6.5: mm patches #2

Rasenkai · 2023-09-23T13:03:37Z

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What watermark boosting does is preemptively fire up kswapd to free memory when there hasn't been an allocation failure. It does this by increasing kswapd's high watermark goal and then firing up kswapd. The reason why this causes freezes is because, with the increased high watermark goal, kswapd will steal memory from processes that need it in order to make forward progress. These processes will, in turn, try to allocate memory again, which will cause kswapd to steal necessary pages from those processes again, in a positive feedback loop known as page thrashing. When page thrashing occurs, your system is essentially livelocked until the necessary forward progress can be made to stop processes from trying to continuously allocate memory and trigger kswapd to steal it back. This problem already occurs with kswapd *without* watermark boosting, but it's usually only encountered on machines with a small amount of memory and/or a slow CPU. Watermark boosting just makes the existing problem worse enough to notice on higher spec'd machines. Disable watermark boosting by default since it's a total dumpster fire. I can't imagine why anyone would want to explicitly enable it, but the option is there in case someone does. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

Keeping kswapd running when all the failed allocations that invoked it are satisfied incurs a high overhead due to unnecessary page eviction and writeback, as well as spurious VM pressure events to various registered shrinkers. When kswapd doesn't need to work to make an allocation succeed anymore, stop it prematurely to save resources. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

The page allocator wakes all kswapds in an allocation context's allowed nodemask in the slow path, so it doesn't make sense to have the kswapd- waiter count per each NUMA node. Instead, it should be a global counter to stop all kswapds when there are no failed allocation requests. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

Throttled direct reclaimers will wake up kswapd and wait for kswapd to satisfy their page allocation request, even when the failed allocation lacks the __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM flag in its gfp mask. As a result, kswapd may think that there are no waiters and thus exit prematurely, causing throttled direct reclaimers lacking __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM to stall on waiting for kswapd to wake them up. Incrementing the kswapd_waiters counter when such direct reclaimers become throttled fixes the problem. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

On-demand compaction works fine assuming that you don't have a need to spam the page allocator nonstop for large order page allocations. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

There is noticeable scheduling latency and heavy zone lock contention stemming from rmqueue_bulk's single hold of the zone lock while doing its work, as seen with the preemptoff tracer. There's no actual need for rmqueue_bulk() to hold the zone lock the entire time; it only does so for supposed efficiency. As such, we can relax the zone lock and even reschedule when IRQs are enabled in order to keep the scheduling delays and zone lock contention at bay. Forward progress is still guaranteed, as the zone lock can only be relaxed after page removal. With this change, rmqueue_bulk() no longer appears as a serious offender in the preemptoff tracer, and system latency is noticeably improved. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

Allocating pages with __get_free_page is slower than going through the slab allocator to grab free pages out from a pool. These are the results from running the code at the bottom of this message: [ 1.278602] speedtest: __get_free_page: 9 us [ 1.278606] speedtest: kmalloc: 4 us [ 1.278609] speedtest: kmem_cache_alloc: 4 us [ 1.278611] speedtest: vmalloc: 13 us kmalloc and kmem_cache_alloc (which is what kmalloc uses for common sizes behind the scenes) are the fastest choices. Use kmalloc to speed up sg list allocation. This is the code used to produce the above measurements: static int speedtest(void *data) { static const struct sched_param sched_max_rt_prio = { .sched_priority = MAX_RT_PRIO - 1 }; volatile s64 ctotal = 0, gtotal = 0, ktotal = 0, vtotal = 0; struct kmem_cache *page_pool; int i, j, trials = 1000; volatile ktime_t start; void *ptr[100]; sched_setscheduler_nocheck(current, SCHED_FIFO, &sched_max_rt_prio); page_pool = kmem_cache_create("pages", PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); for (i = 0; i < trials; i++) { start = ktime_get(); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) while (!(ptr[j] = kmem_cache_alloc(page_pool, GFP_KERNEL))); ctotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) kmem_cache_free(page_pool, ptr[j]); start = ktime_get(); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) while (!(ptr[j] = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL))); gtotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) free_page((unsigned long)ptr[j]); start = ktime_get(); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) while (!(ptr[j] = __kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL))); ktotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ptr); j++) kfree(ptr[j]); start = ktime_get(); *ptr = vmalloc(ARRAY_SIZE(ptr) * PAGE_SIZE); vtotal += ktime_us_delta(ktime_get(), start); vfree(*ptr); } kmem_cache_destroy(page_pool); printk("%s: __get_free_page: %lld us\n", __func__, gtotal / trials); printk("%s: __kmalloc: %lld us\n", __func__, ktotal / trials); printk("%s: kmem_cache_alloc: %lld us\n", __func__, ctotal / trials); printk("%s: vmalloc: %lld us\n", __func__, vtotal / trials); complete(data); return 0; } static int __init start_test(void) { DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(done); BUG_ON(IS_ERR(kthread_run(speedtest, &done, "malloc_test"))); wait_for_completion(&done); return 0; } late_initcall(start_test); Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

The RCU read lock isn't necessary in list_lru_count_one() when the condition that requires RCU (CONFIG_MEMCG && !CONFIG_SLOB) isn't met. The highly-frequent RCU lock and unlock adds measurable overhead to the shrink_slab() path when it isn't needed. As such, we can simply omit the RCU read lock in this case to improve performance. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kazuki Hashimoto <[email protected]>

… delayed items When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline] lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781 up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline] btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239 search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376 btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline] btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153 flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078 process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600 worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751 kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257: #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline] #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287 #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8 </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(). Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ CC: [email protected] # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>

The following warning was reported when running "./test_progs -a link_api -a linked_list" on a RISC-V QEMU VM: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 261 at kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:342 bpf_mem_refill Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) CPU: 3 PID: 261 Comm: test_progs- ... 6.5.0-rc5-01743-gdcb152bb8328 #2 Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) epc : bpf_mem_refill+0x1fc/0x206 ra : irq_work_single+0x68/0x70 epc : ffffffff801b1bc4 ra : ffffffff8015fe84 sp : ff2000000001be20 gp : ffffffff82d26138 tp : ff6000008477a800 t0 : 0000000000046600 t1 : ffffffff812b6ddc t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 : ff2000000001be70 s1 : ff5ffffffffe8998 a0 : ff5ffffffffe8998 a1 : ff600003fef4b000 a2 : 000000000000003f a3 : ffffffff80008250 a4 : 0000000000000060 a5 : 0000000000000080 a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000735049 s2 : ff5ffffffffe8998 s3 : 0000000000000022 s4 : 0000000000001000 s5 : 0000000000000007 s6 : ff5ffffffffe8570 s7 : ffffffff82d6bd30 s8 : 000000000000003f s9 : ffffffff82d2c5e8 s10: 000000000000ffff s11: ffffffff82d2c5d8 t3 : ffffffff81ea8f28 t4 : 0000000000000000 t5 : ff6000008fd28278 t6 : 0000000000040000 [<ffffffff801b1bc4>] bpf_mem_refill+0x1fc/0x206 [<ffffffff8015fe84>] irq_work_single+0x68/0x70 [<ffffffff8015feb4>] irq_work_run_list+0x28/0x36 [<ffffffff8015fefa>] irq_work_run+0x38/0x66 [<ffffffff8000828a>] handle_IPI+0x3a/0xb4 [<ffffffff800a5c3a>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0xa4/0x1f8 [<ffffffff8009fafa>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [<ffffffff800ae570>] ipi_mux_process+0xac/0xfa [<ffffffff8000a8ea>] sbi_ipi_handle+0x2e/0x88 [<ffffffff8009fafa>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [<ffffffff807ee70e>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e [<ffffffff812b5d3a>] handle_riscv_irq+0x54/0x86 [<ffffffff812b6904>] do_irq+0x66/0x98 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The warning is due to WARN_ON_ONCE(tgt->unit_size != c->unit_size) in free_bulk(). The direct reason is that a object is allocated and freed by bpf_mem_caches with different unit_size. The root cause is that KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE is 64 and there is no 96-bytes slab cache in the specific VM. When linked_list test allocates a 72-bytes object through bpf_obj_new(), bpf_global_ma will allocate it from a bpf_mem_cache with 96-bytes unit_size, but this bpf_mem_cache is backed by 128-bytes slab cache. When the object is freed, bpf_mem_free() uses ksize() to choose the corresponding bpf_mem_cache. Because the object is allocated from 128-bytes slab cache, ksize() returns 128, bpf_mem_free() chooses a 128-bytes bpf_mem_cache to free the object and triggers the warning. A similar warning will also be reported when using CONFIG_SLAB instead of CONFIG_SLUB in a x86-64 kernel. Because CONFIG_SLUB defines KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE as 8 but CONFIG_SLAB defines KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE as 32. An alternative fix is to use kmalloc_size_round() in bpf_mem_alloc() to choose a bpf_mem_cache which has the same unit_size with the backing slab cache, but it may introduce performance degradation, so fix the warning by adjusting the indexes in size_index according to the value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE just like setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table() does. Fixes: 822fb26 ("bpf: Add a hint to allocated objects.") Reported-by: Björn Töpel <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

Hou Tao says: ==================== Fix the unmatched unit_size of bpf_mem_cache From: Hou Tao <[email protected]> Hi, The patchset aims to fix the reported warning [0] when the unit_size of bpf_mem_cache is mismatched with the object size of underly slab-cache. Patch #1 fixes the warning by adjusting size_index according to the value of KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE, so bpf_mem_cache with unit_size which is smaller than KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE or is not aligned with KMALLOC_MIN_SIZE will be redirected to bpf_mem_cache with bigger unit_size. Patch #2 doesn't do prefill for these redirected bpf_mem_cache to save memory. Patch #3 adds further error check in bpf_mem_alloc_init() to ensure the unit_size and object_size are always matched and to prevent potential issues due to the mismatch. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>

macb_set_tx_clk() is called under a spinlock but itself calls clk_set_rate() which can sleep. This results in: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580 | pps pps1: new PPS source ptp1 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 40, name: kworker/u4:3 | preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | 4 locks held by kworker/u4:3/40: | #0: ffff000003409148 | macb ff0c000.ethernet: gem-ptp-timer ptp clock registered. | ((wq_completion)events_power_efficient){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c | #1: ffff8000833cbdd8 ((work_completion)(&pl->resolve)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x14c/0x51c | #2: ffff000004f01578 (&pl->state_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: phylink_resolve+0x44/0x4e8 | #3: ffff000004f06f50 (&bp->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: macb_mac_link_up+0x40/0x2ac | irq event stamp: 113998 | hardirqs last enabled at (113997): [<ffff800080e8503c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x30/0x64 | hardirqs last disabled at (113998): [<ffff800080e84478>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xac/0xc8 | softirqs last enabled at (113608): [<ffff800080010630>] __do_softirq+0x430/0x4e4 | softirqs last disabled at (113597): [<ffff80008001614c>] ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c | CPU: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.5.0-11717-g9355ce8b2f50-dirty torvalds#368 | Hardware name: ... ZynqMP ... (DT) | Workqueue: events_power_efficient phylink_resolve | Call trace: | dump_backtrace+0x98/0xf0 | show_stack+0x18/0x24 | dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0xac | dump_stack+0x18/0x24 | __might_resched+0x144/0x24c | __might_sleep+0x48/0x98 | __mutex_lock+0x58/0x7b0 | mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30 | clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xa8 | clk_set_rate+0x24/0x8c | macb_mac_link_up+0x25c/0x2ac | phylink_resolve+0x178/0x4e8 | process_one_work+0x1ec/0x51c | worker_thread+0x1ec/0x3e4 | kthread+0x120/0x124 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 The obvious fix is to move the call to macb_set_tx_clk() out of the protected area. This seems safe as rx and tx are both disabled anyway at this point. It is however not entirely clear what the spinlock shall protect. It could be the read-modify-write access to the NCFGR register, but this is accessed in macb_set_rx_mode() and macb_set_rxcsum_feature() as well without holding the spinlock. It could also be the register accesses done in mog_init_rings() or macb_init_buffers(), but again these functions are called without holding the spinlock in macb_hresp_error_task(). The locking seems fishy in this driver and it might deserve another look before this patch is applied. Fixes: 633e98a ("net: macb: use resolved link config in mac_link_up()") Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

After commit 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"), removing the igb module could hang or crash (depending on the machine) when the module has been loaded with the max_vfs parameter set to some value != 0. In case of one test machine with a dual port 82580, this hang occurred: [ 232.480687] igb 0000:41:00.1: removed PHC on enp65s0f1 [ 233.093257] igb 0000:41:00.1: IOV Disabled [ 233.329969] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: Multiple Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) err0 [ 233.340302] igb 0000:41:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata) [ 233.352248] igb 0000:41:00.0: device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000 [ 233.361088] igb 0000:41:00.0: [20] UnsupReq (First) [ 233.368183] igb 0000:41:00.0: AER: TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c [ 233.376846] igb 0000:41:00.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata) [ 233.388779] igb 0000:41:00.1: device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000 [ 233.397629] igb 0000:41:00.1: [20] UnsupReq (First) [ 233.404736] igb 0000:41:00.1: AER: TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c [ 233.538214] pci 0000:41:00.1: AER: can't recover (no error_detected callback) [ 233.538401] igb 0000:41:00.0: removed PHC on enp65s0f0 [ 233.546197] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: device recovery failed [ 234.157244] igb 0000:41:00.0: IOV Disabled [ 371.619705] INFO: task irq/35-aerdrv:257 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [ 371.627489] Not tainted 6.4.0-dirty #2 [ 371.632257] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this. [ 371.641000] task:irq/35-aerdrv state:D stack:0 pid:257 ppid:2 f0 [ 371.650330] Call Trace: [ 371.653061] <TASK> [ 371.655407] __schedule+0x20e/0x660 [ 371.659313] schedule+0x5a/0xd0 [ 371.662824] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x11/0x20 [ 371.667983] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x372/0x6c0 [ 371.673237] ? __pfx_aer_root_reset+0x10/0x10 [ 371.678105] report_error_detected+0x25/0x1c0 [ 371.682974] ? __pfx_report_normal_detected+0x10/0x10 [ 371.688618] pci_walk_bus+0x72/0x90 [ 371.692519] pcie_do_recovery+0xb2/0x330 [ 371.696899] aer_process_err_devices+0x117/0x170 [ 371.702055] aer_isr+0x1c0/0x1e0 [ 371.705661] ? __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x54/0xa0 [ 371.710723] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 371.715496] irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60 [ 371.719491] irq_thread+0xe6/0x1b0 [ 371.723291] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10 [ 371.728255] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 371.732731] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [ 371.736243] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 371.740430] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 [ 371.744428] </TASK> The reproducer was a simple script: #!/bin/sh for i in `seq 1 5`; do modprobe -rv igb modprobe -v igb max_vfs=1 sleep 1 modprobe -rv igb done It turned out that this could only be reproduce on 82580 (quad and dual-port), but not on 82576, i350 and i210. Further debugging showed that igb_enable_sriov()'s call to pci_enable_sriov() is failing, because dev->is_physfn is 0 on 82580. Prior to commit 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"), igb_enable_sriov() jumped into the "err_out" cleanup branch. After this commit it only returned the error code. So the cleanup didn't take place, and the incorrect VF setup in the igb_adapter structure fooled the igb driver into assuming that VFs have been set up where no VF actually existed. Fix this problem by cleaning up again if pci_enable_sriov() fails. Fixes: 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit") Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <[email protected]> Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Fix an error detected by memory sanitizer: ``` ==4033==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55fb0fbedfc7 in read_alias_info tools/perf/util/pmu.c:457:6 #1 0x55fb0fbea339 in check_info_data tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1434:2 #2 0x55fb0fbea339 in perf_pmu__check_alias tools/perf/util/pmu.c:1504:9 #3 0x55fb0fbdca85 in parse_events_add_pmu tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1429:32 #4 0x55fb0f965230 in parse_events_parse tools/perf/util/parse-events.y:299:6 #5 0x55fb0fbdf6b2 in parse_events__scanner tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:1822:8 #6 0x55fb0fbdf8c1 in __parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.c:2094:8 #7 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in parse_events tools/perf/util/parse-events.h:41:9 torvalds#8 0x55fb0fa8ffa9 in test_event tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2393:8 torvalds#9 0x55fb0fa8f458 in test__pmu_events tools/perf/tests/parse-events.c:2551:15 torvalds#10 0x55fb0fa6d93f in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:242:9 torvalds#11 0x55fb0fa6d93f in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:271:8 torvalds#12 0x55fb0fa6d082 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:442:5 torvalds#13 0x55fb0fa6d082 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:564:9 torvalds#14 0x55fb0f942720 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322:11 torvalds#15 0x55fb0f942486 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375:8 torvalds#16 0x55fb0f941dab in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419:2 torvalds#17 0x55fb0f941dab in main tools/perf/perf.c:535:3 ``` Fixes: 7b723db ("perf pmu: Be lazy about loading event info files from sysfs") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: James Clark <[email protected]> Cc: Kan Liang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says: ==================== net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames. this is a follow-up to https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ replacing https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5). HSRv0 is (was) not affected. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

Specific stress involving frequent CPU-hotplug operations, such as running rcutorture for example, may trigger the following message: NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #2!!!" This happens in the CPU-down hotplug process, after CPUHP_AP_SMPBOOT_THREADS whose teardown callback parks ksoftirqd, and before the target CPU shuts down through CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD. In this fragile intermediate state, softirqs waiting for threaded handling may be forever ignored and eventually reported by the idle task as in the above example. However some vectors are known to be safe as long as the corresponding subsystems have teardown callbacks handling the migration of their events. The above error message reports pending timers softirq although this vector can be considered as hotplug safe because the CPUHP_TIMERS_PREPARE teardown callback performs the necessary migration of timers after the death of the CPU. Hrtimers also have a similar hotplug handling. Therefore this error message, as far as (hr-)timers are concerned, can be considered spurious and the relevant softirq vectors can be marked as hotplug safe. Fixes: 0345691 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle") Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

…es_lock [ Upstream commit fb5a431 ] __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock under port->lock. Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it. Trimmed-down lockdep splat: The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110 debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8 dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230 dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8 geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54 handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30 gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148 do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68 arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8 ____do_softirq+0x18/0x24 ... -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc console_flush_all+0x344/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 register_console+0x230/0x38c uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494 qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 really_probe+0x148/0x280 __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100 __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8 __device_attach+0xe4/0x140 device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0 device_add+0x538/0x668 of_device_add+0x44/0x50 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8 of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304 of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4 devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 ... -> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Chain exists of: console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(free_entries_lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(free_entries_lock); lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0 show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234 check_noncircular+0x78/0xac __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Reported-by: Rob Clark <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]> Acked-by: Robin Murphy <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 1a6a464 upstream. Specific stress involving frequent CPU-hotplug operations, such as running rcutorture for example, may trigger the following message: NOHZ tick-stop error: local softirq work is pending, handler #2!!!" This happens in the CPU-down hotplug process, after CPUHP_AP_SMPBOOT_THREADS whose teardown callback parks ksoftirqd, and before the target CPU shuts down through CPUHP_AP_IDLE_DEAD. In this fragile intermediate state, softirqs waiting for threaded handling may be forever ignored and eventually reported by the idle task as in the above example. However some vectors are known to be safe as long as the corresponding subsystems have teardown callbacks handling the migration of their events. The above error message reports pending timers softirq although this vector can be considered as hotplug safe because the CPUHP_TIMERS_PREPARE teardown callback performs the necessary migration of timers after the death of the CPU. Hrtimers also have a similar hotplug handling. Therefore this error message, as far as (hr-)timers are concerned, can be considered spurious and the relevant softirq vectors can be marked as hotplug safe. Fixes: 0345691 ("tick/rcu: Stop allowing RCU_SOFTIRQ in idle") Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] torvalds#8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f torvalds#9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 torvalds#10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] torvalds#11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc torvalds#12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] torvalds#13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] torvalds#14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 torvalds#17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] torvalds#19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 torvalds#20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 374012b upstream. Fix the deadlock by refactoring the MR cache cleanup flow to flush the workqueue without holding the rb_lock. This adds a race between cache cleanup and creation of new entries which we solve by denied creation of new entries after cache cleanup started. Lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2785.326074 ] 6.2.0-rc6_for_upstream_debug_2023_01_31_14_02 #1 Not tainted [ 2785.339778 ] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2785.340848 ] devlink/53872 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2785.341701 ] ffff888124f8c0c8 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0xc8/0x900 [ 2785.343403 ] [ 2785.343403 ] but task is already holding lock: [ 2785.344464 ] ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.346273 ] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2785.346273 ] [ 2785.347720 ] [ 2785.347720 ] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2785.349003 ] [ 2785.349003 ] -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 2785.350160 ] __mutex_lock+0x14c/0x15c0 [ 2785.350962 ] delayed_cache_work_func+0x2d1/0x610 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.352044 ] process_one_work+0x7c2/0x1310 [ 2785.352879 ] worker_thread+0x59d/0xec0 [ 2785.353636 ] kthread+0x28f/0x330 [ 2785.354370 ] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 2785.355135 ] [ 2785.355135 ] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 2785.356515 ] __lock_acquire+0x2d8a/0x5fe0 [ 2785.357349 ] lock_acquire+0x1c1/0x540 [ 2785.358121 ] __flush_work+0xe8/0x900 [ 2785.358852 ] __cancel_work_timer+0x2c7/0x3f0 [ 2785.359711 ] mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0xfb/0x250 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.360781 ] mlx5_ib_stage_pre_ib_reg_umr_cleanup+0x16/0x30 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.361969 ] __mlx5_ib_remove+0x68/0x120 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.362960 ] mlx5r_remove+0x63/0x80 [mlx5_ib] [ 2785.363870 ] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x52/0x70 [ 2785.364715 ] device_release_driver_internal+0x3c1/0x600 [ 2785.365695 ] bus_remove_device+0x2a5/0x560 [ 2785.366525 ] device_del+0x492/0xb80 [ 2785.367276 ] mlx5_detach_device+0x1a9/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.368615 ] mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x5a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.369934 ] mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0x292/0x580 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.371292 ] devlink_reload+0x439/0x590 [ 2785.372075 ] devlink_nl_cmd_reload+0xaef/0xff0 [ 2785.372973 ] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x1bd/0x290 [ 2785.374011 ] genl_rcv_msg+0x3ca/0x6c0 [ 2785.374798 ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x12c/0x360 [ 2785.375612 ] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 [ 2785.376295 ] netlink_unicast+0x438/0x710 [ 2785.377121 ] netlink_sendmsg+0x7a1/0xca0 [ 2785.377926 ] sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 [ 2785.378668 ] __sys_sendto+0x1bc/0x290 [ 2785.379440 ] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdc/0x1b0 [ 2785.380255 ] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 [ 2785.381031 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.381967 ] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2785.381967 ] [ 2785.383448 ] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2785.383448 ] [ 2785.384544 ] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2785.385383 ] ---- ---- [ 2785.386193 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.386940 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.388327 ] lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); [ 2785.389425 ] lock((work_completion)(&(&ent->dwork)->work)); [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.390414 ] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2785.390414 ] [ 2785.391579 ] 6 locks held by devlink/53872: [ 2785.392341 ] #0: ffffffff84c17a50 (cb_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: genl_rcv+0x15/0x40 [ 2785.393630 ] #1: ffff888142280218 (&devlink->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: devlink_get_from_attrs_lock+0x12d/0x2d0 [ 2785.395324 ] #2: ffff8881422d3c38 (&dev->lock_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x4a/0x110 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.397322 ] #3: ffffffffa0e59068 (mlx5_intf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_detach_device+0x60/0x360 [mlx5_core] [ 2785.399231 ] #4: ffff88810e3cb0e8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8d/0x600 [ 2785.400864 ] #5: ffff88817e8f1260 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mlx5_mkey_cache_cleanup+0x77/0x250 [mlx5_ib] Fixes: b958451 ("RDMA/mlx5: Change the cache structure to an RB-tree") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

The following panic can happen when mmap is called before the pmu add callback which sets the hardware counter index: this happens for example with the following command `perf record --no-bpf-event -n kill`. [ 99.461486] CPU: 1 PID: 1259 Comm: perf Tainted: G E 6.6.0-rc4ubuntu-defconfig #2 [ 99.461669] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 99.461748] epc : pmu_sbi_set_scounteren+0x42/0x44 [ 99.462337] ra : smp_call_function_many_cond+0x126/0x5b0 [ 99.462369] epc : ffffffff809f9d24 ra : ffffffff800f93e0 sp : ff60000082153aa0 [ 99.462407] gp : ffffffff82395c98 tp : ff6000009a218040 t0 : ff6000009ab3a4f0 [ 99.462425] t1 : 0000000000000004 t2 : 0000000000000100 s0 : ff60000082153ab0 [ 99.462459] s1 : 0000000000000000 a0 : ff60000098869528 a1 : 0000000000000000 [ 99.462473] a2 : 000000000000001f a3 : 0000000000f00000 a4 : fffffffffffffff8 [ 99.462488] a5 : 00000000000000cc a6 : 0000000000000000 a7 : 0000000000735049 [ 99.462502] s2 : 0000000000000001 s3 : ffffffff809f9ce2 s4 : ff60000098869528 [ 99.462516] s5 : 0000000000000002 s6 : 0000000000000004 s7 : 0000000000000001 [ 99.462530] s8 : ff600003fec98bc0 s9 : ffffffff826c5890 s10: ff600003fecfcde0 [ 99.462544] s11: ff600003fec98bc0 t3 : ffffffff819e2558 t4 : ff1c000004623840 [ 99.462557] t5 : 0000000000000901 t6 : ff6000008feeb890 [ 99.462570] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 99.462658] [<ffffffff809f9d24>] pmu_sbi_set_scounteren+0x42/0x44 [ 99.462979] Code: 1060 4785 97bb 00d7 8fd9 9073 1067 6422 0141 8082 (9002) 0013 [ 99.463335] Kernel BUG [#2] To circumvent this, try to enable userspace access to the hardware counter when it is selected in addition to when the event is mapped. And vice-versa when the event is stopped/unmapped. Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support in the SBI backend") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>

…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.6, take #2 - Fix the handling of the phycal timer offset when FEAT_ECV and CNTPOFF_EL2 are implemented. - Restore the functionnality of Permission Indirection that was broken by the Fine Grained Trapping rework - Cleanup some PMU event sharing code

[ Upstream commit 4428399 ] The lt8912b driver, in its bridge detach function, calls drm_connector_unregister() and drm_connector_cleanup(). drm_connector_unregister() should be called only for connectors explicitly registered with drm_connector_register(), which is not the case in lt8912b. The driver's drm_connector_funcs.destroy hook is set to drm_connector_cleanup(). Thus the driver should not call either drm_connector_unregister() nor drm_connector_cleanup() in its lt8912_bridge_detach(), as they cause a crash on bridge detach: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000006 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000858f3000 [0000000000000000] pgd=0800000085918003, p4d=0800000085918003, pud=0800000085431003, pmd=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: tidss(-) display_connector lontium_lt8912b tc358768 panel_lvds panel_simple drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks CPU: 3 PID: 462 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc2+ #2 Hardware name: Toradex Verdin AM62 on Verdin Development Board (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drm_connector_cleanup+0x78/0x2d4 [drm] lr : lt8912_bridge_detach+0x54/0x6c [lontium_lt8912b] sp : ffff800082ed3a90 x29: ffff800082ed3a90 x28: ffff0000040c1940 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: dead000000000122 x24: dead000000000122 x23: dead000000000100 x22: ffff000003fb6388 x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff000003fb6260 x18: fffffffffffe56e8 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0010000000000000 x15: 0000000000000038 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081914b48 x12: 000000000000040e x11: 000000000000015a x10: ffff80008196ebb8 x9 : ffff800081914b48 x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff0000040c1940 x6 : ffff80007aa649d0 x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff80008159e008 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: drm_connector_cleanup+0x78/0x2d4 [drm] lt8912_bridge_detach+0x54/0x6c [lontium_lt8912b] drm_bridge_detach+0x44/0x84 [drm] drm_encoder_cleanup+0x40/0xb8 [drm] drmm_encoder_alloc_release+0x1c/0x30 [drm] drm_managed_release+0xac/0x148 [drm] drm_dev_put.part.0+0x88/0xb8 [drm] devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x14/0x24 [drm] devm_action_release+0x14/0x20 release_nodes+0x5c/0x90 devres_release_all+0x8c/0xe0 device_unbind_cleanup+0x18/0x68 device_release_driver_internal+0x208/0x23c driver_detach+0x4c/0x94 bus_remove_driver+0x70/0xf4 driver_unregister+0x30/0x60 platform_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20 tidss_platform_driver_exit+0x18/0xb2c [tidss] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x1a0/0x2b4 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x60/0x10c do_el0_svc_compat+0x1c/0x40 el0_svc_compat+0x40/0xac el0t_32_sync_handler+0xb0/0x138 el0t_32_sync+0x194/0x198 Code: 9104a276 f2fbd5b7 aa0203e1 91008af8 (f85c0420) Fixes: 30e2ae9 ("drm/bridge: Introduce LT8912B DSI to HDMI bridge") Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Robert Foss <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 torvalds#8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 torvalds#9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 torvalds#10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 torvalds#11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 torvalds#12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 #7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 torvalds#8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 torvalds#9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 torvalds#10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 torvalds#11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 torvalds#12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 torvalds#13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 torvalds#14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 torvalds#15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Cc: He Kuang <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

This allows it to break the following circular locking dependency. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ====================================================== Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Not tainted Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ------------------------------------------------------ Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: wireplumber/2236 is trying to acquire lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca5320da18 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: but task is already holding lock: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: which lock already depends on the new lock. Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #3 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #2 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_inth_allow+0x2c/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x181/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #1 (&event->refs_lock#4){....}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_state+0x37/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy_allow+0x63/0xd0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_uevent_mthd+0x4d/0x70 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_ioctl+0x10b/0x250 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_object_mthd+0xa8/0x1f0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvif_event_allow+0x2a/0xa0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_enable_signaling+0x78/0x80 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __dma_fence_enable_signaling+0x5e/0x100 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dma_fence_add_callback+0x4b/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_cli_work_queue+0xae/0x110 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_gem_object_close+0x1d1/0x2a0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_gem_handle_delete+0x70/0xe0 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa5/0x150 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: drm_ioctl+0x256/0x490 [drm] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_drm_ioctl+0x5a/0xb0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x91/0xd0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: -> #0 (&fctx->lock){-...}-{2:2}: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: other info that might help us debug this: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Chain exists of: &fctx->lock --> &device->intr.lock --> &event->list_lock#2 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Possible unsafe locking scenario: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU0 CPU1 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ---- ---- Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&device->intr.lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&event->list_lock#2); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock(&fctx->lock); Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: *** DEADLOCK *** Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: 2 locks held by wireplumber/2236: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #0: ffff8fca53177bf8 (&device->intr.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_intr+0x29/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: #1: ffff8fca41208610 (&event->list_lock#2){-...}-{2:2}, at: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x50/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: stack backtrace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: CPU: 6 PID: 2236 Comm: wireplumber Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7+ torvalds#10 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI/Z390 I AORUS PRO WIFI-CF, BIOS F8 11/05/2021 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Call Trace: Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: <TASK> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x90 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: check_noncircular+0xe2/0x110 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __lock_acquire+0x14e3/0x2240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? lock_acquire+0xc8/0x2a0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4b/0x70 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ? nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler+0x2b/0x100 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_client_event+0xf/0x20 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_event_ntfy+0x9b/0xf0 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: ga100_fifo_nonstall_intr+0x24/0x30 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: nvkm_intr+0x12c/0x240 [nouveau] Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x88/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: handle_edge_irq+0xa3/0x240 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: __common_interrupt+0x72/0x160 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: common_interrupt+0x60/0xe0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7fb66174d700 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: Code: c1 e2 05 29 ca 8d 0c 10 0f be 07 84 c0 75 eb 89 c8 c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa e9 d7 0f fc ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <f3> 0f 1e fa e9 c7 0f fc> Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RSP: 002b:00007ffdd3c48438 EFLAGS: 00000206 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RAX: 000055bb758763c0 RBX: 000055bb758752c0 RCX: 00000000000028b0 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RDX: 000055bb758752c0 RSI: 000055bb75887490 RDI: 000055bb75862950 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: RBP: 00007ffdd3c48490 R08: 000055bb75873b10 R09: 0000000000000001 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 000055bb7587f000 R12: 000055bb75887490 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: R13: 000055bb757f6280 R14: 000055bb758875c0 R15: 000055bb757f6280 Aug 10 07:01:29 dg1test kernel: </TASK> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]> Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected]

[ Upstream commit 265f3ed ] All callers of work_on_cpu() share the same lock class key for all the functions queued. As a result the workqueue related locking scenario for a function A may be spuriously accounted as an inversion against the locking scenario of function B such as in the following model: long A(void *arg) { mutex_lock(&mutex); mutex_unlock(&mutex); } long B(void *arg) { } void launchA(void) { work_on_cpu(0, A, NULL); } void launchB(void) { mutex_lock(&mutex); work_on_cpu(1, B, NULL); mutex_unlock(&mutex); } launchA and launchB running concurrently have no chance to deadlock. However the above can be reported by lockdep as a possible locking inversion because the works containing A() and B() are treated as belonging to the same locking class. The following shows an existing example of such a spurious lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.6.0-rc1-00065-g934ebd6e5359 #35409 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/0:1/9 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff9bc72f30 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 but task is already holding lock: ffff9e3bc0057e60 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x216/0x500 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __flush_work+0x83/0x4e0 work_on_cpu+0x97/0xc0 rcu_nocb_cpu_offload+0x62/0xb0 rcu_nocb_toggle+0xd0/0x1d0 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #1 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x81/0xc80 rcu_nocb_cpu_deoffload+0x38/0xb0 rcu_nocb_toggle+0x144/0x1d0 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1538/0x2500 lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2a0 percpu_down_write+0x31/0x200 _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 __cpu_down_maps_locked+0x10/0x20 work_for_cpu_fn+0x15/0x20 process_scheduled_works+0x2a7/0x500 worker_thread+0x173/0x330 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> rcu_state.barrier_mutex --> (work_completion)(&wfc.work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work)); lock(rcu_state.barrier_mutex); lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work)); lock(cpu_hotplug_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/0:1/9: #0: ffff900481068b38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x212/0x500 #1: ffff9e3bc0057e60 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x216/0x500 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-00065-g934ebd6e5359 #35409 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn Call Trace: rcu-torture: rcu_torture_read_exit: Start of episode <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 check_noncircular+0x132/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1538/0x2500 lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2a0 ? _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 percpu_down_write+0x31/0x200 ? _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 _cpu_down+0x57/0x2b0 __cpu_down_maps_locked+0x10/0x20 work_for_cpu_fn+0x15/0x20 process_scheduled_works+0x2a7/0x500 worker_thread+0x173/0x330 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe6/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK Fix this with providing one lock class key per work_on_cpu() caller. Reported-and-tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

into HEAD KVM/riscv fixes for 6.18, take CachyOS#2 - Fix check for local interrupts on riscv32 - Read HGEIP CSR on the correct cpu when checking for IMSIC interrupts - Remove automatic I/O mapping from kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region()

Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note CachyOS#2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note CachyOS#3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm654 fixes for 6.18, take CachyOS#2 * Core fixes - Fix trapping regression when no in-kernel irqchip is present ([email protected]) - Check host-provided, untrusted ranges and offsets in pKVM ([email protected]) ([email protected]) - Fix regression restoring the ID_PFR1_EL1 register ([email protected] - Fix vgic ITS locking issues when LPIs are not directly injected ([email protected]) * Test fixes - Correct target CPU programming in vgic_lpi_stress selftest ([email protected]) - Fix exposure of SCTLR2_EL2 and ZCR_EL2 in get-reg-list selftest (20251023-b4-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-sctlr-el2-v1-1-088f88ff992a@kernel.org) (20251024-kvm-arm64-get-reg-list-zcr-el2-v1-1-0cd0ff75e22f@kernel.org) * Misc - Update Oliver's email address ([email protected])

[ Upstream commit 5d726c4 ] Following deadlock can be triggered easily by lockdep: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.17.0-rc3-00124-ga12c2658ced0 #1665 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ check/1334 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100011d9d0678 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 but task is already holding lock: ff1100011d9d00e0 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}: blk_queue_enter+0x40b/0x470 blkg_conf_prep+0x7b/0x3c0 tg_set_limit+0x10a/0x3e0 cgroup_file_write+0xc6/0x420 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #1 (&q->rq_qos_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 wbt_init+0x17e/0x280 wbt_enable_default+0xe9/0x140 blk_register_queue+0x1da/0x2e0 __add_disk+0x38c/0x5d0 add_disk_fwnode+0x89/0x250 device_add_disk+0x18/0x30 virtblk_probe+0x13a3/0x1800 virtio_dev_probe+0x389/0x610 really_probe+0x136/0x620 __driver_probe_device+0xb3/0x230 driver_probe_device+0x2f/0xe0 __driver_attach+0x158/0x250 bus_for_each_dev+0xa9/0x130 driver_attach+0x26/0x40 bus_add_driver+0x178/0x3d0 driver_register+0x7d/0x1c0 __register_virtio_driver+0x2c/0x60 virtio_blk_init+0x6f/0xe0 do_one_initcall+0x94/0x540 kernel_init_freeable+0x56a/0x7b0 kernel_init+0x2b/0x270 ret_from_fork+0x268/0x4c0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 -> #0 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1835/0x2940 lock_acquire+0xf9/0x450 __mutex_lock+0xd8/0xf50 mutex_lock_nested+0x2b/0x40 blk_unregister_queue+0x53/0x180 __del_gendisk+0x226/0x690 del_gendisk+0xba/0x110 sd_remove+0x49/0xb0 [sd_mod] device_remove+0x87/0xb0 device_release_driver_internal+0x11e/0x230 device_release_driver+0x1a/0x30 bus_remove_device+0x14d/0x220 device_del+0x1e1/0x5a0 __scsi_remove_device+0x1ff/0x2f0 scsi_remove_device+0x37/0x60 sdev_store_delete+0x77/0x100 dev_attr_store+0x1f/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x65/0x90 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x189/0x280 vfs_write+0x256/0x490 ksys_write+0x83/0x190 __x64_sys_write+0x21/0x30 x64_sys_call+0x4608/0x4630 do_syscall_64+0xdb/0x6b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &q->sysfs_lock --> &q->rq_qos_mutex --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->rq_qos_mutex); lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); lock(&q->sysfs_lock); Root cause is that queue_usage_counter is grabbed with rq_qos_mutex held in blkg_conf_prep(), while queue should be freezed before rq_qos_mutex from other context. The blk_queue_enter() from blkg_conf_prep() is used to protect against policy deactivation, which is already protected with blkcg_mutex, hence convert blk_queue_enter() to blkcg_mutex to fix this problem. Meanwhile, consider that blkcg_mutex is held after queue is freezed from policy deactivation, also convert blkg_alloc() to use GFP_NOIO. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 97bcc5b ] This patch fixes an issue where two different flows on the same RXq produce the same hash resulting in continuous flow overwrites. Flow #1: A packet for Flow #1 comes in, kernel calls the steering function. The driver gives back a filter id. The kernel saves this filter id in the selected slot. Later, the driver's service task checks if any filters have expired and then installs the rule for Flow #1. Flow #2: A packet for Flow #2 comes in. It goes through the same steps. But this time, the chosen slot is being used by Flow #1. The driver gives a new filter id and the kernel saves it in the same slot. When the driver's service task runs, it runs through all the flows, checks if Flow #1 should be expired, the kernel returns True as the slot has a different filter id, and then the driver installs the rule for Flow #2. Flow #1: Another packet for Flow #1 comes in. The same thing repeats. The slot is overwritten with a new filter id for Flow #1. This causes a repeated cycle of flow programming for missed packets, wasting CPU cycles while not improving performance. This problem happens at higher rates when the RPS table is small, but tests show it still happens even with 12,000 connections and an RPS size of 16K per queue (global table size = 144x16K = 64K). This patch prevents overwriting an rps_dev_flow entry if it is active. The intention is that it is better to do aRFS for the first flow instead of hurting all flows on the same hash. Without this, two (or more) flows on one RX queue with the same hash can keep overwriting each other. This causes the driver to reprogram the flow repeatedly. Changes: 1. Add a new 'hash' field to struct rps_dev_flow. 2. Add rps_flow_is_active(): a helper function to check if a flow is active or not, extracted from rps_may_expire_flow(). It is further simplified as per reviewer feedback. 3. In set_rps_cpu(): - Avoid overwriting by programming a new filter if: - The slot is not in use, or - The slot is in use but the flow is not active, or - The slot has an active flow with the same hash, but target CPU differs. - Save the hash in the rps_dev_flow entry. 4. rps_may_expire_flow(): Use earlier extracted rps_flow_is_active(). Testing & results: - Driver: ice (E810 NIC), Kernel: net-next - #CPUs = #RXq = 144 (1:1) - Number of flows: 12K - Eight RPS settings from 256 to 32768. Though RPS=256 is not ideal, it is still sufficient to cover 12K flows (256*144 rx-queues = 64K global table slots) - Global Table Size = 144 * RPS (effectively equal to 256 * RPS) - Each RPS test duration = 8 mins (org code) + 8 mins (new code). - Metrics captured on client Legend for following tables: Steer-C: #times ndo_rx_flow_steer() was Called by set_rps_cpu() Steer-L: #times ice_arfs_flow_steer() Looped over aRFS entries Add: #times driver actually programmed aRFS (ice_arfs_build_entry()) Del: #times driver deleted the flow (ice_arfs_del_flow_rules()) Units: K = 1,000 times, M = 1 million times |-------|---------|------| Org Code |---------|---------| | RPS | Latency | CPU | Add | Del | Steer-C | Steer-L | |-------|---------|------|--------|--------|---------|---------| | 256 | 227.0 | 93.2 | 1.6M | 1.6M | 121.7M | 267.6M | | 512 | 225.9 | 94.1 | 11.5M | 11.2M | 65.7M | 199.6M | | 1024 | 223.5 | 95.6 | 16.5M | 16.5M | 27.1M | 187.3M | | 2048 | 222.2 | 96.3 | 10.5M | 10.5M | 12.5M | 115.2M | | 4096 | 223.9 | 94.1 | 5.5M | 5.5M | 7.2M | 65.9M | | 8192 | 224.7 | 92.5 | 2.7M | 2.7M | 3.0M | 29.9M | | 16384 | 223.5 | 92.5 | 1.3M | 1.3M | 1.4M | 13.9M | | 32768 | 219.6 | 93.2 | 838.1K | 838.1K | 965.1K | 8.9M | |-------|---------|------| New Code |---------|---------| | 256 | 201.5 | 99.1 | 13.4K | 5.0K | 13.7K | 75.2K | | 512 | 202.5 | 98.2 | 11.2K | 5.9K | 11.2K | 55.5K | | 1024 | 207.3 | 93.9 | 11.5K | 9.7K | 11.5K | 59.6K | | 2048 | 207.5 | 96.7 | 11.8K | 11.1K | 15.5K | 79.3K | | 4096 | 206.9 | 96.6 | 11.8K | 11.7K | 11.8K | 63.2K | | 8192 | 205.8 | 96.7 | 11.9K | 11.8K | 11.9K | 63.9K | | 16384 | 200.9 | 98.2 | 11.9K | 11.9K | 11.9K | 64.2K | | 32768 | 202.5 | 98.0 | 11.9K | 11.9K | 11.9K | 64.2K | |-------|---------|------|--------|--------|---------|---------| Some observations: 1. Overall Latency improved: (1790.19-1634.94)/1790.19*100 = 8.67% 2. Overall CPU increased: (777.32-751.49)/751.45*100 = 3.44% 3. Flow Management (add/delete) remained almost constant at ~11K compared to values in millions. Signed-off-by: Krishna Kumar <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

commit 6dd97ce upstream. When a connector is connected but inactive (e.g., disabled by desktop environments), pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg will be destroyed. Then, reading odm_combine_segments causes kernel NULL pointer dereference. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 16 UID: 0 PID: 26474 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.17.0+ #2 PREEMPT(lazy) e6a17af9ee6db7c63e9d90dbe5b28ccab67520c6 Hardware name: LENOVO 21Q4/LNVNB161216, BIOS PXCN25WW 03/27/2025 RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> seq_read_iter+0x125/0x490 ? __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x18f/0x350 seq_read+0x12c/0x170 full_proxy_read+0x51/0x80 vfs_read+0xbc/0x390 ? __handle_mm_fault+0xa46/0xef0 ? do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ksys_read+0x73/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x900 ? count_memcg_events+0xc2/0x190 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2d0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21a/0x690 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6c/0x74 RIP: 0033:0x7f44d4031687 Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00> RSP: 002b:00007ffdb4b5f0b0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f44d3f9f740 RCX: 00007f44d4031687 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007f44d3f5e000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000040000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007f44d3f5e000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000040000 </TASK> Modules linked in: tls tcp_diag inet_diag xt_mark ccm snd_hrtimer snd_seq_dummy snd_seq_midi snd_seq_oss snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi snd_seq snd_seq_device x> snd_hda_codec_atihdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek_lib lenovo_wmi_helpers think_lmi snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_soc_core kvm snd_compress uvcvideo sn> platform_profile joydev amd_pmc mousedev mac_hid sch_fq_codel uinput i2c_dev parport_pc ppdev lp parport nvme_fabrics loop nfnetlink ip_tables x_tables dm_cryp> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:odm_combine_segments_show+0x93/0xf0 [amdgpu] Code: 41 83 b8 b0 00 00 00 01 75 6e 48 98 ba a1 ff ff ff 48 c1 e0 0c 48 8d 8c 07 d8 02 00 00 48 85 c9 74 2d 48 8b bc 07 f0 08 00 00 <48> 8b 07 48 8b 80 08 02 00> RSP: 0018:ffffd1bf4b953c58 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000005000 RBX: ffff8e35976b02d0 RCX: ffff8e3aeed052d8 RDX: 00000000ffffffa1 RSI: ffff8e35a3120800 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8e3580eb0000 R09: ffff8e35976b02d0 R10: ffffd1bf4b953c78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffd1bf4b953d08 R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f44d3f9f740(0000) GS:ffff8e3caa47f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000006485c2000 CR4: 0000000000f50ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Fix this by checking pipe_ctx->stream_res.tg before dereferencing. Fixes: 07926ba ("drm/amd/display: Add debugfs interface for ODM combine info") Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mario Limoncello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f19bbec) Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

When freeing indexed arrays, the corresponding free function should be called for each entry of the indexed array. For example, for for 'struct tc_act_attrs' 'tc_act_attrs_free(...)' needs to be called for each entry. Previously, memory leaks were reported when enabling the ASAN analyzer. ================================================================= ==874==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 CachyOS#1 0x55c98db048af in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813 CachyOS#2 0x55c98db048af in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:71 Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 CachyOS#1 0x55c98db04a93 in tc_act_attrs_set_options_vlan_parms ../generated/tc-user.h:2813 CachyOS#2 0x55c98db04a93 in main ./linux/tools/net/ynl/samples/tc-filter-add.c:74 Direct leak of 10 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f221fd20cb5 in malloc ./debug/gcc/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:67 CachyOS#1 0x55c98db0527d in tc_act_attrs_set_kind ../generated/tc-user.h:1622 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 58 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s). The following diff illustrates the changes introduced compared to the previous version of the code. void tc_flower_attrs_free(struct tc_flower_attrs *obj) { + unsigned int i; + free(obj->indev); + for (i = 0; i < obj->_count.act; i++) + tc_act_attrs_free(&obj->act[i]); free(obj->act); free(obj->key_eth_dst); free(obj->key_eth_dst_mask); Signed-off-by: Zahari Doychev <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Handle skb allocation failures in RX path, to avoid NULL pointer dereference and RX stalls under memory pressure. If the refill fails with -ENOMEM, complete napi polling and wake up later to retry via timer. Also explicitly re-enable RX DMA after oom, so the dmac doesn't remain stopped in this situation. Previously, memory pressure could lead to skb allocation failures and subsequent Oops like: Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [CachyOS#2] Hardware name: SonyPS3 Cell Broadband Engine 0x701000 PS3 NIP [c0003d0000065900] gelic_net_poll+0x6c/0x2d0 [ps3_gelic] (unreliable) LR [c0003d00000659c4] gelic_net_poll+0x130/0x2d0 [ps3_gelic] Call Trace: gelic_net_poll+0x130/0x2d0 [ps3_gelic] (unreliable) __napi_poll+0x44/0x168 net_rx_action+0x178/0x290 Steps to reproduce the issue: 1. Start a continuous network traffic, like scp of a 20GB file 2. Inject failslab errors using the kernel fault injection: echo -1 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/times echo 30 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/interval echo 100 > /sys/kernel/debug/failslab/probability 3. After some time, traces start to appear, kernel Oopses and the system stops Step 2 is not always necessary, as it is usually already triggered by the transfer of a big enough file. Fixes: 02c1889 ("ps3: gigabit ethernet driver for PS3, take3") Signed-off-by: Florian Fuchs <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 84bbe32 ] On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() is called. When pinning a VMA to GGTT address space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks. [86.861179] ====================================================== [86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G U [86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------ [86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock: [86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.861290] but task is already holding lock: [86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.862233] which lock already depends on the new lock. [86.862251] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [86.862265] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862292] dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390 [86.862315] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862334] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862353] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862369] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862383] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862399] -> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}: [86.862425] dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390 [86.862440] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862454] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862470] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862482] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862495] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862509] -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862531] down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0 [86.862546] lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280 [86.862561] do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0 [86.862578] exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0 [86.862593] asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 [86.862607] filldir64+0xeb/0x180 [86.862620] kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480 [86.862635] iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0 [86.862648] __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140 [86.862661] x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660 [86.862675] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.862689] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.862703] -> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [86.862725] down_write+0x3e/0xf0 [86.862738] kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0 [86.862751] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0 [86.862765] internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0 [86.862779] sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20 [86.862792] topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30 [86.862806] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850 [86.862822] cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0 [86.862836] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320 [86.862852] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.862866] topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50 [86.862879] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.862893] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680 [86.862908] kernel_init+0x1b/0x200 [86.862921] ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70 [86.862934] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [86.862947] -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [86.862969] __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0 [86.862982] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [86.862995] __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320 [86.863012] __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220 [86.863026] page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60 [86.863041] mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0 [86.863054] start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0 [86.863068] x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 [86.863084] x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110 [86.863098] common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 [86.863114] -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: [86.863135] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.863152] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.863166] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.863180] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.863194] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.863987] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.864735] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.865510] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.866248] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.866983] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.867719] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.868453] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.869228] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.870001] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.870774] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.871546] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.872330] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.873057] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.873782] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.873802] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.873817] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.873833] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.873848] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.873862] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.873876] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.873892] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.873904] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.873917] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.873931] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.873945] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.874678] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.875347] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.875369] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.875385] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.875398] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.875413] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.875426] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.875440] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.875454] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.875470] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.875486] other info that might help us debug this: [86.875502] Chain exists of: cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex [86.875539] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [86.875552] CPU0 CPU1 [86.875563] ---- ---- [86.875573] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875588] lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire); [86.875606] lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex); [86.875624] rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock); [86.875637] *** DEADLOCK *** [86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432: [86.875663] #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220 [86.875699] #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.876512] #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915] [86.877305] stack backtrace: [86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G U 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER [86.877336] Hardware name: /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020 [86.877339] Call Trace: [86.877344] <TASK> [86.877353] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [86.877364] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [86.877369] print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360 [86.877379] check_noncircular+0x135/0x150 [86.877390] __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810 [86.877403] lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0 [86.877408] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.877422] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878173] cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100 [86.878182] ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878191] ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.878916] stop_machine+0x1c/0x50 [86.878927] bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915] [86.879652] intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915] [86.880375] __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915] [86.881133] fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915] [86.881851] fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915] [86.882566] __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915] [86.883286] i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915] [86.884003] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915] [86.884756] ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915] [86.885513] i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915] [86.886281] initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915] [86.887049] intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915] [86.887819] intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915] [86.888587] i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915] [86.889293] ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20 [86.889301] ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190 [86.889308] ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80 [86.889321] i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915] [86.890038] local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0 [86.890049] pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260 [86.890058] really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0 [86.890067] __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180 [86.890072] driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0 [86.890078] __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220 [86.890083] ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10 [86.890088] bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0 [86.890097] driver_attach+0x1e/0x30 [86.890101] bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290 [86.890107] driver_register+0x5e/0x130 [86.890113] __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90 [86.890119] i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915] [86.890833] i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915] [86.891482] ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915] [86.892135] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0 [86.892145] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470 [86.892157] do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0 [86.892164] load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80 [86.892168] ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300 [86.892185] ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320 [86.892195] init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892199] ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0 [86.892211] idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330 [86.892224] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100 [86.892230] x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660 [86.892236] do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90 [86.892243] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0 [86.892249] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [86.892256] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d [86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d [86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c [86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80 [86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0 [86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710 [86.892304] </TASK> Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case. v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi), - mention target environments in commit message. Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.") Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985 Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] (cherry picked from commit 648ef13) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9d7dfb9 ] Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel. Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can crash itself, but not L1. Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit, but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0 check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks). Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode. Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM" specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long- form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the TDX-Module base specification. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Cc: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Cc: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

…ockdep While developing IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT support for the code under fs/smb/common/smbdirect [1], I noticed false positives like this: [T79] ====================================================== [T79] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [T79] 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ CachyOS#1 Tainted: G OE [T79] ------------------------------------------------------ [T79] kworker/2:0/79 is trying to acquire lock: [T79] ffff88801f968278 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] but task is already holding lock: [T79] ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] which lock already depends on the new lock. [T79] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [T79] -> CachyOS#1 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}: [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] __mutex_lock+0x1af/0x1c10 [T79] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [T79] cma_get_port+0xba/0x7d0 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm] [T79] cma_bind_addr+0x107/0x320 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_resolve_addr+0xa3/0x830 [rdma_cm] [T79] destroy_lease_table+0x12b/0x420 [ksmbd] [T79] ksmbd_NTtimeToUnix+0x3e/0x80 [ksmbd] [T79] ndr_encode_posix_acl+0x6e9/0xab0 [ksmbd] [T79] ndr_encode_v4_ntacl+0x53/0x870 [ksmbd] [T79] __sys_connect_file+0x131/0x1c0 [T79] __sys_connect+0x111/0x140 [T79] __x64_sys_connect+0x72/0xc0 [T79] x64_sys_call+0xe7d/0x26a0 [T79] do_syscall_64+0x93/0xff0 [T79] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [T79] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}: [T79] check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0 [T79] validate_chain+0x466/0x590 [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [T79] sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw] [T79] iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm] [T79] cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd] [T79] ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930 [T79] worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0 [T79] kthread+0x3ec/0x8b0 [T79] ret_from_fork+0x314/0x400 [T79] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [T79] other info that might help us debug this: [T79] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [T79] CPU0 CPU1 [T79] ---- ---- [T79] lock(lock#9); [T79] lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); [T79] lock(lock#9); [T79] lock(sk_lock-AF_INET); [T79] *** DEADLOCK *** [T79] 5 locks held by kworker/2:0/79: [T79] #0: ffff88800120b158 ((wq_completion)events_long){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0xfca/0x1930 [T79] CachyOS#1: ffffc9000474fd00 ((work_completion)(&ctrl->ctrl_work)) {+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x804/0x1930 [T79] CachyOS#2: ffffffffc11307d0 (ctrl_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: server_ctrl_handle_work+0x21/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] CachyOS#3: ffffffffc11347b0 (init_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x18/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] CachyOS#4: ffffffffc10f7230 (lock#9){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_listen+0x3d2/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] stack backtrace: [T79] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 79 Comm: kworker/2:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.18.0-rc4-metze-kasan-lockdep.01+ CachyOS#1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [T79] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [T79] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [T79] Workqueue: events_long server_ctrl_handle_work [ksmbd] ... [T79] print_circular_bug+0xfd/0x130 [T79] check_noncircular+0x150/0x170 [T79] check_prev_add+0xf3/0xcd0 [T79] validate_chain+0x466/0x590 [T79] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? apparmor_socket_post_create+0x180/0x700 [T79] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [T79] ? sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] sock_set_reuseaddr+0x14/0x70 [T79] siw_create_listen+0x145/0x1540 [siw] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? local_clock_noinstr+0xe/0xd0 [T79] ? __pfx_siw_create_listen+0x10/0x10 [siw] [T79] ? trace_preempt_on+0x4c/0x130 [T79] ? __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4a/0x90 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? preempt_count_sub+0x52/0x80 [T79] iw_cm_listen+0x313/0x5b0 [iw_cm] [T79] cma_iw_listen+0x271/0x3c0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] rdma_listen+0x3b1/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x2c/0x60 [T79] ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? rdma_restrack_add+0x12c/0x630 [ib_core] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] cma_listen_on_dev+0x46a/0x750 [rdma_cm] [T79] rdma_listen+0x4b0/0x740 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? __pfx_rdma_listen+0x10/0x10 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? cma_get_port+0x30d/0x7d0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? rdma_bind_addr_dst+0x598/0x9a0 [rdma_cm] [T79] ksmbd_rdma_init+0x12b/0x270 [ksmbd] [T79] ? __pfx_ksmbd_rdma_init+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? register_netdevice_notifier+0x1dc/0x240 [T79] ksmbd_conn_transport_init+0x26/0x70 [ksmbd] [T79] server_ctrl_handle_work+0x1e5/0x280 [ksmbd] [T79] process_one_work+0x86c/0x1930 [T79] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 [T79] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [T79] ? assign_work+0x16f/0x280 [T79] worker_thread+0x6f0/0x11f0 I was not able to reproduce this as I was testing with various runs switching siw and rxe as well as IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT sockets, while the above stack used siw with the non IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT patches [1]. Even if this patch doesn't solve the above I think it's a good idea to reclassify the sockets used by siw, I also send patches for rxe to reclassify, as well as my IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT socket patches [1] will do it, this should minimize potential false positives. [1] https://git.samba.org/?p=metze/linux/wip.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/master-ipproto-smbdirect Cc: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Acked-by: Bernard Metzler <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

…ockdep While developing IPPROTO_SMBDIRECT support for the code under fs/smb/common/smbdirect [1], I noticed false positives like this: [+0,003927] ============================================ [+0,000532] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [+0,000611] 6.18.0-rc5-metze-kasan-lockdep.02+ CachyOS#1 Tainted: G OE [+0,000835] -------------------------------------------- [+0,000729] ksmbd:r5445/3609 is trying to acquire lock: [+0,000709] ffff88800b9570f8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000831] but task is already holding lock: [+0,000684] ffff88800654af78 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: smbdirect_sk_close+0x122/0x790 [smbdirect] [+0,000928] other info that might help us debug this: [+0,005552] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [+0,000723] CPU0 [+0,000359] ---- [+0,000377] lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); [+0,000478] lock(k-sk_lock-AF_INET); [+0,000498] *** DEADLOCK *** [+0,001012] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [+0,000831] 3 locks held by ksmbd:r5445/3609: [+0,000484] #0: ffff88800654af78 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: smbdirect_sk_close+0x122/0x790 [smbdirect] [+0,001000] CachyOS#1: ffff888020a40458 (&id_priv->handler_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_lock_handler+0x17/0x30 [rdma_cm] [+0,000982] CachyOS#2: ffff888020a40350 (&id_priv->qp_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: rdma_destroy_qp+0x5d/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [+0,000934] stack backtrace: [+0,000589] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3609 Comm: ksmbd:r5445 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.18.0-rc5-metze-kasan-lockdep.02+ CachyOS#1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [+0,000023] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [+0,000004] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 ... [+0,000010] print_deadlock_bug+0x245/0x330 [+0,000014] validate_chain+0x32a/0x590 [+0,000012] __lock_acquire+0x535/0xc30 [+0,000013] lock_acquire.part.0+0xb3/0x240 [+0,000017] ? inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000013] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000007] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [+0,000012] lock_acquire+0x60/0x140 [+0,000006] ? inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000028] lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0 [+0,000009] ? inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000008] inet_shutdown+0x52/0x360 [+0,000010] kernel_sock_shutdown+0x5b/0x90 [+0,000011] rxe_qp_do_cleanup+0x4ef/0x810 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000043] ? __pfx_rxe_qp_do_cleanup+0x10/0x10 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000030] execute_in_process_context+0x2b/0x170 [+0,000013] rxe_qp_cleanup+0x1c/0x30 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000021] __rxe_cleanup+0x1cf/0x2e0 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000036] ? __pfx___rxe_cleanup+0x10/0x10 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000020] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000006] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [+0,000012] rxe_destroy_qp+0xe1/0x230 [rdma_rxe] [+0,000035] ib_destroy_qp_user+0x217/0x450 [ib_core] [+0,000074] rdma_destroy_qp+0x83/0x1f0 [rdma_cm] [+0,000034] smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp+0x98/0x2e0 [smbdirect] [+0,000017] ? __pfx_smb_direct_logging_needed+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [+0,000044] smbdirect_connection_destroy+0x698/0xed0 [smbdirect] [+0,000023] ? __pfx_smbdirect_connection_destroy+0x10/0x10 [smbdirect] [+0,000033] ? __pfx_smb_direct_logging_needed+0x10/0x10 [ksmbd] [+0,000031] smbdirect_connection_destroy_sync+0x42b/0x9f0 [smbdirect] [+0,000029] ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90 [+0,000012] ? __pfx_smbdirect_connection_destroy_sync+0x10/0x10 [smbdirect] [+0,000019] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000007] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x64/0x70 [+0,000029] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000010] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000006] ? __smbdirect_connection_schedule_disconnect+0x339/0x4b0 [+0,000021] smbdirect_sk_destroy+0xb0/0x680 [smbdirect] [+0,000024] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000006] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x64/0x70 [+0,000006] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000005] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xba/0x150 [+0,000011] sk_common_release+0x66/0x340 [+0,000010] smbdirect_sk_close+0x12a/0x790 [smbdirect] [+0,000023] ? ip_mc_drop_socket+0x1e/0x240 [+0,000013] inet_release+0x10a/0x240 [+0,000011] smbdirect_sock_release+0x502/0xe80 [smbdirect] [+0,000015] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000024] sock_release+0x91/0x1c0 [+0,000010] smb_direct_free_transport+0x31/0x50 [ksmbd] [+0,000025] ksmbd_conn_free+0x1d0/0x240 [ksmbd] [+0,000040] smb_direct_disconnect+0xb2/0x120 [ksmbd] [+0,000023] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [+0,000018] ksmbd_conn_handler_loop+0x94e/0xf10 [ksmbd] ... I'll also add reclassify to the smbdirect socket code [1], but I think it's better to have it in both direction (below and above the RDMA layer). [1] https://git.samba.org/?p=metze/linux/wip.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/master-ipproto-smbdirect Cc: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <[email protected]> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>

Rework the handling of the MMIO Stale Data mitigation to clear CPU buffers immediately prior to VM-Enter, i.e. in the same location that KVM emits a VERW for unconditional (at runtime) clearing. Co-locating the code and using a single ALTERNATIVES_2 makes it more obvious how VMX mitigates the various vulnerabilities. Deliberately order the alternatives as: 0. Do nothing 1. Clear if vCPU can access MMIO 2. Clear always since the last alternative wins in ALTERNATIVES_2(), i.e. so that KVM will honor the strictest mitigation (always clear CPU buffers) if multiple mitigations are selected. E.g. even if the kernel chooses to mitigate MMIO Stale Data via X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM_MMIO, another mitigation may enable X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and that other thing needs to win. Note, decoupling the MMIO mitigation from the L1TF mitigation also fixes a mostly-benign flaw where KVM wouldn't do any clearing/flushing if the L1TF mitigation is configured to conditionally flush the L1D, and the MMIO mitigation but not any other "clear CPU buffers" mitigation is enabled. For that specific scenario, KVM would skip clearing CPU buffers for the MMIO mitigation even though the kernel requested a clear on every VM-Enter. Note CachyOS#2, the flaw goes back to the introduction of the MDS mitigation. The MDS mitigation was inadvertently fixed by commit 43fb862 ("KVM/VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation"), but previous kernels that flush CPU buffers in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit() are affected (though it's unlikely the flaw is meaningfully exploitable even older kernels). Fixes: 650b68a ("x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active") Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

When populating the initial memory image for a TDX guest, ADD pages to the TD as part of establishing the mappings in the mirror EPT, as opposed to creating the mappings and then doing ADD after the fact. Doing ADD in the S-EPT callbacks eliminates the need to track "premapped" pages, as the mirror EPT (M-EPT) and S-EPT are always synchronized, e.g. if ADD fails, KVM reverts to the previous M-EPT entry (guaranteed to be !PRESENT). Eliminating the hole where the M-EPT can have a mapping that doesn't exist in the S-EPT in turn obviates the need to handle errors that are unique to encountering a missing S-EPT entry (see tdx_is_sept_zap_err_due_to_premap()). Keeping the M-EPT and S-EPT synchronized also eliminates the need to check for unconsumed "premap" entries during tdx_td_finalize(), as there simply can't be any such entries. Dropping that check in particular reduces the overall cognitive load, as the management of nr_premapped with respect to removal of S-EPT is _very_ subtle. E.g. successful removal of an S-EPT entry after it completed ADD doesn't adjust nr_premapped, but it's not clear why that's "ok" but having half-baked entries is not (it's not truly "ok" in that removing pages from the image will likely prevent the guest from booting, but from KVM's perspective it's "ok"). Doing ADD in the S-EPT path requires passing an argument via a scratch field, but the current approach of tracking the number of "premapped" pages effectively does the same. And the "premapped" counter is much more dangerous, as it doesn't have a singular lock to protect its usage, since nr_premapped can be modified as soon as mmu_lock is dropped, at least in theory. I.e. nr_premapped is guarded by slots_lock, but only for "happy" paths. Note, this approach was used/tried at various points in TDX development, but was ultimately discarded due to a desire to avoid stashing temporary state in kvm_tdx. But as above, KVM ended up with such state anyways, and fully committing to using temporary state provides better access rules (100% guarded by slots_lock), and makes several edge cases flat out impossible. Note CachyOS#2, continue to extend the measurement outside of mmu_lock, as it's a slow operation (typically 16 SEAMCALLs per page whose data is included in the measurement), and doesn't *need* to be done under mmu_lock, e.g. for consistency purposes. However, MR.EXTEND isn't _that_ slow, e.g. ~1ms latency to measure a full page, so if it needs to be done under mmu_lock in the future, e.g. because KVM gains a flow that can remove S-EPT entries during KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, then extending the measurement can also be moved into the S-EPT mapping path (again, only if absolutely necessary). P.S. _If_ MR.EXTEND is moved into the S-EPT path, take care not to return an error up the stack if TDH_MR_EXTEND fails, as removing the M-EPT entry but not the S-EPT entry would result in inconsistent state! Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

During vCPU creation, a vCPU may be destroyed immediately after kvm_arch_vcpu_create() (e.g., due to vCPU id confiliction). However, the vcpu_load() inside kvm_arch_vcpu_create() may have associate the vCPU to pCPU via "list_add(&tdx->cpu_list, &per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, cpu))" before invoking tdx_vcpu_free(). Though there's no need to invoke tdh_vp_flush() on the vCPU, failing to dissociate the vCPU from pCPU (i.e., "list_del(&to_tdx(vcpu)->cpu_list)") will cause list corruption of the per-pCPU list associated_tdvcpus. Then, a later list_add() during vcpu_load() would detect list corruption and print calltrace as shown below. Dissociate a vCPU from its associated pCPU in tdx_vcpu_free() for the vCPUs destroyed immediately after creation which must be in VCPU_TD_STATE_UNINITIALIZED state. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [CachyOS#2] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x82/0xd0 Call Trace: <TASK> tdx_vcpu_load+0xa8/0x120 vt_vcpu_load+0x25/0x30 kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x81/0x300 vcpu_load+0x55/0x90 kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x24f/0x330 kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu+0x1b1/0x53 kvm_vm_ioctl+0xc2/0xa60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x9a/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x10ee/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x470 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: d789fa6 ("KVM: TDX: Handle vCPU dissociation") Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yan Zhao <[email protected]> Tested-by: Kai Huang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

According to the APM Volume CachyOS#2, Section 15.17, Table 15-10 (24593—Rev. 3.42—March 2024), When "GIF==0", an "Debug exception or trap, due to breakpoint register match" should be "Ignored and discarded". KVM lacks any handling of this. Even when vGIF is enabled and vGIF==0, the CPU does not ignore #DBs and relies on the VMM to do so. Handling this is possible, but the complexity is unjustified given the rarity of using HW breakpoints when GIF==0 (e.g. near VMRUN). KVM would need to intercept the #DB, temporarily disable the breakpoint, singe-step over the instruction (probably reusing NMI singe-stepping), and re-enable the breakpoint. Instead, document this as an erratum. Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> says: Hi Martin, This patch series includes two bug fixes for this development cycle and six small patches that are intended for the next merge window. If applying the first two patches only during the current development cycle would be inconvenient, postponing all patches until the next merge window is fine with me. Please consider including these patches in the upstream kernel. Thanks, Bart. [mkp: Applied patches CachyOS#1 and CachyOS#2 to 6.18/scsi-fixes] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

… 'T' When perf report with annotation for a symbol, press 's' and 'T', then exit the annotate browser. Once annotate the same symbol, the annotate browser will crash. The browser.arch was required to be correctly updated when data type feature was enabled by 'T'. Usually it was initialized by symbol__annotate2 function. If a symbol has already been correctly annotated at the first time, it should not call the symbol__annotate2 function again, thus the browser.arch will not get initialized. Then at the second time to show the annotate browser, the data type needs to be displayed but the browser.arch is empty. Stack trace as below: Perf: Segmentation fault -------- backtrace -------- #0 0x55d365 in ui__signal_backtrace setup.c:0 CachyOS#1 0x7f5ff1a3e930 in __restore_rt libc.so.6[3e930] CachyOS#2 0x570f08 in arch__is perf[570f08] CachyOS#3 0x562186 in annotate_get_insn_location perf[562186] CachyOS#4 0x562626 in __hist_entry__get_data_type annotate.c:0 CachyOS#5 0x56476d in annotation_line__write perf[56476d] CachyOS#6 0x54e2db in annotate_browser__write annotate.c:0 CachyOS#7 0x54d061 in ui_browser__list_head_refresh perf[54d061] torvalds#8 0x54dc9e in annotate_browser__refresh annotate.c:0 torvalds#9 0x54c03d in __ui_browser__refresh browser.c:0 torvalds#10 0x54ccf8 in ui_browser__run perf[54ccf8] torvalds#11 0x54eb92 in __hist_entry__tui_annotate perf[54eb92] torvalds#12 0x552293 in do_annotate hists.c:0 torvalds#13 0x55941c in evsel__hists_browse hists.c:0 torvalds#14 0x55b00f in evlist__tui_browse_hists perf[55b00f] torvalds#15 0x42ff02 in cmd_report perf[42ff02] torvalds#16 0x494008 in run_builtin perf.c:0 torvalds#17 0x494305 in handle_internal_command perf.c:0 torvalds#18 0x410547 in main perf[410547] torvalds#19 0x7f5ff1a295d0 in __libc_start_call_main libc.so.6[295d0] torvalds#20 0x7f5ff1a29680 in __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.34 libc.so.6[29680] torvalds#21 0x410b75 in _start perf[410b75] Fixes: 1d4374a ("perf annotate: Add 'T' hot key to toggle data type display") Reviewed-by: James Clark <[email protected]> Tested-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tianyou Li <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 CachyOS#1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 CachyOS#2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 CachyOS#3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] CachyOS#4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 CachyOS#5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 CachyOS#6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 CachyOS#7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 torvalds#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 torvalds#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 torvalds#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 torvalds#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 torvalds#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 torvalds#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] torvalds#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

When interrupting perf stat in repeat mode with a signal the signal is passed to the child process but the repeat doesn't terminate: ``` $ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1 Control descriptor is not initialized [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#1 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#2 ... ] ^Csleep: Interrupt [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#3 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#4 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#5 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#6 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#7 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run torvalds#8 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run torvalds#9 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run torvalds#10 ... ] Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs): 0.9500 +- 0.0512 seconds time elapsed ( +- 5.39% ) 0.01user 0.02system 0:09.53elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 18940maxresident)k 29944inputs+0outputs (0major+2629minor)pagefaults 0swaps ``` Terminate the repeated run and give a reasonable exit value: ``` $ perf stat -v --null --repeat 10 sleep 1 Control descriptor is not initialized [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#1 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#2 ... ] [ perf stat: executing run CachyOS#3 ... ] ^Csleep: Interrupt Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1' (10 runs): 0.680 +- 0.321 seconds time elapsed ( +- 47.16% ) Command exited with non-zero status 130 0.00user 0.01system 0:02.05elapsed 0%CPU (0avgtext+0avgdata 70688maxresident)k 0inputs+0outputs (0major+5002minor)pagefaults 0swaps ``` Note, this also changes the exit value for non-repeat runs when interrupted by a signal. Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/ Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <[email protected]> Tested-by: Thomas Richter <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

The pic64gx has a second pinmux "downstream" of the iomux0 pinmux. The documentation for the SoC provides no name for this device, but it is used to swap pins between either GPIO controller CachyOS#2 or select other functions, hence the "gpio2" name. Currently there is no documentation about what each bit actually does that is publicly available, nor (I believe) what pins are affected. That info is as follows: pin role (1/0) --- ---------- E14 MAC_0_MDC/GPIO_2_0 E15 MAC_0_MDIO/GPIO_2_1 F16 MAC_1_MDC/GPIO_2_2 F17 MAC_1_MDIO/GPIO_2_3 D19 SPI_0_CLK/GPIO_2_4 B18 SPI_0_SS0/GPIO_2_5 B10 CAN_0_RXBUS/GPIO_2_6 C14 PCIE_PERST_2#/GPIO_2_7 E18 PCIE_WAKE#/GPIO_2_8 D18 PCIE_PERST_1#/GPIO_2_9 E19 SPI_0_DO/GPIO_2_10 C7 SPI_0_DI/GPIO_2_11 D6 QSPI_SS0/GPIO_2_12 D7 QSPI_CLK (B)/GPIO_2_13 C9 QSPI_DATA0/GPIO_2_14 C10 QSPI_DATA1/GPIO_2_15 A5 QSPI_DATA2/GPIO_2_16 A6 QSPI_DATA3/GPIO_2_17 D8 MMUART_3_RXD/GPIO_2_18 D9 MMUART_3_TXD/GPIO_2_19 B8 MMUART_4_RXD/GPIO_2_20 A8 MMUART_4_TXD/GPIO_2_21 C12 CAN_1_TXBUS/GPIO_2_22 B12 CAN_1_RXBUS/GPIO_2_23 A11 CAN_0_TX_EBL_N/GPIO_2_24 A10 CAN_1_TX_EBL_N/GPIO_2_25 D11 MMUART_2_RXD/GPIO_2_26 C11 MMUART_2_TXD/GPIO_2_27 B9 CAN_0_TXBUS/GPIO_2_28 Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

The pic64gx has a second pinmux "downstream" of the iomux0 pinmux. The documentation for the SoC provides no name for this device, but it is used to swap pins between either GPIO controller CachyOS#2 or select other functions, hence the "gpio2" name. Add a driver for it. Signed-off-by: Conor Dooley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>

Commit 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*()") dropped the configuration of ISEL from struct irq_chip::{irq_enable, irq_disable} APIs and moved it to struct gpio_chip::irq::{child_to_parent_hwirq, child_irq_domain_ops::free} APIs to fix spurious IRQs. After commit 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*()"), ISEL was no longer configured properly on resume. This is because the pinctrl resume code used struct irq_chip::irq_enable (called from rzg2l_gpio_irq_restore()) to reconfigure the wakeup interrupts. Some drivers (e.g. Ethernet) may also reconfigure non-wakeup interrupts on resume through their own code, eventually calling struct irq_chip::irq_enable. Fix this by adding ISEL configuration back into the struct irq_chip::irq_enable API and on resume path for wakeup interrupts. As struct irq_chip::irq_enable needs now to lock to update the ISEL, convert the struct rzg2l_pinctrl::lock to a raw spinlock and replace the locking API calls with the raw variants. Otherwise the lockdep reports invalid wait context when probing the adv7511 module on RZ/G2L: [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.17.0-rc5-next-20250911-00001-gfcfac22533c9 torvalds#18 Not tainted ----------------------------- (udev-worker)/165 is trying to lock: ffff00000e3664a8 (&pctrl->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0x38/0x78 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 3 locks held by (udev-worker)/165: #0: ffff00000e890108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0x90/0x1ac CachyOS#1: ffff000011c07240 (request_class){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xb4/0x6dc CachyOS#2: ffff000011c070c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xdc/0x6dc stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-next-20250911-00001-gfcfac22533c9 torvalds#18 PREEMPT Hardware name: Renesas SMARC EVK based on r9a07g044l2 (DT) Call trace: show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0xd0 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 __lock_acquire+0xa14/0x20b4 lock_acquire+0x1c8/0x354 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x88 rzg2l_gpio_irq_enable+0x38/0x78 irq_enable+0x40/0x8c __irq_startup+0x78/0xa4 irq_startup+0x108/0x16c __setup_irq+0x3c0/0x6dc request_threaded_irq+0xec/0x1ac devm_request_threaded_irq+0x80/0x134 adv7511_probe+0x928/0x9a4 [adv7511] i2c_device_probe+0x22c/0x3dc really_probe+0xbc/0x2a0 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x12c driver_probe_device+0x40/0x164 __driver_attach+0x9c/0x1ac bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xd0 driver_attach+0x24/0x30 bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208 driver_register+0x60/0x128 i2c_register_driver+0x48/0xd0 adv7511_init+0x5c/0x1000 [adv7511] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x30c do_init_module+0x58/0x23c load_module+0x1bcc/0x1d40 init_module_from_file+0x88/0xc4 idempotent_init_module+0x188/0x27c __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xac invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 el0_svc+0x4c/0x160 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c Having ISEL configuration back into the struct irq_chip::irq_enable API should be safe with respect to spurious IRQs, as in the probe case IRQs are enabled anyway in struct gpio_chip::irq::child_to_parent_hwirq. No spurious IRQs were detected on suspend/resume, boot, ethernet link insert/remove tests (executed on RZ/G3S). Boot, ethernet link insert/remove tests were also executed successfully on RZ/G2L. Fixes: 1d2da79 ("pinctrl: renesas: rzg2l: Avoid configuring ISEL in gpio_irq_{en,dis}able*(") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>

As Jiaming Zhang and syzbot reported, there is potential deadlock in f2fs as below: Chain exists of: &sbi->cp_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> sb_internal#2 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(sb_internal#2); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); rlock(&sbi->cp_rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/73: #0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7015 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0x951/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389 CachyOS#1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_trylock_shared fs/super.c:562 [inline] CachyOS#1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_cache_scan+0x91/0x4b0 fs/super.c:197 CachyOS#2: ffff888011840610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: f2fs_evict_inode+0x8d9/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:890 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2ee/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x134/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain+0xb9b/0x2140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 __lock_acquire+0xab9/0xd20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x120/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 down_read+0x46/0x2e0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1537 f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2278 [inline] f2fs_lock_op fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2357 [inline] f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x21c/0x10c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:791 f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:867 f2fs_truncate+0x489/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:925 f2fs_evict_inode+0x9f2/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:897 evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1dc/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:853 evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 dispose_list fs/inode.c:852 [inline] prune_icache_sb+0x21b/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1000 super_cache_scan+0x39b/0x4b0 fs/super.c:224 do_shrink_slab+0x6ef/0x1110 mm/shrinker.c:437 shrink_slab_memcg mm/shrinker.c:550 [inline] shrink_slab+0x7ef/0x10d0 mm/shrinker.c:628 shrink_one+0x28a/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4955 shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:5016 [inline] lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5094 [inline] shrink_node+0x315d/0x3780 mm/vmscan.c:6081 kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6941 [inline] balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7124 [inline] kswapd+0x147c/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> The root cause is deadlock among four locks as below: kswapd - fs_reclaim --- Lock A - shrink_one - evict - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B - iput - evict - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B - f2fs_truncate - f2fs_truncate_blocks - f2fs_do_truncate_blocks - f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C ioctl - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C - __f2fs_commit_atomic_write - __replace_atomic_write_block - f2fs_get_dnode_of_data - __get_node_folio - f2fs_check_nid_range - f2fs_handle_error - f2fs_record_errors - f2fs_down_write --- Lock D open - do_open - do_truncate - security_inode_need_killpriv - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - f2fs_handle_error - f2fs_record_errors - f2fs_down_write --- Lock D - f2fs_commit_super - read_mapping_folio - filemap_alloc_folio_noprof - prepare_alloc_pages - fs_reclaim_acquire --- Lock A In order to avoid such deadlock, we need to avoid grabbing sb_lock in f2fs_handle_error(), so, let's use asynchronous method instead: - remove f2fs_handle_error() implementation - rename f2fs_handle_error_async() to f2fs_handle_error() - spread f2fs_handle_error() Fixes: 95fa90c ("f2fs: support recording errors into superblock") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/[email protected] Reported-by: Jiaming Zhang <[email protected]> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANypQFa-Gy9sD-N35o3PC+FystOWkNuN8pv6S75HLT0ga-Tzgw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 163e5f2 ] When using perf record with the `--overwrite` option, a segmentation fault occurs if an event fails to open. For example: perf record -e cycles-ct -F 1000 -a --overwrite Error: cycles-ct:H: PMU Hardware doesn't support sampling/overflow-interrupts. Try 'perf stat' perf: Segmentation fault #0 0x6466b6 in dump_stack debug.c:366 #1 0x646729 in sighandler_dump_stack debug.c:378 #2 0x453fd1 in sigsegv_handler builtin-record.c:722 #3 0x7f8454e65090 in __restore_rt libc-2.32.so[54090] #4 0x6c5671 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1862 #5 0x6c5ac0 in perf_event__synthesize_id_index synthetic-events.c:1943 #6 0x458090 in record__synthesize builtin-record.c:2075 #7 0x45a85a in __cmd_record builtin-record.c:2888 torvalds#8 0x45deb6 in cmd_record builtin-record.c:4374 torvalds#9 0x4e5e33 in run_builtin perf.c:349 torvalds#10 0x4e60bf in handle_internal_command perf.c:401 torvalds#11 0x4e6215 in run_argv perf.c:448 torvalds#12 0x4e653a in main perf.c:555 torvalds#13 0x7f8454e4fa72 in __libc_start_main libc-2.32.so[3ea72] torvalds#14 0x43a3ee in _start ??:0 The --overwrite option implies --tail-synthesize, which collects non-sample events reflecting the system status when recording finishes. However, when evsel opening fails (e.g., unsupported event 'cycles-ct'), session->evlist is not initialized and remains NULL. The code unconditionally calls record__synthesize() in the error path, which iterates through the NULL evlist pointer and causes a segfault. To fix it, move the record__synthesize() call inside the error check block, so it's only called when there was no error during recording, ensuring that evlist is properly initialized. Fixes: 4ea648a ("perf record: Add --tail-synthesize option") Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>

Jakub reported an MPTCP deadlock at fallback time: WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.18.0-rc7-virtme CachyOS#1 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- mptcp_connect/20858 is trying to acquire lock: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280 but task is already holding lock: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&msk->fallback_lock); lock(&msk->fallback_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by mptcp_connect/20858: #0: ff1100001da18290 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x114/0x1bc0 CachyOS#1: ff1100001db40fd0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x2cb/0xaa0 CachyOS#2: ff1100001da18b60 (&msk->fallback_lock){+.-.}-{3:3}, at: __mptcp_retrans+0x352/0xaa0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20858 Comm: mptcp_connect Not tainted 6.18.0-rc7-virtme CachyOS#1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0 print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xcd validate_chain+0x2ff/0x5f0 __lock_acquire+0x34c/0x740 lock_acquire.part.0+0xbc/0x260 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50 __mptcp_try_fallback+0xd8/0x280 mptcp_sendmsg_frag+0x16c2/0x3050 __mptcp_retrans+0x421/0xaa0 mptcp_release_cb+0x5aa/0xa70 release_sock+0xab/0x1d0 mptcp_sendmsg+0xd5b/0x1bc0 sock_write_iter+0x281/0x4d0 new_sync_write+0x3c5/0x6f0 vfs_write+0x65e/0xbb0 ksys_write+0x17e/0x200 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fa5627cbc5e Code: 4d 89 d8 e8 14 bd 00 00 4c 8b 5d f8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 11 c9 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <c9> c3 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 e7 e8 13 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa RSP: 002b:00007fff1fe14700 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 00007fa5627cbc5e RDX: 0000000000001f9c RSI: 00007fff1fe16984 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007fff1fe14710 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff1fe16920 R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000001f9c R15: 0000000000001f9c The packet scheduler could attempt a reinjection after receiving an MP_FAIL and before the infinite map has been transmitted, causing a deadlock since MPTCP needs to do the reinjection atomically from WRT fallback. Address the issue explicitly avoiding the reinjection in the critical scenario. Note that this is the only fallback critical section that could potentially send packets and hit the double-lock. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Closes: https://netdev-ctrl.bots.linux.dev/logs/vmksft/mptcp-dbg/results/412720/1-mptcp-join-sh/stderr Fixes: f8a1d9b ("mptcp: make fallback action and fallback decision atomic") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251205-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-6-19-rc1-v1-4-9e4781a6c1b8@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

Petr Machata says: ==================== selftests: forwarding: vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul: Fix flakiness The net/forwarding/vxlan_bridge_1q_mc_ul selftest runs an overlay traffic, forwarded over a multicast-routed VXLAN underlay. In order to determine whether packets reach their intended destination, it uses a TC match. For convenience, it uses a flower match, which however does not allow matching on the encapsulated packet. So various service traffic ends up being indistinguishable from the test packets, and ends up confusing the test. To alleviate the problem, the test uses sleep to allow the necessary service traffic to run and clear the channel, before running the test traffic. This worked for a while, but lately we have nevertheless seen flakiness of the test in the CI. In this patchset, first generalize tc_rule_stats_get() to support u32 in patch CachyOS#1, then in patch CachyOS#2 convert the test to use u32 to allow parsing deeper into the packet, and in CachyOS#3 drop the now-unnecessary sleep. ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

The IPv4 code path in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() calls dst_link_failure() without ensuring skb->dev is set, leading to a NULL pointer dereference in fib_compute_spec_dst() when ipv4_link_failure() attempts to send ICMP destination unreachable messages. The issue emerged after commit ed0de45 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") started calling __ip_options_compile() from ipv4_link_failure(). This code path eventually calls fib_compute_spec_dst() which dereferences skb->dev. An attempt was made to fix the NULL skb->dev dereference in commit 0113d9c ("ipv4: fix null-deref in ipv4_link_failure"), but it only addressed the immediate dev_net(skb->dev) dereference by using a fallback device. The fix was incomplete because fib_compute_spec_dst() later in the call chain still accesses skb->dev directly, which remains NULL when IPVS calls dst_link_failure(). The crash occurs when: 1. IPVS processes a packet in NAT mode with a misconfigured destination 2. Route lookup fails in __ip_vs_get_out_rt() before establishing a route 3. The error path calls dst_link_failure(skb) with skb->dev == NULL 4. ipv4_link_failure() → ipv4_send_dest_unreach() → __ip_options_compile() → fib_compute_spec_dst() 5. fib_compute_spec_dst() dereferences NULL skb->dev Apply the same fix used for IPv6 in commit 326bf17 ("ipvs: fix ipv6 route unreach panic"): set skb->dev from skb_dst(skb)->dev before calling dst_link_failure(). KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000328-0x000000000000032f] CPU: 1 PID: 12732 Comm: syz.1.3469 Not tainted 6.6.114 CachyOS#2 RIP: 0010:__in_dev_get_rcu include/linux/inetdevice.h:233 RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0x17a/0x9f0 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285 Call Trace: <TASK> spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:232 spec_dst_fill net/ipv4/ip_options.c:229 __ip_options_compile+0x13a1/0x17d0 net/ipv4/ip_options.c:330 ipv4_send_dest_unreach net/ipv4/route.c:1252 ipv4_link_failure+0x702/0xb80 net/ipv4/route.c:1265 dst_link_failure include/net/dst.h:437 __ip_vs_get_out_rt+0x15fd/0x19e0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:412 ip_vs_nat_xmit+0x1d8/0xc80 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c:764 Fixes: ed0de45 ("ipv4: recompile ip options in ipv4_link_failure") Signed-off-by: Slavin Liu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

Fix a loop scenario of ethx:egress->ethx:egress Example setup to reproduce: tc qdisc add dev ethx root handle 1: drr tc filter add dev ethx parent 1: protocol ip prio 1 matchall \ action mirred egress redirect dev ethx Now ping out of ethx and you get a deadlock: [ 116.892898][ T307] ============================================ [ 116.893182][ T307] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 116.893418][ T307] 6.18.0-rc6-01205-ge05021a829b8-dirty torvalds#204 Not tainted [ 116.893682][ T307] -------------------------------------------- [ 116.893926][ T307] ping/307 is trying to acquire lock: [ 116.894133][ T307] ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50 [ 116.894517][ T307] [ 116.894517][ T307] but task is already holding lock: [ 116.894836][ T307] ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50 [ 116.895252][ T307] [ 116.895252][ T307] other info that might help us debug this: [ 116.895608][ T307] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 116.895608][ T307] [ 116.895901][ T307] CPU0 [ 116.896057][ T307] ---- [ 116.896200][ T307] lock(&sch->root_lock_key); [ 116.896392][ T307] lock(&sch->root_lock_key); [ 116.896605][ T307] [ 116.896605][ T307] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 116.896605][ T307] [ 116.896864][ T307] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 116.896864][ T307] [ 116.897123][ T307] 6 locks held by ping/307: [ 116.897302][ T307] #0: ffff88800b4b0250 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0xb20/0x2cf0 [ 116.897808][ T307] CachyOS#1: ffffffff88c839c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_output+0xa9/0x600 [ 116.898138][ T307] CachyOS#2: ffffffff88c839c0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x2c6/0x1ee0 [ 116.898459][ T307] CachyOS#3: ffffffff88c83960 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x200/0x3b50 [ 116.898782][ T307] CachyOS#4: ffff88800c122908 (&sch->root_lock_key){+...}-{3:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50 [ 116.899132][ T307] CachyOS#5: ffffffff88c83960 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:3}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x200/0x3b50 [ 116.899442][ T307] [ 116.899442][ T307] stack backtrace: [ 116.899667][ T307] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 307 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-01205-ge05021a829b8-dirty torvalds#204 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 116.899672][ T307] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 116.899675][ T307] Call Trace: [ 116.899678][ T307] <TASK> [ 116.899680][ T307] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 [ 116.899688][ T307] print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xc0/0xdc [ 116.899695][ T307] __lock_acquire+0x11f7/0x1be0 [ 116.899704][ T307] lock_acquire+0x162/0x300 [ 116.899707][ T307] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50 [ 116.899713][ T307] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 116.899717][ T307] ? stack_trace_save+0x93/0xd0 [ 116.899723][ T307] _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x40 [ 116.899728][ T307] ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50 [ 116.899731][ T307] __dev_queue_xmit+0x2210/0x3b50 Fixes: 178ca30 ("Revert "net/sched: Fix mirred deadlock on device recursion"") Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

kerneltoast added 8 commits September 23, 2023 18:32

mm: Disable proactive compaction by default

2e3cb1a

On-demand compaction works fine assuming that you don't have a need to spam the page allocator nonstop for large order page allocations. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>

ptr1337 merged commit ec3dcef into CachyOS:6.5/cachy Sep 23, 2023

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Rasenkai commented Sep 23, 2023

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