LCS and Speed

Recent posts have seen some speculation on what the LCS speed was intended for.  As many pointed out, speed is not a useful feature in and around mines.  So, what was the LCS speed intended to do?  Why was it such a major design requirement?  One could make a good argument that speed was the number one design requirement … but why?
 
I have no idea.
 
Well, that was a short post.
 
Actually, the purpose of the post is to, yet again, emphasize the purpose and importance of a concept of operations (CONOPS) prior to committing to a finalized design and, ultimately, production.
 
The Navy has publicly acknowledged that it never developed a CONOPS for the LCS.  Thus, we have no idea what purpose the LCS speed was to have served.
 
The best speculation I’ve seen is that the speed was intended to move the ship as quickly as possible between the operational/combat area and the nearest module swapping port which, logically, would be quite a long distance from the combat area.  Of course, the Navy abandoned the module swapping concept fairly early on thus rendering the speed feature moot.
 
In addition, the intra-theater speed concept was highly questionable to begin with.  The LCS had short range to begin with and the DOT&E reports and trials quickly reported that the range capability was nowhere near the design spec and they significantly downgraded the range.  Further, high speed consumes fuel at a prodigious rate, further reducing the effective range.  An LCS that made a sustained, high speed, long distance dash from a module swapping port to an operational area would have a useful loiter time in the operational area of just a few hours or days, having consumed its fuel in the dash to get there.  That’s not a combat-useful feature.  A well thought out CONOPS would have revealed that prior to final design and production … assuming that was even the reason for the speed requirement.  This is why you do CONOPS.
 
The LCS provides an object lesson in the need for a CONOPS.
 
CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS!
 

Zumwalt Hypersonic Update

The Navy has been working toward the installation of hypersonic weapons on the Zumwalt class by 2025.  The hypersonic missiles would be housed in, and launched from, modified Multiple All-up-round Canister (MAC) tubes similar to those installed in the Ohio class SSGN submarines. 

 

Initial reports varied but the plan seems to be to install two MAC tubes on one of the Zumwalts, offset to the sides, port and starboard.  The existing, idled Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) does not need to be removed according to CNO Gilday.[1]

 

Zumwalt has been operating as part of the Navy’s unmanned ship test squadron, Surface Development Squadron One (SURFDEVRON) which was established in May-2019.

  

 

MAC Tube

 

The modified MAC launch tubes will hold three hypersonic weapons.

 

The MAC tubes on the four SSGNs put seven Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) in the same space of a Trident-II D5 nuclear ballistic missile. The Navy will put three of the larger C-HGBs in the same space, USNI News understands.[1]

  

 

Common Hypersonic Glide Body

 

The hypersonic weapon is the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) which is being co-developed developed by the Army and Navy.  The missiles will be housed in a system similar to the Multiple All-up-round Canister (MAC) tubes that are installed on the Ohio class guided-missile submarines (SSGN).  The SSGN MAC tubes contain seven Tomahawk cruise missiles per tube.  Reports suggest that the Navy will convert the MAC tubes to house three hypersonic weapons.

 

The Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) is a weapon system that uses a booster rocket motor to accelerate to well-above hypersonic speeds, and then jettisons the expended rocket booster.

 

 

CONOPS

 

Here’s an interesting comment from CNO Gilday:

 

“Zumwalt gave us an opportunity to get [hypersonics] out faster and to be honest with you I need a solid mission for Zumwalt,” Gilday said.[1] [emphasis added]

 

I guess you should have developed a CONOPS before building the ship, admiral.  I guess you also should have R&D’ed the AGS before you committed to making it the main weapon of the ship.  The Zumwalt’s problems and current lack of mission are a purely self-inflicted wound … inflicted by stupidity.

 

Now, the question for the admiral is, have you learned your lesson about CONOPS or are you just stupidly plunging ahead with this hypersonics-on-Zumwalt idea without a CONOPS that tells you how you’ll use the Zumwalt-hypersonics, assuming it technically works?  I’m guessing you haven’t thought this through, at all.

 

For example,

 

-Zumwalt currently only has the capacity for 80 missiles.  Hypersonics take up more room so there will be even fewer (half as many??) regular missiles?  Is that a tactically useful amount?

 

-If you have to remove the existing Mk57 peripheral VLS and missiles to make room for hypersonics, how will the ship defend itself?  Will the ship require a permanent Burke escort (two ships to accomplish a one-ship mission)?

 

-In what scenario(s) will a ship with hypersonics be useful?  How will hypersonics fit in with the rest of the fleet’s missions?

 

-Does a ship with hypersonic missiles have a use in a carrier task force?

 

CONOPS, admiral, CONOPS!

 

CONOPS

 

CONOPS

 

 

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]USNI News website, “Navy Can Install Hypersonic Missiles Aboard Zumwalt Destroyers Without Removing Gun Mounts”, Sam LaGrone, 14-Mar-2022,

https://news.usni.org/2022/03/14/navy-will-install-hypersonic-missiles-aboard-zumwalt-destroyers-without-removing-gun-mounts

JHSV Update

When the Spearhead class transports (Joint High Speed Vessel, JHSV; now referred to as Expeditionary Fast Transports, EPF) came into the Navy, ComNavOps severely criticized them for lacking any useful mission or purpose.  As you recall, the JHSV was intended to be a fast intra-theater transport and was to be operated by civilian crews under the Military Sealift Command.  Unfortunately, as reported by DOT&E, problems have plagued the class.[2]

 

Joint High Speed Vessel - No Mission, No Purpose, No Need

See the following posts for background information, issues, and concerns:

 

“JHSV”

 

“More JHSV”

 

“JHSV Update”

 

“Joint High Speed Vessel Missions”

 

DOT&E Report:  “Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report”

 

 

Now, some 10 years later, ComNavOps’ concerns about the lack of a mission have been validated. 

 

The twelve Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) currently in the battle fleet have enormous potential, but these small “theatre” transports have failed to capture the imagination of fleet sponsors. They’re not getting integrated into innovative day-to-day operations, and the Military Sealift Command hates the cost of maintaining these underutilized and poorly understood auxiliaries.[1]

 

Now, the Navy is quietly semi-retiring the vessels after less than ten years service.

 

Last year, two of the fast transports, the nine-year-old USNS Spearhead (T-EPF-1) and the seven-year-old USNS Fall River (T-EPF-4), were consigned effectively to the scrapyard, placed in an ignominious “Reduced Operating Status 45.” Reduced Operating Status 45—where the ship needs 45 days to get underway after an activation order—is the maximum amount of time a ship can be placed in reduced operating status and still remain “counted” as an active member of the battle fleet.

 

Rumors suggest that all the Spearhead Class Expeditionary Fast Transports outside of the yet-to-be-built medical variants may well be on the budget chopping block this year and consigned to storage status.[1]

 

This is, now, the third instance of the Navy [very] early retiring ships/classes that just a few years ago were claimed to be revolutionary and vital to the future of naval combat and dominance:

 

• LCS
• Mobile Landing Platform (MLP;  now referred to as Expeditionary Transfer Dock, ESD)
• Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV; now referred to as Expeditionary Fast Transports, EPF)

 

How can multiple ships/classes be so vital and then so useless in just a matter of a few years?  It all goes back to the complete lack of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  None of these classes had a CONOPS, none had a mission, and now they’re being dumped due to the lack of a mission.

 

How many times do I have to say it?  You can’t build a successful ship design without first developing a detailed CONOPS.

 

How many times can the Navy make the same mistake before they start paying attention to CONOPS before design?

 

How many abject failures can the Navy have before Congress starts removing Navy leaders?

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Forbes website, “The 2023 Defense Budget May Sink More Navy Ships Than Pearl Harbor”, Craig Hooper, 22-Mar-2022,

https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/03/22/the-2023-defense-budget-may-sink-more-navy-ships-than-pearl-harbor/?sh=2318eab61fbe

 

[2]DOT&E, “Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV), Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report”, Sep-2015,

https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Science_and_Technology/16-F-0250_(REPORT)_Follow-On_Operational_Test_and_Evaluation_(FOT&E)_Report_on_the_Joint_High_Speed_Vessel_(JHSV).pdf

Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) CONOPS

The Navy is embarking on a program to acquire dozens/hundreds of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) with [** warning: shocking news ahead! **] no concept of operations (CONOPS) to guide the design.  Okay, that was probably the least shocking news you could have read, right?  I mean, the Navy hasn’t developed a CONOPS for anything other than admiralty promotions in many decades so why would this be any different?  We’ve seen from the LCS program what happens when you commit to a full production program with no CONOPS and no prototype.  Way to learn a lesson, Navy.

 

Since the Navy won’t develop a CONOPS, let’s see what, if anything, we can come up with, along those lines, for a UUV.

 

The Navy is developing dozens of different UUV designs in many different sizes.  Most are just glorified torpedoes.  We’ll ignore those as the minor pieces of equipment that they are.  Instead, we’ll focus on the largest UUV, the extra large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV, also called Orca).

 

… the Navy defines XLUUVs as UUVs with a diameter of more than 84 inches, meaning that XLUUVs are to be too large to be launched from a manned Navy submarine.  Consequently, XLUUVs instead will transported to a forward operating port and then launched from pier. The Department of the Navy’s March 16, 2021, unmanned campaign framework document states that the XLUUV will be designed “to accommodate a variety of large payloads….”  The Navy testified on March 18, 2021, that mines will be the initial payload for XLUUVs.  More specifically, the Navy wants to use XLUUVs to, among other things, covertly deploy the Hammerhead mine, a planned mine that would be tethered to the seabed and armed with an antisubmarine torpedo, broadly similar to the Navy’s Cold War-era CAPTOR (encapsulated torpedo) mine.[1]

 

The XLUUV will be based on the Boeing Echo Voyager with some Navy-specific modifications.  That being the case, let’s take a look at the Echo Voyager.

 

Echo Voyager is roughly the size of a subway car—it is 51 feet long and has a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet by 8.5 feet, a weight in the air of 50 tons, and a range of up to 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a modular payload section up to 34 feet in length, increasing its length to as much as 85 feet. A 34-foot modular payload section provides about 2,000 cubic feet of internal payload volume; a shorter (14-foot) section provides about 900 cubic feet.[1]

 

Boeing Echo Voyager

Echo Voyager has a maximum speed of 7.8 kts [2] and uses a combination diesel-electric propulsion/power system.  On battery, the vessel has a range of 150 miles at 2.6 kts whereupon it must surface and recharge its batteries using its diesel generator. 

 

With a single fuel module in its payload bay, Boeing claims the range is 6,500 miles.[2]  I’ve found no information about the size of the fuel module.  The statement that fuel modules are stored in the payload bay is important because that means that the effective payload space is less than the stated specification of 2,000 cu.ft.

 

The vessel has an obstacle avoidance sonar and inertial guidance.

 

The maximum dive depth is 11,000 ft.[2]

 

In 2019, the Navy contracted with Boeing to produce four XLUUVs for $43M which is just under $11M apiece.[2]  The contract was later expanded to include a fifth vessel.  Funding will come from a Navy Research and Development account similar to the funding mechanism used for the first two LCS.[1]

 

The preceding description suggests certain operational characteristics that will influence the CONOPS and selection of appropriate missions.

 

 

CONOPS Characteristics

 

Speed – As noted, the vessel is very slow.  The maximum speed is 7.8 kts and, presumably, the economical cruising speed is much less.  Given the statement about the range on battery being 150 miles at 2.6 kts, this suggests that the cruising speed is 2-3 kts.  This has a major impact on operations.  For example, pier launch and lack of forward bases means that for Chinese theater operations the nearest launch point (disregarding Japan which is not a guaranteed base of combat operations), Guam, would be around 2100 miles from the South China Sea.  Even at the maximum speed of 7.8 kts, the transit time to the South China Sea would be around ten days and a more economical cruising speed of, say, 3 kts, would result in around a thirty day transition time.

 

Payload – This is a small vessel with a correspondingly small usable payload.  Consider the Navy’s main postulated mission:  laying Hammerhead mines.  How many mines could fit in a 2000 cu.ft. payload space?  I can’t find any specs on the Hammerhead capsule size, however, there is a picture of the Hammerhead package so a reasonable estimate of the package size is possible.  Knowing the Mk54 torpedo size, we can visually estimate the overall package size.  Assuming the package is sized to fit a 21” torpedo tube, this gives us approximate dimensions of 21” x 21” x 19 ft, for a total of 58 cu.ft.  Simple arithmetic tells us that the maximum number of mines that could be carried in the 2000 cu.ft. payload space would be 34.  However, there needs to be room to move and secure the mines during loading.  It would be reasonable to assume that half the payload space would be dedicated to movement and securing the mines which would reduce the capacity to 17 mines.  Some sort of mine handling and ejection mechanism is required and that would further reduce the number of mines.  If the fuel module is also stored in the main payload section, the number of mines is even smaller.  A reasonable estimate would be a mine capacity of around 12.  See, ref [3] for an interesting discussion of this.

 

Hammerhead Mine Capsule

Range – On the face of it, the claimed range of 6,500 is excellent and suggests that not only can the vessel reach its operating area and return (4200 miles round trip from Guam to the South China Sea) but it will have enough excess range to effectively operate for an extended period within the operating area.  However, as noted, the submerged range is only 150 miles on a single battery charge.  Thus, in order to achieve the claimed range of 6,500 miles, the vessel will have to surface frequently … a very bad requirement for a submarine operating in enemy waters!

 

Communications – I’ve found no mention of communications in any description of the vessel which implies that once launched, the XLUUV will be largely autonomous.  Aside from being very dubious about the success of a truly autonomous vessel for any length of time, this suggests that the vessel’s usefulness in the surveillance role will be limited as that would require frequent and lengthy transmissions from the UUV back to its port - communications that would quickly pinpoint the vessel’s location for the enemy and given the UUV’s very slow speed, it would be quickly destroyed.

 

 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

 

In attempting to assemble a CONOPS, what do we have to work with?  We have a small vessel with a small payload (small on the scale of contributing to a war effort).  The vessel, itself, is very slow and unresponsive.  As with any submerged vessel, communications will be difficult once a mission is started. 

 

So, what does that suggest for a CONOPS?

 

It suggests that the only viable missions are those that are very slow developing and can afford to wait for very long periods of time and can be effective with very small payloads.

 

While various articles have postulated virtually every mission ever conceived in the history of warfare, there are only two viable missions that meet the criteria and constraints described above:

 

Mine Laying – An XLUUV can be effective as a mine layer but with a significant caveat: it is only useful and effective for a very small area.  Typically, mines are deployed in the thousands to tens of thousands for a single field.  The very small payload of the XLUUV precludes using it to lay a large field no matter how many XLUUVs we acquire.  That only leaves point mining of a very small area such as a channel or entrance to a harbor or a narrow passage between islands.  For example, one could imagine productively mining the entrance/exit to a Chinese naval port.

 

Surveillance – Given the combination of limited sensors, limited field of view, very slow speed (inability to follow a target), and communication issues, the only type of surveillance mission that would make sense is monitoring a very small, restricted area as described in the mine laying section.  In such a scenario, the XLUUV becomes, essentially, a static sensor and targets come to it (or not – that’s useful information, too).  The caution is that any important and restricted area will be heavily patrolled by the enemy.  Whether the craft is quiet enough to escape close scrutiny is unknown.  It will have to be extremely quiet since it will have no ability to fight back or maneuver to avoid detection.  Further, the extremely limited battery life that requires frequent surfacing to recharge is a major liability in this mission.  Without knowing exactly how stealthy the XLUUV can be (factoring in frequent surfacing for recharging), surveillance is a pretty iffy mission.

 

 

Rationale

 

Given the lack of worthwhile missions, why is the Navy so enthusiastic about building these UUVs?  What is their rationale?  Cheapness, compared to a real submarine, is obviously a major factor and if the XLUUV had even a fraction of a real sub’s capability, this might make sense … but it does not. 

 

Does the Navy really view these as a cheap replacement for real subs?  That would be hard to believe but we’re replacing Burkes with small, defenseless, unmanned surface vessels so … maybe.  Could they, in some twisted way, view them as a cheap, indirect replacement for surface ships in the overall force structure? 

 

Is it technology for its own sake? 

 

Is it sheer, unmitigated stupidity?

 

A handful for the limited mine laying mission is reasonable but any more than that cannot be justified and yet the Navy seems committed to a large production run and making these a significant portion of the future fleet structure.  It’s baffling.

 

 

Conclusion

 

It is very difficult to postulate a worthwhile concept of operations other than the very limited mine laying mission described above, although that single mission does have some value.  That does not, however, seem to justify the acquisition of more than a handful of XLUUVs – certainly not the large program the Navy seems to want to pursue.

 

Acquisition of this XLUUV will require a supply/support logistics train, administration, operators, specialized equipment, specialized maintenance, etc.  Does the limited scope of useful missions justify all this?  I’m doubtful.

 

This seems to be yet another case of the Navy jumping on the unmanned technology bandwagon for no demonstrable good reason;  technology for the sake of technology.

 

This also continues the trend of minimizing the value of raw firepower in combat, as the XLUUV offers no significant firepower.

 

At best, this is a niche mission/craft with a significant cost in terms of acquisition and support.

 

 

___________________________________

 

[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, 19-Jan-2022

 

[2]https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/26513/boeing-is-building-the-navy-big-orca-submarine-drones-to-hunt-and-lay-mines-and-more#:~:text=Boeing%20experimental%20Echo%20Voyager.%20The%20diesel-electric%20Echo%20Voyager,and%20use%20its%20air-breathing%20diesel%20generator%20to%20recharge.

 

[3]Strikepod Systems website, 1-Jun-2021,

https://www.strikepod.com/xluuv-offensive-mining/#:~:text=Little%20is%20known%20of%20the%20CDM%2C%20but%20it,very%20shallow%20water%2C%20or%20possibly%20the%20surf%20zone.

MUSV Update

The Navy is pursuing two unmanned vessels:

 

• Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) – weapons barge
• Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) – surveillance (ISR) vessel or [later?] electronic warfare (EW) vessel

 

The MUSV is loosely defined by the Navy as being 45-190 ft long and around 500 tons.(1)

 

On 13-Jul-2020, the Navy issued a $35M contract to L3 Harris for construction of a 195 ft MUSV with an option for eight additional vessels which would bring the contract value to $281M.  The issuance of this contract has provided us with a glimpse of the appearance of the L3 Harris MUSV design.  What we see is a low silhouette vessel with few stealth features.  The bulk of the vessel displays a flat, open deck aft of a forward located, minimal pilot house.

 

MUSV Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel

What can the ship’s appearance tell us about its suitability for its ISR mission?

 

 

Survivability – The vessel is unarmed and not stealthy.  The hull sides appear to be nearly vertical, increasing the radar signature, and the superstructure has masts and antennae scattered about.  The open, flat deck suggests that functional modules and equipment will be carried on it which, presumably, would consist of additional radars, sensors, antennae, communications, and data processing computer enclosures, all of which further degrade any stealth the vessel might have.  Thus, we appear to have an unarmed, non-stealthy ship that is likely going to be radiating signals (both communications and sensors)  thereby pinpointing its location.  In combat, the vessel’s survivability will likely be measured in minutes.

 

Sensor Range – The very low silhouette suggests that the sensors will, perforce, be located very close to the water surface which means a very a limited sensor range (short horizon) for many of the sensors unless the payload includes tall masts which would impact stability and further decrease what little stealth the vessel might have. 

 

Seakeeping - The short, blunt bow suggests that the forward sections will be very wet in any kind of seas and the forward antennae will encounter breaking seas on a regular basis.

 

 

How do the factors just described impact the mission?

 

CONOPS – From various Navy descriptions, the MUSV will be an ISR vessel operating out in front of a surface group, at a distance, to provide early warning and broad area situational awareness.  If correct, this would place a defenseless, non-stealthy vessel out on its own.  Defenseless, non-stealthy vessels are known as target drones.  A Burke, in the main group, could provide some long range AAW support for the MUSV but only if the enemy obligingly flies aircraft and missiles very high so as to enable long range detection and targeting by the Burke.

 

As we noted, the MUSV will, presumably, be using active sensors for much of its surveillance activity.  This will broadcast the vessels location and, coupled with the lack of defensive weapons and non-stealthy nature, likely lead to fairly short combat lives for the vessels.  Worse, the radiating MUSVs surrounding the host surface group will provide the enemy with a very convenient and accurate location of the host group.

 

The low placement of the sensors and resultant short sensing range suggest that it will be difficult to achieve the early warning and wide area situational awareness that the Navy desires.  Instead, the vessels will only be able to monitor a fairly small area and it would require many dozens of these vessels to establish any kind of useful wide area awareness … for the short time the vessels operate before being sunk.

 

As I’ve stated, the Navy has jumped on the unmanned path with no foundation of proven operating doctrine.  Despite this utter lack of evidence of effectiveness, the Navy has already committed to completely restructuring the fleet, similar to the savaging and neutering the Marines are inflicting on themselves.  The Navy seems determined to move from a fleet of the most powerful ships in the world to a fleet of individually weak, nearly defenseless, network nodes with little firepower or survivability.  The Chinese have to be like kids waiting for Christmas, almost unable to contain their excitement until the moment that the Navy completes their own self-destruction and the Chinese can brush the US Navy aside as nothing more than a minor annoyance.

 

 

 

____________________________________

 

(1)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress”, 25-Feb-2021

Backward Ship Development, Yet Again

Diversity is great.  No one proved that it offers any benefits.  You’re not allowed to question it.  The only question you can ask is how to implement it.

Similarly, the US Navy, with no validation, no questioning, no supporting documentation, no valid wargames, and no exercises, is now developing unmanned surface vessels (USV) and, in fact, has already budgeted a few years of construction.  You’re not allowed to question it.  The only question you can ask is how to implement it.

Speaking of implementation,

The head of the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Forces Command has ordered the service’s surface force to develop a concept of operations for both the large and medium unmanned surface vessels in development, according to a Dec. 19 message seen by Defense News. (1)

So, having already doctrinally committed to a very large USV presence in the fleet and having already committed to replacing many current surface ships with lightly armed USVs and having already committed to fighting future battles with USVs as a primary fighting asset, the Navy is now, after the fact, beginning to look at developing a concept of operations (CONOPS).  How many times have we seen the Navy do this backwards?  You develop a CONOPS first, and then look to develop a ship to fit the CONOPS, not develop the ship and then look to fit a CONOPS to it.  This backward approach is how we got the LCS and Zumwalt, among others.  This backward approach is how we wound up with an Afloat Forward Staging Base ship that has no mission (see, “AFSB –Looking For Something To Do”).

It is also noteworthy that the Navy is not being invited to debate the concept or experiment with the concept or validate the concept or question [gasp!] the concept.  No, they are being told only to figure out how to use USVs.  Forget whether it’s a good idea or, as demonstrated repeatedly in these pages, a bad idea;  it remains only to figure out how to best use them.

I can’t foresee any problems, whatsoever, with this approach.

This approach of ordering an organization to make a product work without any supporting evidence that it’s a good idea is how organizations force a bad idea into life.

Is ComNavOps the only one with reservations about this?  No, Congress has doubts, too.

What Congress wants to see is more gradual development and proof of concept before it commits serious funding … (1)

Well, good for Congress!  I hope they forcefully exercise their oversight responsibility.

Every time I think I’ve seen the limits of the Navy’s stupidity, they amaze me with their ability to set the bar still lower.

___________________________________

(1)Defense News website, “Fleet commander directs US Navy’s surface force to develop concepts for unmanned ships”, David B. Larter, 3-Jan-2019,

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/01/02/fleet-commander-directs-the-us-navys-surface-force-to-develop-concepts-for-unmanned-ships/

Frigates in the US Navy

Despite ComNavOps’ indifference, nay, disdain, for the idea of frigates in the US Navy, the Navy, in its infinite wisdom idiocy has opted to go ahead and acquire 20 frigates.  Of course, this was done without any Concept of Operations so no one has yet given any thought to how these frigates would be used. 

What does the US Navy have to say about the role of the frigate?  From USNI News we get this,

The RFI [frigate program Request For Information from industry] states that one of the FFG(X)’s two main purposes is to “relieve large surface combatants from stressing routine duties during operations other than war.” It goes on to say later that “this ship will reduce demand on high-end cruisers and destroyers that currently conduct [anti-submarine warfare], [surface warfare], and theater security cooperation missions, allowing for an increase of more capable assets to maintain a stabilizing presence in regions where tensions with nations that have highly capable naval forces may exist.” (1)

Unfortunately, this is just a bunch of gibberish that says nothing and doesn’t even mention actual combat use.  Total, pointless garbage.  As with the LCS, I guess we’re on our own to figure out how to fit the frigate into combat operations.  So, why don’t we lead the way and engage in some speculation about frigate use?

In order to assess and ‘fit’ the frigate into the US Navy scheme, we need to recognize and bear in mind a few key aspects and characteristics of the frigate:

• The frigate will be a mini-Burke with 50% of the capability and 60%-70% of the cost (let’s face it, no one believes the Navy’s cost estimate and history guarantees that the cost will be much greater than current estimates!).
• Only 20 will be built.
• The design appears to have a bit of an ASW focus.
• It will carry one helo (MH-60R) and one UAV (MQ-8C).
• The Navy has around 70 Burkes in service.

So, what can we do with a frigate that will be procured in small quantity, is very expensive (likely $1.5B each), and has a bit of an ASW focus?

One of the obvious uses is as part of a surface group escort. 

As an escort, frigates would offer almost nothing extra in the way of group AAW defense since we already have more than enough high end, AAW focused Burkes and Ticonderogas with Standard missiles having ranges of hundreds of miles. 

What a frigate could offer is extended, outer zone ASW screening.  Several frigates, pushed well out along the group’s front and sides could extend the ASW awareness significantly.  That would relegate the Burkes to inner zone ASW and their main function which is, of course, AAW.  The frigates, with their own self-defense AAW, are capable of surviving when pushed out a bit from the group especially if they remain under the Burke/Ticonderoga Aegis umbrella.  Obviously, a concerted, focused attack on an individual frigate would overwhelm it but that’s where the Aegis umbrella comes in.

The limitation of carrying only a single helo for ASW is a problem and a design flaw in an ASW frigate (recall that the Perrys were designed to carry 2x Seahawk helos) but it’s better than nothing and the Burke’s helos could stage through the frigates to supplement the outer helo screen although the response time operating that way would be a problem.  What we need is to pair the frigates with a long range, high speed, persistent ASW aircraft like the S-3 Viking.  The frigates would provide initial detection and the S-3 would confirm and prosecute.  But … we don’t have S-3 Vikings so the frigates and their single helo will have to suffice, if poorly.

Regardless of the helo limitation and lack of an S-3, frigates could effectively extend the ASW screen.

The other obvious use for frigates in war is as convoy escorts.  The Perrys were intended to act as escorts for the US-to-Europe resupply convoys in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.  Similarly, we will have need of regular convoys from the US to Pearl Harbor, Guam, and whatever other bases we might operate in a China war.  In this role, the frigates would be providing limited area AAW protection and ASW coverage. 

The limitation in these concepts is numbers.  We are only building 20 frigates.  A war time carrier group of 3-4 carriers would require around 8 frigates to effectively extend the screen given the vast area that a carrier group occupies.  That means that there would only be enough frigates to provide screening for 2 surface groups at a time and, if we use frigates in this role, there won’t be any available for the typical frigate missions of convoy escort and patrols of peripheral combat areas.  Again, recall that we had 71 Perrys!  The reverse is also true – if we assign frigates to convoy escort, we won’t have any available for surface group escort.

Before we leave the ASW application, let’s also briefly consider what this means for the Burkes.  Nominally, the Burkes have ASW capability.  In fact, they are the only surface ASW capability we have!  Even at that, Burkes rarely train for ASW and are not even remotely proficient at it.  If we introduce frigates as our ASW assets, it is only reasonable to believe that Burke ASW training will be further de-emphasized.  If we had, say, 70 ASW frigates that might be acceptable.  However, with only 20 frigates we can’t depend on just the frigates for ASW.  We will still need Burkes to provide ASW and I don’t see our Burke ASW training being able to meet that continued need.  It’s a concern and a capability gap due to training issues. 

We’ve discussed war uses for a frigate but what about peace?

As far as peacetime uses of the frigate, the Navy has suggested that the frigate will ‘free up’ Burkes for more pressing duties.  However, with 70 some Burkes running around, how many more do we need to ‘free up’?  Are we short of Burkes somewhere?  No, we’re not.  As far as the claim that the frigates will ‘relieve’ the Burkes for more pressing duties, we’ve already demonstrated that there’s nothing more pressing for the Burkes to do since we’re following a policy of non-confrontation and appeasement.  Further, there’s no significant, practical difference between a $2.5B Burke chasing pirates in a skiff and a $1.5B frigate chasing pirates in a skiff.  Both are a colossal waste of time and resources.

What’s more, if we assume the usual peacetime ratio of three ships rotating to keep one deployed, that means that the 20 frigates will only generate 6 deployable ships at any given moment.  Six useful frigates.  Six.  That’s not a lot and it’s certainly not going to ‘relieve’ the Burkes from much of anything.

So, what did this thought exercise tell us?  It tells us that a frigate can be an effective ASW escort but the lack of numbers means we have to choose between surface group escort or convoy escort.  We don’t have enough numbers to do both.  It also tells us that in peacetime the frigates won’t accomplish anything since we have more than enough Burkes and there’s no difference between an expensive Burke and an expensive frigate when it comes to showing the flag, chasing pirates, participating in the many ‘exercises’ with third rate navies, or hanging around during humanitarian assistance and handing out a few meals.  A Burke and a frigate are both huge overkills for peacetime work.

Did anyone really think through the balance of costs, numbers, deployable numbers, and missions?  In other words, did the Navy develop a Concept of Operations for these frigates to see if they could actually be useful?  It doesn’t seem like it.  Once again, it seems as if the Navy simply jumped on whatever they thought they could get funding for with no thought, whatsoever, as to how to use them.

Twenty frigates simply aren’t all that useful.  I’d much rather have 60 dedicated ASW corvettes.

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy Releases Details of New FFG(X) Guided-Missile Frigate Program in Request to Industry”, Megan Eckstein, 10-Jul-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/07/10/navy-releases-details-of-new-ffgx-guided-missile-frigate-program-in-request-to-industry

Navy's Manned-Unmanned Fleet Concept

Breaking Defense website has an article about the role of unmanned surface vessels in the future combat fleet.  Fascinating stuff and, not surprisingly, not a lot of detail but let’s take a look.

The Navy’s vision is that manned ships will be accompanied by two different sizes of unmanned surface vessels.  From the article (1),

Medium-sized Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs), about the size of the experimental 132-foot Sea Hunter launched in 2016, will act as scouts and decoys, carrying sensors and jammers for what the Navy calls Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare. If their radio and radar emissions draw enemy fire, well, they were relatively cheap and there’s nobody aboard to get killed.

Larger USVs [around 164 ft long],  … will provide additional punch, loaded with missile launchers but relying on other vessels to find the enemy and relay targeting data – a concept similar to the Arsenal Ship cancelled 20 years ago. (1)

On the surface, this doesn’t seem like a bad concept but let’s dig a little deeper.

There are some assumptions inherent in this concept.

Numbers – With actively radiating sensors, one has to assume the lifespans of the vessels will be short.  Remember, the enemy can “see” the USV much further away than the USV can see the enemy.  For a small, unarmed (?), sensor vessel it would only take a single anti-radiation missile (ARM) fired from very long range to sink or incapacitate the vessel.  This is okay provided that we have sufficient numbers of such vessels that we can operate more than the enemy can sink or we can replace the vessels faster than the enemy can sink them.  Having no individual USV defensive protection, a surface group would need a couple dozen USVs, at least to deal with the attrition and this is probably the low end of the numbers requirement.  This leads directly to the next assumption.

Cost – If numbers are important then cost becomes paramount.  These unmanned vessels will not be tiny quadcopters costing ten dollars each.  These will be fully functional ships without a crew.  It is not possible to somehow magically build free ships.  A 130-170 ft long ship is going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars.  If we can resist the urge to gold plate the USV with, say, a UAV landing pad/hangar, ultra high end sensors, complex hybrid multi-mode co-diesel/turbine/nuclear engines, and super sophisticated electronics, communications, and electronic countermeasures then, perhaps, we can keep the cost in the $50M-$100M range – and that’s being very optimistic.  Still, that’s a lot of money for a throwaway vessel that we don’t expect to have a very long life in combat.  As suggested above, even a couple dozen such vessels at $50M-$100M would represent $1.2B-$2.4B.  Yikes!  We’re going to casually throw that away and say, “well, they were relatively cheap and there’s nobody aboard to get killed.”?  That’s hard to imagine.  “Relatively cheap” is not the same as cheap.  One to two billion dollars, even if thrown away piecemeal, is still a lot of real money!

Operations – These USVs are small vessels and there is a limit to the range, speed, and seakeeping you can build into such a ship.  For comparison, the famous Flower class corvette of WWII was 205 ft long which is some 25% larger than the large USV and 55% larger than the small USV and the Flower class still struggled with weather and sea state.  How much worse will it be for smaller USVs?  A surface group is going to operate at 20+ kts which means these USVs are going to have to operate at 20 kts in all manner of sea states.  What will be the impact of these small vessels on the rest of the group.  Will we have to conduct daily refuelings?  Will such small vessels be able to maintain speed in even moderate seas?  Will the USVs become operational ”anchors” on the rest of the group?

Having offered some critical analysis, the general concept of unmanned, throwaway sensor platforms is not without merit and, in fact, ComNavOps has suggested this same approach but using UAVs instead of USVs.  Think about it … all the faults of the USVs are remedied by using UAVs.  UAVs are a fraction of the cost of a ship, can be used in very large numbers, and have no detrimental impact on group operations.  What’s more, they can be stored on, and operated from, almost any ship.  Remember, we’re not talking about large UAVs with thousand mile range and infinite endurance – all we need is a small UAV with, perhaps, 200 mile range and, maybe, 12 hour endurance and around 70 mph speed.  The Scan Eagle UAV, for example, has 24 hr endurance, 60-80 mph speed, weighs 30-40 lbs, and would easily have 200 mile range with suitable communications modifications (range is currently comm-limited).  Cost is listed as less than $100,000 each (2) and large scale production would certainly reduce that cost.

After the lesson of the LCS which was designed and built without a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), does the Navy have a CONOPS for these unmanned vessels?  It appears not.

“We’re still working through… how specifically we’re going to use these things,” Small [Rear Adm. Douglas Small, PEO-IWS.] told me. What’s crucial is to get the technology to the fleet, quickly, so real crews can experiment with it in real-world conditions. We may have in our small minds some idea of how this thing’s going to be used,” he said, “but when you turn it over to the sailors, they’re going to have a whole new, awesome way of using it.” (1)

No, you idiot!!!  This is how you wind up with an LCS.  You don’t just build something and give it to sailors to see what they’ll do with it – you develop a solid concept of operations (CONOPS), then design and build the ship, and then you tell the sailors what to do with it.  The Navy appears pathologically incapable of learning lessons.

So, what are we left with?  The Navy has a portion of a correct concept (unmanned, distributed sensors) but, in typical Navy fashion, is screwing it up by choosing to implement it with an inappropriate platform and without a CONOPS.

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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Robot Wolfpacks: The Faster, Cheaper 355-Ship Fleet ”, Sydney J. Freedburg, Jr., 22-Jan-2019,

https://breakingdefense.com/2019/01/robot-wolfpacks-the-faster-cheaper-355-ship-fleet/

(2)Barnard MicroSystems,

http://barnardmicrosystems.com/UAV/uav_list/scaneagle.html

The New Frigate - A Knee Jerk Reaction

The Navy is well along the path of acquiring a new frigate.  Well, it’s more of a mini-Burke than a frigate.  Before we celebrate what so many people have wanted for so long, let’s rewind history a bit and review how we got here.

The LCS that we produced looked nothing like its original war game lessons form.  Instead, it developed into a hodgepodge of almost random characteristics and capabilities with no clear cut mission.  Why did this happen?  It was due to the lack of a Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  Even the Navy eventually admitted that they didn’t have a fully developed CONOPS for the LCS when they designed it.  This begs the obvious question, how can you design something that you have no concept of operations for?  Well, the answer, as we saw, was that you can’t.  You inevitably wind up with a product that has no purpose and isn’t an optimum fit for whatever purpose you ultimately give it. 

CONOPS …  This is an incredibly important point so keep it firmly in mind as you read the rest of this post.

It was no surprise, then, that the LCS was met with an avalanche of justified criticism.  The Navy was relentlessly mocked and criticized.  LCS detractors loudly and continually shouted about all the supposedly wonderful frigate designs in the world that we could have had instead of the LCS.

What was the Navy’s response to the failures of the program and the incessant criticism? 

Was it to shut the program down?  No.

Was it to conduct a thorough study of fleet needs as defined by our military strategy?  No.

Was it to develop a CONOPS?  No.

The Navy’s response, in 2014, was to propose a “frigate” version of the LCS to appease the critics.  Again, the idea of a “frigate” LCS was born without a supporting CONOPS or analysis of needs and alternatives.  Well, the Navy would claim they formed a study task force and did an analysis of alternatives but it was a pre-ordained public relations exercise which, to no one’s surprise, recommended the LCS as the basis for a new “frigate”.

Again, the mockery and criticism poured in as it became clear that the “frigate” LCS was just a slightly upgunned LCS.  Congress and some high ranking military civilian leaders began to seriously question the Navy’s decision. 

As all this was going on, the Navy also experienced systematic failures with the new Zumwalt and Ford programs due to the attempt to incorporate non-existent technologies.  Again, to no one’s surprise but the Navy, the attempts failed and we witnessed the embarrassing spectacle of a Zumwalt with no gun and a carrier that couldn’t launch or recover aircraft and couldn’t move munitions because it was commissioned with no weapon elevators.

The Navy was becoming increasingly gun shy about new programs and new technology but were desperate to keep their budget slice intact and construction funds flowing.  Their solution?  Their solution was to appease critics by reopening the frigate issue once again only this time they would require that the frigate designs be based on an existing, operational ship.  This, the Navy believed, would silence critics since they would, at long last, be getting the frigate they’d been clamoring for and would eliminate risk by only using existing technology.  Of course, notable for its absence is any mention of a CONOPS for the new frigate or a rigorous analysis of alternatives to define what capability gaps exist and whether a frigate is even the best way to address those gaps.  See, the CRS report for a summary of the issues. (1) 

Clearly, the frigate’s real “mission” is to appease critics.

We see, then, that the new frigate is a knee-jerk reaction to the failure of the LCS program rather than a carefully thought out, needs-driven, CONOPS-backed, analytically based, addition to the fleet.

That brings us to today.

Setting aside the appeasement mission, what is the new frigate going to do for the Navy?

Well, it won’t gain us large numbers of cheap ASW vessels – ASW being the main role of modern frigates.  Even the Navy’s cost estimates are around $1B and when was the last time a Navy cost estimate wasn’t seriously underestimated?  The new frigate will most likely cost $1.5B+.  This ensures that only a fairly limited number will be built.

It won’t gain us any significant improvement in AAW.  We already have all the AAW we need, and then some, plus our inventory of VLS cells already far exceeds our inventory of weapons.  We have nothing to put in all these new cells unless we short cells elsewhere!

This is a classic example, once again, of building a ship without a CONOPS.  We have no idea what the new frigate will do or how it will contribute to the fleet’s warfighting capability.  It will be a ship looking for a mission.

And, hanging over the entire issue is the likely (ComNavOps believes, certain) specter of the LCS being chosen as the basis for the new frigate, as the Navy previously did in 2014, with all the attendant and inherent flaws that the LCS brings with it.  Navy leadership wanted a LCS frigate in 2014 and nothing has changed so why would the decision change?

We see, then, that ultimately the new frigate is the result of not having a CONOPS for the original LCS.  Incredibly, the Navy is repeating their original mistake by failing to have a CONOPS for this ship!!!!  I wonder what misguided, knee-jerk abomination will eventually be born out of this failure?

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(1)Congressional Research Service, “Navy Frigate (FFG[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, Ronald O’Rourke, Oct 2018