Destroyer Escorts (DE), or Frigates (FF/FFG), as they’re now
known, have an interesting developmental history that illustrates many of the
problems we’re dealing with today.
The modern DE, as we know it, came to be in WWII. There are earlier possible predecessors but,
for our purposes, we’ll say WWII was the starting point, as typified by the
Buckley class. The type continued to
evolve throughout the war and the immediate post-war, eventually developing
into missile and helicopter versions, changing names from destroyer escort to
frigate and leading, ultimately, to the current Constellation class frigate.
In its early guise, the outstanding characteristics of the
DE were:
Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
Cheap cost and large numbers
Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was
submarines
As post-war development took place, the ships grew steadily
larger and eventually lost their ASW focus, becoming more multi-function (not a
good thing!), expensive, and less numerous.
Consider the steady increase in size, as shown in the table
below and the scaled silhouette drawings.
|
Destroyer Escort Size Growth
|
|
Class
|
Length, ft
|
|
Buckley
|
306
|
|
Dealey
|
314
|
|
Garcia
|
414
|
|
Knox
|
438
|
|
Perry
|
453
|
|
Constellation
|
496
|
Let’s take a look at several representative destroyer escort
classes.
Buckley – This is the classic destroyer escort of
WWII. Weapons included 3x 3” guns,
Hedgehog, 200x depth charges, 2x stern depth charge rails, 3x 21” torpedoes and
assorted 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.
Sensors included Type 128D or Type 144 sonar in retractable dome. The noteworthy aspect of this class was its
ASW focus which set the pattern for subsequent DE classes. This was a focused, efficient, cheap vessel
whose cost allowed procurement in large numbers with around 150 being
built. The class had a clear primary
purpose and contained nothing that did not directly contribute to that purpose. The ship was as small as it could be,
consistent with its function.
In this class, we see all the characteristics of an
excellent ship: small as possible,
heavily armed, single function, cheap, simple and easy to build, and numerous.
Dealey – This was the first post-WWII DE. Weapons included 4x 3” guns in two twin
mounts, RUR-4 Weapon Alpha anti-submarine rocket launcher, 2x ASW triple
torpedo launchers, 2x K-gun depth charge launchers, and 1x stern depth charge
rails. Sensors included the SQS-4 low
frequency sonar. USS Willis, DE-1027,
operated a variable depth sonar from the stern.
The class was later modified for DASH operations. The class was still focused on ASW but one
can already see the beginnings of a decrease in ASW weaponry with smaller,
lighter torpedoes and fewer depth charges and rails/launchers
Garcia – These ships typified the major jump in size that
occurred due, primarily, to the incorporation of an aviation component (flight
deck, helo, hangar). Weapons included 2×
5 in guns, 1× 8-tube ASROC Mk16 launcher
(16 missiles), 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes, and 2× MK 37 stern
mounted fixed torpedo tubes which were later removed. Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar. The ship operated the SeaSprite helo.
This class is an example of the beginnings of a fascination
with technology over firepower and combat effectiveness as evidenced by an
emphasis on aviation as the primary ASW tool rather than up close, volume
oriented ASW firepower (depth charges and the like).
The use of 5” guns illustrates additional loss of focus and
the movement away from a single, primary function towards a multi-function
philosophy.
Knox – This class further emphasizes the movement
away from a strict focus on ASW and towards a broader, ocean escort role. Weapons include 1× 5 in gun, 1× Mk16
8–cell ASROC launcher,
and 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes.
Again, the on-board ASW weapons have been decreased in favor of the
helo. Sensors included the SQS-26 bow
sonar and SQR-18 towed array. The ship
operated the SeaSprite helo.
Perry – This is where the destroyer escort concept
really went off the rails as the focus shifted to ocean escort and anti-air
although ASW was still a mission.
However, the Perry’s SQS-56 sonar was considered only marginally capable
although the SQR-19 towed array was useful.
This class also saw the near abandonment of ship-based ASW in favor of helo-based
ASW with the ship acting as a helo-host rather than an active ASW combatant.
Constellation – This class doesn’t even pretend to be
ASW-focused. The ship lacks even a
VL-ASROC. It is a mini-Burke, pure and
simple, trying to be all things and being good at none. This is a class without a mission other than
to be a cheaper Burke and not be a failure (see, “Constellation
Class Frigate - Success or Just Not Failure?”).
From the brief history and description of the DE classes, we
clearly see that the initial primary characteristics of a destroyer escort,
Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
Cheap cost and large numbers
Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines
were altered, over time, to,
Focus
The WWII DE was supremely focused on one task and one task
alone. It was sized and equipped for
that one task and nothing else. This
resulted in the minimum possible construction cost/time and, hence, the maximum
number of ships. We’ve lost that over
the years. Today’s destroyer escorts –
which we now call frigates – are multi-focused (multi-functional) which has
drastically driven up size and cost, diluted ASW weapons, and drastically
decreased the number of ships we can afford.
Helo-centric ASW
We need to address one of the DE trends and that is the
adoption of helos as replacements for shipboard ASW. When they’re in the air and over a contact,
helos are quite effective and useful.
The problem is that helos are only sporadically available. Helos are good for around two 3-hour missions
per day. Even with two helos per ship
(an optimistic number) that provides only 12 hours of airborne coverage per day
and even that will be sporadic in the sense that in combat there will be many
false contacts that will have to be pursued.
Thus, the helo won’t be flying around searching broad areas, as so many
people envision. Instead, they’ll be
tied to one contact location for an extended period, trying to prove/disprove a
suspected contact. That’s point coverage,
not broad area searching. Thus, by
making helos the focus of our ASW effort, we’ve effectively reduced our
coverage area.
Cost/Numbers
Destroyer escorts have, historically, been effective not
because they were individually supremely effective ASW machines but because
they were ubiquitous. They were
effective due to numbers! Their presence
forced submarines to alter course, miss intercepts, and abort attacks. As the type has grown in size, complexity,
and cost, the numbers have been reduced to the point that their main mode of
effectiveness, a ubiquitous presence, is no longer viable. Our entire supposed ASW force will now
consist of 20 Constellations. That’s not
even remotely enough to be effective.
The Navy can claim that Burkes are ASW-capable but they’re not. They don’t train for it and no sane commander
is going to risk a $2B-$3B ship playing tag with a submarine.
Summary
By foolishly trying to make every ship a multi-function,
do-everything, single-handed war-winning, mega-machine, we’ve lost all the
positive attributes of the type. We’ve
taken a ship that was exquisitely optimized for its role and morphed it into a
ship that has no defined role (or, maybe, every role!).
Consider the Constellation.
We clearly do not have a CONOPS for the class other than ‘do everything’
which is another way of saying ‘do nothing well’.
The DE development history also clearly shows the
relationship between size/cost and numbers.
We’ve gone from 150 Buckleys, at 306 ft long, to 20 Constellations, at
496 ft long. Size equals reduced
numbers. It can’t be stated any plainer
than that. A 496 ft long frigate is an
abomination and makes a mockery of the type’s traditional role while
simultaneously reducing, nearly to the point of extinction, the numbers of ASW
ships in the fleet.
