It’s Not About One Versus One

Far too often (all the time?) commenters and analysts focus on one-on-one assessments of the weapon systems they are arguing for or against.  The US has more carriers than China.  A Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile can’t be stopped.  This missile has a ten mile greater range than that missile.  This weapon can penetrate that tank’s armor.  And so on.  That’s fine but it completely ignores the big picture.  Where does the weapon system fit into the larger military scheme?  Can it be produced in quantity?  Can it be serviced in the field?  Is it reliable?  And so on.
 
How many times have you heard the argument that if this weapon can beat that ship/plane/tank then that ship/plane/tank is obsolete and useless?
 
One-on-one, the WWII German Tiger tank was nearly unbeatable but that’s not how the war was fought.  Tiger tanks and US Sherman tanks didn’t line up, one against one, in a series of jousts.  The Tiger tank was difficult to produce, lacked numbers, was hard to maintain, hard to repair, and suffered from critical fuel shortages due to Allied attacks on Germany’s raw materials, factories, refineries, etc.  The war against the Tiger tank was fought in many ‘domains’ not just one-on-one.
 
We, as observers and analysts, need to stop the one-on-one thinking that dominates our discussions and begin recognizing and considering the many other factors that make up the larger military picture.
 
Let’s take a look at a current example involving Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian fuel capacity which is impacting the general Russian military effort.
 

Ukraine has intensified its campaign of drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, hitting refineries in recent weeks and deepening fuel shortages across the country.[1]
 
About 40% of Ukraine's long-range strike missions this year have focused on refineries, while others have hit storage and pumping facilities. [1]
 
Independent estimates suggest up to 20% of Russia's refining capacity has been disabled, cutting more than 1 million barrels a day of output, mostly gasoline. Refineries that have been hit repeatedly have sustained lasting damage, especially to cracking units that are difficult to replace under Western sanctions. [1]
 
The impact has been felt nationwide. Motorists face fuel shortages, long lines, and record prices. Wholesale gasoline prices have jumped 54% since January, prompting authorities to suspend exports and impose rationing in some regions. [1]

We see, then, that the Russian military effort can be impacted not just by one-on-one weapon contests but by many other factors such as fuel supply – a lesson straight out of WWII (and every other conflict in history!).  No longer can we, as analysts, talk about one-on-one assessments without considering the larger picture and all the other factors that impact and determine a weapon system’s actual usefulness and effectiveness.
 
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On a bit of side note, albeit closely related, here’s a bit of information about Ukraine’s drone effort.
 

The FP-1 long-range "kamikaze" drone, introduced in May, now accounts for about 60% of strikes inside Russia. Produced at an estimated 100 units a day, it carries a 60- to 120-kilogram warhead with a range of up to 1,600 kilometers.
 
Despite a price of about $55,000, it is said to feature advanced guidance software that maintains accuracy under electronic jamming. [1]

This highlights so many lessons we’ve discussed in past posts.  For example, not every weapon has to be bleeding edge, light years ahead technology.  Had the US tried to produce this drone, it would have been 10x the size, 1000x the cost, and been partially ready in a decade or two.  In the non-US procurement world, simple and just plain effective will almost always be sufficient.  Low cost, easy to mass produce, reasonably useful characteristics … this is what effective weapons procurement should look like.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Russia Faces Gasoline Crisis as Ukrainian Drones Strike”, Sandy Fitzgerald, 5-Sep-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/russia-ukraine-war/2025/09/05/id/1225208/

Chinese Ports in Latin America

Just a quick note documenting the expansion of Chinese influence.
 

Chinese companies are now involved in the construction or operation of 31 active ports in Latin America and the Caribbean — a significantly higher number than previously reported, according to new findings from the Center for Strategic and International Studies …
 
This includes ports built by companies such as CK Hutchison and state‑backed entities such as China Merchants Port.
 
U.S. analysts warn that key ports - especially Kingston, Jamaica, and Manzanillo and Veracruz, Mexico - present strategic vulnerabilities.[1]

Regarding Kingston, Jamaica,
 

The Chinese firm China Merchants Port Holdings is now in complete control of Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited (KFTL), the entity responsible for managing the Port of Kingston under a concession agreement made with Jamaica’s government. The agreement has a duration of 30 years.[2]

Regarding Mexico,
 

China is funding the expansion of the port of Veracruz Medico through China Harbour Engineering company. The expansion project will make Veracruz the second largest port in Mexico. In addition, the Port of Manzanillo is undergoing a $2.7 billion expansion project that will make it Latin America’s largest maritime gateway. Chinese companies like Hutchinson Whampoa have control over piers in several Mexican states, including Baja California, Colima, Michoacán, and Morelia.
 
In recent years, direct investment from Chinese companies into Mexico has experienced significant growth. This surge is evident in the figures, rising from $38m in 2011 to $386m in 2021. Notably, Chinese companies now represent the fastest-growing source of foreign investment in Mexico.[3]

Aside from the obvious concerns about China establishing control over ports and, eventually, shipping, Chinese influence on the political actions of cash and investment starved countries bodes ill for the US.  Again, China is not doing anything the US couldn’t have done.  We need to engage.  You can’t win a war if you don’t engage.
 
All of this demonstrates just one of the many ways that the Chinese are conducting their war of global domination:  control the ports and you control the global economy while simultaneously establishing strategic strongholds and gaining influence over the host countries.  We talk about all-domain warfare in our pathetic, limited understanding of the term while the Chinese are practicing true all-domain warfare, as we speak.
 
The US and the Western world need to recognize that a war is happening, now, and engage with urgency.  There is no reason that the US couldn’t have done what China did.  We were just too geopolitically lazy.  We’re losing the war.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Think Tank: China's Reach Goes to Latin American Ports”, Solange Reyner, 25-Jun-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-latin-america-caribbean/2025/06/24/id/1216332/
 
[2]Jamaicans.com website, “Chinese Company Takes Total Control Of Kingston Freeport Management Firm”, staff, 1-May-2020,
https://jamaicans.com/chinese-company-takes-total-control-of-kingston-freeport-management-firm/
 
[3]Jeff Newman Law website, “China funding port constructions in Mexico to shorten shipping routes to U.S. back door”, Jeff Newman, 23-Jan-2025
https://jeffnewmanlaw.com/china-funding-port-constructions-in-mexico-to-shorten-shipping-routes-to-the-u-s-back-door/

Chinese Tariff Riots

Many have criticized Trump’s policy of rebalancing trade arrangements with China through tariffs but they’re working.
 
Many have claimed that the mighty Chinese economy is impervious to US actions and can overwhelm the US in a war.  We now see that isn’t quite the case.
 
Daily Caller website reports riots by disgruntled workers throughout China.
 

Workers throughout China are flooding the streets in revolt as U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs slam the fragile Chinese export economy.
 
The wave of unrest follows a brutal plunge in China’s export orders, now at their lowest since the COVID lockdowns. Goldman Sachs estimates up to 16 million Chinese jobs could vanish as Trump’s tariffs bite deeper into the regime’s weak underbelly.[1]

The tariffs are accomplishing the same thing that a war would do.  China would be isolated and its export-centric economy would collapse as the world halted all manufacturing orders.  On top of that would be blockades restricting imports of vital raw materials, further impacting manufacturing.
 
ComNavOps has often said that China has far more to lose, economically, in a war than the US and the tariff ‘war’ is providing ample proof of that.
 
This is not to trivialize the Chinese economy.  It’s powerful, to be sure, but it’s not the all-powerful, unassailable behemoth that so many fear.  Just as the US has some glaring strategic weaknesses, so too does China and their export-dependent economy is one of them.  Of course, in a war, China could always force workers to produce as unpaid slave labor but that would create additional problems.
 
This, as much as any other factor, may be what’s staying China’s bid for Taiwan for the time being.
 
This also demonstrates the potential of true all-domain warfare which, as an example, we are not applying to the Houthi conflict.
 
 

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[1]Daily Caller website, “China Erupts: Furious Workers Riot As Factories Collapse Under Trump’s Tariffs”, Floyd Buford, 1-May-2025,
https://dailycaller.com/2025/05/01/china-erupts-riot-factories-trump-tariffs/

True Multi-Domain War

‘Multi-domain’ is the current buzzword and fad of the month in the US military although, in practice, it seems to just be gibberish-speak for more computers and more unmanned assets.  That aside, the basic concept is that you wage war not just on the kinetic level but on additional levels such as the electromagnetic, public relations, Internet, space, and so on.  Unfortunately, one of the major domains that has the most potential impact is also the most overlooked and ignored and that is the financial domain.
 
Consider the current Houthi conflict.
 
We’re trading shots back and forth with the Houthis and, clearly, not deterring them in the least.  This is yet another in an endless list of demonstrable failures of deterrence for those of you who believe deterrence is effective but, I digress …
 
The point is that our minimal attacks are having little or no effect.  This is quite similar to the ISIS truck-plinking that we engaged in some years ago and which had zero impact.
 
If we were serious about ending the Houthi actions, we’d focus as much on the financial domain as the kinetic and it would likely produce far better results.  The Houthis must finance their operations, weapon acquisitions, weapon component acquisitions, shipping and transport costs, ‘soldier pay’, etc.  That financial mechanism is not just a local, village level network.  They’re engaged in global financial dealings with suppliers, Iran, and others.  That financial network represents a major center of gravity and extreme vulnerability for the Houthis.  We have the means to completely shut down their financial network, halt bank transfers, seize assets, freeze and seize bank accounts, etc.  I’m not a financial expert so these are just the conceptual, top level ideas that I’m aware of.  I’m sure our government accountants and financial experts could devise much more extensive and effective methods.  We should also be tracking and covertly eliminating links in the Houthi financial chains … you know, CIA type work.
 
Waging war is not cheap and the Houthis are not above the financial requirements.  In fact, being a smaller operation, relative to the US, they are more vulnerable to financial disruptions.  Of course, it would help if we would stop giving billions of dollars to Iran![1]
 
I know that the administration will claim to be applying some sanctions against the Houthis but we are a universe away from bringing the full weight of our financial combat capability to bear.  Just as our occasional strikes accomplish nothing, a few minor sanctions also accomplish nothing.
 
We need to either bring our full military and financial might to bear on the Houthis in a true multi-domain fight or we need to leave the area.  What we’re doing is accomplishing nothing and risking everything.  One lucky hit on a warship and the Houthis win on the global stage.
 
As with so many things, our military and government (largely one and the same!) pay lip service to concepts but refuse to actually carry them out to the maximum extent.  We talk about multi-domain combat but largely refuse to engage in financial combat which has, arguably, the most potential to produce the desired results.

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Note: The same considerations apply to our dealings with China.  We are at war with China, right now, even if the current administration refuses to acknowledge it, and we’re making almost no effort to win or even engage.  If we were to fully engage in financial combat with China we’d win overwhelmingly.  Yes, there would be some short term pain for us but also some incredible long term gains.  However, that’s a topic for another post.
 
 
 
 
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[1]Guardian website, “US agrees to release $6bn in Iran funds as part of deal to free detained Americans”, Julian Borger, 11-Sep-2023,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/11/us-iran-sanctions-waiver-americans-detained-iran