UAV Carrier

We’ve frequently noted the need for a UAV carrier (see, for example, the fictional snippet, “Piece It Together”, for a description of a UAV carrier involved in an amphibious assault).  What might such a carrier look like and how would it operate?  Let’s speculate.

 

 

Conceptual Foundation

 

Here’s the major foundational assumptions underlying a UAV carrier concept:

 

Small UAVs - The key concept in a UAV Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is that the UAVs are not the large Predator type UAVs that would be utterly non-survivable over a modern battlefield but would, instead, be small, cheap, expendable, limited functionality UAVs somewhere in the ballpark of a slightly enhanced RQ-21 Blackjack UAV (see, “RQ-21 Blackjack”).

RQ-21 Blackjack

 Swarms - Critically important is the concept that UAVs would be deployed in swarms rather than singly.  Thus, a UAV carrier needs the ability to launch swarms of UAVs simultaneously.

 

Numbers - These small UAVs will suffer significant attrition in battle so a UAV carrier needs to carry lots of UAVs – around 500 would be a good amount.

 

Control - Since we don’t have ‘Terminator’ level artificial intelligence yet – nor are we likely to in the foreseeable future – we will need lots of aircraft controller stations on the carrier.  Most UAVs won’t require hands on, continuous, remote piloting but all will require the ability to be controlled via waypoints and basic flight and operational instructions with occasional hands-on remote piloting.

 

Communications - In addition to sending instructions to UAVs, receiving return communications will be important.  Swarms of UAVs will be sending brief bursts of data back to the carrier so the carrier needs a robust, two-way, UAV communications suite.

 

Data Assembly - The UAV data will be fragmentary, at best, so the carrier needs the ability to assemble comprehensive ‘pictures’ out of lots of individual data points.  This dictates a large data synthesis center.

 

 

Design

 

Now that we understand the foundational requirements for a UAV carrier, what does the preceding suggest about the look and design of a UAV carrier?  Well, for one thing, it won’t look much like a ‘normal’ carrier as we think of it, today.

 

Launch – The carrier will launch UAVs from small catapults.  Thus, long runs of clear open deck, as with a conventional carrier, will not be required.  The small catapults (again, see the RQ-21 Blackjack for an idea of what these catapults might resemble) will line the sides of the deck, facing out.  Around 30 catapults ought to be sufficient to launch swarms of UAVs in a reasonable time frame.

 

Recovery – Recovery of small UAVs does not require traditional arresting gear and long, open, landing areas.  Instead, a short 50 foot long x 30 foot wide section of deck with a net at the forward end will suffice to catch returning UAVs which would be manually disentangled and removed from the landing area. 

 

Hangar – The ‘hangar’ would not be a hangar in the traditional sense.  While UAVs would be brought below for repair and maintenance work, that work would occur in small workshops.  The ‘hangar’ area, instead of being an open aircraft work space, would be a UAV storage area with UAVs stored in racks with enough space between the racks to allow equipment to raise/lower the UAVs and move them to elevators as needed.  Alternatively, the ‘hangar’ could simply be a superstructure on the same level as the flight deck so that UAVs could be moved straight to the launch catapults rather than requiring elevators.

 

Dimensions – Carrier size would be something on the order of 250-300 feet long, depending on the UAV storage requirements.  Something like a small cargo ship ought to serve as the design basis with the modification of some open deck space as described above.

 

 

Future

 

Looking slightly further into the future, a true UAV carrier would also include underwater unmanned vehicle (UUV) launch and recovery capability, as well.  UUV launches would involve underwater torpedo tube type systems and recovery would be via a small well ‘tunnel’.

 

 

Summary

 

A UAV carrier would be very small relative to a real carrier, likely based on a fast cargo ship design, and would be intended to provide situational awareness for a group through the use of UAV sensor swarms with the swarm making up for the lack of sensor capability in the individual UAVs.

 

The exact design details would, as always, depend on the specific Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  Though not quite spelled out, here, the CONOPS would likely emphasize operations with amphibious groups and non-carrier surface groups since a carrier’s aircraft would be able to provide all the needed sensor capability for the group. 

 

This concept could, and should, be prototyped using an available small cargo ship with some simple modifications.  Let’s see what kind of situational awareness we can generate from a small swarm of UAVs.  Let’s see if we can assemble a comprehensive picture from lots of individual data points.  Let’s see if we can launch, control, and recover a swarm.  Let’s see how detectable a swarm of small UAVs is.  Let’s see if they can survive long enough to accomplish the mission.  Let’s see what this concept can do.

RQ-21 Blackjack

The Navy and Marines have a tendency to latch onto pieces of equipment with little or no data to base such enthusiasm on other than manufacturer’s claims.  They then attempt to rush the equipment into service and do everything they can to either minimize testing or conduct unrealistic, simplistic testing in an effort to produce data supporting their equipment choice.  Unfortunately, all too often, when more rigorous testing is eventually conducted, the equipment is found to be badly flawed.  At this point, the Navy and Marines are faced with the choice of either admitting they chose a flawed piece of equipment or pouring ridiculous sums of money into frantic attempts to fix the equipment.

An example of such a story is the RQ-21 Blackjack small UAV, manufactured by Insitu Inc.  The story is detailed in the 2015 DOT&E Annual Report.

From the DOT&E report, the RQ-21 will be used to provide Marine Corps commanders and units ashore with a dedicated battlefield Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability that will reduce their dependence on higher headquarters for ISR support.

RQ-21 Blackjack

As a reminder, the RQ-21 is a UAV system consisting of five small RQ-21 Blackjack UAVs, ground control stations, launch and recovery equipment, datalinks, and multi-mission payloads

From the DOT&E report, the Marine Corps intends the RQ-21A system to have:

- The reliability to support an operating tempo of 12 hours on station per day at a sustained rate for 30 days and the capability for one surge of 24 hours on-station coverage per day for a 10-day period during any 30-day cycle

- An aircraft with 10 hours endurance, airspeed up to 80 nautical miles per hour, a service ceiling of 15,000 feet density altitude, and an operating radius of 50 nautical miles

- An electro-optical sensor capable of providing the ground control station operator team sufficient visual resolution to support classification of a 1-meter linear sized object from 3,000 feet altitude …

 - An infrared sensor capable of classifying a 3-meter sized linear object from 3,000 feet

OK.  All of that sounds good.  So what’s the problem?  Well, here is DOT&E’s assessment of the RQ-21 performance. 

• The detachment equipped with RQ-21A is not effective in supporting the ground commander’s mission because of an inability to have an unmanned aircraft arrive on station at the designated time and remain on station for the duration of the tasked period. During the IOT&E, the RQ-21A-equipped unit provided coverage during 68 percent of the tasked on-station hours (83.8 of 122.7 hours).

• The electro-optical/infrared sensor provides accurate target locations. While the Capabilities Production Document does not specify a threshold value for sensor point of interest accuracy, Marine Corps guidance indicates that 100 meter accuracy is sufficient to support tactical operations. RQ-21A provides a 90-percent circular error probable target location error of 43.8 meters. Such accuracy is sufficient to support targeting in a conventional linear battlefield, but does not support targeting in a dense urban environment that requires more accurate target locations.

• The RQ-21A sensor does not meet one of the two target classification Key  Performance Parameters (KPPs) established in the Capabilities Production Document. The electro-optical sensor does not provide a 50 percent probability of correct classification for 1-meter linear objects (weapons or tools). The infrared sensor does meet the 50 percent threshold probability for correctly classifying 3-meter objects (vehicle chassis type) by demonstrating 100 percent correct classification.

• The communications relay payload limits the commanders’ tactical flexibility and mission accomplishment. It is constrained to a single frequency in each of the two radios that are set before launch. Once airborne, operators cannot change frequencies.  …

• The recessed, nose-mounted electro-optical/infrared payload requires circular orbits over the top of the target to maintain continuous coverage and positive target identification. The use of offset orbits results in the fuselage blocking the payload field of view for significant periods of time. These offset orbits resulted in auto-track break locks and loss of positive identification of high-value targets. There are orbit shapes that would allow RQ-21A operators to maintain continuous coverage of a target, but the current RQ-21A operating system limits operators to circular orbits.

• The RQ-21A is not operationally suitable. The RQ-21A demonstrated a Mean Flight Hour Between Abort for the System of 15.2 hours versus the 50-hour requirement. Because of aircraft reliability, overall system availability did not meet the 80 percent KPP threshold (demonstrated value equals 66.9 percent).  [Emphasis added]

• The average time between overhaul of the propulsion modules was 48.9 hours, which does not meet the manufacturer’s stated 100-hour capability.

• The RQ-21A Naval Air Training and Operations Standardization manual is missing important information regarding mission computer logic. This lack of information is especially critical during emergencies where operators are unaware of which conditions enable/disable various aspects of aircraft functionality. This lack of system operations information contributed to the loss of an aircraft during the first IOT&E flight.

• Extended logistics delay times and production quality control issues contributed to the system’s poor reliability and availability. In six instances, aircraft spent time in a non-mission capable status while awaiting spare parts. Incorrectly assembled/configured components received from the manufacturer increase the maintenance time to repair or replace components, resulting in reduced mission availability.

• The system has exploitable cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

You caught the part about the RQ-21 being not operationally suitable?  Overall, that’s a pretty poor assessment for a piece of equipment that has reached the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) stage.

IOT&E should be the final, almost rubber stamp, demonstration for a system that has gone through extensive development and had all the bugs worked out of it.  Instead, the RQ-21 doesn’t even come remotely close to being what was desired.  How does this happen?

The military latched onto this without demanding proof of performance.  That’s bad but they made it worse by programming it into the force structure, untested.  Essentially, the military is buying equipment sight unseen, based on nothing more than sales brochures.  We’ve witnessed this phenomenon play out with the LCS.  The Navy committed to 55 LCS before the first was even designed, let alone tested in the form of a prototype and we’ve seen the results.

The RQ-21 might, someday, with enough work, become the system that it’s advertised to be.  At that point, it might make sense to acquire it – but not before.  Worse, the military is pouring money into testing and fixing the system.  Here’s a shocker – that’s the manufacturer’s job!!!  If the manufacturer wants to sell a small UAV then the onus is on them to build a working prototype and thoroughly test it so as to be able to provide actual performance data to the military, not made up sales brochure numbers.  There is no need for the military to fund the manufacturer’s development effort.  Do you have any idea how many small UAV companies and products are available?  If the manufacturer can’t or won’t offer a proven, tested, fully developed prototype then the Navy can simply move on to the next manufacturer.  This idea that the military has to pay for manufacturer’s development programs is insane.  None of us would pay for a manufacturer to develop a toaster.  We’d simply buy one that already works from some other company.

This is yet another example of a procurement system that is badly broken.  It’s one thing (though still unacceptable) when you’re talking about a carrier and there is no alternative source but for a small UAV that is offered by dozens of manufacturers, why are we jumping on the first thing we see, with no proof of performance, and paying the manufacturer to do their own job?

Come on, Navy/Marines, show us just a little bit of common sense.