Japanese Minesweepers

A few comments in recent posts have suggested that the US Navy buy minesweeper ships from foreign navies/yards.  Japan has one of the more extensive fleets of MCM vessels so let’s take a look at Japan’s minesweepers as a good example of a possible MCM vessel for the US Navy.
 
Japan has MCM vessels of various types, size, and function.  We’ll look at the Awaji class mine countermeasures ship.  The Awaji is classified as a mine sweeper as opposed to the larger mine warfare mother ships that Japan also operates.
 

Awaji Class Minesweeper

As a brief summary, the Awaji class has a displacement of 690 tons, a length of 219 ft, a width of 36 ft, and is powered by 2x 2,200 hp diesel engines.  Top speed is 14 kt.  Crew size is around 50.  The hull is a composite fiber-reinforced plastic for weight and magnetic signature reduction.  Service life is 30 years.[1]
 
The ship has LIDAR mine detection systems that use reflected light to detect underwater mines.  Note, however, that this is similar to the ALMDS (Airborne Laser Mine Detection System) the U.S. Navy attempted to develop for the LCS MCM module and which has encountered significant problems and limitations in capability.
 
A variable depth sonar (VDS) system is also used to detect mines.  It also has a Remus 600 autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), known as OZZ-4 to detect deeper mines.
 
For mine destruction, the ship has the Mitsui expendable mine disposal system (EMDS) which is fiber optic cable controlled and uses a camera for detection and identification before blowing up itself and the mine. Surface mines can also be engaged with a remote control 20 mm weapon station.
 
 
Discussion
 
It is clear that this is not a minesweeper in any sense of the word but, rather, a one-at-a-time mine hunting/clearance vessel.  Of course, this means that the clearance rate is incredibly slow and is utterly unsuited for dynamic combat operations. 
 
Unfortunately, the one-at-a-time mine clearance approach has been adopted by all Western navies with only an occasional and minor nod to actual sweeping operations.  Again, this approach is useless in combat is reflective of the West’s fixation on unmanned and crippling dependence on technology as the solution to the brutal, hard aspects of warfare.
 
We see, once again, that foreign MCM assets offer no value to the US Navy although they might be of use to Coast Guard ships charged with harbor defense.  This is not to say that glacially slow mine hunting is not without its uses for countries that are only concerned with limited territorial waters but for a global US Navy that must be able to fight anywhere and ensure vast areas are free of mines, mine hunting is a non-starter.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Japan commissions fourth Awaji-class minesweeper”, Kosuke Takahashi, 12-Mar-2025,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/03/japan-commissions-fourth-awaji-class-minesweeper/

Mine Sweeping - SAAB SAM3

ComNavOps has pointed out the West’s tendency toward individual, one-at-a-time mine hunting and neutralization and how utterly impractical this would be in combat.  There’s no getting around the fact that large scale, large area, short time frame mine clearance can only be accomplished by some type of sweeping operation – the exact opposite of what the West is doing.  There is, however, one example of a minesweeping technology that is moving along the right path and that is the ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems SAM3 unmanned minesweeping vessel.  The vessel is described in a sales brochure (1) as a small catamaran design ‘sled’ (I would describe it as a pontoon style craft) that is remotely operated.  The sweep units are capable of being operated in tandem to simulate larger target signals (like carriers or large commercial cargo/tankers?).
 

SAM 3 Minesweeper

Specifications[2]:
 
Length                          14.4 m
Beam                            6.7 m
Draught                                    1.2 m
Displacement                14 tons
Speed, transit               10 knots
Sweep Speed               8 knots
Power                           Diesel 2x140 KW
Sweep Depth                3-60 m
 
 
Note that the sweep speed is a very low 8 kts.  This is not going to clear large areas in a short time unless many, many units are used simultaneously and it is unknown whether this is even possible from a signal interference and command/control perspective.  A sales brochure claims that four sweeper units can be operated together.  Whether multiple groups of four can be operated in the same general area is unknown.
 
The main feature of the unit is that the sweep signal is programmable with “magnitude and shape tuning of both magnetic and acoustic signatures”[1], making this a ‘smart’ sweeper which allows effects such as[1]: 

• Correct signal levels, variation and duration for a specific target vessel type, size and speed
• Synchronization of magnetic and acoustic signature output
• “Ripple” effect for degaussing simulation
• Simulation of multiple passes for mines with ship-counting device

It is this output signal manipulation capability that is the key.  Modern smart mines use a combination of input signals to determine triggering and we have to have sweeps that can simulate realistic, multi-aspect output signals in order to trigger a mine.  To the best of my knowledge, the LCS unmanned influence sweep system (UISS) does not use dynamically programmable signals and, if true, this will prove to be a major failure in real world operations.
 
ComNavOps has also expressed doubt that current minesweeping technology is capable of clearing (meaning triggering) modern mines which can use a variety of magnetic, seismic, pressure, and electrical signatures to distinguish real targets from sweep signals.  To the best of my knowledge, there has been very little research done on modern sweeping and even less interest shown by the US Navy.  This ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems minesweeping unit would appear to be one of the few examples of ‘smart’ sweeping technology.  Of course, how well it works is unknown.
 
I’m unaware of any minesweeping test, in modern times, that has actually tested sweeping technology against real mines (remove the explosive and just see if the mines were triggered or not), deployed in real conditions. 
 
The lack of real world testing should be extremely worrisome.  Combine this with the Navy’s near absence of any functioning mine clearance assets (the MH-53E helos are decades past scheduled retirement and only a handful are even flight worthy let alone mission capable and the Avenger class minesweepers are long overdue for retirement and most are not capable of sailing) and we have a major vulnerability that can cripple and paralyze fleet operations.
 
 
 
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[1]http://in-node.com/resources/brochures/SAM3_Brochure_2009.pdf

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

The Dutch-Belgian mine countermeasures (MCM) mothership project offers a glimpse at one vision of future mine countermeasures.  MCM motherships have been frequently discussed and proposed for US Navy mine clearance efforts.  In fact, the original purpose of the Afloat Forward Staging Base was supposed to have been to act as an MCM mothership.  However, that usage appears to have fallen by the wayside as the ship searches for a new mission (see, “AFSB – Looking For Something To Do”).  Regardless, let’s take a look at the Dutch-Belgian MCM mothership project and see if there are any lessons from the project that are applicable to US Navy MCM needs.

 

In no particular order, here are some observations, good and bad, collected from a YouTube promotional video[1] narrated by the program manager:

 

Ship Size – The mothership is 82 m long (269 ft) with a displacement of 2800 tons.  Maximum speed is 15 kts and range is 3500 nm (speed basis unknown).  Base crew is 33 with a capacity of 63.  Contrast this with the Freedom class LCS MCM which is 378 ft long with a displacement of 3500 tons and a maximum speed of 40 kts.  Clearly, in the quest for multi-mission modularity, the LCS was grossly overbuilt for the MCM role.  Overbuilt means wasted money and resources.

Dutch-Belgian MCM Mothership

 Buzzwords and Graphics – The mothership project managers refer to the MCM equipment as the ‘toolbox’ which is, presumably, a marketing buzzword suggesting modularity.  This kind of buzzword fascination serves no beneficial purpose and contributes to a feeling of undeserved superiority and arrogance.  In other words, when exposed to buzzwords on a daily basis, people begin to believe the hype and fail to ruthlessly examine the concepts and execution, believing that the system is inherently superior.  We’ve seen this with the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, F-35, etc.  …  all abject failures due, in large measure to a failure to ruthlessly examine and critique the projects at early stages.  The projects were protected by their buzzwords.  No one wanted to be seen contradicting or criticizing the magnificent buzzwords.

 

Similarly, today’s digital public relations graphics are hugely detrimental to programs.  Again, they convey an awe-inspiring sense of superiority and accomplishment that blinds program personnel to the flaws in the product.  It may not seem like it but glitzy graphics are one of the causes of project failure.

 

Hosting – The mothership can host two UAVs, two RHIBs, and two unmanned surface vessels (USV).  While that technically meets the definition of a mothership, in that it plays host to a smaller craft, it is a very small complement for a mothership.  I would have preferred to see a mothership capable of hosting a dozen USVs and a dozen UAVs (although I’m dubious about the value of small UAVs for MCM work).  That would make the mothership a significant MCM asset. 

 

Hosting merely two USVs and two UAVs of dubious utility is a very minimal capability. The two RHIBs are, presumably, for personnel movements and, perhaps, diver platforms for addressing single mines which serve no useful purpose in combat mine clearance operations.  That leaves just two USVs which are far too few to be effective in combat mine clearance.

 

Launching – One decidedly positive feature is the presence of two separate davit based USV launch mechanisms, port and starboard.  This provides redundancy and speed of operations as opposed to a single launch point.  One of the major failings of the LCS MCM variant was the installation of only a single UUV/USV launch point which has become a logistic and efficiency choke point with individual launches and recoveries requiring one to two hours per evolution.

 

Communications – The program manager emphasized that the mothership needed extensive communications with the various unmanned vehicles.  The concept of operations calls for a stand off distance of 12 nm from the minefield and the UAVs are intended to act as communication relays as well as providing surface mine visual detection.  The downside of all the communications is that it provides the enemy with a positive location.  Extensive, continuous communications will be detected regardless of any claims of line-of-sight or low probability of intercept.

 

Sonar – The mothership has a mine and obstacle avoidance sonar in recognition of the reality of operating near a minefield and never being 100% sure that you’ve avoided all mine threats.  This is lacking in the LCS MCM, I believe.

 

Shock Testing – The mothership was tested for resistance to nearby explosive shocks although no details were provided as to test conditions.  As you recall, the LCS failed its shock testing quite badly with the explosive loads having to be reduced and the final tests cancelled due to anticipated damage.  Being shock resistant is just a common sense requirement for a MCM vessel.

 

Mine Hunting – The mine hunting concept involves at least two to three passes.  The individual steps are:  detection, identification, and destruction.  This is a very time consuming process and is, essentially, a one-at-a-time process as opposed to sweeping.  The process is suitable for small area clearance with no time constraints but would be unsuited for combat clearance of large areas in short time frames.

 

 

Additional information is available in a Naval News article [2]

 

 

Conclusion

 

So, what does all this offer the US Navy in the way of lessons?

 

There are aspects to like about the Dutch-Belgian MCM mothership such as multiple launch mechanisms, mine detecting sonar, limited size, limited speed, and single function.

 

There are also aspects that are detrimental such as the very limited vessel capacity, the inclusion of UAVs that serve no real MCM purpose, the limited number of launch/recovery stations, and the need for incessant communications.

 

Considering the benefits and detriments, it is possible to design a conceptual MCM mothership for the US Navy.  An MCM mothership should have the following characteristics:

 

• Host at least a dozen USVs capable of conducting sweep operations as opposed to one-at-a-time hunting.
• Speed should be limited to around 15 kts which is sufficient for the task and avoids over-building and unnecessary costs.
• Physical dimensions should be minimized to the extent possible.
• No aviation capabilities beyond Scan Eagle type UAVs and even that should be justified by a CONOPS that can actually benefit from them.
• Very long endurance and range.

With the demise of most/all of the Freedom class LCS, the Navy is  woefully short of MCM assets and the LCS is not even a capable, effective MCM asset if it was available in numbers.  We desperately need a new MCM ship and a mothership, as described, would be a good start.

As a reminder, the Allies used over 250 minesweepers for the Normandy assault.

 

 

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[1]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCrfvHAKJwg

 

[2]Naval News website, “This Is What The Future Belgian & Dutch MCM Motherships Will Look Like”, Xavier Vavasseur, 27-May-2019,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/05/this-is-what-the-future-belgian-dutch-mcm-motherships-will-look-like/

MCM – Speed is Everything

The LCS mine clearance capability was a very marginal capability from day one, even if it had worked perfectly.  The fundamental, inherent, problem was – and still is – that the MCM module simply could not clear mines efficiently or quickly and in combat mine clearance, speed is everything.  An amphibious assault that has to stand offshore for days or weeks while mines are slowly cleared is a disaster.  A carrier group that is forced to drift in one spot for days while a navigational chokepoint is cleared of mines is a disaster.

 

As an example, the WWII Normandy D-Day landing accomplished its mine clearance ‘in stride’ as the invasion fleet crossed the channel.  There was no delay and there was no pre-sweeping to give away the element of surprise.  The mine clearance was an ‘instantaneous’ event that occurred as the assault began.

 

So, what do we know about LCS mine clearance?

 

From LT Roxanne Sumanga (MCM Naval Mine Warfare school) commenting at the Surface Navy Association (SNA 2021) Virtual Symposium held in mid-January 2021,

 

“The time piece is a little bit more tricky.  So generally as MCM Officers, we’re always working against time.  So regardless of platform, regardless of systems, we can always finish faster. The question is how much risk are you willing to inter?  [Example] So we can take a channel [and] clear it in 10 days, [and do it] by 7 [days].  Are you willing to sail through a channel with 40% risk?  So the time piece is relative.

Compare the LCS to the MCM Avengers. If the Avenger acquires a mine via sonar, it can do a run to detonate the mine.  With an LCS using unmanned systems, the LCS sends out the drone, gathers the data, analyzes it, and if questionable, sends out the drone again, do a different pattern to gather more data and then analyzes it again, and then send out a system to neutralize the mine.  So, for an Avenger that can detect and destroy a mine in four hours, it might take the LCS an entire day and that is because the LCS cannot do a single sortie to detect and engage and relies on unmanned systems.” (1)

Let’s repeat … Combat clearance is all about speed.

 

Speed can be achieved via individual speed from a single platform, cumulative speed by using a lot of platforms, or a combination of both.  The worst situation would be what the Navy currently has which is neither individual platform speed nor numbers of platforms.

 

The Navy currently has 8 active Avenger class MCM.  There are no LCS with functional MCM modules and only 6 LCS – 3 on each coast – are designated as future deployable MCM vessels.  The Navy has discussed various MCM module procurement plans but it is unclear where any additional modules beyond the designated 6 would go.  Regardless, it leaves the MCM numbers woefully short of any useful speed and capacity.

 

In previous posts and comments, I’ve analyzed the LCS clearance process and estimated the LCS can clear one mine per hour.  Based on Lt. Sumanga’s comment, that estimate may be wildly optimistic.

 

In combat mine clearance, speed is everything and we have nothing.

 

 

 

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(1)Naval News website, “Update on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Program”, Peter Ong, 4-Feb-2021,

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/02/update-on-the-u-s-navys-littoral-combat-ship-program/

Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS)

The Navy – and, I suspect, many naval observers – have a completely unrealistic idea about mine clearance (MCM, mine countermeasures) and the speed with which it occurs.  The Navy would have us believe that half dozen LCS-MCM vessels are all we need.  On a particularly honest day, you might get a Navy admiral to grudgingly admit that a few MCM operators in a RHIB might also lend a hand but that’s the extent of the clearance assets that the Navy is developing.

 

The problem (well, one of many!) with the Navy’s MCM vision is that it is excruciatingly slow and I’ve pointed this out many times.  I won’t rehash the overall discussion.  Instead, I’d like to take a deeper look at the heart of the MCM system, the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS, AN/ASQ-235).

 

Airborne Mine Neutralization System - Empty 

Carrier Being Recovered

As enumerated by the Navy, mine clearance consists of three basic steps:

 

Detect possible mines with a broad area search

Identify mines with small AQS-20A towed sonar

Destroy mines with AMNS/Archerfish

 

This already sounds slow, doesn’t it?  Searching an area twice before you can neutralize the first mine is not a process designed for speed.  But, I digress …

 

The AMNS is the neutralizer which is the Navy’s less-violent euphemism for the destructor system.  The system consists of a helicopter (MH-60S or MH-53E) which mounts a carrying cradle (Launch and Handling System, LHS) for four mini-unmanned ‘torpedoes’ which are individually guided to a mine and then blow themselves up, destroying the mine in the process.  Thus, each helo can destroy a maximum of four mines before it has to return to the host ship to reload or replace the cradle.

 

 

 

Archerfish is the destructor for the AMNS.  It is a small, lightweight (34 lb), expendable, remote controlled, underwater vehicle which carries a small shaped charge to destroy mines one at a time.  It is a suicide vehicle since it is destroyed each time it is used.  Each Archerfish contains a sonar, video camera, and light to assist the operator in reacquiring the mine. 

 

Archerfish

Unfortunately – and repetitively inefficiently - , AMNS has to reacquire the previously detected mines and the Archerfish is then guided to the mine by a sonar sensor operator on the helo, using a fiber optic communication cable, positive identification is established, and the destructor is command detonated.

 

The destructor reacquisition and approach phase is not a lightning fast operation as some might imagine.  The destructor doesn’t approach the target at 50 kts, ram into it, and explode.  Instead, the approach is slow and time-consuming.  From the BAE Archerfish data sheet we get a sense of the slow, deliberate approach process,

 

Excellent maneuvering characteristics enable Archerfish to traverse the target to obtain pictures and sonar images from a variety of angles.  Archerfish approaches the target under command guidance. In the final stages of the approach, the Archerfish sonar and video also acquire the target and transmit more detailed information to the operator via the fibre optic link.(1)

 

Shown below is the launch system with four destructors.

AMNS with Four Archerfish Loaded

 

AMNS - Note the Size of the LHS Mounting System

 

Setting aside the first two steps of the MCM process which are the initial survey and subsequent sonar identification, the speed of the AMNS portion is determined by the steps below.  The time estimates are just ballpark figures and would depend on a multitude of factors but they offer a decent approximation.

 

 

AMNS Speed of Operation
Step	Time
Configure helo for LHS carry	Hours?(a)
Load LHS	1 hr
Transit to operation area	30 min
Lower LHS	10 min
Launch destructor	10 min
Locate and identify target mine	15 min
Detonate	instantaneous
Repeat until four destructors have been consumed	-
Return to ship	30 min
Reload LHS	30 min
Repeat cycle	-

 

 ^(a)demonstrated on an LCS video; very lengthy process

 

 

The overall time for a single cycle with the helo already configured for the AMNS and with the LHS already loaded is on the order of 2h:20m.  That equates to a mine clearance rate of 4 mines per 2h:20m or 1 mine every 35 min or, roughly, 2 mines per hour.  This is the best case clearance rate but the actual rate is lower since the helo has to return for maintenance, crew changes, fuel, etc., multiple times over the course of a day so the actual clearance rate is less than 2 mines per hour.

 

It is also important to note that the helo is also used for the initial broad area detection sweep, using the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) and that time has to be included in the overall mine clearance rate so the effective clearance rate is further reduced to around 1 mine per hour on a sustained basis.

 

The AMNS system, assuming it works as advertised – and they never do - , is decisively effective, in that it blows up the mine, while also being utterly inefficient.  Clearing minefields one at a time is the worst possible approach especially in combat where speed of clearance is vital.  Ships waiting for passage through a chokepoint or amphibious forces waiting to land can’t wait while mines are cleared one at a time and yet this is the system that the Navy has decided on for its future mine clearance capability. 

 

We should note that the Navy is also working on a rapid sweep technique using the Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (CUSV), however, the effectiveness of sweeps against modern smart mines is highly questionable.  As with so many other weapon systems, we desperately need to test the sweep system under realistic conditions against actual smart mines to determine whether the system can work, at all.

 

AMNS is fine for peacetime or very limited mine clearance operations but in war mines are likely to be laid by the thousands and AMNS will be completely unsuited for the task.  We need to develop highly efficient, wide area sweeping and neutralization capabilities. 

 

AMNS is yet another example of the Navy developing peacetime capabilities instead of large scale war capabilities.  We must break out of this peacetime mentality that the Navy is married to and start preparing for real war.

 

 

 

 

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(1)https://www.baesystems.com/en/product/archerfish-mine-neutralisation-system

Navy Retires Three Avenger Mine Countermeasure Ships

Without even much debate, the biggest threat to the Navy is mines.  To counter that threat, the Navy has only a handful of Avenger class mine countermeasure (MCM) ships and some long past retirement age MH-53E helicopters (see, “MH-53E and MineCountermeasures”). 

Avenger Class MCM

As we all know, the Navy’s vision was for the LCS to replace both the Avengers and the MH-53E Sea Dragon helos and that plan has failed spectacularly.  There are currently no MCM-capable LCS ships and the MCM module is still years away from functional deployment, if ever.  Further, the module swapping concept that would have allowed for surges of MCM LCSes has also been abandoned in favor of two 4-ship squadrons of dedicated MCM-LCS, one on each coast (actually, only 3 of the 4 ships in each squadron are deployable with the fourth being a training ship).  Given that colossal failure, you’d think the Navy would be caring for the Avengers as if they precious, newborn babies, right?  So, what is the Navy doing?  They’ve retired three Avengers (1): 

• USS Champion
• USS Scout
• USS Ardent

We’re down, now, to 8 Avengers and probably around 12 flyable MH-53E helos.  That’s our entire, global mine countermeasures force. 

Note that the helo fleet became operational in 1986 is now around 35 years old and the Avengers are around 30 years old.  Both are long past retirement age and both are substantially unsafe to operate.

We’re headed right down to ZERO mine countermeasure assets.

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(1)https://www.militarynews.com/norfolk-navy-flagship/champion-scout-ardent-decommission-after-distinguished-service/article_41422842-e581-11ea-ba58-ab888ee329cf.html

Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures

USNI News website published an interesting article that highlights a bit of progress in mine countermeasures and the prevailing problem with all that the Navy does.(1)  The article described how the Navy has made some MCM adaptations in the face of the LCS’ abject failure to produce a functioning MCM module.

The LCS-MCM was supposed to replace the entire Avenger class minesweepers, the two dozen MH-53E MCM helos, and the various MCM diver units.  Of course, after the endless series of failures of both the ship and MCM module, we are left with a total of 6 deployable LCS-MCM ships – not a viable or effective MCM force by any measure!  However, the Navy has found that some of the MCM module components can be effectively utilized as individual elements (Swordfish/Kingfish, for example) by operators working from land or small RHIBs.  The Navy is now looking to make the individual elements a permanent part of the diver units.

Today, the Expeditionary Mine Countermeasures (ExMCM) companies include an unmanned systems platoon to launch and recover these unmanned underwater vehicles from an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat; a post-mission analysis cell to analyze sonar and video data; and an EOD MCM platoon with divers who could reacquire a threat, neutralize it, or remove it from the water for further study. (1)

Well, isn’t that resourceful and clever?  Um, kind of, but it’s not a useful combat/war capability.  Reread the above quote and take note of the use of small RHIBs to launch and recover the vehicles and the ‘post-mission analysis’ and the need to ‘reacquire’ and the use of divers.  Does any of that sound like it will be fast?  Does any of that sound like something that would be practical in combat?  You’ve got an amphibious assault force stacked up and waiting for a minefield to be cleared and you’ve got individual divers having to ‘reacquire’ and neutralize mines one at a time?

Does This Seem Like An Effective Large Scale, Combat Useful Way To Clear Mines?

Obviously, this is a very low end, peace time capability that could, at best, handle a few odd mines.  What kind of scenario that situation would apply to, I have no idea.

The Navy seems excited, though.

“ExMCM was meant to be a bridging solution. Turned out to be a very viable, capable system that we’ve now decided is going to be an enduring system. (1)

The Navy has a disconnect and acknowledges it while simultaneously refusing to recognize it.  Here’s what Capt. Chris Merwin, director for mine warfare at the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center, had to say about this ExMCM capability:

Not designed for large area search, per se, but certainly for very specific smaller area searches, Q routes – very capable when you’re talking supporting Marines for amphibious assault, very good in-shore capabilities. (1)

So, the Captain acknowledges the extremely limited capability of individual vehicles and divers but then refuses to recognize what that means in combat.  To repeat, do you really see individual divers trying to launch and recover vehicles in a small RHIB, in the open ocean, waiting to conduct post-mission analysis, and then having to go back into the water and reacquire individual mines to neutralize them one at a time as a viable MCM support method for a Marine amphibious assault????  The good Captain has clearly not thought this through.

What all this demonstrates is the Navy’s utter refusal to acknowledge the theat.  Depending on what source you choose, China has something on the order of hundreds of thousands of mines.(2)  To counter that, we have some divers working off a RHIB.  When war with China comes, and it will, China has only to mine the various passages between the islands of the first island chain and the US Navy will be effectively locked out of the East and South China Seas.  Throw in some Chinese subs with mine laying capability and Guam could be locked out as a naval base, too.

Mines have been proven throughout history to be one of the most effective naval weapons and yet the Navy refuses to even recognize the threat let alone deal with it.

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(1)USNI News website, “ExMCM Companies, LCS Mission Package Will Both Contribute to New Mine Countermeasures Triad”, Megan Eckstein, 6-Nov-2019,

https://news.usni.org/2019/11/06/exmcm-companies-lcs-mission-package-will-both-contribute-to-new-mine-countermeasures-triad

(2) https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1429&context=nwc-review , p.9

Atlas Mine Countermeasures System

The Navy’s efforts to develop an effective mine countermeasure (MCM) module for the LCS have been problem plagued, to say the least, and a dismal failure to put it more accurately. 

Just for some comparative perspective, let’s take a look at another MCM system, this one from Atlas Elektronik which is developing a system to equip the new Belgian-Dutch vessels that are planned.  The two countries are teaming up to build replacement MCM ships and frigates.  Belgium is in charge of MCM vessel procurement and the Netherlands is responsible for the frigate. (1)  The new ships will replace the existing Tripartite class minehunters and the command and support ship BNS Godetia.

Atlas MCM System

Following the current trend towards ‘families of capabilities’ and ‘systems of systems’, the Atlas system components include:

Atlas Remote Capability Integrated Mission System (ARCIMS) Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) – The USV is 33 ft long, weighs 13,200 lbs, and has a payload capacity of 6,600 lbs.  It can accommodate a power module and magnetic, acoustic, and electric sweeps.  The boat’s max speed is 40 kts but the towing speed is only 8 kts. (2)  While perfectly adequate for non-time critical mine clearance during peacetime, this is woefully inadequate for combat mine clearance.

Atlas USV

SeaCat Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) – The AUV is a small, torpedo shaped unmanned, underwater vehicle that weighs around 150 lbs and has a payload capacity of around 60 lbs.  It is equipped with a dual frequency side scan sonar and has a max speed of 6 kts. (3)  It can operate autonomously or via remote control using a 1000 m fiber optic cable.  Optional payloads include a multibeam echosounder, imaging sonar, sub-bottom profiler, conductivity/temperature/pressure (CTD), or a camera.

Seacat UUV

Towed Synthetic Aperture Sonar – The sunspecified sonar is towed by the AUV and provides mine detection and classification capability.  Again, the max speed is 6 kts.

Mine-sweeping – Sweeping is provided by the ARCIMS USV and includes magnetic, acoustic, and electric sweeps.

Vertical Take-off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTOL) – I have no idea what effective use this would provide.

Mine Avoidance Sonar – This is a hull-mounted sonar for the MCM host ship.

The Belgian Navy will spend 1.1 billion euros on the entire MCM project which envisions a range of unmanned systems including unmanned surface, aerial and underwater vehicles alongside towed sonars and mine identification and neutralization ROVs.

Does all of this sound familiar?  This is, more or less, what the US Navy has been trying to develop for the MCM version of the LCS.

What assessment can we make of the system and how does it compare to the LCS MCM module?

Speed.  As we noted, the speed of the components is very slow (6-8 kts) and is suited only for non- combat scenarios.  For rapid combat clearance operations the system is entirely unsuited.  The same is true for the LCS whose components have an effective clearance rate of 2 mines per hour, at best.  In both cases, the slow speed can be compensated for by sheer numbers of additional units but the numbers required would be staggering and far beyond any imaginable acquisition program.  Further, such numbers would require a degree of asset co-ordination that is also unimaginable.

Transit Time.  The low speeds of the various components mean that the transit time to and from the mothership, which stands well off from the suspected minefield, will be quite lengthy thereby contributing to an extremely slow overall clearance rate.  Again, the same applies to the LCS module components.

It is clear that the high tech, individual component approach to mine clearance is inherently slow and combat ineffective which leads one to wonder why it is even being pursued.  In fact, one could make a reasonable case that the ‘why’ is related to either the fixation by modern militaries on automation and unmanned for its own sake or the desire of commercial companies to offer products which enhance their corporate profits but do little for the customer’s combat capabilities coupled with the Navy's inability to recognize that and specify products that would actually be effective.

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(1)navaltoday.com website, “Atlas pitches MCM toolbox for new Belgian, Dutch minehunters”, 1-Feb-2019,

https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/01/atlas-pitches-mcm-toolbox-for-new-belgian-dutch-minehunters/

(2)Naval Technology website,

https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/atlas-remote-combined-influence-minesweeping-system-arcims/

(3)Geo-matching website,

https://geo-matching.com/auvs-autonomous-underwater-vehicles/seacat

Wonsan Amphibious Assault And Mine Lessons

The US Navy has had two major post-WWII lessons handed to it regarding the link between amphibious assault and mines.  You may, already, be asking yourself, ‘Why two lessons?  Shouldn’t one major lesson suffice?’ .  For anyone but the US Navy, yes, a single major lesson should suffice.  But, I digress …

The two lessons were the Wonsan, Korea assault in 1950 and the aborted amphibious assault during the Desert Storm conflict (see, "Marine Corps in Desert Storm - The Great Diversion").  Let’s take a closer look at Wonsan.

The Navy Historical Center website very nicely summarizes the Wonsan operational rationale.

The great success of the Inchon Invasion led General MacArthur to order a second amphibious assault, targeting Wonsan on North Korea's east coast. After landing there, Tenth Corps could advance inland, link up with the Eighth Army moving north from Seoul and hasten the destruction of the North Korean army. Wonsan would also provide UN forces with another logistics support seaport, one closer to the battlefronts than Pusan and with greater handling capacity than tide-encumbered Inchon.

Wonsan's greatest value, though, was unintended: it gave the U.S. Navy a painfully valuable reminder of the fruits of neglecting mine countermeasures, that unglamorous side of maritime power that, when it is needed, is needed very badly. As Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, remarked "when you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea". This experience provoked one of the greatest minesweeper building programs in the Navy's history, one that produced hundreds of ships to serve not only under the U.S. flag, but under those of many allied nations. (1)

The Soviet Union had supplied North Korea with thousands of mines and technical advisors to help them plan and lay the mines using sampans operating at night.  The mines included 1904 era Russian contact mines and new magnetic influence mines sensitive enough to be triggered by a wooden minesweeper’s engines. (3)

Operation Wonsan was the clearance of mines from the Wonsan harbor and surrounding area in preparation for the amphibious assault.  The operation began on 10-Oct-1950, ten days before the assault was to begin.  The minesweeping and clearance operation was conducted under accurate artillery fire from the North Koreans.  On 12-Oct-1950, mines sank two US minesweepers, the USS Pledge (AM-277) and the USS Pirate (AM-275).  A Republic of Korea minesweeper, YMS-516, was blown up and sunk by a magnetic mine while conducting a clearance check sweep on 18-Oct-1950. (2)

SKorean Minesweeper Blown Up By A Mine

The landing force of some 30,000 Marines and soldiers arrived off Wonsan to begin the assault on 20-Oct-2019 but the mines had not yet been cleared and the assault force was forced to wait two weeks at sea while the mine clearance operation continued.

The minefields caused a 250-ship amphibious task force with 50,000 Marines and soldiers aboard to ‘yo-yo’ up and down Korea’s East coast for two weeks as NAVFE waited for Wonsan harbor to be cleared. (3)

Rear Admiral (RADM) Allan E. ‘Hoke’ Smith, TF Advance Force 95 at Wonsan was forced to message Washington,

“We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.” (3)

In the larger Korean conflict, five destroyers were severely damaged by mines and seven minesweepers were sunk. (3)

The incident offers some valuable lessons still immensely relevant today.

Clearance Under Fire – The mine clearance effort was greatly hampered by the North Korea artillery fire directed against the minesweepers.  We have totally ignored this aspect of MCM today.  We have too few MCM assets to allow for any combat losses.  We have no doctrine for protecting the MCM assets since our amphibious assault doctrine has the Navy standing 25-50+ miles offshore.  The LCS COBRA shoreline UAV is envisioned to function by slowly flowing back and forth, up and down the shoreline.  The life expectancy of the UAV will likely be measured in minutes.  We’re designing capabilities with no thought, whatsoever, to enemy resistance.

Sampans as Minelayers – This raised the question of how to counter what appear to be civilian craft?  Do we sink everything that floats and not worry about whether it was engaged in a military action or not?  Do we attempt to board every boat – while under fire?!  Do we allow the enemy a free ‘haven’ for mine laying?  This sounds ridiculous but the US has a long history of exactly that – allowing the enemy various types of free havens!  We have given this zero doctrinal attention.

Clearance Rate – I’ve talked about this repeatedly.  We simply do not have the right technology, the right number of assets, and the right mentality to conduct mine clearance in an operationally useful time frame.  This, alone, all but rules out amphibious assaults as a viable operation!

Technology Disparity versus Effectiveness – The US maintains a wide technological disparity over most potential enemies and yet we see time and again the stunning success of very low tech mines.  One can’t help but wonder if we’re pursuing the wrong end of the technology trail?  For starters, we need to acknowledge the incredible effectiveness of low tech mines instead of all but ignoring them as we have done for decades.  Next, we should be looking at simpler, more basic methods of mine clearance.  For example, instead of using exquisite technology to identify every mine, get its serial number, count the rivets on it, and neutralize them one by one, perhaps we should be looking at a method of indiscriminate destruction of every  object that even remotely looks like a mine – area destruction instead of precision destruction.  An example of such an approach would be to flood an area with a true swarm of small, suicidal underwater vehicles that just blow up everything they ‘see’ and don’t worry about what it was.  This is just one back-of-the-napkin idea.  I’m sure MCM professionals could come up with other ideas.

History is screaming lessons at us and the Navy is walking around with their hands over their ears.  We need to study history, learn the lessons, and change our ways.  Amphibious assault cannot occur in the presence of mines and we have no effective mine clearance capability.  The Marines, in particular, need to be pounding on this problem since amphibious assaults are their claimed reason for existence.

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(1)Navy Historical Center website, “The Wonsan Operation, October 1950 --
Overview and Selected Images”, retrieved 21-Jul-2019,

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/wonsan.htm

(2)https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/OnlineLibrary/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/wonsan.htm

(3)https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v9n1_cia_paramilitary_sb_nemesis.html