBerry, maybe the Droid, but there will be no rampage. On the fun side, maybe we will finally see that Facebook malware/malicious application (that I predicted and consequently missed in 2008). This one will be fun to watch (others agree), and current malware defenses will definitely not stop this "bad boy," at least not before it does damage.
WIN. Read my lips: no..year..of…mobile…malware! Yes, I know AV vendors want it badly (in their ongoing fight for relevance) and keep predicting it  but it ain’t coming. Sorry!

#8
Risk management: more confusion. Enough said. In 2008, I said “Will we know what risk management actually isin the context of IT security? No!It sounds like we know no more now.
WIN, but maybe not for long. Growing amount of security data might change it in the next few years. Maybe. For now, as Mike said it, "Risk scoring is still a load of crap"

Conclusion: I can predict, but mostly easily predictable stuff. I am an extrapolator, not a Nostradamus.
Possibly related posts:

Monday, December 20, 2010

Security Reflections and Musings on the Year 2010

Here is my new annual post (on top of my annual top post chart and annual predictions):  Security Reflections and Musings on a Passing Year.

Totally informal. Subjective! No science has been harmed while making it!

So, what security events, things, happenings do I remember from 2010 (in no particular order):

  • 86% of breached companies had intrusion evidence in their logs” and other super-juicy bits from Verizon breach report.
  • Wikileaks. Your data will be stolen  and, if you are lucky, leaked. If you are not lucky, sold and then used against you. Boom! That was your business going down.
  • PCI DSS 2.0 is here – but the fight goes on. Now you merchants finally have to do it (or outsource card processing)
  • APT. Please forget APT (most people – NOT all) – while you are reading in the media about APT, your barely-there-security is being owned by Backwards Non-persistent Whaaa-you-call-that-a-threat? (BNW). Boom!!
  • TSA JunkGrabGate – please don’t laugh, but “S” in TSA actually …OK, stop laughing NOW… stands for …yeah, I know, I know… “security.” So, it counts as a part of security reflections for the year. It is definitely stuck in my head – and probably will be stuck in my head for more than a year.
  • RSA2010  conference – this was my first show where I was as an independent consultant (no vendor hat in hand) and I loved it. I am sooo looking forward to this year – and my press pass is already confirmed.

Maybe I can tag others to reflect on the year? Hey, others, Smile want to do it?

Stand by for my review of 2010 predictions and – yes!- 2011 predictions.

Monday, May 17, 2010

Hack in The Box Keynote in Amsterdam 2010

Among all the fun security conferences I’ve been to lately, this one is promising to be extra-special. After two failed attempts (one), I’d be doing (finally!) a keynote at Hack in The Box (HITB) Amsterdam 2010. So, if you are in the vicinity of Amsterdam on June 30 – July 2, 2010, come over and attend it. My keynote will be titled “Security Chasm

Full abstract follows:

Have you often wondered why people are updating their security policies, closing compliance gap and defining ISMS while attackers are owning their systems – at the same time? Why consultants advise management on ‘risk ass-essment” while new bots are being deployed on what was formerly known as ‘your network’? Why some say that “DLP is all the rage” while record data losses and resulting fraud occur daily? Why application architects now have to assume that a client PCs is ‘owned’ when its user goes to a bank website and the design solutions to work securely around that?

Reality today often presents a grim vision of “two securities”: one concerned with ‘elevating the infosec conversation’ while the other is concerned with cleaning up the mess on our networks and systems. In one, people pretend to ‘assess risk’ while in the other incident response is the only way to go…. This very concept, that I call “security chasm,” will be the subject of my keynote presentation, along with such questions as “why we wear seatbelts because of the monetary fine, but not because of risk to our lives?” and “What will make us secure – if anything?” (and what does it actually mean!) Finally, I will explore the future of what we now call security industry and make a few long term predictions of where we will end up in a few years….

See ya all there!

Possibly related posts:

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Wednesday, March 17, 2010

RSA 2010 – Day 4-5

The final RSA 2010 post covers the last two days: Day 4-5.
As during the previous days, I had quite a few fun meetings with people that will hopefully translates in to more business for Security Warrior Consulting.


One of the days, Branden and I did our PCI book signing (picture). First, we were shocked to learn that the book actually sold out (!) at RSA bookstore and the publisher had to rush another batch in (which actually almost sold out as well by the end of the show…)

On Friday, I went to a really interesting presentation called “Got DLP. Now What?” Some guy from Forsythe delivered a VERY well-thought-through presentation on what to do after you got that DLP box. Basically, stuff on DLP program, process, even how to think about DLP (“not for malicious attacks”, “not for malicious data theft”), etc.
Just as SIEM, DLP most often fails for political and cultural reasons, not because the technology is somehow inadequate.  His range of common DLP mistakes went all the way down to “we don’t know whether we have anything sensitive, but we think DLP will protect us” (yeah right!)
I also loved that he focused on building incident response procedures first after buying DLP (and, better, even before!). Indeed, response plan is needed first (SIEM is the same – what happens when that correlation rule triggers?). He also reminded that DLP will likely require full-time employees (or staff augmentation by a skilled consultant) to operate it.
He also said that “just run DLP and then chase alerts” approach never work. Thousands of alerts – the IDS syndrome- will kill it. Starting from a detailed DLP policy is the only way (surprise! :-)); AUP or general security policy won’t do.
Another thing I loved is the dilemma of “classify first OR discover first.”  Just as I suspected, in a perfect world , “classify first” works – just not in this one (see Rich explain it here). “Discover scan first then create policy/classification” is more useful.
Similarly, “monitor first then slowly add prevention” is the only way to successful implementation. Overall, this presentation proved to me that RSA conference is not just about business development, chasing VCs and partying :-)

Finally, the juiciest bit: The Vendor Hall.


First, the meta-observation. Security industry is baaaack!  RSA 2010 felt more like super-glam RSA 2007 than like the meager RSA 2008. Economy in crisis? Not in this sector, baby! New vendors, old vendors, large vendors, small vendors – everybody is back in business [in fact, even some folks who shouldn’t be… you, triple-dead-zombies, you :-)]
Second, I noticed a lot of new security vendors with REEEEEEEEEEEEEEEALLY bad marketing, all the way down to this [BTW, somebody mentioned that the vendor in question has pretty useful and novel technology, it’s just their marketing is a bit … ya know… dumb].  BTW, “bad” here is defined as actually ineffective, not “overly deceptive” (e.g. compliance appliance) or “somehow offensive” (e.g. utilizes boobs and, especially, augmented ones).
Yes, there was even an obligatory village idiot with “we sell SOC-in-a-box” message. As well as “<our name>= Security” (while everybody knows that their name merely stands for PCI DSS compliance). And don’t even get me started on APT marketing – Rich said it best here.
Sometimes I felt like all vendors are divided into those who know what they are doing and how to market it; those who know what they are doing, but not how to market it; those who know don’t know what they are doing, but with great skills on how to market it; and, finally, those who don’t know what they are doing and have no idea how to market it (sad).
Third, it was funny when I’d approach a booth of Log Management Vendor X and everybody (including people I don’t personally know) will say “Hi Anton.” Then I approach Log Management Vendor Y and ask them a question, while wearing my name tag, and they  will say “come talk to this press guy over here” (!) and then they will start explaining to me what a columnar database is  :-) This was indeed hilarious! BTW, there was plenty of log management and SIEM vendors [some would say too many] and most if not all of them looked pretty optimistic.
Fourth, I have not picked anything that smelled like a new technology trend. It looked like most security subspaces (well, maybe not NAC…) are experiencing a major reemergence. The only thing that jumped at me (not sure why) was a large number of authentication and “access control” (loosely defined) vendors. Cloud stuff – even if in name only! – is even louder than in 2009 (substance is a bit hard to find, of course). You can try to do a quick divination on “Securosis Guide to RSA” [PDF], but I suspect all trends have been mined from there already :-)
Here is some more fun RSA 2010 (and BSides) notes from other folks (in no particular order)
  • Martin McKeay on our compliance panel
  • Rocky DeStefano on BSides and RSA
  • Securosis team on RSA (those guys also notice amazing spurt of optimism!); read this one about APT as well (quote: “astounded at the outlandish displays of idiocy and outright deception among pundits and the vendor community”)
  • More RSA 2010 and SecurityBSides impressions are here, here, here (from RSnake) etc.
  • And of course, #rsac Twitter hash tag, if you’d like to be overwhelmed.
So, I am really looking forward to RSA 2011 :-)
Possibly related posts:

Tuesday, March 16, 2010

RSA 2010 – Day 2-3

Continuing my much delayed coverage of RSA 2010, this is my summary of Days 2-3.

Day 2 was all meetings and getting new business for Security Warrior Consulting, so nothing to write about (yet). By far the most fun part was a long discussion with Rocky DeStefano, that went all the way back to 2003 when we faced each other through the gun ports of the warring battleships… eh... competing SIEM vendors [his side eventually won :-)]

Day 3 started from attending  an 8AM session by Bob Russo. Now, think about it!

RSA conference + Wednesday (day after heavy party Tuesday) + PCI DSS + 8AM (!) = empty room?

I honestly thought I’d be the only one who wouldn’t want to miss Bob Russo (session GRC-201). Ha-ha-ha, poor naive Anton :-) I came at 7:55AM – and there was barely a place to sit in a HUGE room. Bob didn’t say that much new, but he heavily focused on educating the merchants to focus on security, not checklists and “teaching to the test” [=PCI assessment]. See my RSA interview with the PCI Council  for more PCI DSS updates.

After the panel, I spent some time wandering the vendor hall – one of my favorite things to do at RSA; coverage of this will be presented in the next post since I am still sleeping on some of the trends that I think I’ve noticed.

Later in the day, I jumped to SecurityBSides where our compliance panel “The Great Compliance Debate: No Child Left Behind or The Polio Vaccine” was about to be held. This time we also had a QSA , a large service provider CSO and the usual suspects: Josh “PCI is the Devil” Corman and Jack Daniel, our illustrious moderator.  The panel went well and was a much better experience overall than our similar ShmooCon panel (notes, video [FLV]): more structure, more useful discussion and just enough anger to keep it fun :-)  To me the most jarring part was a comment by an esteemed audience member (sadly, she is not seen on the video) that implementing PCI DSS controls is COMPLETELY out of alignment of what she needs to do based on her understanding of risk at a mid-size service provider. Hopefully, she clarifies it on her blog soon :-) So, watch the video: part 1 and then part 2. Also, read some more notes here.

Enjoy! One more RSA 2010 post to come: Days 4-5.

Possibly related posts:

Monday, March 15, 2010

RSA 2010 – Day 1 Metricon

Let me start my [much delayed] coverage of RSA 2010 conference with the awesomeness of Metricon 4.5 (technically, a Mini-Metricon 4.5 :-)) where I spent my first RSA day (sacrificing the Cloud Security Alliance meeting that was reported to be packed).

Here is an agenda for the meeting with my comments:

08:45 - 10:05: Morning Session I - Chair: Jeremy Epstein

  • Qualitative Tuning as Preparation for Quantitative Methods, Pete Lindstrom

This was one of the most fun presentations, focusing on expert opinion vs. fact/metric in security. Pete showed an interesting approach for assessing the opinions in order to come up with something that looks more like fact.

  • Metrics for insights on the state of application security, Ashish Larivee

This was an interesting presentation of Veracode research of binary analysis (paper, some highlights). A few thing actually blew me away first, but, upon further consideration, started to look perfectly logical. For example,  software industry is worse at developing secure software than financial service industry. It can be explained that FS folks develop only mission-critical software though. Still, this seems to prove that in some areas “if you want it done well, do it yourself and do NOT trust the professionals to do it” :-) In fact, commercial software overall fared worse [vulnerability-wise] than internally developed AND outsourced software. It also had longest remediation cycle, while open source had the shortest (for methodology details see their full report)

10:20 - 11:40: Morning Session II - Chair: Joe Magee
  • Translating the Narrative into Metrics: The Verizon Incident Sharing Framework,Alex Hutton and Wade Baker

Verizon VerIS was released via this presentation (release, exec summary, document [PDF]). VerIS “translates the incident narrative (the attacker did this, then that, then the other thing) into a data set” and thus allows the creation of such awesomeness as DBIR.

  • Ontologies for Modeling Enterprise Level Security Metrics, Anoop Singhal

This presentation was a bit of a cruel joke. It carried unfortunate signs of being done by somebody who never ventured in the real world of security (for example, single number “asset value”, “risk = damageValue”, “security measures that reduce the frequency of attacks”, etc, etc, etc). And, what was even more embarrassing, it came after the stellar presentation by the Verizon team; I think I have seen the grimaces on their faces :-) And every time the NIST speaker mentioned “this was done on tax payer dime” or uttered the word “ontology”, I wanted to just reach for a ShmooBall. To make his material even more insulting, he was also a bad presenter. Yuck!

13:10 - 14:40: Afternoon Session I - Chair: Caroline Wong
  • Improving CVSS-based vulnerability prioritization with business context information, Christian Fruhwirth

This was a curious little preso that basically can be summarized in one phrase “using CVSS as it was intended by the original team – with Env scores – is valuable.” Even though there was one “cringe moment” when the speaker expected a normal distribution of vulnerability CVSS scores (pray tell me, why medium severity are more likely than low severity?)

  • Security Metrics Field Research, Ramon Krikken

This presentation by a Burton …eh... Gartner… analyst Ramon Krikken was hugely insightful. They did some metrics research among their clients and came up with some surprising conclusion that shows metrics programs largely in the Stone Age (in fact, what was before the Stone Age? Ah, yes, Sharpened Stick Age! The maybe the metrics are in that age…). Here are some of the themes, but get the presentation materials when they are posted – very worthwhile. As expected, “compliance metrics are easy; security metrics are hard”, “assessments and audits matter”, “need to map to ” and “ONLY prevention of ‘business being stopped’ matters at many companies.” The research showed no focus on improvements, no peer benchmarking, etc. Regarding tools, MS Excel was by far the #1, couple of times RSA/Archer and SIEM.

 15:10 - 16:30: Afternoon Session II - Chair: Ray Kaplan

  • Metrics for Cloud Security, Lynn Terwoerds, Caroline Wong, Betsy Nichols

This panel announced that CSA is starting a cloud security metrics effort, which was in a VERY early stage. No material has been created yet.

  • Identifying critical information security areas with a Threat Agent Risk Assessment, Matthew Rosenquist

I read the TARA paper back when it came out, but this presentation (and the discussion) was still VERY interesting. The main idea is that vulnerability or asset focused approach makes no sense since there are way too many vulnerabilities (presenter example was “data center is vulnerable to a meteor strike”) and thus the way to go is to focus on threat agents that are motivated to cause damage and that can realistically to do so. The logic thus becomes: threat agent –> vulnerability –> control –> what remains is the risk that needs to be dealt with somehow. But read the paper instead of this, Intel folks explain it much better :-)

 

So, as I said, Metricon was the most thought-provoking part of RSA for me! And I am not even mentioning the level of hallway discussions there…

Friday, March 12, 2010

RSA 2010 EXCLUSIVE PCI Security Standards Council Interview

At RSA 2010, I was given a unique opportunity to interview Bob Russo (GM at PCI SSC) and Troy Leach (CTO at PCI SSC). I have prepared a deck of very tough questions and then had an hour-long discussion with Bob and Troy around those questions. What follows is the interview reconstruction from my notes with minimum edits and clarifications by the Council folks.

Anton Introduction:  I think PCI DSS is the most valuable thing to hit security industry since its inception – both as a driving force for security improvements and as a source for security guidance. However, there are skeptics among merchants (too much security) and some security professionals (too little security). Some of my questions below focus on dispelling the misconceptions such skeptics might hold.
Anton Question 1: What, in your opinion, is the main value of PCI DSS – to the community at large? Merchants? Banks? Brands?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
You have answered this question yourself above: it is security. Motivation for payment security improvements is the value of PCI. For some companies it is also a springboard for additional security improvements needed for their businesses. This benefits everybody!
PCI value can also be rephrased as demonstrating trust across organizational boundaries and. As we know, payment security has many sides and PCI compliance is one way of demonstrating trust across organizational boundaries.

Anton Question 2: Way too many companies seem to focus on compliance and not on security. What is the best way to prevent “teaching to the test” for PCI DSS compliance?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
Too many companies focus on studying for the test. We believe the PCI Standards provide a solid foundation for a security strategy to look after payment and other types of data, but security does not start and end with compliance with standards.
Education is very important and that is why the PCI Council will focus even more on educating the merchants and changing their mindset from one of compliance to security. Their old way of doing business – retaining card data, for example- was viable one day, but not today.One of the steps we see is increased outsourcing of payment processing to trusted providers.

Anton Question 3: Some people say that “the brands must just change the system” since Level4 merchants [=typically smaller merchants] can never be educated and this never can be secured. What do you say to this?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
It’ll happen eventually, but it is obviously not so easy. We’re talking 5 to 10 years here. The payment system is diverse and incredibly complex. Any drastic changes will probably be more costly and disrupt merchants’ business even more than PCI DSS ever could, so they have to happen gradually. The PCI Council’s mandate is to get as much done to improve payment security as possible - within the existing system. Security has to become part of every business that deals with card data.

Anton Question 4: There are many debates about PCI DSS in security industry, among merchants, etc. How can the impact of PCI DSS payment security be measured? Who might have the data to do it?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
Security breach statistics demonstrating a root cause that can be mapped to PCI DSS requirements is one such possible way to prove the value of PCI. For example, if the company did not take any measures to protect against SQL injection and got breached through that, they need to pay more attention to Requirement 6.6.
On the other hand, trying to analyze what the non-breached companies are doing right with PCI is harder since you don’t hear about the myriad of success stories of companies that are defending against breaches through following DSS or have minimized card data compromise in breach situations through strong logging and monitoring, mandated by PCI.
PCI DSS prescribes logging and monitoring, which help detect data loss. Unfortunately some recent incidents had breach evidence present in logs, but since logs were not reviewed until breach became public (contrary to PCI DSS requirements) this was not utilized for detecting the breach.
More education efforts are needed to explain to merchants that PCI is not only about breach prevention, but also about detection of intrusions and security monitoring. Thus, judging its value only on breach prevention is shortsighted.
Enhanced information sharing will drive more improvements here.

Anton Question 5: What is your opinion of mandating the discovery of stored card data and especially track and other prohibited data? This technology was not high on the list in PWC report.
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
Many QSAs already use data discovery tools today. Since PCI scope covers systems where card data is present, payment card data discovery should be part of scope validation. “Forgotten” credit card data dumps were indeed present in some recent breaches stories.
Methods of such discovery can vary- using an automated tool is one of the options, but such tools are still not mature.

Anton Question 6: Do you think that there should be tiered security requirements for small and large organizations (that go beyond today’s SAQ validation levels)? For example, daily log review seems onerous to many merchants.
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
You cannot dumb security down below a certain level. More education efforts will be needed to explain to merchants how to satisfy requirements and become compliant [and stay compliant].
However, the Council is planning to build more tools in order to help merchants understand what exactly they need to do to become compliant. A wizard interface or some other method to simplify the SAQ process can be used here to highlight which controls the merchant needs to implement.

Anton Question 7: The “None were compliant when breached” rings true to me. Why do you think so many people object to this?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
People simply need to know the facts and find out what happened in those breach stories. For example, some breached companies had massive stores of prohibited data, such as authorization data. Or they were not adequately protected at the application or database level against things like SQL injections. There is a difference between “breached due to negligence” and “breached due to bad luck.” Being diligent but still ultimately failing to protect the information is possible (so safe harbor does exist for such companies); it just isn’t what happened in those incidents.

You just need to get the facts. If a company gained compliant status by misrepresenting the facts to a QSA, PCI standards are not at fault when the breach happened.


Anton Question 8: What is the best way to balance PCI DSS lifecycle with both merchants complaints about “moving target” and with rapidly changing threats?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
So far, the current two year lifecycle has provided a good balance between structured development and staying abreast of rapidly changing threats. Feel free - and have your readers - to suggest changes to that lifecycle, if you think it needs to be changed! We are considering how it might evolve.

Anton Question 9: What do you think of using PCI DSS controls for non-payment-card data?
Bob and Troy @ PCI Council answer:
It is a good thing, if you keep in mind that PCI DSS controls are the foundation or the minimum baseline for an effective security strategy. Organizations will likely need to build more security on top of the PCI foundation to protect other sensitive data. Layering technology solutions and combining with the necessary people and processes continues to be the most effective means in protecting cardholder data.
PCI has certainly raised awareness for all data protection, not just payment card data.
Anton Summary
Overall, the main themes I picked in the conversation were:
  • “PCI compliance” is a means to an end. And the end is “security!”
  • Education is one of the ways to change the thinking of merchants and to improve security.

Thanks to Bob and Troy for the insightful discussion!

Thursday, February 25, 2010

RSA 2010: Where to Find Anton?

Since everybody is  heading down (…up or sideways – in my case) to RSA, here my schedule. If you want to meet up, it will help you to track me down.

  • Monday: Metricon 4.5. Sadly, missing the Cloud Security Summit. Is there anything more important than cloud? Yes, security metrics! :-)
  • Tuesday: mostly meetings with clients, prospects, friends and everybody else. I plan to attend a few GRC-themed RSA presentations in the afternoon.
  • Wednesday: at SecurityBSides, speaking on PCI DSS and otherwise having fun. Come say hi if you are there! Obviously the way to end this day is at the famous RSA Security Blogger Meet-up.
  • Thursday: attending RSA, more meetings with prospects and friends, and – YES! - our PCI DSS book signing (!!!). Come have your PCI book signed by BOTH Branden and me (a rare event indeed!) at 1PM at the RSA bookstore.
  • Friday: yet another day of meetings and RSA presentations.

BTW, we […for any value of ‘we’] totally need to bunch up and do a vendor hall walk – if for no other reason but to make fun of vendors with incompetent marketing, look for hippos (=misspelled HIPAA) and “compliancy” as well as other fun stuff. Maybe this year I should finally organize the “1st Annual RSA Vendor Hall Walk”, especially given that I do not work for a vendor anymore

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

Nobody Is That Dumb ... Oh, Wait XII

RSA is that time of the year when a lot of otherwise hidden hilarity is suddenly exposed – thru the work of noble PR folks. For example, below is a pre-RSA press email I received the other day – it made a perfect candidate for my “Nobody Is That Dumb ... Oh, Wait” series. The last post in the series was a while ago, so this was a perfect opportunity to revive the series.

“I know your time at RSA is filling up, but I wanted to tell you about “Embarrass Security” [company name sanitized – A.C.], a company that is changing the way companies protect their web properties. “Embarrass Security” is going to be at booth No. XXX [sanitized – A.C.] during RSA and will be:

  • Announcing a new ‘counter-hacking appliance’ for enterprises
  • Demonstrating a ‘live hacking & sting operation’  demonstration in the “Embarrass Security” booth (with the disclaimer that no animals will be harmed in the production of the demo)

With the counter-hacking appliance, “Embarrass Security” will demonstrate the ability to alert companies when hackers are knocking at the door, and can also show how they thwart evil intentions by making sure the hackers don’t actually see what they think they’re seeing. “Embarrass Security” enables enterprises to protect their web properties at a deeper level that even the bad guys can’t touch.”

Nothing to add really.. let’s all go buy the “counter-hacking appliances,” thwart some evil intentions and be done with it :-)  I can’t help but wonder what kinda people work for their product management / marketing team…

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Wednesday, February 10, 2010

ShmooCon 2010 – Our PCI DSS Panel

It goes without saying that our PCI DSS panel was – for me – the most fun part of ShmooCon 2010. Yes, spectator sports are OK, but the most fun is had when you are playing and kicking the ball – or balls as the case may be in a heated discussion :-) So, Mike Dahn, Jack Daniel, Joshua Corman – over video Skype! he got “snowed out” – and me got to play.

Everybody who’s been to ShmooCon, can easily figure out that the audience there is extremely smart – I sensed there were no “security laggards” in the room. So what happens if you combine PCI and some smart security people? Rage! In fact, we had people from large merchants, QSAs, issuing bank (!) and other organizations. I am amazed that even some non-PCI folks, who can’t tell a QSA from an SAQ found the discussion enjoyable…

It was very interesting to watch that the debate split into two distinct flows: “security vs prescriptive compliance” AND “fuck PCI, they [the brands] must fix the system.” The latter sentiment was very strong, like the Dark Side of the Force (even though there is absolutely nothing dark about it…). It ranged from “why don’t they fix it [the payment system]? they have billions in profit!” (naive) to “if 4 millions of people put the Band-Aids on, is this cure for cancer?” (philosophical). The impression that PCI DSS approach is “too much work” even if good security results from it – which is …how should we put it… not always the case… was also represented. Given the circumstances, it is evident that the view that PCI DSS is many companies’ first encounter with real security management kinda was not very visible…

Also, I always felt it for the issuing bank guys, since they were often left holding the bag for ignorant merchant (TJX anybody?) and unlucky processors or acquirers (Heartland anybody?). But I didn’t expect the present issuers to be so angry at the brands – and not at the merchants! Well, learn something new every day…

The other discussion that even if “checklist security” is offensive to some people, it is the only way to many organization to actually do something. A lot of “risk management stuff” just goes – whooosh! – over their heads. IMHO, this is still an unsolved problem.

Also, somebody very smart in a red blouse :-) said the following: even if we “do everything perfect with PCI DSS”, we will only solve the problem of cardholder data…not any other data (like SSN or key IP) and not any other security issue. Indeed, if PCI DSS magically “just works” and payment card security “becomes 100% secure” , a lot of security work will remain. This is something useful to keep in mind.

I don’t remember signing any NDAs, so I will share some of the reviewer comments that I got from the ShmooCon feedback system (BTW, if you were at the show, please leave the feedback!!)

“Best panel discussion of the con. You could tell there wasn't agreement amongst the panel but the disagreements weren't made personal. Mike and Josh did a great job in explaining their positions and Jack did a super job moderating.”

as well as:

“This dissolved in a religious argument 30 seconds into the talk.”

(in reality, it was maybe 20 minutes into the talk :-))

Overall, the panel was “awesome+” We even took one question from the Internet, something I have not seen at other sessions. Looks like that live video feed was not broadcast in vain… So, watch the video when [correction: it appears that the correct word is “if” here…] it comes out – VERY fun!

BTW, I had an Eureka moment when I spoke to Josh after the panel – deep thought warning! – if we think that the only way to get some merchants to secure their system is to force PCI DSS on them, then how can we expect for them to do a good job with it and not just “check the box”? “Forced standards” and “doing a good job” are hardly compatible.

Finally, thanks to my publisher for providing a copy of the PCI book for the event. I had a chance to wave it at the audience a couple of times :-), but in all the excitement I completely forgot that I wanted to give it out via a contest (FAIL!). In any case, a well-deserving person got the book.

Possibly related posts:

Tuesday, February 09, 2010

ShmooCon 2010 – Show Notes

First things first: ShmooCon was one of the most awesome conferences I attended in quite some time.

If you’d like to see what REALLY was going on as Washington, DC was plunging into a “snow-pocalypse”, go check out #ShmooCon Twitter coverage. Then read other show accounts, such as this one from PaulDotCom.

My note follow below:

First, Bruce’s “intro” was kinda interesting.  For example, he made a couple of TSA jokes (the video was hilarious) and noted that “if you think this is funny, then you’d see that network security is actually worse.” What was interesting to me that he also noted that many organizations prefer to “buy new boxes” rather then do something useful, like log “accepts” and “allows” and analyze them.

Then I went to “Social Zombies II: Your Friends Need More Brains.” This was one of those “shit is bad” presentations. Maybe it’s just me, but somehow the idea that some people disclose too much info (Blippy anyone? Anyone sane? Heloooo…)  fails to scare me.  No shock value really. It can be summarized as "info is out there. done."  Then again, I have to admit that their “KanyeWestify” tool was pretty cool and I downloaded the Maltego tool already, so it was pretty useful (Twitter+Facebook+text mining tools = hilarity! :-)). More coverage of it is here and the deck is here.

Now, “GSM: SRSLY?” talk was massive fun. For one, I had no idea that a [relatively simple] piece of hardware can both capture all local cell phone connections (by easily masquarading as AT&T or T-Mobile)  AND force them into A5/0 mode that means “no encryption – and you don’t know about it.” So, as I said, I didn't know much about the area, but this talk was very enlightening, useful and overall awesome.

Ah, “Build your own Predator UAV @ 99.95% Discount” talk was fun as well. Think what you can do with an autonomic, mostly quiet robot plane that can fly around (10-12 mile range) and do some wireless hacking and video (via video goggles, of course). No missiles though. What can possibly be more awesome than that? Check  out the partial video of it here and many of the UAV building tips are here.

The next presentation was my only disappointment, the  “Cyborg Information Security: Defense Against the Dark Arts” talk. Think of this as Dan Kaminsky, but with no issue described in detail and no Dan Kaminsky :-) Yes, some implantable medical devices are a) wireless and b) unencrypted. This is sad. So what?  But "This shit is bad! FAIL! Epic fail" summarizes the talk well. Not useful, not really amazing - and, honestly, not really shocking either. And as my opinion of the talk was going down – they misspelled HIPAA. At which point I realized: these guys built the talk based on some googling and no real research at all. FAIL! Epic fail! :-)  In some post-show conversation, I actually tried to defend the talk as “raising awareness”, but was beat up by other folks, most of whom labeled is as content-free and aimed only as some posturing.

The Splendiferous Story of Archive Team and the Rapidly Disappearing Digital Heritage” rant was purely that – a rant. But it was 5PM, people were tired and needed a drink – and a rant :-) So it was a perfect fit for the occasion. Apart from reminding everybody about backup (and if there is one thing that everybody always needs a reminder of – that’s backup! I am backing up my laptop as I am typing this :-)), Jason basically talked that some web content just dies – think GeoCities. More details are here.

Even though I am not a web hacker, “Exposed | More: Attacking the Extended Web” aka “owning the APIs” talk was actually very interesting – and useful. I wish he’d speak more about methods to discover undocumented APIs though.

Next – OMFG! – was our “PCI" panel” – but let me first finish with other’s talks and I will write a whole post on that tomorrow.

Also, I went to “Pulling the Plug: Security Risks in the Next Generation of Offline Web Applications” by the zScaler guy and learned about csSQLi  and other interesting offline apps stuff. HTML5 will make security fun again – eh.. that is if it is not fun enough for you know :-) That talk – IMHO – was how “a new security issue”-type talk needs to be presented: with details and ideas for solutions. There is enough of fun and epic FAIL in our realm, but the talk was not just whining about it, but actually taking it apart and showing areas of concern.

Finally, as with any great conference, “hallway conversations” are golden. This time I broke the record and probably deserve the Guinness record book inclusion: on the last day of the show I was involved in – srsly! – a 9 hour (!!!) such conversation. It will probably result in a dozen blog posts, a few papers, a few consulting projects  and some other interesting implications…

The usage of word “fun” count: 8

Monday, December 28, 2009

Security Predictions 2010

First, if you want to impress friends with your future-seeing powers, just do what Richard Feynman did when he predicted some WWII events: predict “everything will stay the same.” It is known to typically score better than any more “smarty-pants” ways of seeing the future. Granted, you’d be wrong in many cases, but other methods just make you wrong in MORE cases :-) Image
But how fun is that? What is the value of such passive “predicteering”, apart from winning bets? No new insight will be produced, no new thoughts, no new strategy, etc. I will not follow that approach!

In any case, let’s start from my traditional del.ici.us annual security prediction tracker: http://delicious.com/anton18/security+predictions+2010. There I log what everybody else has been predicting, from fairly insightful to downright dumb and biased. Also, right before preparing the 2010 version, I reviewed my 2008 security predictions and then I realized that I never posted the 2009 version. Shame on me!
The main theme of my 2010 predictions is “nearing the thresholds.”  These thresholds are in many dimensions: interest in information security, security awareness across organizations (mostly due to PCI DSS) as well as threshold of the offensive side lead (offense’s lead cannot grow indefinitely, ya know).
Next, let’s go by themes!
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Compliance: as many other observers (Joshua at 451 Group comes to mind) noted, many of the security activities in 2010 will be defined by regulatory mandates such as PCI DSS, HIPAA/HITECH and others.  This will be the case from the smallest (larger extent) to the largest (smaller extent of compliance influence) organizations. I’d love to predict that people will finally get the spirit of PCI DSS (data security) and not just the letter (assessment readiness), but it is a tall one to forecast.
So, PCI DSS will continue its march. In fact, I bet (like I did in 2008) PCI DSS frenzy will further spread down-market - there is so much more Level 3s and Level 4s compared to Level 1 merchants. Now they all take payment cards, they are all insecure - thus, they might all be 0wned! BTW, nowadays nobody is predicting that PCI momentum will fizzle, as some did in 2007-2008.  While some people criticize it for specific requirements or missing things here and there, I still swear that those organizations who paid NO attention to security now do it ONLY because of PCI.
On the other hand, just as it was in 2008, ISO17799 (and its 2700x children), ITIL, COBIT frameworks likely won't be 'hot,' at least not in the US. Ad hoc approach (with some use of ideas from the above frameworks) to security management will still rule. In fact, more will try to base their entire security program on PCI DSS.
All this “comply-mancing” will bring both good and bad, as far as those organization’s ability to defend themselves from “bad shit” is concerned. And while we are on the subject…

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Bad shit: what we have here is an intersection of two opposite trends: rampant, professional cybercrime and low occurrence of card fraud (as a percentage of card transaction volume). I explain this conundrum by predicting a scary picture of huge criminal opportunity, which still exists unchanged.
So, there will be more of rampant, professional cybercrime: from RBN to its descendants, from individual criminal entrepreneurs to emerging criminal enterprises, all signs point to dramatic rise of cybercrime. This is not some kinda FUD – this is simply logical consequence of today’s situation with the use of information systems: Insecure computers + lots of money + no punishment = go do it! (in the past, I made fun of people who predicted that “hackers will hack” – this item is different)
Still, I predict that low card fraud rates will continue: despite the above crime picture, many in the payment security industry know that fraud as a percentage of transaction volume is relatively low (I’ve seen estimates from 1% to 5% - in dollar volume this is till huge, by the way). Why is that? I explain it by the fact that criminal enterprises have limited bandwidth -you simply cannot pump ten billion dollars through a garage-style operation. My guess is that most if not all credit card numbers in circulation have already been stolen; the bad guys just didn’t have a chance to monetize most of them due to their limited bandwidth. This is exactly why selling card dumps is seen as a better [criminal] business than actually using stolen cards to buy goods – a counter-intuitive situation to many outside the industry.
In other words, there has not been a better time to go into a cybercrime business. The strategy is pretty much the “blue ocean” one: a lot of unexplored opportunity with low barrier to entry. You don’t want to wait until emerging “market leaders” will run the black business. Today, those folks have a unique opportunity to focus on “easy AND rich targets”, not “easy OR rich targets.” The best analogy is robbing a large bank with no security instead of large bank with security or small bank with no reliable security.

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Intrusion tolerance is another trend (and its continues existence is in fact my prediction for 2010) which helps the “bad guys”: it is highly likely that most organizations have bots on their networks. What are they doing about it? Nothing much that actually helps. It is too hard; and many businesses just aren’t equipped – both skill-wise and technology wise – to combat a well-managed criminal operation which also happens to not be very disruptive to the operation of their own business. Your systems run OK and bots don’t bother you, what’s 5% of CPU and 10% of bandwidth between friends for sending penis enlargement spam? This view is admittedly cynical, but fairly realistic and results in a weird symbiosis that I call “intrusion tolerance.”
BTW, the Heartland guy said (http://www.govinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=1774&rf=091509eg) “a breach is usually detected when the processing payer is notified of fraudulent use of cards.” This simply negates the existence of the entire security industry! Why is that? ‘Cause it is not doing enough to stop the tide. For example, it was very insightful to learn  that it took us on average 30 days in 2004 to patch a vulnerability, while in 2009 is takes 29 (!) days. See a huge improvement in security management practices here? 2010 will not change this trend: more bugs (such as all the Adobe stuff) moved the stats back to the Stone Age even as we improved our handling of platform patches.
Still, I doubt that “fully automated crime”, predicted back in the 90s by Donn Parker is fully possible today. If it were, the fraud rates and losses will probably grow – yes, you guessed right! – exponentially. So, I vote “no”, at least not in 2010. If that happens, the threshold will surely be crossed…
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Cloud security: I predict much more noise and a bit more clarity (due to CSA work) in regards to information security requirements as more and more IT migrates to the cloud. The Holy Grail of “cloud security” – a credible cloud provider assessment guide/checklist – will emerge during 2010.

Finally, I am going to drag some of the 2008 predictions which are still valid and dust them off for 2010:

Platform security: just like Vista didn’t in 2007, Windows 7 won’t “make us secure.” The volume of W7 hacking  will increase as the year progresses.  Also, in 2008, I predicted an increase in Mac hacking. I’d like to repeat it as there is still room there :-)
And, only the truly lazy won’t predict more web application attacks. Of course! It is a true no-brainer, if there ever were one. Web application hacking is “a remote network service overflow” of the 2000s….

Incidents: just like in 2008, I predict no major utility/SCADA intrusion and thus no true “cyber-terrorism”  (not yet). Everybody predicts this one forever (as Rich mentions), but I am guessing we would need to wait at least few years for this one (see my upcoming predictions for 2020!) Sure, it makes for interesting thinking about why it did not happen; surely there is a massive fun factor in sending some sewage towards your enemies.  I'm happy to be correct here and have no such incidents happen, but I was predicting that something major and world changing would NOT happen so Feynman paradox is on my side.
A massive data theft to dwarf Heartland will probably be on the books. And it will include not some silly credit card number (really, who cares? :-)), but full identity - SSN and all.

Malware: sorry guys, but this year won’t be the Year of Mobile Malware either. As I discussed here, mobile malware is "a good idea" (for attackers) provided there is something valuable to steal – but it is just not the case yet in the US. There will be more PoC malware for iPhone, BlackBerry, maybe the Droid, but there will be no rampage. On the fun side, maybe we will finally see that Facebook malware/malicious application (that I predicted and consequently missed in 2008). This one will be fun to watch (others agree), and current malware defenses will definitely not stop this "bad boy," at least not before it does damage.

Risk management: more confusion. Enough said. In 2008, I said “Will we know what risk management actually is in the context of IT security? No!It sounds like we know no more now.

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Various security technologies (refreshed from 2008):
  • Full disk encryption will not (yet?) become ubiquitous.
  • NAC will be largely forgotten by the end of 2010.
  • More whitelisting for host and network security will happen (but combined with blacklisting, which is certainly not going away!) As malware landscape becomes even more diverse, application whitelisting for security will start to shine even more. Collaborative filtering for malware will also become more noticeable.
  • Secure coding does not (yet?) becomes mainstream (definitely, 'not yet' on this one) It pains me to say that that I think that while this ball definitely started rolling (e.g. SANS is pushing it hard now) it won't be hurtling down the highway at full speed. 2011? Sure, maybe! :-)
  • More vendors will release SaaS versions of their security technologies and new SaaS security vendors will be launched.
  • Few people will be on the market for “just the network firewall.”
  • WAFs will finally boast near-mainstream adoption.
  • A sizable percentage of log management users will feed application logs into their systems. Not just payment application (for PCI DSS), but various enterprise application logs as well (and, of course, web application logs)
  • End-user organization will start talking (and buying) technologies specifically aimed at protecting virtual machines and other virtualization technology (the first year of “virt sec” tools will be 2010)
Overall, we will be approaching those thresholds – with unpredictable and interesting events likely during the course of the year!
Decade predictions will follow next!!! Go “security 2020”!
Possibly related posts:

Dr Anton Chuvakin