LRASM Update and Production History

The Navy has been trying, half-heartedly, to replace the obsolete Harpoon anti-ship missile.  The initial attempt was/is the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).  Let’s check the status of the program.

 

The LRASM program began in 2009 and production was authorized in February 2014 as an urgent capability stop-gap solution to address range and survivability problems with the Harpoon missile.[1]  This is a completely valid need/requirement as the Harpoon is obsolete against any moderate defense.  As an urgent need, accelerated program, the LRASM should have been put into production in, what, several months, maybe a year given that it is a modification of an existing missile, the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)?  By now, thirteen urgent years later, we should have thousands of missiles in the fleet and in inventory, right?

 

As a reminder, the LRASM program initially had two paths:  the LRASM-A version was a subsonic cruise missile based on the Lockheed Martin's AGM-158 JASSM-ER while the LRASM-B version was a supersonic missile.  The –B was cancelled in 2012.

 

The initial plan was for LRASM to be launched from aircraft and, eventually, adapted to ship launch from VLS systems.  As we’ve noted, after some initial feasibility tests, the ship launched version seems to have ceased development.

 

A brief timeline is presented below.  Note that this was an urgent need program.  With that in mind, the drawn out time frame is quite disappointing.

 

 

2009 – Program start with LRASM-A subsonic version and LRASM-B supersonic version.

2012 – LRASM-B cancelled.

2013 – Testing begins.

2013 – Company funded VLS test.

2015 – Designated AGM-158C

2017 – Lot 1 Low Rate Initial Production contract for 23 air-launched missiles.

2018 – Approved for use on B-1 bomber.

2019 – Approved for use on F-18 Hornet.

 

Had the urgent need been met in a year or less, this program would have been an excellent example of rapid adaptability and responsiveness.  As it stands, however, it is yet another example of a badly broken R&D and procurement system.

 

Here is a timeline of the LRASM production contracts.

 

Jul 2017 - LM awarded $86M contract for production of 23 missiles for Lot 1 LRIP [3]

Jan 2019 - LM awarded $172M contract for production of 50 missiles for Lot 2 [4]

Apr 2020 - LM awarded $167M contract for production of 48 missiles for Lot 3 [6]

Feb 2021 – LM awarded $414M contract for production of 137 missiles for Lots 4 and 5 [2]

Nov 2021 – LM awarded $125M contract for production of 42 missiles for Lot 6 [5]

 

The contract totals appear to be $964M for 300 missiles which gives an average cost of $3.2M per missile.

 

So, an urgent need program has delivered (meaning contracts awarded rather than missiles actually delivered) 300 missiles in 8 years using an existing missile as its basis.  That’s disappointing performance, to say the least.  I guess ‘urgent’ doesn’t mean in the military what it does in real life.

 

 

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Related Note: The LRASM was to have been quickly followed by the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 2 anti-ship missile slated for entry into service in 2024.  In reality, the 2020 DOT&E report states that the Navy is now hoping for OASuW Increment 2 sometime in the FY28-30 time range and, without a doubt, that will slip by a few to several years.  This really is pathetic.

 

 

 

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[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-158C_LRASM

 

[2]https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/lockheed-martin-lrasm-production-usaf-navy/

 

[3]https://www.defensedaily.com/lockheed-martin-wins-87-million-lrasm-production-contract-tests-ship-launch/air-force/

 

[4]https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sna-2019/2019/01/u-s-navy-air-force-award-lockheed-martin-2nd-lrasm-production-lot/

 

[5]https://www.govconwire.com/2021/11/lockheed-awarded-125m-for-6th-long-range-anti-ship-missile-production-lot/

 

[6] https://finance.yahoo.com/news/lockheed-martin-lmt-secures-168m-145202359.html

Mk16 ASROC and Harpoon Launcher

Before the advent of VLS, missiles were launched from some type of arm or box launcher.  One such launcher was the Mk16 ASROC/Harpoon box launcher.  Let’s take a closer look at the launcher.

 

The Mk16 was an 8-cell box launcher that could rotate and elevate to provide complete hemispherical coverage (minus superstructure cut outs, of course).  The launcher was sized for ASROC (RUR-5) and Harpoon missiles.  Early systems had no reloads while latter versions mounted on Spruance, Knox, California, and other classes had up to 16 automated reloads.(1)

Mk16 Launcher

 

We’ve previously discussed the relative merits of single arm launchers and VLS systems (see, “VLS Versus Arm Launchers”) and the Mk16 ASROC launcher benefits fall into the single arm category.  Trainable launchers offer some advantages over vertical launchers, as we’ve noted. 

   

In addition, one of the major benefits of a box launcher is that it has no significant deck penetration into the hull as opposed to VLS and arm launcher systems which consume large volumes of internal hull space.  Of course, the reloadable versions of the box launcher require internal volume for storage of the reloads.

 

Another benefit of the box launcher was the ability to mix loads of ASROC and Harpoon.  The reloadable version of the box launcher offered a maximum of 24 Harpoon missiles which far outguns any Navy ship today.  Even a reasonable mix would offer, say, 8 ASROC and 16 Harpoon.

 

It is worth noting that today’s VLS still does not support Harpoon anti-ship missiles although the Navy is looking at adapting the LRASM anti-ship missile to vertical launch.  Given anticipated budget constraints, that may or may not come to fruition and Navy interest appears to have greatly abated.

 

Before one scoffs at the outdated technology of a box launcher, it should be noted that the Navy, today, employs box launchers for Sea Sparrow missiles (Mk29 launcher) on carriers and RAM launchers, which are just a smaller version of a box launcher, on a variety of ships.  Similarly, the Army uses box launchers extensively.

 

Mk29 Launcher and RAM Launcher in Background

Just as we’ve previously noted that the arm launchers have certain advantages over VLS systems, box launchers share some of the same advantages such as being able to train directly at the threat and launching horizontally which eliminates the vertical tip-over and gets missiles on the threat faster.  With that in mind, it is worth considering a wider application of box launchers, possibly with the earlier combination of Harpoon and ASROC missiles.

 

ASROC Launch

 

 

Launcher with Reload Hatches in the Superstructure to the Left

 

Launcher Behind 5" Gun

 

 

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(1)http://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/RUR-5-ASROC.htm

LRASM Drops Out of OTH Competition

Well, the Navy’s over the horizon (OTH) anti-ship missile (ASM) selection process just gets more baffling by the day!  As you recall, the Navy is looking for an OTH ASM to arm its LCS ships and, possibly, Burkes and other ships.  The OTH ASM is intended both to give the toothless LCS a bit of bite and to make the LCS and every other ship in the Navy components in the much-hyped distributed lethality concept that the Navy seems committed to.  You’ll further recall that distributed lethality is one of the outgrowths of the Third Offset Strategy which is predicated on networks and UAVs.  The Third Offset and Distributed Lethality envision a vast regional (world wide?!) network of all-seeing sensors completely interconnected with every platform and weapon.  Every ship in the Navy thus becomes an offensive threat – or so the fairy tale goes.  The key to all of this is, of course, networking.  Remember that - we’ll come back to it in a moment.

You’ll also recall that Boeing just recently dropped out of the OTH competition, stating that its missile, the Harpoon, was overqualified (see, "Harpoon Drops Out of OTH Competition").

Now, in a fairly surprising bit of news, Lockheed has announced that it, too, is dropping the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) out of the competition.

“After long and careful consideration, Lockheed Martin has decided to withdraw from the U.S. Navy Over-the-Horizon Weapon System (OTH-WS) competition. As the current OTH-WS request for proposal process refined over time, it became clear that our offering would not be fully valued,” read a statement from the company provided to USNI News.” (1)

“Lockheed Martin, frustrated by changing requirements the company feels are skewed to a particular competitor [Kongsberg’s NSM], is dropping out of the U.S. Navy’s over-the-horizon missile program … “ (2)

Their offering would not be fully valued????  What does that mean?  Apparently, it means that certain features of the missile would not be considered as benefits in the eyes of the Navy selectors.

“Both companies expressed concern that the Navy was giving little consideration to the networked capability of the weapons, USNI News understands.” (1)

“…Boeing and Lockheed felt that key attributes of their systems, particularly networking capabilities and in-flight targeting updates, were being discounted, robbing Lockheed’s Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, and Boeing’s extended-range Harpoon Block II Plus of key competitive advantages.

“There was no value for being able to go after radiating or emitting targets,” an industry source said, discounting an LRASM capability that can detect emitting and moving targets.  “Through responses it became clear there would be no credit for attacking emitting targets, and no requirement to be on a network.” 

The absence of a networking requirement was “surprising,” the industry source said, “given the needs of the distributed lethality concept,” which envisions netting together weapons, sensors and command facilities on a variety of platforms.   

Additionally, the industry source said, there was “no plan to do a cost-per-kill analysis. They made that clear. So no extra credit for improved survivability.” (2)

So, if you believe Lockheed and Boeing, the OTH ASM selection competition is a sham and the Navy has a pre-determined winner, the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) already selected.  Now, do I believe Lockheed and Boeing?  Do they have any credibility?  Emphatically, no!  However, they have both dropped out of a potentially lucrative competition so that means that there is something seriously wrong.  With that in mind, yes, I am inclined to believe that the Navy has already, unofficially selected the NSM for the OTH ASM.

The only alternative explanation is that the Navy is conducting a fair and open competition but that the real requirements are for a vastly dumbed down missile with no networking capability and that just doesn’t seem believable.  The entire foundation of the Third Offset Strategy and the Navy’s distributed lethality concept is networking – the very feature that they don’t want in the OTH ASM?  Does that seem believable?

The Navy, and the military in general, loves to trumpet tests wherein a Boy Scout in Montana controls a Standard missile fired by a cruiser in the Pacific until the missile is re-targeted, mid flight, by a Marine private marching out of his boot camp graduation ceremony while he relays the new targeting data via a handheld quadcopter.  Given the Navy’s love of this kind of nonsensical networking capability, the dependence of distributed lethality on networking, the Navy’s pursuit of NIFC-CA (Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air) and CEC (Cooperative Engagement Capability), again I ask, does not requiring networking in the OTH ASM sound believable?

Now, understand, I have no sympathy for Lockheed or Boeing and I have no problem with the Navy tailoring their industry requests (RFP) to give them exactly the product they want.  Their requests should be specific and tailored.  Why pay for capabilities you don’t want or need? 

However, if the stories and claims are to be believed, what the Navy appears to want doesn’t match their desired warfighting concepts, as questionable as those may be in my mind.  This is inconsistent.  I’m missing something here.

What is it about the NSM that makes the Navy want it so bad?  You’ll recall that we recently looked at the NSM (see, "Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile") and concluded that it was a nice weapon with some advantages and disadvantages.  Curiously, we also noted that it was claimed to be capable of in-flight re-targeting which suggests at least a degree of networking which is at odds with Lockheed and Boeing’s claims.  Be that as it may, nothing about the NSM jumped out as a world-beater capability that would make it the automatic choice of the Navy for an OTH ASM.  The NSM’s completely passive nature was an unusual feature but that did not strike me as an overwhelming advantage.

Kongsberg NSM - Where's the Magic?

I can’t answer my own question.  I don’t know what makes the NSM so desirable to the Navy that they would write RFPs that “force” the Harpoon and LRASM out of the competition. 

Further, forcing the LRASM out is doubly puzzling because the LRASM is being developed as the air-launched ASM of the Navy and most observers, myself included, assumed the ship-launched version would quickly follow and that the LRASM would become the standard Navy OTH ASM.  Now, it’s possible that the NSM could become the LCS OTH missile and the LRASM could be selected, separately, for Burkes but I would have thought the Navy would have been driven to standardize on a single OTH ASM.

Finally, forcing Lockheed and Boeing out leaves only a single competitor.  Is that single competitor, knowing that the Navy has no other option, likely to offer their cheapest bid?  Of course not!  The single source competitor is going to greatly increase their bid to the highest point that they think they can get without triggering a reopening of the competition.  Instead of getting everyone's cheapest bids the Navy will get a single source's highest bid!  That's one of the reasons why monopolies are bad.  I would have thought the Navy would leave the requirements loose enough to at least have a few companies offer a bid so that all the bids are cheaper.  In the end, the Navy can always select the one they want, anyway, so there's no harm in having multiple bidders even if the Navy already knows which one they want. There's no harm, and a lot of good, in having multiple bidders.  The Navy seems to have no business sense about how to play competitors against each other.

In summary, I have no idea what’s going on here. 

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(1)USNI News website, “Lockheed Martin Drops LRASM Out of Littoral Combat Ship/Frigate Missile Competition”, Sam LaGrone, 24-May-2017,

https://news.usni.org/2017/05/24/lockheed-martin-drops-lrasm-frigate-missile-competition

(2)Defense News website, “Lockheed Martin Drops Out of US Navy Missile Competition”, Christopher Cavas, 24-May-2017,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/lockheed-drops-out-of-us-navy-missile-competition

Harpoon Drops Out of OTH Competition

Defense New website reports that Boeing is pulling its Harpoon missile out of the running for the Navy’s over-the-horizon (OTH) weapon system intended for the LCS and, possibly, other Navy ships (1).  The bizarre aspect of this is that Boeing’s stated reason for doing so is that the Navy has dumbed down the requirements to the point that Boeing believes the Harpoon is overqualified and that the opportunity is, therefore, not worth pursuing.

Digest that, for a moment.

Here are the relevant quotes.

“Troy Rutherford, director of cruise missile systems at Boeing Defense, said the company had long planned to adapt the Block II Plus Extended Range Harpoon being developed for Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to support the needs of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).

“We felt we were well-positioned when the RFP dropped” in February, Rutherford said, but subsequent Navy changes -- in Boeing’s opinion – devalued a lot of what the company felt it could offer.”

“But, he said, “in every iteration of the RFP amendments we see a decrease in the top-level requirements document and changes in the top-level requirements document. We’ve taken a hard look at that and said that at this point it doesn’t make sense for the Boeing Company to bid on this.” 

We just recently reviewed the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) (see, "Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile") and we’ve previously looked at the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) (see, for example, "LRASM Update").  Both of those appear to have many more features and capabilities than the Harpoon and yet they're not dropping out of the competition.

Harpoon Test Launch From LCS

Something is not right about this.  Is Boeing pulling out because they’ve realized or been told that their Harpoon is technologically non-competitive and they just want to put a positive spin on it – a spin intended to support and reassure less demanding foreign sales?  Is Boeing nervous about having a unilateral – and non-profitable – cost imposed on them by the government, as was done to Lockheed?  Has Boeing concluded that their ship version of the Harpoon would be too expensive to compete?  Something else?

By all accounts, the ship launched version of Harpoon essentially already exists.  If the Navy has dumbed down requirements, Boeing could simply omit the various affected bits and pieces and price the missile accordingly.  What would they have to lose by placing a bid for a dumbed down version?

Here’s a puzzling and potentially disturbing statement from the article.

“Among the differences between the NAVAIR and NAVSEA requirements, Rutherford noted, are all-weather and net-enabled capabilities for the air-launched weapon – capabilities deleted or not given in the surface ship requirements.”

This is saying that the ship launched OTH missile will not be all-weather capable?!  So, we’re only going to fight during good weather?  Nothing about that sounds right, does it? 

Also, the OTH missile won’t be network enabled?  The entire premise of the Navy’s much ballyhooed distributed lethality is that every sensor, every platform, and every weapon ARE networked.  Again, this does not sound right.

You don’t need me to tell you that something is fishy about this.  Something is not right about this story but I don’t know what.  I’ll keep an eye on this.

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(1)Defense News website, “Boeing Pulls Harpoon From US Navy Missile Competition”, Christopher Cavas, 2-May-2017,

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/boeing-pulls-harpoon-from-us-navy-missile-competition

LCS Harpoon Failure

We have a report that a Harpoon test fire from the LCS USS Coronado failed during a RIMPAC 2016 SINXEX (1).  The missile apparently launched successfully but then disappeared.  The Navy is investigating. 

Let’s get this part out of the way.  I do not link the Harpoon failure to the LCS.  The Harpoon launched from the Mk141 rack launcher which is a self-contained, modular launch system that was, at one time, ubiquitous throughout the fleet.  This appears to be a pure Harpoon failure.  Plus, the Harpoon and launcher were not integrated into the LCS combat system, anyway, so the LCS seems an unlikely cause of the failure.  Still, the LCS program can’t seem to catch a break, can it?  But enough of that …

You’ll recall that the Navy’s inventory of Harpoons is old and most have been pulled from active duty in order to extend the life of the remaining stockpile.

This appears to be a simple failure associated with complex weapons.  When you consider all the components of a missile (motors, sensors, circuit boards, flight control surfaces, etc.) that must function perfectly for overall success, you immediately realize that each component has a failure probability and that all those probabilities added together (statistically, it’s actually the product of the individual probabilities that determine the overall probability) determine the overall probability of success.  Thus, statistically, there is a probability of failure for every missile (and every weapon system, for that matter).  In other words, a certain level of failure is inevitable.  Of course, the manufacturer and the Navy claim that the probability is almost non-existent while actual test data, such as this, demonstrate that the probability is significant.  For what it’s worth, my overall assessment of Tomahawk/Standard/Harpoon missiles is that 10%-15% will fail to guide.  That’s fine, as long as we have a realistic understanding of the failure rate and compensate for it by having and launching a few extra missiles.

Harpoon Launch Failure

So, what’s the point of this post?  It’s testing, of course.

It’s not enough to simply conduct tests when a weapon is first introduced.  That’s good, and madatory, but we must continue to test weapons throughout their service life, especially as the weapons reach the end of their shelf lives.  I’m guessing that the Harpoon failure rate has doubled by now, compared to when the missile was first introduced.  Again, that’s okay as long as we test and know the failure rate as time passes and the rate changes.

Has anyone heard of reliability testing of Harpoon in the last 5-10 years?  I haven’t. 

I’m just speculating about the failure rates.  The Harpoon failure rate may be 70%, for all I know!!!

We’ve seen how hard it is to get the Navy to conduct proper testing when a weapon is new; how much harder and rarer is it to get the Navy to conduct proper testing of established weapons?  And yet, these are the weapons we’ll go to war with.  It’s vital to know how they’ll perform and how they are holding up over time.

Solitary live fire tests such as this one demonstrate nothing.  That failure could be the unlucky one in ten thousand failure or it could be the common one in three failure.  Without a statistical test, we don’t know – and that’s both the danger and the point of this post.

Someone is sure to bring up the cost of testing and that’s just idiotic.  Say we test two dozen Harpoons.  That’s $24M or so worth of missiles.  That’s a vanishingly small drop in the budget bucket and if it saves a single ship in combat by having a better idea of how our weapons perform, it’s completely worthwhile.

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(1) Popular Mechanics website, “Navy's Harpoon Missile Misses Target During Test Fire”, Kyle Mizokami, 21-Jul-2016,

http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a21979/navy-shoots-new-anti-ship-missile-misses/

Harpoon Block II+ - What Changed In Three Minutes?

The Navy is in the process of testing the Harpoon Block II+ missile.  The main feature of the II+ is the ability to accept in-flight guidance.

Is that really a big deal?  Or even a moderately worthwhile capability?

Harpoon has a range of 60 miles and a speed of 540 mph.  Doing the math, that translates to 9 miles per minute.  Thus, at max range, the Harpoon will cover the distance to the target in 6.6 minutes.  Is there really going to be a need to update the targeting in 6.6 minutes?  A ship target moving at 30 kts, for example, will move 3.3 nm in 6.6 minutes – presumably still well within the Harpoon seeker range – and that’s the worst case of max range and max target speed. 

Presumably, the mid-course guidance (it’s called “mid-course” because it happens part way through the flight, not at the last second) would take place at around the 3 or 4 minute mark of the flight.  Seriously?  Is there really a need for mid-course flight path changes after 3 or 4 minutes?  Even a very fast ship would only have moved a mile or two and most targets less than that.  Presumably, we had a pretty good target fix when we launched.  It won’t have changed that much!  Yes, we can launch on bearing only but if that’s all we had at launch, we’re not going to have any better data 3 or 4 minutes later.

For any case of less than max range or less than max target speed, the need for mid-course guidance just goes from not realistically needed to utterly not needed.  There just seems to be little need for mid-course guidance updates.  This seems like a capability that sounds nice when you say it but is not worth the cost and added complexity.  Remember, not only does the Harpoon have to carry additional equipment (cost and complexity as well as weight) but whatever guiding platform there is has to have a transmitter capable of sending signals in whatever format is required (cost and complexity).

By the way, what platform is going to provide the mid-course guidance data?  Any platform that has a good enough fix on the target at the moment of mid-course correction almost certainly had the same good fix at launch with exact knowledge of location, course, and speed thus rendering the need for mid-course guidance moot.

Honestly, I get the feeling that this is just a hyped capability designed to get more developmental funding for the manufacturer.  This is a solution looking for problem.  There’s a lot of things I’d rather spend the developmental money on than this.

New Anti-Ship Missiles

Some good news on the anti-ship missile (ASM) front! 

As you undoubtedly know, the Navy’s only ship launched anti-ship missile is the venerable Harpoon.  Aside from being slow, not stealthy, and limited in capability, the missiles are reaching the end of their shelf lives.  Because of this, the Navy is being very judicious in its deployment of the missile.  Many ships don’t carry any, some carry the minimum of two or four, and only the ships deployed to high threat areas are being loaded with the maximum of eight.  Of course, even a loadout of eight represents a very small anti-ship capability.

Harpoon also suffers from an incompatibility with the Mk41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) resulting in the Harpoon having to be placed out in the open on deck thus rendering it susceptible to battle damage.  The manufacturer has offered a vertical launch Harpoon but the Navy has, puzzlingly, opted not to pursue it.

The Navy has desperately needed a new ASM for many years - one that is faster, stealthier, more intelligent, capable of autonomous or semi-autonomous targeting, has advanced electronic counter-measures, and so forth.  Well, the current issue of Proceedings (1) reports that NAVAIR is looking to award a contract to Raytheon for development of an anti-ship missile based on the Block IV Tactical Tomahawk.  Operational capability is scheduled for 2015 and appears to be a bridge solution until more advanced ASMs become available.  The Block IV is capable of in-flight retargeting using a two-way datalink, has a jam-resistant GPS receiver, and carries a camera for damage assessment.

Interestingly, there was a previous ASM version of the Tomahawk, the TASM, which used inertial guidance and an active radar for terminal guidance.  TASMs were withdrawn from service in the early 1990’s.



Long Range Anti-Ship Missile



In addition, Defense Update reports that the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) has awarded Lockheed Martin a $157 million contract to develop an advanced long range anti ship missile (LRASM) (2).  They have this to say about it,

“Unlike current anti-ship missiles LRASM be capable of conducting autonomous targeting, relying on on-board targeting systems to independently acquire the target without the presence of prior, precision intelligence, or supporting services like Global Positioning Satellite navigation and data-links. As an autonomous weapon LRASM will rely exclusively on on-board sensors and processing systems. According to DARPA, these capabilities will enable positive target identification, precision engagement of moving ships and establishing of initial target cueing in extremely hostile environment. The missile will be designed with advanced counter-countermeasures,to effectively evade hostile active defense systems.

…

LRASM will comply with existing weapon launchers and storage systems, fitted to match existing the VL-41 Vertical Launch System carried on board all modern U.S. Navy combat ships.

…

Two LRASM concepts were assessed - LRASM B, a high altitude, supersonic, ramjet-powered cruise missile. This design leverages prior ramjet development activities and a suite of supporting sensors and avionics to achieve a with balanced speed and stealth for robust performance. The second LRASM design is stealthier, low-level cruise-missile designated LRASM A. This design utilizing the Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range (JASSM-ER) airframe, added with additional sensors and systems to achieve a stealthy and survivable subsonic cruise missile. LRASM A is considered more suitable for air launched applications.”

 

The article goes on to report yet another possible ASM in development.

“While LRASM is positioned as a direct successor for the Harpoon, the development of a more ambitious weapon known as ArcLight is also under evaluation at DARPA as a quick reaction weapon hitting time critical targets at a distance of 2,000 nautical miles within 30 minutes. ArcLight will employ a rocket booster, sustainer accelerating the weapon to hypersonic speed, from where the strike vehicle will glide at high speed, carrying a warhead weighing 100-200 pounds to strike the target with pinpoint accuracy. ArcLight, like LRASM, will also be stored in, and launched from existing Mk 41 VLS.”

Though late in coming, it appears that the Navy is finally begining to get serious about surface warfare.  Now, if only they'll get serious about mine warfare, naval gunfire support for land forces, and anti-submarine warfare!

(1) United States Naval Institute Proceedings, “New Tomahawks Ordered, Offensive Antisurface Weapon Planned”, Edward Walsh, Aug 2012

(2) Defense Update, http://defense-update.com/features/2010/november/18112010_lrasm.html, “Next Generation Missiles – LRASM”