Plausible Deniability

Plausible deniability is one of the cornerstones of clandestine actions.  It means that you recognize that the targeted foreign government may know you were responsible for an action but you don’t leave them a ‘smoking gun’ of evidence to parade on the world stage.  In fact, you may even want them to know it was you … just as long as they can’t incontrovertibly prove it.  In fact, we did a story along these lines (see, “Mark VI – Gunboat Diplomacy Story”).

 

One of the common comments among naval analysts is the lament that our military forces can’t really do anything effective because then we’d risk …  *horrified whisper* … ESCALATION.  Aaghh!  Sorry, I frightened myself there.  I’ve got to go change into a dry pair of pants.  I’ll be right back.

 

…   …   …   …

 

Okay, I’m back and I’ve stopped shivering with fear.  I can go on now.

 

Is our military really that bound and helpless?  Well, by current policy we certainly are but are there actions we could take if we had a modicum of fortitude?  Let’s consider history as a prelude to answering the question.

 

 

History and Precedent

 

In the Cold War, our submarines routinely violated Soviet territorial waters, tapped communications, lingered just outside (maybe inside??) Soviet harbors, and tightly trailed Soviet subs.  We even stole a Soviet sub!!!!!  Our U2 flights routinely overflew Soviet territory.  If rumors are to be believed, we routinely engaged in assassinations and all manner of skullduggery. And that’s just the stuff we know about!

 

It would seem, then, that we most certainly have used our military aggressively, in the past, during times of ‘peace’.  Precedent exists and the world did not ESCALATE  * aagh!!!!!  sorry, I thought I was ready for that word but it still scares me *  into nuclear war.  So, if we could somehow muster the courage and will, are there any actions we could take, today, that would appreciably benefit our general geopolitical aims and still allow us to maintain plausible deniability?  I think there are! 

 

 

Actions

 

*Warning!* The following may be considered escalatory.  If you are timid and faint of heart, stop now and go sing nursery rhymes until you are relaxed and reassured.

 

Note that I’m not necessarily recommending these actions;  just noting what could be done.

 

Submarines

 

Let’s use our silent service the way they were intended to be used:

 

• Lay some mines around the Russian naval forces operating near Ukraine.  Clearly, the Russian navy has little or no ability to detect or threaten our subs.  They’d never know we were there.  We can publicly claim the Russians hit Ukrainian mines.
• Launch a few torpedoes into Russian ships and, again, publicly suggest the Russians hit Ukrainian mines.
• Launch some Submarine Launched Mobile Mines (SLMM) into NKorean naval ports and sink a few ships … you know, like they sank the SKorean ship.  They’ll never figure out what it was.

 

SEALs

 

Let’s pull our SEALs off their land combat jobs and use them the way they were meant to operate … clandestinely, from the sea:

 

• Sabotage port facilities in the Solomons that the Chinese attempt to use or build.
• Sabotage the illegal Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea.
• Sabotage the Chinese port facilities in Sri Lanka.
• Sabotage Iranian swarm boats and facilities.

 

Surface Navy

 

Let’s use our surface navy for something other than cruise ships:

 

• Shoot down every NKorean test missile and claim that we projected the missile’s course to come perilously close to our ships or civilian shipping and had to shoot them down for safety.  It’s not without precedent since NKorea has shot missiles into Japanese territorial waters.
• Let’s sail large groups into the South China Sea and ‘herd’ Chinese ships away, as they’ve done to us.  Maybe we’ll bump ships and realize that we ought to be building stronger ships!

 

General Military

 

Let’s use our general military:

 

• Initiate electronic warfare against the Russians from international air, water, and friendly territories.  EW is impossible to prove on the world stage.
• Let’s take down drones as other countries have done to us.  We haven’t protested when it’s been done to us so it’s apparently open season on drones.  Let’s join in!
• Let’s buzz Russian ships as close as possible, on a non-stop schedule.  The Russians can’t protest because that’s exactly what they do to us.
• Assemble an air armada and fly into Chinese Air Defense Identification Zones exactly as the Chinese did to Taiwan on 28-Nov-2021.

 

 

Shaping

 

What I’m really suggesting is that we start shaping events in the world instead of reacting to them - usually by cowering.  We all understand the concept of ‘shaping the battlefield’ so why aren’t we doing that?  The world is a battlefield.  We’re at war with China whether we want to acknowledge it or not.  We have enemies in Iran, Russia, and NKorea who are actively working against us.  So why aren’t we using our military to shape events in our favor?

 

 

Conclusion

 

While I’m not necessarily recommending the actions described herein, neither am I recommending against them.  I’ll leave the political aspect for other blogs.  What I am suggesting is that by purely reacting – invariably with appeasement ! – to events instead of shaping them, we’ve allowed our enemies to shape the battlefield and we’ve removed a useful and effective tool from our tool box.  We’ve lost the mindset to even consider plausibly deniable actions and that is a mistake.  We have a navy and yet we’re not using it to any positive effect while allowing it to physically degrade, shrink in size, and become hollow.  We need to relearn plausible deniability.

 

DASH ASW Drone

Note: This post was inspired by an Anonymous reader.  I'd like to give him more credit but that's all the information I have on him.  Regardless, thanks for the idea!

The Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) was an early attempt at a long range, remote control, anti-submarine weapon delivery platform that could operate from small surface vessels and act as a standoff weapon.  It was produced in the 1960’s with 755 being produced, according to Wikipedia.

An extensive and excellent history of the DASH drone is presented in reference (4) below.

DASH - Note Co-Axial Rotors

DASH was part of the larger Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) effort that was initiated in response to the growing Soviet submarine threat.  FRAM allowed WWII vintage destroyers to be updated to a point where they could be effective against the latest submarines of the time.

The DASH drone was around 13 ft long with a 20 ft diameter co-axial rotor and weighed around 1100 lbs.  Cruising speed was around 50 kts.  Operating range was around 22 miles which was limited by the control ship’s radar horizon.  Take off and landing control was performed by a deck level control station with post-launch operational control being transferred to another operator in the Combat Information Center (CIC).  The drone could carry one Mk46 or two Mk44 torpedoes.  Until late in the program, control was blind with the CIC operator using only radar for situational awareness.  Later, a TV camera was added to the drone.

DASH Launch/Land Control Station

The drone was designed to be cheap and expendable.

Since it was expendable, DASH used off-the-shelf industrial electronics with no back-ups. The controls were multi-channel analog FM. Over 80% of operational aircraft losses were traced to single-point failures of the electronics. A total of 10% of the losses were from pilot errors, and only 10% of the losses were from engine or airframe failures. (1)

According to Wikipedia, half the Navy’s drones were lost at sea.

Beginning in 1965, some drones were adapted for reconnaissance work (SNOOPY missions)  and gun spotting with the addition of real time video, cameras, telemetry, and transponders.(4)  Loiter time was around an hour which offered plenty of time for the associated destroyer to work its target.

Some drones were adapted for ground attack with 2.75” rocket pods being mounted and used in Vietnam (2)

Later, as the drones were being phased out, some were adapted for use as target drones for live fire exercises.(3)

The program was cancelled and the drones withdrawn from service by the mid-1970s. 

By late 1969, DASH began to be removed from FRAM destroyers as they returned to their home ports for overhaul work. On the destroyer, USS CHEVALIER (DD-805), for example, the DASH hangar was converted into a "nifty looking" crews lounge with fake wood paneling and a suspended ceiling covering the overhead florescent lights. The only problem with this installation was that it was installed with pop-rivets. The first time CHEVALIER fired its after 5 inch guns, the entire hangar lounge was destroyed when the ceiling crashed down and most of the paneling fell off! The DASH hangar was later used to simply store all the stuff the crew bought overseas. (4)

A few interesting aspects of the DASH program are discussed below.

Standoff – The DASH drone was the early equivalent of the ASROC that we use today to provide a standoff ASW weapon.  The drones were also a lead in to the ubiquitous ASW helicopters we now use.  Interestingly, DASH’s range of 22 miles still far exceeds the range of the current ASROC which Wikipedia cites as 6 miles.

Cheap and Expendable – One of the distinguishing characteristics of the DASH drone was that it was cheap which allowed it to be obtained in large numbers and made it expendable.  This is a lesson we consistently forget, today.

Technology – DASH was new technology, for its time, and the result was a lot of failures (half the drones being lost).  This is to be expected from any new technology.  In fact, high failure rates are a characteristic of any new technology.  What stood out about this new technology implementation was that, as mentioned above, it was cheap.  This allowed the technology to be explored and slowly refined without incurring massive budget hits.  Contrast this with the LCS or F-35 or Zumwalt or almost any recent Navy program where the new technology was hideously expensive and production commitments were made before any prototype was built or, indeed, any design/construction plans were completed.

Speaking of prototypes, the DASH was initially prototyped using a modified existing Gyrodyne RON-1 Rotorcycle in early 1958.  By the end of 1958, a contract was awarded for the production of 12 additional prototypes which were used for testing in 1960.  Evaluations led to additional modifications which became the production version of DASH, the QH-50C, and production began in 1963.  We see, then, the program was executed responsibly with prototypes and testing prior to final design and production – the opposite of how the Navy executes programs today!

DASH with Torpedoes

Focus – The DASH program was also an example of focus.  DASH was designed and built to perform one task and only one task: deliver torpedoes.  This kept the cost low and the design simple which allowed large numbers of drones to be purchased, made losses acceptable, and sped up implementation of the program.  Contrast that with today’s obsession with making every asset a do-everything, wonder machine which, inevitably, winds up over budget and behind schedule.  There is a valuable lesson (some would call it common sense!), here, about focus and restraint. 



Summary - Unfortunately, DASH was just slightly ahead of its time.  The technology, such as remote telemetry, video, electronics, etc. was not yet advanced enough to allow the drone to realize its full potential.  The lack of situational awareness due to lack of sensors made the unit very difficult to operate.  Still, DASH provided valuable institutional experience for the Navy with both helicopters for ASW and remote controlled aircraft.  Ironically, many naval observers today are calling for unmanned UAVs to perform ASW chores such as weapons or sonobuoy delivery without realizing that we had this capability over fifty years ago!

_________________________________

(1)Wikipedia, “Gyrodyne QH-50 DASH”, retrieved 11-Jul-2020,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyrodyne_QH-50_DASH

(2)https://www.facebook.com/DASH.Weapon.System/photos/a.635226203225109/1766978220049896/?type=3&theater

(3)http://americanhelicopter.museum/aircraft/gyrodyne-qh-50c-drone-dsn-3

(4)http://gyrodynehelicopters.com/dash_history.htm

Blind Man's Bluff

ComNavOps is often critical of Navy actions and with incredibly good reason.  However, because I critically analyze the Navy and the results of that analysis are so often bad, it’s easy for readers to lose sight of the positives – and there are some! – about the Navy.  Here’s one such positive aspect.

For those of us who grew up during the Cold War against the Soviets, we constantly heard rumors about the activities of the US submarine fleet.  The eventual publication of the book, “Blind Man’s Bluff”, by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew not only confirmed those rumors but detailed an incredible range of exploits far beyond anything imagined by rumors.  US subs routinely trailed Soviet subs undetected (to the best of our knowledge), skulked just outside (and sometimes inside!) Soviet ports and territorial waters, tapped underwater communications cables, and much more.

If you haven’t read the book, do yourself a favor and get a copy. (1)

Presumably, these same types of activities are occurring today.  While I can’t prove they’re happening, I assume that we’re trailing Chinese subs, mapping the underwater features of the East and South China Seas, trailing Chinese surface ships, collecting data and acoustic signatures on new sub and ship classes, locating Chinese listening arrays, collecting signals intelligence, and noting Chinese submarine operating procedures.  In short, I assume we’re prepping the battlefield and, given the supposed quality of our subs versus the presumed quality of Chinese countermeasures and detection capabilities, doing so largely undetected.

The Virginia class submarines offer a significant advantage.  Despite foreign claims, no other country can match the combination of silent operations and sophisticated sensors that a Virginia has.  Conventional powered subs (SSK) are quiet and hard to detect but the overall package that is the Virginia class is unmatched and this advantage will continue for many years to come.  I assume we’re using this period of advantage to prepare for war and to establish even more advantages in operations, tactics, signature collections, etc.

In combination with submarine activities, it is known that we are operating ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS) equipped with surveillance towed-array sensor systems (SURTASS).  These ships are operating in the Pacific, collecting data on Chinese ships and subs, mapping the underwater arena, establishing acoustic databases, etc.

When war comes, the US will hold a significant undersea advantage.

_____________________________

(1)Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff:  The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage, PublicAffairs 2008, ISBN-13 9781586486785

Near Miss

The USNI website reports a near miss flight incident between an Air Force RC-135 and a Russian Su-27 (1).

"The American aircraft was flying in international airspace when it encountered a Russian Su-27 fighter over the Sea of Okhotsk. The Air Force plane took evasive maneuvers to avoid hitting the Russian jet, which reportedly came within 100 feet of the U.S. aircraft.

Pentagon officials have characterized the incident as a blatant attempt to disrupt or interfere with U.S. operations in the area ..."

No mention is made of any supporting combat platform providing assistance to the Air Force plane.

You'll recall that we recently discussed the hazards associated with surveillance flights and passages for unarmed ships and planes and the need to provide immediate armed support to avoid another EP-3 or Pueblo incident (see, “Independent Operations”).  The post was directed at operations near China but Russia, clearly, must now be included in the discussion.

We seem determined not learn any lessons about protecting and supporting our high value assets.

(1) http://news.usni.org/2014/06/04/pentagon-russian-flanker-near-miss-u-s-air-force-jet#more-7974