MEU/ARG Issues

With the demise of informative DOT&E annual reports, we are left having to scratch around for breadcrumbs of information about the state of our military.  One such crumb is a Breaking Defense website article, undoubtedly intended as a praise-packed, puff piece, about the 2024 deployment of the 15^th MEU.  On the face of it, the deployment was a non-stop cascade of puppy dogs and kittens sliding down double rainbows and landing in pots of gold.  However, a careful reading between the lines reveals some surprising systemic problems that degraded the unit’s readiness and combat capability.  Let’s look closer.
 

Starting in January and spanning through most of 2024, the 15th MEU and Amphibious Squadron-5 completed nine major exercises; visited 11 foreign countries; responded to a typhoon that hit the Philippines; and completed 80 operations over the course of 10 months.

As an aside, why are we still doing 10 month deployments?  Does anyone remember the Navy’s Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP - 2014) of several years past that was going to optimize the deployment/training/maintenance cycle to ensure readiness and prevent extended deployments?  Yeah, that lasted about a day (see, “Deployments and OFRP”).
 
The deployment did not get off to a good start, losing one of its three amphibious ships, USS Boxer, almost immediately.
 

Just days after it initially deployed in April, the Boxer (LHD-4) was forced back to San Diego to fix a variety of maintenance issues.[1]

Even later in the deployment when Boxer eventually rejoined the ARG, ship maintenance issues continued.
 

But he [Capt. James Robinson, ARG commodore] did concede there was at least one “OAI” — an acronym short for “operations, activities and investments” — that was missed due to the ship’s maintenance problems.[1]

Ships were not the only equipment failures.  The ACV proved challenging, as well.
 

… MEU deployed with 12 ACVs in tow, and, he said, “it’s almost underwhelming to say that we learned a lot.”

There were challenges in understanding how to maintain the vehicles while deployed and concerns about corrosion prevention.[1]

This suggests that the Marine’s training with the ACV was significantly inadequate despite a decade or more of use and supposed thorough testing.  Corrosion prevention?  Seriously?  Aren’t these things designed to be immersed in salt water and be exposed to a salt-air environment for months on end?  How could corrosion possibly still be a problem and an unexpected problem, at that?
 

ACV - No one thought it would get wet or warm?

Another disturbing note was this,
 

The MEU also had to coordinate sending beach survey teams ahead of the ACVs to check that conditions were safe.[1]

The ACV is supposed to be able to handle less than perfect weather and physical conditions.  If not, if it can only be used in perfect conditions and hospitable locations then we have a nearly useless piece of equipment.  Combine this note with the history of ACV accidents and one can’t help but conclude that the vehicle is far less safe and effective than advertised.
 

At one point, even the water temperatures were cause for a concern. Dynan [Col. Sean Dynan, 15th MEU commanding officer] recalled that the waters in the Philippines were particularly hot, and there were questions about whether the vehicle’s cooling systems would cope.
 
“That was somewhat of a surprise,” he added.[1]

After all this time, water temperature effects were a surprise?  Really?  No one thought to test the vehicle in warm water?  The ACV’s first RFI dates back to 2011 and in the intervening 13 years no one thought to test the vehicle in warm water despite knowing that the Pacific would be a major area of employment?  What kind of geniuses were working on this program?
 
The ACV was not the only piece of equipment to experience challenges.
 

The MEU’s training and deployment also coincided with the Pentagon’s three-month-long grounding of the V-22 Osprey fleet, including the Marine Corps’ MV-22 variant.
 
… restrictions and intermittent V-22 Osprey groundings …
 
Due to where the MEU was operating, Dynan said the restrictions the Pentagon left in place after the Osprey fleets returned to flight didn’t affect operations. But the missed training time did mean that his flight crews had to work fast to regain qualifications and proficiency once the grounding was lifted in April.[1]

The MV-22 continues to be a problematic piece of equipment, useful only in very specific and restricted scenarios.  In any truly objective assessment, the MV-22 would have to be declared a very marginal success or an outright failure.
 
 
Discussion
 
As noted, we have no hard data to work with and must, instead, attempt to read between the lines and look for patterns.  Doing so reveals that the MEU/AGR have serious equipment and maintenance problems and that testing and training has been woefully inadequate.  This is true for both the Navy and Marines.  I suppose it’s good that the Marines have declared themselves out of the amphibious assault business (so why are they floating around on endless deployments?) because they seem to utterly lack the ability to execute a successful assault.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “One deployment, three ships and a whole lot of challenges”, Justin Katz, 5-Feb-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/02/one-deployment-three-ships-and-a-whole-lot-of-challenges/

MEU vs. Army/Air Force Rapid Response

MEUs (Marine Expeditionary Units) currently deploy without tanks, artillery, or heavy mortars.  Thus, they are no different than light, air mobile infantry in terms of firepower and, barring dumb luck that a crisis just happens to break out right next to them, are much slower to respond to a global crisis, requiring days or weeks to reach the area of concern.
 
One of the limitations of a MEU is that, contrary to popular impressions, a MEU cannot conduct an opposed landing although, presumably, they could deal with minor resistance.
 
Now, consider the Army’s global crisis response units which are supported by Air Force transports and can deposit troops anywhere in the world in 24 hours. 
 
A common objection to the Army as the global crisis response force is that they must have a secure airfield to land and that is not a sure thing and might even be considered unlikely.  However, it should be noted that the airfield requirements are pretty minimal with dirt strips being adequate.  From the AF fact sheet about the C-17, for example, 

The design of the aircraft (high-lift wing, slats, and externally blown flaps) allows it to operate through small, austere airfields. The C-17 can take off and land on runways as short as 3,500 feet (1,064 meters) and only 90 feet wide (27.4 meters).

 
In addition, the Army does have the capability to seize an airfield.  The 2^nd Ranger battalion, 75^th Ranger regiment is specifically tasked with airfield seizure.  Of course, an airfield is not even absolutely necessary as troops can be parachuted in.
 

In fact, once upon a time, the Army had some fairly significant airborne armor support with the ability to air-unload M551 Sheridan tanks using the LAPES (Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System) method (an impressive operation readily viewable on Youtube!) or medium altitude multi-parachute drops.  Similarly, I’m aware that the Army conducted Stryker air drops, at one time.  I don’t know whether the Army still maintains such a capability, or not.
 

LAPES - Sheridan Air Drop

Stryker Parachute Drop

 Up until around 2014, airborne forces also included artillery.  From Wiki, 

1st Battalion (Airborne), 321st Field Artillery Regiment maintained a full capacity to provide 155mm howitzer fires anywhere in the world within 18 hours in support of the 82d Airborne Division and while supporting other global responsibilities. The unit had the unique ability to employ 155mm howitzer platforms through a "Howitzer Heavy Drop Package" capability which essentially allowed for the weapon system to be dropped from an aircraft while its paratroopers would then place the weapon into action.

Again, I don’t know whether the Army still maintains airborne artillery capability.
 

Air Dropped 105 mm Howitzer

The following units are considered to be rapidly deployable.  I don’t follow Army matters that closely so there may be others.
 
- XVIII Airborne Corps 

• 3rd Infantry Division
• 10th Mountain Division
• 82nd Airborne Division
• 101st Airborne Division

- 75th Ranger Regiment - Can deploy can deploy one Ranger battalion within eighteen hours of alert notification.[1]
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that the Army/AF can provide firepower and numbers equal to, or greater than, a MEU and with much quicker response times.  Given the Marine’s elimination of tanks and a great deal of artillery and mortars, one can’t help but wonder why we don’t eliminate the MEUs and use Army units as our crisis response force.
 
One of the key aspects of this discussion is armor.  At one time, the MEU deployed with tanks which offered a justification for the use of MEUs.  Unfortunately, the Marines eliminated their tanks several years ago – along with heavy mortars and much of their artillery - and that justification has now vanished.
 
In light of the Marine’s ill-advised move away from being a medium weight combat force and toward being a light infantry force, we need to re-evaluate the rationale for MEUs.  Add to that the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and operating a fleet of amphibious ships to give the MEUs something to ride around on and the rationale looks very suspect.
 
 
 
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Note:  I’m trying to assemble a current list of the combat equipment of a deployed MEU.  As best I can tell, this is the current list: 
 
7 to 16  Light Armored Vehicle  
15         Assault Amphibious Vehicle      
6          155mm howitzer: M777 
8          M252 81mm mortar       
63         Humvee           
 
That’s not much in the way of firepower.  Anyone have any modifications to the list?  In particular, I’m very unsure that MEUs deploy with any artillery, today.  Anyone know?
 
 
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[1]Special Operations Forces Reference Manual (Fourth ed.). MacDill AFB, Florida: Joint Special Operations University. June 2015. pp. 78–82. ISBN 9781933749914. Archived from the original on 28 March 2017. Retrieved 27 March 2017.

LSD-41/49 Class and LX(R)

The Navy has designated the LPD-17 as the basis for the LX(R) (now designated LPD-17 Flt II) which is intended to replace the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships.  The San Antonio LPD-17 class began with the LPD-17 and has continued through LPD-27 with LPD-28 and -29 being designated transition vessels to the LPD-17 Flt II which begins with LPD-30.  The Navy intends to build 13 of the ships.

LX(R) / LPD-17 Flt II

As a reminder, the LSD-41 (Landing Ship, Dock) Whidbey Island class, built in the 1980’s, was designed specifically to transport and launch LCAC vessels and has a capacity of four LCACs which is the most of any amphibious ship.(1)   It can also provide docking and repair services for LCACs and for conventional landing craft.(1)

In 1987 the Navy began construction on LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class which reduced LCAC capacity to two while increasing cargo capacity.(1)

Here’s a few basic specifications for the LSD-41/49 class. (1)  Note the LCAC capacities.

LSD-41/49 Specifications
	LSD-41	LSD-49
Length, ft	609	609
Beam, ft	84	84
Displacement, tons	16000	17000
LCAC Capacity	4	2

LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class

There are several questionable aspects to the LPD-17 Flt II program that warrant a bit of discussion.

Well Deck Size.  The LX(R) is intended as the replacement for the LSD-41/49 class.  The problem is that the LX(R) has a significantly smaller well deck than the LSD-41 class and can only carry 2 LCACs.  Here are the well deck dimensions for recent classes of amphibious ships (see, “Wither The Well Deck”).  Note the generally decreasing well deck sizes.

Amphibious Ship Well Deck Size
Whidbey Island LSD-41	440’ x 50’
Harpers Ferry LSD-49	220’ x 50’
Tarawa LHA-1	268’ x 78’
Wasp LHD-1	267’ x 50’
America LHA-6	none
San Antonio LPD-17	170’ x 50’

The decreased well deck and LCAC capacity represents a significant decrease in ship to shore amphibious capability which seems incongruent with the LSD/LPD’s main function of amphibious assault.  One can’t help but wonder what the Navy sees as the main function of the new LPD-17 Flt II since it clearly isn’t amphibious assault.

Cost.  Navy’s cost target for the LPD-17 Flt II is $1.8B (FY2019$) for the lead vessel, LPD-30, and $1.5B (FY2019$) for the follow on ships (2), however, LPD-31 is now estimated to cost a bit over $2.0B (5) so, as always, the Navy’s cost estimates are significantly understated.

Huntington Ingalls announced a sole-source $1.5B fixed price incentive contract for the lead ship, LPD-30, in Mar 2019.  As usual, this is only a partial cost and does not include advanced procurement funds already expended, Government Furnished Equipment, or post-delivery construction which is an ever-increasing portion and is intended to get around cost caps and make acquisitions seem cheaper than they are.  The true cost is likely $2B+.  Indeed, the Navy’s budget request documents show a cost of $1.7B without GFE or post-construction costs. (4)

As usual, the Navy is not pursuing responsible contracting practices and is doing everything it can to obscure costs.  From the CRS report,

The Navy plans to award sole-source contracts to Huntington Ingalls—the only shipbuilder of Flight I ships—for Flight II construction. Further, the program did not request a separate independent cost estimate for Flight II prior to awarding the LPD 30 detail design and construction contract. At the same time, the Navy identified no plans to establish a cost baseline specific to Flight II. Without this baseline, the Navy would report full LPD 17 program costs—rather than Flight II specific costs—constraining visibility into Flight II. (4, p.14)

Design Basis.  The Navy’s driving force for the ship design was the cost target rather than functionality or combat effectiveness.  As we have repeatedly stated, cost is a secondary consideration for warship design and cannot be the primary design factor.  No good ship was ever designed with cost as the primary design criteria.

From 1Q 2013 to 1Q 2014, the Navy claims to have conducted an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) with three alternatives considered:

• modified (reduced capability/reduced-cost) LPD-17
• brand new designs
• foreign design

Given the Navy’s documented half-hearted or non-existent AOAs for other ships, one can’t help but wonder about the rigor and validity of this AOA.  The LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, Burke Flt III, and new frigate never got rigorous AOAs.  They were either never performed or they were conducted for show with the outcome having been pre-determined.  Indeed, the selection of the modified LPD-17 strongly suggests that this was yet another example of a pre-determined AOA conducted purely for show.

Following are LX(R) design features compared to the San Antonia Class (3):

• half the medical spaces
• smaller hangar for stowing two MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft
• no composite masts
• two main propulsion diesel engines instead of four
• two spots for Landing Craft Air Cushion hovercraft or one Landing Craft Utility boat
• reduced troop capacity from 800 to 500
• reduced vehicle storage space
• enhanced command and control facilities

Competition.  According to the Congressional Research Service, as recently as May 2017, the Navy had publicly stated that a competition would be held between HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS, the builder of LPD-17 Flight I ships, and General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA.  However, on April 6, 2018, the Navy announced that it would sole-source the design and construction of LPD-30 to HII.  Again, this suggests that the previously announced ‘competition’ was for show and that the builder had been pre-determined from the start.

CONOPS.  One of the major justifications for the LX(R) is the “requirement” to operate independently.  Of course, this is idiotic but that’s the Navy’s story and they’re sticking to it.  Under this concept, the 3-ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG/MEU) will routinely disaggregate and operate as independent ships, widely separated geographically.  This, the Navy/Marines claim, will increase flexibility and responsiveness.

The reality is that disaggregated ARGs have even less capability than the mathematical 1/3 capability that splitting them up into three parts would suggest.  For example, the LPD, when operating independently, carries less than a third of a MEU and almost none of the aviation assets.  Similarly, the larger LHA-6 America class, when operating independently, cannot land heavy equipment as they have no well deck.

The Marines state that a MEU is the smallest full-function combat unit.  Subsets of a MEU are, by the Marine’s own definition, incapable of effective combat.  So, what does the Navy/Marines want to do?  Why, split the MEU up and send the pieces off to distant points where they cannot act as a complete unit nor support each other!  Stupid on a shingle!

Commandant’s Vision.  All of the preceding was background for the real point of this post and that is to consider how the LPD-17 Flt II jibes with the Marine Commandant’s recent statements and documents which call for a movement away from the 38 amphibious ship and 2 MEB lift requirements.

It is worth noting at the outset that the LPD-17 Flt II was conceived long before the current Commandant took office.  Thus, it may be that the Flt II doesn’t fit his plans for the Corps, at all !

Commandant Berger has unilaterally and arbitrarily set the Corps on a radically different path, assuming he follows through on his early statements.  To be fair, there are, as yet, few details so much is speculation, at this point.  That said, Berger has been pretty clear that the Marines will move towards small, dispersed units using forward bases.  The question, then, becomes how does the Flt II fit into and support this concept, if at all?

On the one hand, the Flt II, with traditional well decks and LCACs may be considered a relic of the old way thinking which involved massed combat power and amphibious assaults and, thus, of little value in a small unit, dispersed, forward based type of force structure.  On the other hand, a Flt II, being significantly smaller than the large deck LHA/LHDs, might be quite useful in moving around and supporting small units.  Then again, the Flt II has very limited aviation capability which is a cornerstone of the forward base concept and the Marine’s recent push to become aviation-centric.  As I noted, without details about Berger’s plans, it is very difficult to pass judgment about the value of the Flt II in the new Marine concept.

If we take the Commandant at face value and assume that the Flt II is of limited value, it calls into question the reason for the entire Flt II program.  Should we immediately halt the program and move in a different direction?  Berger has suggested that the Marines will look to smaller, cheaper, more numerous vessels such as the JHSV or the Light Amphibious Warship (see, “Light Amphibious Warship Update”) for transport.  If that’s the case, we can build a lot of JHSVs for the cost of one Flt II and we should halt the Flt II program immediately.  At the very least, a pause in the LPD-17 program is warranted until the Commandant decides what ships he wants for his Navy.

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(1)Navy website,

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1000&ct=4

(2)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II (LX[R]) Amphibious Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, R43543, Ronald O’Rourke, 3-Jul-2018,

https://www.defensedaily.com/wp-content/uploads/post_attachment/202101.pdf

(3)Wikipedia, “LX(R)-Class Amphibious Warfare Ship”, retrieved 10-Oct-2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LX(R)-class_amphibious_warfare_ship

(4)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, 10-Oct-2019

(5)Congressional Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress”, 22-Jul-2020

13th MEU Deployment Tidbits

The Essex Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) just left for a deployment to the Western Pacific and Middle East.  There are some interesting aspects to the deployment including a detachment of F-35Bs.  Here’s some more tidbits of interest.

Essex ARG includes Essex (LHD-2), amphibious transport dock USS Anchorage (LPD-23), and dock landing ship USS Rushmore (LSD-47).

• "Blackjacks" of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 21 (MH-60S helos)
• Assault Craft Unit 5 (LCAC)
• Naval Beach Group 1
• Beachmaster Unit 1
• Fleet Surgical Team 3
• Tactical Air Control Squadron 11

13^th MEU is commanded by Col. Chandler Nelms and consists of

• Command Element
• Aviation Combat Element
• Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 166 (Reinforced)
• Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211
• Ground Combat Element
• Battalion Landing Team 3/1 (Reinforced)
• Logistics Combat Element
• Combat Logistics Battalion 13.

  

The F-35B’s belong to VMFA-211 (Yuma Marine Corps Air Station, Ariz.) and will make up part of the 26-aircraft air combat element.  A MEU typically operates around half a dozen Harriers in addition to MV-22s and various transport and attack helos so, presumably, the F-35B’s will also number around six.

Deployment training evolutions included exercises in maritime interdiction operations, anti-piracy operations, close-air support, air assaults, reconnaissance, amphibious landings, humanitarian assistance, non-combatant evacuation, assisting the State Department. (3)  Note how many of those missions are non-combat.

One of the interesting aspects of the ARG is the apparent lack of advanced communications and data linking as compared to other surface warships.

“Olin [Capt. Gerald Olin, Amphibious Squadron 1 commander and commodore of the Essex], who’s served on warships and a carrier, said he was surprised when he came to Essex – his first amphibious ship assignment – and took command of PHIBRON 1 in November after serving as its deputy commander. “I didn’t see an air picture. I didn’t see a robust link picture,” as he did on other ships.

“We’re trying to up that game a little bit, ensure that the command-and-control piece is much more clearer for the leader controlling forces,” he said of the Essex ARG. (1)

The Marine Commandant noted the same types of issues.

“Neller [Commandant of the Marine Corps] voiced concerns about continued shortfalls in advanced joint communications technology among the Navy’s L-class inventory of amphibious ships, particularly as it enables the Marine Corps to maximize the capabilities and features of the Joint Strike Fighter. “They need to have a comparable capability with other ships,” the commandant said.

With the F-35 shipboard deployments looming ahead, “I’m not sure we’re going to optimize the capability of that airplane on the big-deck amphib because of some of the command-and-control. So we’ve got to fix that,” he added.” (1)

And,

“The Marines’ new F-35Bs have the sensors to gather vast amounts of data and the computer smarts to “fuse” and make sense of it, experts tell us, but the Navy amphibious warships it will fly from lack the networks and computing to download and use all that intelligence. (4)

“almost none of our ships are equipped communications-wise to make full use of all of the information an F-35 can send to them in real time,” (4)

How long has the F-35 been under development and the Navy still hasn’t addressed aircraft-to-ship communications and data linking?  It’s not like this is a sudden, new problem.  The communication and datalinking issue has been highlighted for many years in DOT&E reports.

F-35 sensor fusion remains a problem.  Note the use of the phrase, “a little bit funky”.

“Shoop, VMFA-211’s commander, said the F-35B’s AN/APG-81 distributed radar “is the best one on the market, hands down,” noting among other features its multiple air-to-ground nodes to link with ground forces. Various sensors fused for situational awareness into a single display remain “a little bit funky,” he said, but pilots “get a God’s eye view.”

“It’s good right now. It’s getting better as software fusion algorithms get tweaked,” he added.”

The MEU will also deploy with a small UAV, the RQ-21 Blackjack.

“The F-35B isn’t the only new aircraft the 13th MEU will have for the first time. The air combat element will have the RQ-21 Blackjack, a small, tactical Group 3 unmanned aerial vehicle from a detachment from Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1, based at Yuma.

“There are some naysayers about the RQ-21 deploying with the MEU, because it does have a fairly limited radius as a platform,” Nelms said. “It’s got an incredible amount of time on station, but it’s only get a fairly limited amount of combat radius for us because it’s a line-of-sight controlled platform.”

The UAV has a “range” of 50 kilometers, or 31 miles, according to Naval Air Systems Command. (Boeing, whose subsidiary Insitu, Inc., developed the RQ-21, advertises a “line-of-sight range” of 55 nautical miles, or 63 miles.)” (1)

Blackjack UAV

These kind of UAVs are a niche capability but, under the right circumstances, can be quite useful.  Whether they’re worth the space onboard ship is an open question especially since the ARG/MEU has plenty of full size helos with much greater range.

13^th MEU will also bring along M1 Abrams tanks – something that is becoming less and less common.

“Along with a full company of 19 light-armored vehicles, more than it took on its prior MEU deployment, it will have a platoon of [four] M1A2 Abrahms main battle tanks.” (1)

The Marine’s focus on non-combat capabilities shows with the 13th MEU deploying with a Female Engagement Team (2) which is, according to the Marines, a small group of women as advisers and liaisons uniquely poised to cut through cultural sensitivities surrounding gender.  What a bunch of bilgewater!  If you need a Female Engagement Team then you’re not engaged in combat and you don’t need the Marines.  The Marines are meant to fight, not talk.  We have plenty of other organizations that can talk about feelings and sensitivities.

Female Engagement Team - Seriously?

The 13^th MEU’s deployment is demonstrating the changes the Corps and the MEU’s are undergoing as they transition from powerful, feared, credible amphibious combat units to non-combat, light infantry, crisis response groups whose focus is steadily moving away from combat and towards humanitarian missions.  Peer level combat seems to be a fading priority.

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(1)USNI News website, “Challenges Ahead as 13th MEU, Essex ARG Prep for First West Coast F-35 Deployment”, Gidget Fuentes, 12-Feb-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/02/12/challenges-ahead-13th-meu-essex-arg-prep-first-west-coast-f-35-deployment

(2)https://www.13thmeu.marines.mil/

(3)http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=105312

(4)Breaking Defense website, “Upgrade Navy Networks To Get Most From F-35: Commandant Wants Quality” Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 15-Feb-2018,

https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/upgrade-navy-networks-to-get-most-from-f-35-commandant-wants-quality/

Disaggregated MEU

There’s an article on the USNI News website trumpeting the flexibility and capability of the Navy/Marine Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  The article notes that the three ships of the ARG were widely distributed, as shown below.

• Iwo Jima (LHD-7) – Persian Gulf

• USS Oak Hill (LSD-51) – Baltic Sea

• USS New York (LPD-21) – Mediterranean Sea

Take a look at the map below and find those three locations.  That’s thousands of miles separation.  The Baltic Sea is some 3000 miles sailing distance from the center of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf is another 2500-3000 miles assuming the Suez Canal were available – not a sure thing in the event of a conflict.  So, depending on where the ARG/MEU needed to congregate, it would require one to two weeks or more of sailing to reform the MEU.  Consider that a disaggregated ARG ship that is, say, 3000 nm away from its needed location would require over 6 days sailing at 20 kts to reach the desired location.

  

The point of a MEU is to present a credible, ready, on-site, amphibious force in high threat areas.  It is not to split off into operationally non-functional units and go on world tours.

One of the official MEU characteristics is

“Rapid response: within 6 hours of notification”. (1) 

While simply waking up within six hours is, technically, responding, I’m quite sure that’s not what is meant.  I’m sure the six hour response is supposed to be to begin taking action.  Again, while beginning to set sail so that they can aggregate several days later is a response, it’s a pretty ineffectual response.  Thus, disaggregation negates one of the central characteristics of the MEU.

What else does Marine policy state?

“An ARG/MEU is best employed as designed—as a single entity.” (1)

An ARG/MEU spread over several thousand miles and with a continent’s separation is not a single entity nor can it aggregate in any useful time frame.

Further, the MEU is considered the smallest Marine unit capable of independent operations but only as a complete unit.  Disaggregation eliminates the MEU as a combat capable unit.

The big problem with this policy of disaggregation is that in a time of crisis the temptation will be to commit the disaggregated MEU piecemeal instead of waiting several days for the group to assemble its full combat power.  A third of a MEU is of little use and would likely become a liability.

As the Marine MEU summary dryly notes,

“Although ARG/MEUs are highly capable and flexible organizations, there are some limitations on key enablers that constrain tactics and employment options if required to operate in a split or disaggregated manner.” (1) [emphasis added]

What this is really saying is that a disaggregated MEU can’t perform any task more stressing than taking on a rogue Boy Scout troop.

So what was accomplished, in this case, by breaking up the ARG/MEU to the point of ineffectiveness?  Well, one third of the MEU got to practice amphibious operations with the Romanians.(2)  Seriously, does anyone believe we’ll ever conduct an amphibious assault with Romania?  And, even if we did, what are the odds that the handful of personnel that participated in the exercise with Romania would be around to conduct the assault?  The Romanians used rubber boats, for crying out loud!  That’s not how we do assaults so why are we practicing for that?  What a waste of time and resources! 

The Marines seem to recognize the dangers and limitations inherent in disaggregated operations and yet persist in doing so.  Why?  The benefits are miniscule, at best.

We run the risk of committing MEU fractions piecemeal – a recipe for disaster.

Finally, I have to ask, if we’re going to disaggregate the ARG/MEUs, then why have them?  If it takes a week or two to consolidate before they can take action, can’t we just leave them home and ship them out when needed?  The time frame would be the same. 

Further, if it takes a week or two to bring an ARG/MEU to bear, why don’t we just use Army/Air Force units which can deploy anywhere in the world in less time.

Honestly, disaggregated MEUs are a great argument for disbanding the Marine Corps.  Marine leadership appears not to recognize this.

Marine Corps leadership needs to get their heads out of their butts, drop this disaggregation nonsense, and start preparing and training for their real job which, in my opinion, should be port seizure.

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(1)https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Amphibious%20Ready%20Group%20And%20Marine%20Expeditionary%20Unit%20Overview.pdf

(2)USNI News website, “USS Oak Hill BALTOPS Participation Highlights Pentagon Push for Unexpected Deployments”, Megan Eckstein, 18-Jun-2018,

https://news.usni.org/2018/06/18/uss-oak-hill-baltops-participation-highlights-pentagon-push-unexpected-deployments

We Didn't Bring The Tanks

I’ve been waiting for this one for a while, now, and it’s finally happened.  The Marines are deploying a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) without any tanks.  Perhaps it’s happened before and I just didn’t notice.  As noted in the May 2017 issue of Proceedings,

“Despite the maneuverability, lethality, and survivability that tanks provide, the 15^th MEU will deploy without its battalion landing team’s (BLT’s) M1A1s.  The unit will embark on the USS America (LHA-6), the USS San Diego (LPD-22), and the USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52);  these ships lack adequate space for the unit’s equipment, driving the decision to deploy without the tanks.”

The article’s author goes on to note that, in addition to the obvious benefits of armor, firepower, infantry support, and survivability, tanks also offer a great deal of flexibility due to their dozer blades and mine plows which allow the tanks to create and remove obstacles, clear safe paths through mine fields, provide breeching capability under fire, etc.

The point of this post is not to analyze or extol the value of tanks but, rather, to note the insanely stupid decisions that have led to not having enough room for the MEU’s equipment and the highly questionable choice to leave the tanks behind.

Let’s start with the decision to remove the well deck from the LHA America.  Without a well deck and LCAC, there’s no point loading a tank since you can’t unload it.

“To that end, its commanders [Col. Joseph Clearfield, commander of the 15th MEU] say, the 15th MEU/ARG remains a highly-capability and perhaps more flexible force. The lack of a well deck, often cited by critics in recent years, won’t diminish its combat and operational might, they said.” (1)

Losing the MEU’s entire tank platoon doesn’t diminish the MEU’s combat capability?  Spin is one thing, lies are another.

Nope - Didn't Bring 'Em

There’s another aspect to all this and that is the Navy/Marine’s obsession with disaggregated Amphibious Ready Groups wherein the individual ships go their separate ways on deployment.  What happens when the USS America, with no well deck and no connector craft, has to conduct a solo operation?  If it requires nothing more than light infantry, they’ll be fine.  If it requires a bit of heavy support, they won’t have any.  In any single ship, contested operation, the aircraft will be largely tied up defending the ship and will be unavailable for ground support.

The Marines are supposed to be a medium weight force.  Leaving the tanks behind and using an LHA without a well deck is just another step on the path to a pure light infantry force.  Light infantry are not survivable on the modern battlefield.

If this MEU has to conduct a contested amphibious operation and the troops are being pounded and screaming for armored firepower, someone is going to have to tell the troops, “We didn’t bring the tanks.”

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(1)USNI News website, “Navy, Marines to Test, Stretch Aviation-heavy USS America Before Deployment”, Gidget Fuentes, 23-Jan-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/01/23/navy-marines-test-stretch-aviation-heavy-uss-america-deployment