Japanese Minesweepers

A few comments in recent posts have suggested that the US Navy buy minesweeper ships from foreign navies/yards.  Japan has one of the more extensive fleets of MCM vessels so let’s take a look at Japan’s minesweepers as a good example of a possible MCM vessel for the US Navy.
 
Japan has MCM vessels of various types, size, and function.  We’ll look at the Awaji class mine countermeasures ship.  The Awaji is classified as a mine sweeper as opposed to the larger mine warfare mother ships that Japan also operates.
 

Awaji Class Minesweeper

As a brief summary, the Awaji class has a displacement of 690 tons, a length of 219 ft, a width of 36 ft, and is powered by 2x 2,200 hp diesel engines.  Top speed is 14 kt.  Crew size is around 50.  The hull is a composite fiber-reinforced plastic for weight and magnetic signature reduction.  Service life is 30 years.[1]
 
The ship has LIDAR mine detection systems that use reflected light to detect underwater mines.  Note, however, that this is similar to the ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) the U.S. Navy attempted to develop for the LCS MCM module and which has encountered significant problems and limitations in capability.
 
A variable depth sonar (VDS) system is also used to detect mines.  It also has a Remus 600 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), known as OZZ-4 to detect deeper mines.
 
For mine destruction, the ship has the Mitsui expendable mine disposal system (EMDS) which is fiber optic cable controlled and uses a camera for detection and identification before blowing up itself and the mine. Surface mines can also be engaged with a remote control 20 mm weapon station.
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that this is not a minesweeper in any sense of the word but, rather, a one-at-a-time mine hunting/clearance vessel.  Of course, this means that the clearance rate is incredibly slow and is utterly unsuited for dynamic combat operations. 
 
Unfortunately, the one-at-a-time mine clearance approach has been adopted by all Western navies with only an occasional and minor nod to actual sweeping operations.  Again, this approach is useless in combat is reflective of the West’s fixation on unmanned and crippling dependence on technology as the solution to the brutal, hard aspects of warfare.
 
We see, once again, that foreign MCM assets offer no value to the US Navy although they might be of use to Coast Guard ships charged with harbor defense.  This is not to say that glacially slow mine hunting is not without its uses for countries that are only concerned with limited territorial waters but for a global US Navy that must be able to fight anywhere and ensure vast areas are free of mines, mine hunting is a non-starter.
 
 
 
_______________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Japan commissions fourth Awaji-class minesweeper”, Kosuke Takahashi, 12-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/japan-commissions-fourth-awaji-class-minesweeper/

Just Make a Decision

Naval News website reports that Japan is interested in co-producing SM-6 Standard missiles. 
 

Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani has announced that Tokyo proposed joint production of the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) ship-to-air missile during his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on March 30.[1]

Japan has previously agreed, to some nebulous extent, to co-produce AMRAAM and PAC-3 missiles although no action appears to have come of that, yet.
 

… the U.S. and Japan in Tokyo in July 2024, both governments had already agreed to “pursue mutually beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of AMRAAM and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE).
 
Nakatani’s [Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani] proposal this time will not only include joint production of AMRAAM and PAC-3 MSE missiles, which have been under consideration since the previous Joe Biden administration, but also include the long-range ship-to-air missile SM-6 … [1]

What is the US reaction/response?
 

… the U.S. side responded, by saying “We would like to continue to discuss the joint production of missiles that are mutually beneficial for both Japan and the United States, including the SM-6, as well as AMRAAM, and PAC3 that we have discussed so far, even at an administrative level. We understand the importance, so we would like to deepen the discussion at the administrative level in the future.”[1]

Good grief.  What a bunch of wishy washy nonsense.  Make a decision, already.  Endless studies and discussions benefit no one.  This is what’s wrong with modern government.  They’re incapable of acting, instead defaulting to never ending commissions, studies, reports, and discussions.  A major reason China is outproducing us their ability to make a rapid decision and then get about implementing it.  We, in the meantime, continue to study the issues to death.
 
I don’t have all the details on this particular issue but it certainly seems like a win-win proposition.  As the Ukraine war has demonstrated, we lack the weapon production capacity to meet our needs.  If Japan can help fill that need, where’s the downside?
 
Do it or don’t do it but make a damn decision!
 
 
 
_________________________________

 
[1]Naval News website, “Japan proposes co-production of SM-6 missiles to the U.S.”, Kosuke Takahashi, 3-Apr-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/japan-proposes-co-production-of-sm-6-missiles-to-the-u-s/

Yokosuka Pearl Harbor

The US Navy has, for several decades, maintained a permanently forward deployed carrier at Yokosuka, Japan.  Here’s the sequence of carriers that have been based at Yokosuka:
 
1973  Midway
1991  Independence
1998  Kitty Hawk
2008  Washington
2015  Reagan
2024  Washington
 
 
To have maintained a carrier at Yokosuka for so many decades, the Navy must perceive some value in it.  What is that value?  I ask because I’m not seeing it.  Let’s examine some possible benefits and risks.
 
 
Deterrence
 
The obvious potential benefit – and the one that I’m sure the Navy believes - is deterrence of the Chinese.  In general terms, we’ve discredited forward presence as a deterrent.  Let’s look at the history of China’s actions over the last several decades and see whether deterrence has worked.  Note, this is attempting to prove a negative which is not possible so we’ll try to discern a pattern to see whether we’re succeeding at deterring China.  Consider the following Chinese actions:
 

• China has annexed every unclaimed or disputed island/reef in the East and South China Seas.
• China has built and militarized several artificial islands, illegally and in violation of the UNCLOS treaty of which they are a signatory.
• China forced down and seized a US EP-3 surveillance aircraft in international airspace.  They then held the aircraft and crew, stripped the aircraft of equipment, and dismantled the aircraft before eventually releasing the crew.
• China seized a US underwater drone vehicle.
• China has routinely violated Philippine and Vietnam territorial waters.
• Chinese fishing fleets have routinely encroached on the territorial waters of various countries.
• China has routinely threatened Taiwan and violated its territory and air defense zones.
• China has interfered with US military operations in international waters (McCain towed array incident near Subic Bay, Philippines, for example).

 
Does this sound like we’ve deterred China?  Does this sound like a pattern of deterrence?  Not in the least!  It sounds like a pattern of unrestrained, non-kinetic conquest!
 
Some of you are going to attempt to claim the fact that China hasn’t initiated a war demonstrates that deterrence must be working.  Of course, there is absolutely no indication that China had any intention of going to war with the US, prior to now.  You can’t deter someone from doing something they weren’t going to do anyway. 
 
Even now, why would China want to go to war with the US?  They’re getting everything they want without needing a war!  They’ve annexed and fortified the entire East and South China Seas.  For all practical purposes, they’ve kicked us out of the E/S China Seas.  They’re expanding into the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South America, and Cuba.  They’re in the process of annexing the Philippines through a combination of emigration, intimidation, and foreign assistance.  They’re isolating Taiwan and working to encircle Japan.  They’re attempting to intimidate Australia and gain control of various strategic resources via financial and business manipulations.  And the list goes on and on.
 
They don’t need or want a war when they can get everything they want thanks to our policy of appeasement.
 
Is a single carrier in Japan deterring China from anything?  No.
 

USS Reagan at Yokosuka

 

Combat
 
Another potential benefit is combat.  Can a single carrier conduct initial, forward, combat operations to disrupt Chinese operations and buy time for a more forceful US response?
 
Unfortunately, as we’ve repeatedly proven, a single carrier is not an effective combat force.  It’s a ship waiting to be sunk.  A single carrier is incapable of effective self-defense let alone able to simultaneously mount any kind of useful offense.  A single carrier serves no purpose other than to provide China with a live fire, carrier SINKEX.  So, if a single carrier is not survivable in combat and serves no useful combat purpose … why are we maintaining one there?
 
 
 
Risk
 
Okay, so a Japan-based carrier offers no benefits but what’s the harm?  Why do we care whether there’s a carrier in Japan?  The answer is that we care because of the concomitant risk of losing that carrier.
 
There are only a couple of possibilities for a Japan-based carrier at the start of a war with China:
 

• The carrier is sunk in the first hour of the war.  China is not going to pass up a free sinking of a carrier.
• Japan opts to remain neutral and the carrier is interned for the duration.

 
Neither of those options provides any useful combat capability and both result in the loss of the carrier.  The inescapable conclusion is that a Japan-based carrier is a certain loss in a war with China.  Is the loss of a hideously expensive carrier and air wing for no positive return really what we want?  I would hope not!
 
A carrier in Japan is a ‘Pearl Harbor’ waiting to happen.  You might be tempted to say that we’ll simply pull the carrier back to the US if war seems likely.  That’s possible but history suggests that’s unlikely.  We had ample warning about the actual Pearl Harbor and opted to do nothing.  China is all but telling us they’re just about ready to initiate the invasion of Taiwan and we haven’t pulled our carrier out of danger.  History – and our current inactions – strongly indicate that our carrier will still be sitting, docked in Japan, when war starts.
 
 
Summary
 
So, if a single Japan-based carrier isn’t providing any discernible deterrent effect, isn’t survivable in combat, can’t contribute any useful offense, and is certain to be ‘Pearl Harbored’ in the first hour of a war  …  why do we have a carrier there?  There are two answers:
 

1. Inertia – we’ve always had one there so we’ll continue to do so.
2. Stupidity – our so-called professional warriors are too stupid to understand the situation and change it.  As we’ve repeatedly documented on this blog, the extent of stupidity by Navy leadership is staggering and this is yet another example.

 
The conclusion is obvious – we need to end the Japan-based, forward deployment of a carrier and bring the carrier back home.

Be Careful What You Sign

Japan has protested the passage of a Chinese ship through Japan’s territorial waters. 

 

The [Chinese] Shupang-class survey ship was sighted sailing northeast through Japan’s contiguous zone west of Gaja Island and entered Japan’s territorial waters southwest of Kuchinoerabu Island at 12:10 a.m. local time on Wednesday. The ship departed Japan’s territorial waters after three hours of operating near Yakushima Island and sailed southeast. According to Japanese officials, the transit was the fourth intrusion of a foreign warship this year, marking a record high.

 

Japan has lodged a diplomatic protest over the incident.[1]

 

The only problem is that passage is legal according to international treaty as specified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which Japan is a signatory, having ratified the treaty 20-Jun-1996.

 

The right of innocent passage is described in the UNCLOS agreement in Part 2, Section 3., Articles 17-32.  It describes the right of another country’s ship to pass through the territorial waters of a signatory under certain conditions and with certain constraints on what kind of actions the passing ship can engage in during the passage.

 

Whether the Chinese ship obeyed all the restrictions was not publicly disclosed by Japan.  I suspect the Chinese ship did obey the requirements or else Japan would, presumably, have loudly proclaimed the violations.  If the Chinese ship met the passage requirements then Japan has no legal basis for protest.

 

The larger point is that the right of innocent passage does exist and Japan agreed to the legal process.  If Japan didn’t want foreign ships in its waters, it shouldn’t have signed the treaty.  The lesson is, be careful what you sign. 

 

This is a variation of, be careful what you wish for.  There are always unforeseen consequences.  So many treaties the US signs seem to limit us more than the other party.

 

On a related note, the US has never ratified the UNCLOS treaty and is not bound by it although we tend to observe its requirements.

 

On a further related note, despite being a signatory, China has violated the UNCLOS treaty in multiple instances and in multiple ways, the most famous of which is ignoring an UNCLOS tribunal ruling, in a dispute between China and the Philippines, that ruled in favor of Philippines and found Chinese actions and claims in the South China Sea to be unfounded and illegal.

 

This should serve as a warning to the US not to ratify the treaty since China does not feel bound to obey it.  Ratification would serve only to limit the US while China freely ignores the treaty. 

 

 

_____________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Tokyo Protests Chinese Surveillance Ship Transit in Territorial Waters, Japan Prepares for Fleet Review”, Dzirhan Mahadzir, 4-Nov-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/11/04/tokyo-protests-chinese-surveillance-ship-transit-in-territorial-waters-japan-prepares-for-fleet-review

Washington Versus Kirishima Lessons

The night engagement between the Japanese battleship Kirishima and the US battleship Washington was one of only two battleship vs. battleship engagements in the WWII Pacific fighting.  The end result was the sinking of Kirishima by the Washington.  There are a host of lessons for us, today.  Let’s take a look.

 

There are many descriptions of the battle available in books, on the Internet, and in the public domain.  A comprehensive description of the entire battle is available on line [2] so I’ll not cover it in detail, here.

 

 

USS Washington

US Order of Battle

 

Battleship Force, Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr.

 

Washington (Capt.  Glen Davis), BB

South Dakota (Capt. Thomas Gatch), BB

 

Destroyer Screen, Cdr. Thomas Fraser

 

Walke, DD

Benham, DD

Preston, DD

Gwin, DD

 

 

Japanese Order of Battle

 

Japanese Forces Emergency Bombardment Force

Bombardment Unit, VAdm Kondo Nobutake

 

Atago, CA

Takao, CA

Kirishima, BB

Nagara, CL

Ikazuchi, DD

Samidare, DD

 

Direct Escort Unit RAdm Tamotsu Takama

 

Asagumo, DD

Shirayuki, DD

Hatsuyuki, DD

Teruzuki, DD

 

Sweeping Unit RAdm Shintaro Hashimoto

 

Sendai, CL

Ayanami, DD

Shikinami, DD

Uranami, DD

 

 

Following are some very brief battle highlights and notes.  The times listed are taken from Reference 2, however, it should be noted that I have other sources that list different times for the same events.  Other than placing the events in the proper sequence, the exact times are irrelevant so this is not an issue. 

• The US destroyers were arranged in a line ahead formation, 5000 yds ahead of the two battleships which were, themselves, separated by 2000 yds.
• South Dakota obtains first radar contact at 0008 hrs, 18,300 yds distant.
• Washington obtains first radar contact at 0000 hrs, 19,600 yds distant.
• Washington opens fire at 0016 hr
• South Dakota opens fire at 0017 hr
• Walke, at 0018 hr, leading the destroyer line, veers out of line, unordered and without communicating, and engages various targets before being quickly sunk
• Benham, second in line, nearly ran over Walke, was torpedoed and knocked out of action; survived
• Preston, third in line, engaged various targets but was hit several times and abandoned ship at 0033 hr
• Gwin, fourth and last in line, engages various targets and is ordered to withdraw at 0045 hr by Lee
• Washington passes burning Preston at 0035 hr keeping on dark side
• South Dakota passes on the light side of the burning destroyers and is illuminated and taken under fire at 0049 hr
• South Dakota loses track of Washington around 0056 hr
• Washington begins engagement with Kirishima at 0100 hr
• South Dakota loses radio aerials around 0102 hr;  unable to co-ordinate with Washington and loses track of Washington
• Washington loses track of South Dakota around 0117 hr and passes up many possible targets due to fear of friendly fire

 

 Hits - The best analysis shows the Kirishima having suffered 20x 16” hits and 17x 5” hits.[1]

 

 

 

Lessons

 

Target Identification and IFF.  The common theme in the battle (and war in general !) is uncertainty.  Many shots were passed up due to uncertainty about target identification.  There are multiple ways to deal with identification during battle but all depend on experience, procedures, and doctrine which can only come from repeated, realistic exercises where confusion [intentionally] reigns.

 

Doctrine can be a major aid to identification.  If everyone knows what everyone else will do and where everyone else will be, identification (or non-identification) becomes easier.  For example, if doctrine had dictated that the escorting destroyers, upon contact, should fire torpedoes and then immediately head away from the enemy on a perpendicular course, thus clearing the way for the battleships to fire without worry about friendly fire or misidentification, the battle would have been simpler and, likely, more successful.

 

 

Engagement Time. 

 

Demonstrating the brevity of engagement time, here is Washington’s elapsed time (min:sec) sequence of fire versus Kirishima.

 

2:39 ; 39x 16” (equivalent of 4-1/3 complete salvoes)

1:30  check fire

2:45 ; 36x 16” (equivalent of 4 complete salvoes)

 

Total engagement time = 5:24 ; 75x 16”, 107x 5”

 

Washington’s main battery fire was rapid for the initial two minutes thirty nine seconds, firing thirty nine 16-inch projectiles.  Main battery fire was checked for one minute thirty seconds based on an erroneous report that the target had been sunk.  Fire was resumed for two minutes forty five seconds, firing thirty six 16-inch projectiles. 

 

The total engagement time was a mere 5:24 during which Washington fired seventy five main caliber rounds and 107 5-inch AA common rounds between 0100 hr and 0107 hr.

 

As we demonstrated in the missile attack analysis post (see, “Missile Attack Analysis”), engagements, regardless of weapon or platform speed, tend to be very short.  The Washington’s engagement with Kirishima lasted a grand total of 5:24 (only 6:54 even with the check fire period).  We need to recognize this fact of naval combat and rethink our combat methodology.  We need to ensure that we can ‘cram’ the maximum offensive firepower into the shortest possible time.  As I have so often pointed out, having ten thousand VLS cells does no good for an 87 second engagement.  We also need to be prepared to exert maximum effective defensive firepower in the shortest possible time.  In other words, we need systems that can operate effectively in an utterly chaotic, extremely brief period.  Our current obsessive desire to obtain complete information and absolute target surety is antithetical to the reality of combat.

 

Naval weapons are so powerful and so concentrated in usage that either an attack will be quickly defeated or it will quickly succeed and the target will be destroyed.  The days of long, drawn out engagements with continuous attacks are likely over if for no other reason than the lack of offensive weapon inventories of any significant size.  A US ship has, at best, around 8 anti-ship missiles without counting Standard missiles that aren’t really anti-ship weapons.  Thus, US ships cannot sustain an attack even if they wanted to.

 

The brevity of engagement was also demonstrated by the fate of the American destroyers.  The US destroyers were all sunk or put out of action in a matter minutes.

 

In ten minutes of furious action, Task Force 64’s destroyers were out of the fight.[3]

 

 

Doctrine/Tactics/Training.  None of the US ships had ever worked or trained together and they had no doctrine to fall back on.

 

The admiral was concerned about his destroyers.  They had been chosen almost randomly from TF 16’s screen because they had the most fuel remaining in their bunkers;  no two were of the same class, no two of the same division, and they had never operated together before. … The same could be said of the battleships.  Although both were administratively part of BatDiv 6, until this operation they had never worked together, a fact that was to have its consequences.[3]

 

All reports mention losing targets as they passed into the visual shadow of surrounding islands.  This illustrates the need to exercise under every conceivable condition so as to learn how to deal with atypical situations and conditions.  In contrast, the Navy’s current exercises are all identical, set-piece, scripted works that are conducted under perfect conditions (for safety).  We must accept the risk of exercises under poor and uncontrolled conditions because those are the conditions under which we’ll fight real battles.

 

Pre-WWII live fire night battle exercises would have revealed that the blindingly bright, flashing powder used by the US offered perfect aim points for the Japanese.  In contrast, the Japanese used flashless powder which provided very little illumination and aim points.  There’s just no getting around it – you absolutely must train for every conceivable – and inconceivable – situation.

 

South Dakota, in a display of pure ignorance of combat conditions, passed the burning US destroyers on the lit side, thereby silhouetting itself against the flames and providing the Japanese with perfect aiming.  This was utter lack of tactical training.

 

South Dakota’s Number 3 main turret set the ship’s Kingfisher scout planes on fire, offering the Japanese yet another aim point.  Again, live fire exercises would, presumably, have revealed this vulnerability.

 

Poor training and tactics caused South Dakota to receive 42 hits of various calibers, 38 dead, an 60 wounded.

 

 

Gunnery.  RAdm. Lee’s passion for gunnery excellence was renowned aboard the Washington.  He established a ‘gun club’ of officers who lived and breathed gunnery.[3, p.81]  They understood that there was no point to Washington’s existence if the ship and crew could not hit what they were aiming at.  Live fire drills of some type occurred daily.

 

In contrast, most ships in the Navy today average less than one live fire exercise per year.  Many crew come and go without ever experiencing a live fire event.

 

 

Commander’s Intent.  The Washington officers were thoroughly briefed.

 

After dinner in the wardroom, all officers not on watch were asked to remain, and there followed a detailed briefing by Ching Lee and Glenn Davis on the probably events of the morrow.  … Everything was addressed, from battle formations to pyrotechnics, damage control, gunnery, navigation, and feeding the men at general quarters.[3]

 

For the Washington’s crew, everything was understood.  The same could not be said for the rest of the ships in the task force.

 

 

Communications.  Washington received reconnaissance reports from PT boats which had spotted the Japanese force, however, the reports were coded using a newer code that Washington did not have.  Thus, RAdm. Lee was unable to decipher or take advantage of the PT boat reports.

 

South Dakota lost all her radio aerials and was out of communication with Washington and RAdm. Lee.  This graphically demonstrates that the wise commander will make every effort to eliminate the need for communications during a battle.  Communications, even when successful, are often (usually?) subject to confusion and misinterpretation (for example, “The world wonders”, from Leyte Gulf ).  The best communication is no communication but that requires extensive drills and doctrine.

 

 

Inevitable Confusion.  As the American task force entered Ironbottom Sound, each ship’s magnetic compasses began spinning wildly, the result of the many wrecks littering the ocean floor.[3, p.116]  The Task Force was able to maintain dead reckoning until the effect faded away.

 

Early in the engagement, Washington believed that enemy land based gun emplacements had opened fire on them and the task force replied with 5” gunfire directed at the shoreline.  However, there were no land based guns.  The fire was from Japanese destroyers.

Confusion in battle is not to be feared.  It is to be accepted and embraced.  Just as the US Army once owned the night, we need to own the confusion of battle and master it by training with confusion as an intentional, integral part of every exercise we do.  We need to become comfortable with confusion.

 

 

Technology Dependency and Failures.  The Task Force had a theoretical radar advantage over the Japanese, however, it was negated by the surroundings and fear of friendly fire.

 

The closely confined waters of Ironbottom Sound had partially negated TF 64’s radar advantage … It was difficult to separate the radar echoes between ships and the land mass … [3]

 

The South Dakota chief engineer had tied the ship’s circuit breakers down which, in effect, put the entire electrical system in series.  As South Dakota absorbed otherwise harmless 5” hits, the concussion overloaded the system and the ship lost all electrical power.

Technology will always fail.  The only question is to what extent.  The wise naval force will train to accept those failures and fight on.  In addition to training, this requires backup systems of a completely different nature from the primary.  If our current radar fire control fails, what is our backup fire control system?  We don’t have any.

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

We cannot keep ignoring the lessons of history.  Washington’s engagement offers numerous lessons that are completely relevant today and yet the Navy has no interest in studying and applying the lessons.  When we compare today’s naval force structure, strategy (none), doctrine (none), tactics (none), and training (nothing useful) to the lessons from Washington’s engagement, the disconnect between the fleet and reality becomes painfully evident.

 

The Navy must begin studying their own history.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

[1]http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.pdf

 

[2]http://navweaps.com/index_lundgren/Battleship_Action_Guadalcanal.pdf

 

[3]Musicant, Ivan, “Battleship at War”, Avon Books, 1986, ISBN 0-380-70487-0

Japanese APDs and Marine LAWs

Note:  Credit for this post goes directly to reader ‘Christo’ who brought this up in a comment on the “High Speed Transport” post.

 

As we consider the Marine Commandant’s concept of Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships flitting about the Chinese first island chain, we can look to yet another historical example of the concept (see, “High Speed Transport” for a discussion of the US APD).  In WWII, the Japanese several times attempted to resupply their forward bases using destroyers as APDs.  Some of the APDs were purpose built, the T1 class (1), and others were simply ad hoc destroyers pressed into transport duty.

 

Japanese T1 High Speed Transport

The point is that they used small, fast vessels to attempt clandestine resupply just as the Marine’s believe they’ll use LAWs to attempt resupply of forward bases.  The difference, however, is that the Japanese APDs were fast and well armed.  In contrast the Marine’s LAW is small, slow, non-stealthy, and defenseless.

 

So, how did the Japanese APDs perform?

 

Guadancanal – The Japanese first attempted to conduct resupply using conventional troop transports but suffered significant losses as the transports were easily spotted and attacked.  As a result, they switched to using fast destroyers as troop and cargo transports in an effort dubbed the ‘Tokyo Express’.  Troop laden destroyers would conduct night voyages down the Slot to deliver troops.  Lacking any cargo handling equipment, the destroyers would often dump barrels of supplies into the ocean where troops on the island would attempt to retrieve them with only marginal success. 

 

The resupply effort was an overall failure and many valuable destroyers were lost in the attempt.  Even the successes were pyrrhic in nature since the quantity of troops and cargo delivered did not come anywhere near justifying the ship losses.

 

 

US APD vs. Japanese APD

 

In general, the US APDs enjoyed some success while the Japanese did not even though the ships were functionally identical.  Why the difference in outcome?

 

The US APDs were used for special operations such as raids and were not generally used on a predictable basis or schedule and operated in widespread areas on an almost random basis.  In contrast, the Japanese APDs were used in a very predictable manner and in a very localized area where even the ‘eyeball’ sensors of the time were sufficient to detect them.  Once detected, individual ships were routinely damaged and destroyed.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Despite the lack of modern sensors and night movement, the Japanese ships were generally spotted and attacked.  If fast ships, moving at night, against an enemy with no significant sensors other than eyes could be routinely spotted, how do the Marines believe that the slow, non-stealthy, defenseless LAWs will be able to routinely come and go among the first island chain without being spotted by modern Chinese radar, sonar arrays, EO, IR, air patrols, etc.?

 

It is important to note the key difference between the US and Japanese APDs and that is their Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  As we continually harp on – and the US Navy continually ignores! – a viable CONOPS is the key to ship design and operational success.  The Japanese CONOPS had the APDs operating in a fairly confined area on a predictable basis with an absolutely known destination – a recipe for detection and destruction.  The US CONOPS used the APDs as almost random raiders in unpredictable locations and at unpredictable times.

 

Now, let’s consider the Marines intended use of the LAWs.  They’re intended to operate in predictable locations (with no due respect to the Marine’s wild claims of thousands of islands to operate from, there are only a relatively few worthwhile and feasible locations for the kinds of bases they want to establish), on regular resupply schedules.  Does that sound an awful lot like the Japanese CONOPS?  Yes, it does.  So, why do the Marines expect a totally different outcome?  Same CONOPS … different outcome?  That sounds suspiciously close to the definition of insanity (same set of actions and expecting a different outcome)!  On top of that, the WWII APDs were heavily armed, for their size, and quite fast.  In contrast, the Marine’s LAWs are unarmed and slow. 

 

History is telling us everything we need to know about small, isolated transports but the Marine’s aren’t listening.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

(1)http://www.combinedfleet.com/Dai1Yusokan.htm

This Is A Carrier Strike Group?

The USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group (CSG) is now operating in the South China Sea, according to Navy reports.(1) 

 

China considers the South China Sea to be their property and has threatened the US Navy on many occasions and has, in the past, seized US aircraft and unmanned assets.  If there’s a high risk operating area in the world for the US Navy, the South China Sea would be it.  Therefore, if we’re going to operate a CGS within easy range of the entire Chinese military, it’s only prudent to send a massive carrier strike group.  Here’s a list of the many ships of the Reagan CSG:

 

USS Ronald Reagan (Nimitz class)

USS Shiloh (Ticonderoga class)

USS Halsey (Burke class)

 

A carrier with two escorts operating in the highest risk area in the world ...  do I need to say anything else?

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

(1)https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2654610/commander-us-pacific-fleet-visits-uss-ronald-reagan-carrier-strike-group/

Outranging The Sensor - Long Lance Torpedo

We’ve repeatedly noted that a weapon that outranges its targeting sensors is useless.  The current classic example is the much-hyped Chinese DF-21D ‘carrier killer’ anti-ship ballistic missile.  The missile has a range of around a thousand miles but there are no Chinese sensor systems capable of providing targeting data at that distance.  Thus, the missile is useless as a carrier killer.  The weapon outranges the sensor.

Let’s take a look at a historical example of this phenomenon, the Japanese WWII Type 93 Long Lance torpedo.  The torpedo had a range of up to 25 miles at slower speeds of around 35 kts and was capable of 14 miles at around 50 kts!  On paper, this weapon should have allowed the Japanese to stand well off from the US Navy ships and utterly wipe them out but it failed to do so.  Certainly, the torpedo did do serious damage but fell well short of being the weapon that it could have been because the Japanese had no sensors capable of detecting targets at ranges equal to the range of the weapon, especially in the up close, night battles that were typical of the fighting around Guadalcanal.

It was longer than 9 meters, could travel up to 20 miles at speeds up to 52 knots, and had a warhead in excess of 1000 lbs. This torpedo “out-sticked” (had a longer range) and outperformed the American Mark XV torpedo in all aspects. But, fortunately for the U.S. Navy, its range exceeded the range at which Japanese ships could detect their American prey. (1)

The reality was that most battles involving the use of Japanese torpedoes occurred at point blank ranges where the torpedo’s range advantage was completely negated.  This is not to downplay the torpedo’s lethality in any way.  It was a deadly weapon at any range.  However, it was not the long range threat that its capabilities indicated it could be.  If the Japanese had had effective long range radar, for example, to provide targeting data, the results could have been far worse for the US Navy than they were.

We see this phenomenon of weapons outranging sensors being played out repeatedly, today.

The Zumwalt’s 70-100 mile rocket propelled LRLAP munition (set aside the fact that it never performed to spec and cost too much) required fixed target coordinates and no one ever explained where those target coordinates were going to come from.

The Navy wants to equip its ships with the new, long range anti-ship cruise missile (LRASM) with a range two or three hundred miles but no way to consistently provide effective targeting.

And so on.

As with the Japanese torpedo, those weapons may still be effective at shorter ranges but that fails to take advantage of the full range capability of the weapons.

The lesson is obvious.  We need to devote as much or more effort to developing long range sensing as we do to developing long range weapons.  Further, the sensing needs to be something that is effective in high end combat, unlike the UAVs and P-8’s that the Navy seems to think will somehow provide targeting despite being easily detectable and non-survivable.

Sensors may not be as sexy as shiny new weapons but they’re far more important and the Navy has completely forgotten that.

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(1)USNI Proceedings, “Ten Seconds To Live Or Die”, Dec 2018,

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-12/ten-seconds-live-or-die

USS Ronald Reagan and Force Z

Consider:  USS Ronald Reagan, CVN-76, is forward deployed and home ported in Yokosuka, Japan along with some escort ships as part of the troubled 7^th Fleet.  Yokosuka is just over 1000 miles from Shanghai, China – easy cruise or ballistic missile distance.

Consider:  Force Z was a British task force consisting of two battleships, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, and four destroyers.  Leaving Singapore, the group was sent to sea where it was quickly spotted by Japanese submarines and aircraft and subjected to repeated attacks by land based aircraft.  Four attack waves of aircraft sank the two battleships on 10-Dec-1941 just a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  On paper, Force Z was a powerful group but it found itself operating in enemy territory, at the start of the war, without air cover.  It had no chance.

HMS Prince of Wales

HMS Repulse

So, what’s the link between the USS Ronald Reagan and Force Z?  Well, the parallels should be obvious.  When war with China starts, the Reagan will be forward deployed in enemy territory or, at least, within enemy reach, and if it attempts to move it will have limited air cover.  If Japan is part of the war, the Japanese Air Force will be too busy defending their homeland to provide aerial coverage for a carrier at sea.  If Japan is not part of the war, there will be no Japanese air cover at all.  Guam’s aircraft will be fully occupied (or destroyed!) defending their base and will be unable to provide air cover.

USS Ronald Reagan

No matter how you look at it, the Reagan will have limited air cover. 

Wait, what now?  Limited air cover?  It’s a carrier!  It has its own air cover.  Well, that’s technically true but for all practical purposes it’s nearly irrelevant.  You’ll recall that we’ve discussed the fact that carriers in war will operate in groups of 3-4 (4 being ComNavOps preferred number).  It will require 3-4 carriers operating together to mass sufficient air power to survive in combat.  A single carrier with, currently, only around 38 Hornets (another half dozen are required for tanking and unavailable for combat) is not exactly a powerful air force and would have a very hard time defending itself for very long against a sustained Chinese assault.  Those aircraft will be quickly attrited in combat or due to simple mechanical failings. 

The Reagan is forward deployed to Japan and would be faced with two unpalatable choices at the outset of war.

1. Stand and fight – and be sunk.
2. Run for safer waters around Guam or Pearl Harbor.

Running, the only real choice, would subject the carrier to repeated submarine, anti-ship cruise missile, and, possibly, anti-ship ballistic missiles.  The odds of successfully escaping are not great.

If running is the preferred, albeit poor, option, it leads to the question, why have the carrier based in Japan to begin with?

Is it for the carrier’s deterrent effect?  We’ve often discussed the concept of deterrence and concluded that there is no evidence that deterrence works.  In fact, the recent evidence is absolutely conclusive that deterrence does not work.  China, the obvious deterrence target of a Japan based carrier, has flouted international law and treaties, built illegal artificial islands and militarized them, used military intimidation against Vietnam and Philippines, seized the entire South China Sea, and begun laying the groundwork for seizing the second island chain.  If that’s deterrence at work, I’d hate to think about what China would have done without it!  Clearly, deterrence is not a valid reason to have a carrier forward based.

Is it for the carrier’s rapid response to a sudden outbreak of war?  As we just noted, there is nothing a single carrier can do in a peer war except go down fighting.  On a related note, if China opts to attack Japan at the outset of war, the addition of 38 Hornets to the total Japanese defensive effort isn’t going to make any big difference even assuming that the carrier isn’t sunk pierside in the opening shots.  Clearly, rapid response is not a good reason to have a carrier forward based.

So, why do we have a carrier forward based?  It makes no sense.

Now, just because a carrier is forward based in Japan doesn’t mean that it can’t be pulled out to safety in the run up to a war.  Peer wars simply don’t start with no warning.  However, if the plan is to pull the carrier out prior to a war and if deterrence isn’t effective then why is it there to begin with?